I'm not what you would call a fan of Amoris Laetitia Chapter 8. As I've written before, I don't think it formally contradicts Veritatis Splendor, but it strikes me as a pastoral disaster that undermines the doctrine of Trent on Confession, mostly because it fails to clearly reiterate what that doctrine is. When you are making disciplinary changes, which is primarily what Amoris Laetitia does, reiterating the doctrinal foundation is a basic necessity of clarity. The doctrine that is recited, that of culpability for mortal sin, is mostly irrelevant to the change in discipline, which is why it's been a real challenge to interpret what Amoris Laetitia means. But when conservative opponents of Pope Francis themselves don't know the dogma, that doesn't help the problem. It makes the problem worse.
Timothy Gordon's mistake
It turns out that this misrpresentation of the dogma is the case with Timothy Gordon, who, while asserting that Amoris Laetitia "abrogates" or "contradicts" Familiaris Consortio, makes a clear mistake about what Familiaris Consortio actually teaches:
[58:01] You dream up one scenario that's theoretically conceivable, conceptually feasible, if not plausible. One person under the Sun that might have these odd trolley care circumstances, whereby hypothetically could apply to them, they could be a remarried person who actually needs to have sex, and the principle of double effect would cover them. It just so happens that the one Francis adumbrated is wrong.
So you have remarried adulterers, both of whom have fallen away from the faith. Let's say the wife -- because these guys are feminists, the lady's always the good guy -- she comes back to the faith remarried, has an illegitimate child in her adulterous second union. Francis told us this several times. And she wants to follow paragraph 84 of Familiaris Consortio, meaning we're going to get twin beds, it's not going to be hot and sexy, we're not going to have sex anymore, we're going to live as brother and sister, as Familiaris Consortio paragraph 84 says.
We have to -- that was JP2, by the way, in 1981, writing Familiaris Consortio and saying "fixed it for you, punks; you want to use a theological problem of moral theology to open the gate, and I just fixed it for you, whereas before remarried adulterers were not allowed to keep living together and receive Communion -- if through something like the internal forum you get together, you put people on notice in your church, including your priest, you can have Lucy and Desi beds pushed together, you promise not to have sex, fixed it for you, that was 1981.
...
[1:14:30] Familiaris Consortio is 1981 -- boom, you guys just have to make a promise -- you remarried adulterers to get bunk beds or twin beds or whatever -- get twin beds and to do your best not to have sex. If they slip up once or twice after making that promise, they just go to Confession, you see. So this has all been adjudicated. That's 1981. Familiaris Consortio. You guys makes a promise; yeah, you're living around each other, you'll probably act not like a brother and sister once a decade or so. You'll give in, just go to Confession, go to Communion, you're good.
...
[1:25:30] If in Familiaris Consortio, after 20 years of living as brother and sister -- by the way, I have a lot of audience members who are actually doing this. I did a show on annulment yesterday, and they're like "we've been doing this for a while." They're heroes, and if they slipped up, once you go to Confession, because you've affixed the promise. That's not what any of this is. That's not what the Kasper plan was. That's not what the family synods were. That's not what Amoris Laetitia was. That's not what the response to Cardinal Duka and the other five dubia cardinals were. That's not what Amoris Laetitia was all about.
The problem is that Gordon's interpretation of Familiaris Consortio (FC) is a complete fantasy. The teaching of FC concerning the exception in section 84 is that such people can only attend Communion remoto scandolo. That means they must either receive the Sacrament in private or that they must travel to a far-away parish where their marital status is unknown. The authoritative interpretation of FC by the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts says the following:
Those faithful who are divorced and remarried would not be considered to be within the situation of serious habitual sin who would not be able, for serious motives - such as, for example, the upbringing of the children - "to satisfy the obligation of separation, assuming the task of living in full continence, that is, abstaining from the acts proper to spouses" (Familiaris consortio, n. 84), and who on the basis of that intention have received the sacrament of Penance. Given that the fact that these faithful are not living more uxorio is per se occult, while their condition as persons who are divorced and remarried is per se manifest, they will be able to receive Eucharistic Communion only remoto scandalo.
The couple doesn't "put people on notice in your church" so that they can go to Communion. The presumption is that they cannot (and arguably should not) put their private lives on public display in this way, so that their private sexual conduct is "per se occult" (hidden from public inspection). There's no equivalent here to Josephite marriage, a public declaration that the people are solemnly vowing not to engage in sexual conduct, because they are not free to vow to the other person and they are under a solemn moral obligation to separate that is at best temporarily excused. One can't vow to unmarriage and cohabitation with a person. Moreover, there's no way to know in a publicly cognizable way whether they are abiding by such a vow anyway. And the priest cannot put himself in the position of publicly indicating his private judgment in the internal forum about the sins for which he has granted absolution. That creates exactly the situation the Pontifical Council goes on to describe:
Naturally, pastoral prudence would strongly suggest the avoidance of instances of public denial of Holy Communion. Pastors must strive to explain to the concerned faithful the true ecclesial sense of the norm, in such a way that they would be able to understand it or at least respect it. In those situations, however, in which these precautionary measures have not had their effect or in which they were not possible, the minister of Communion must refuse to distribute it to those who are publicly unworthy. They are to do this with extreme charity, and are to look for the opportune moment to explain the reasons that required the refusal. They must, however, do this with firmness, conscious of the value that such signs of strength have for the good of the Church and of souls.
There's no discretion there. The pastoral latitude for the priest is exactly this: if someone is divorced and remarried, and this is known in the parish, the priest must refuse Communion even if he has absolved them under FC 84 five minutes before Mass! There is literally no possible way for that couple to take public Communion ever, no matter how sincerely they vow to keep continent and how faithfully they keep that vow. They could have been living in separate rooms for twenty years raising their children and never once in that entire time be allowed take Communion in their own home parish. To the extent that such people were ever admitted to public Communion by a priest in their own parish and not remoto scandalo, that was dissent against authoritative discipline by those priests. (Granted, dissent against Sacramental discipline is now practically ubiquitous, which is why politicians who openly advocate for abortion rights are not barred from Communion, but it doesn't change that it is dissent.) If we are talking about the requirements of FC, though, it's absolutely clear that a priest is not even allowed to admit someone who is publicly known to be remarried, regardless of how sincerely and successfully that couple may be maintaining continence.
And this isn't a close case, as if the Prejean interpretation that FC completely bars such people from public Communion were simply one possible interpretation of the text. It's not only the express teaching of FC but also what was confirmed in an official reiteration of the teaching. Gordon's error is therefore a "2+2=5" error; he says that they can be admitted to public Communion if they somehow "put people on notice," and FC says that they can't no matter what they do. That is simply not the disciplinary rule There's no such process for a "vow" or a "promise" or any other formal process. Even if they do exactly what Gordon says, the priest must ban them from Communion for the simple reason that they are still living together as married people do. It's this completely mistaken idea that FC opens the door to the Eucharist in public in their own parish, even though FC outright says that "the Church reaffirms her practice, which is based upon Sacred Scripture, of not admitting to Eucharistic Communion divorced persons who have remarried" without exception. FC 84 opens up the Eucharist in secret but not in public.
Not understanding this is why Gordon also gets the Buenos Aires guidelines on Amoris Laetitia (AL) wrong. In Gordon's mind, there is the "vow" or "promise" or some other formal procedure that is required for the couple before the accommodation under FC can be made. But all that is actually required by FC 84 is firm purpose of amendment to live in continence by whichever person is coming for Reconciliation. The kind of vow or promise that Gordon has in mind is certainly evidence of firm purpose of amendment, but it is by no means a sine qua non requirement for firm purpose of amendment. Instead, the sine qua non requirement is the intent to comply with positive moral obligations (the obligation to separate) and to flee near occasions of sin in the absence of reasonable necessity, as Gordon's guest "Classical Theist" clearly and correctly explained in the context of other habitual sins.
So we can distinguish the dogmatic and disciplinary teaching of FC, neither of which include any "vow" or "promise" to remain continent:
1. Dogmatic: Under FC 84, absolution can be granted to those who fail to satisfy the obligation to separate and thus remain in the near occasion of sin for reasonable necessity.
2. Disciplinary: People absolved under FC 84 can only take Communion remoto scandolo, period. They may never take Communion in public where their marital status is known.
The doctrinal "change" of Amoris Laetitia
With this correction, the Buenos Aires guidelines can then be read appropriately:
5) Whenever feasible depending on the specific circumstances of a couple, especially when both partners are Christians walking the path of faith, a proposal may be made to resolve to live in continence. Amoris laetitia does not ignore the difficulties arising from this option (cf. footnote 329) and offers the possibility of having access to the sacrament of Reconciliation if the partners fail in this purpose (cf. footnote 364, recalling the teaching that Saint John Paul II sent to Cardinal W. Baum, dated 22 March, 1996).
6) In more complex cases, and when a declaration of nullity has not been obtained, the above mentioned option may not, in fact, be feasible. Nonetheless, a path of discernment is still possible. If it is acknowledged that, in a concrete case, there are limitations that mitigate responsibility and culpability (cf. 301-302), especially when a person believes he/she would incur a subsequent fault by harming the children of the new union, Amoris laetitia offers the possibility of having access to the sacraments of Reconciliation and Eucharist (cf. footnotes 336 and 351).
These sacraments, in turn, prepare the person to continue maturing and growing with the power of grace.
7) However, it should not be understood that this possibility implies unlimited access to sacraments, or that all situations warrant such unlimited access. The proposal is to properly discern each case. For example, special care should be taken of “a new union arising from a recent divorce” or “the case of someone who has consistently failed in his obligations to the family” (298). Also, when there is a sort of apology or ostentation of the person’s situation “as if it were part of the Christian ideal” (297). In these difficult cases, we should be patient companions, and seek a path of reinstatement (cf. 297, 299).
Guideline 5 deals with the case when the couple makes a "vow" or "promise," which is not a requirement for firm purpose of amendment. It seems impossible, therefore, to construe Guideline 6 as as anything other than a dogmatic teaching that such a "vow" or "promise" is not a requirement for absolution under FC 84. Note that such a resolution is certainly to be commended pastorally, because it enormously reduces the likelihood of sin. That is why it is recommended in Guideline 5 as the first-line approach for these situations. But if that resolution is not feasible, it's not a sine qua non requirement for absolution over and above the normal resolution not to sin entailed in firm purpose of amendment. Guideline 7 then just points out that good cause and sincerity in the reasons for not separating and not fleeing the near occasion of sin need to be seriously assessed, rather than simply assumed. There is essentially no excuse for someone who, for example, remarried last week or who has left the previous family in dire and immediate need not to separate; there needs to be a real necessity. And the obligation to one's living spouse and family must absolutely be considered in evaluating what is considered good cause for mitigated culpability in the failure to separate.
Based on these Guidelines, then, AL is only teaching dogmatically that no such "vow" or "promise" or other resolution with the other person is required. That's not a contradiction. It's an innocuous doctrinal development that is entirely compatible with prior doctrinal teaching to say that there is no special version of firm purpose of amendment that applies to people in this situation, which is arguably not a new teaching at all. It teaches that it is not the case that in addition to firm purpose of amendment, one must also make some sort of promise or vow with the other person to remain continent. It suffices that the penitent sincerely intends to remain continent, combined with having good cause that mitigates culpability for the failure to separate or to flee from the near occasion of sin. And as Gordon pointed out, they correctly cited Pope St. John Paul II for the proposition that anticipated failure does not imply that they do not sincerely intend to remain continent.
[N.B.: As an aside, the moral theology of culpability for less-than-complete consent to sexual acts and double effect, much less mere foreseeability of such consent, is too complex even to assess here. Suffice it to say that we are far beyond the "anything short of utmost resistance to the point of death is formal cooperation with the sexual act" approach. Consider the case of contraception in the 1994 Vadmecum, wherein the act itself was intrinsically immoral, but reluctant consent to the act was not considered "already illicit in itself":
Special difficulties are presented by cases of cooperation in the sin of a spouse who voluntarily renders the unitive act infecund. In the first place, it is necessary to distinguish cooperation in the proper sense, from violence or unjust imposition on the part of one of the spouses, which the other spouse in fact cannot resist. This cooperation can be licit when the three following conditions are jointly met:
1. when the action of the cooperating spouse is not already illicit in itself;
2. when proportionally grave reasons exist for cooperating in the sin of the other spouse;
3. when one is seeking to help the other spouse to desist from such conduct (patiently, with prayer, charity and dialogue; although not necessarily in that moment, nor on every single occasion).]
Of course, if AL were teaching that, not even the firm intent to remain continent were required for absolution, which is the Kasper program, then that would almost certainly be heretical. There are pathological cases involving invincible ignorance where this might be true, but the statement in AL that "more is involved than mere ignorance of the rule" seems to contradict invincible ignorance expressly. So we are talking about people who are at least know presently that they are under a grave obligation to separate and that adulterous sex would be sinful, even if they might not have known this when they contracted the unlawful union. But if the point were to contradict Pope St. John Paul II to remove the firm purpose of amendment, it would make no sense at all to cite Pope St. John Paul II's writings multiple times in AL, including a letter concerning Reconciliation. For that matter, it doesn't even make sense at all to mention Reconciliation in this context if there is nothing from which to repent. Gordon even points this out when he asks why Confession would even be required, but he inexplicably fails to connect the dots that it wouldn't be mentioned at all if they thought Confession weren't required. These repeated mentions of the Sacrament of Reconciliation are the clearest textual evidence that AL is not adopting the Kasper proposal that Confession is not even required, and this seems to be consistent with the widely held opinion that Amoris Laetitia was a rejection of the progressive proposal.
From the doctrinal perspective, it isn't clear that there has been a change at all, because all AL did was to confirm that FC did not teach any special requirements for confession other than the normal requirement of firm purpose of amendment. Moreover, the extensive discussion on culpability for mortal sin could erroneously be taken to say that breaches in continence do not even need to be confessed, even though both AL and the Buenos Aires guidelines explicitly mention Reconciliation. But AL could have and should have reiterated the doctrinal teaching on Confession from Trent, mostly because that is what one does when offering a clear doctrinal explanation. If you are going to write more than a hundred pages, it seems relevant to spend a couple of paragraphs on the existing doctrinal teaching on the point. One might easily suspect that such studied ambiguity is intended to avoid directly condemning Kasper's progressive position, even while implicitly affirming the doctrine that contradicts it, which I think is an extraordinarily dangerous didactic approach. It puts one in mind of Pope Honorius, who, when given an opportunity to condemn heresy, inexplicably elected not to do so, which made his writings "dangerous to souls."
Nonetheless, Gordon still views this as a contradiction, because the requirement of a "vow" or "promise" has allegedly been removed. But this is only because of Gordon's mistaken view that FC requires some kind of formal, public process. That is in turn because he contemplates that this process would allow the couple to "put people on notice" in order to return to public Communion, but FC actually precludes that from happening. In fact, what the discernment process of AL is intended to do is not to remove the requirement of Confession or continence but rather to prevent the remarried from being banned from public Communion for life if they cannot regularize their marriages. In that respect, AL is creating exactly what Gordon mistakenly thinks FC already did: to create a path to public participation in the Sacraments for people who sincerely intend to remain continent. That brings us to the disciplinary question.
The disciplinary change in Amoris Laetitia
By my lights, AL unquestionably was intended to change the discipline of FC that the remarried, even those who remain continent, are banned from public Communion unless and until their marriage is regularized. FC states this as follows:
However, the Church reaffirms her practice, which is based upon Sacred Scripture, of not admitting to Eucharistic Communion divorced persons who have remarried. They are unable to be admitted thereto from the fact that their state and condition of life objectively contradict that union of love between Christ and the Church which is signified and effected by the Eucharist. Besides this, there is another special pastoral reason: if these people were admitted to the Eucharist, the faithful would be led into error and confusion regarding the Church's teaching about the indissolubility of marriage.
Reconciliation in the sacrament of Penance which would open the way to the Eucharist, can only be granted to those who, repenting of having broken the sign of the Covenant and of fidelity to Christ, are sincerely ready to undertake a way of life that is no longer in contradiction to the indissolubility of marriage. This means, in practice, that when, for serious reasons, such as for example the children's upbringing, a man and a woman cannot satisfy the obligation to separate, they "take on themselves the duty to live in complete continence, that is, by abstinence from the acts proper to married couples.
People have, for some reason, assumed that the statement in the second paragraph that Penance would "open the way to the Eucharist" modifies the teaching of the previous paragraph of not admitting such people to the Eucharist in public. This is false. They are still publicly banned as long as they continue to live under the same roof. This does not mean "but if you promise to remain continent, then we can readmit you to public Communion." On the contrary, you can then only be admitted to Communion remoto scandolo, either in parishes where you are unknown or in private.
Matthew Levering takes the position that the previous pastoral practice is necessary to safeguard the doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage. In commenting on this disciplinary change in Engaging the Doctrine of Marriage to allow the remarried to public Communion, Levering says the following:
Some readers have interpreted [Levering's book The Indissolubility of Marriage] as a defense of Amoris Laetitia. Let me be clear, therefore, that I affirm that Amoris Laetitia teaches the doctrine of marital indissolubility and also rightly insists upon the need for compassion toward people whose sacramental marriages have failed and who are in a new civil marriage without annulment. But I think that there are formulations and theological arguments in Amoris Laetitia that are not adequate to the doctrine of indissolubility of marriage. Furthermore, the new pastoral strategy regarding Eucharistic communion runs counter to the reality of marital indissolubility, as I show in the book. In favor of the view that knowingly violating the bonds of an indissoluble marriage should not necessarily be an impediment to Eucharistic communion in charity, a view that is mistaken, see also Cantalamessa, The Gaze of Mercy, 73. Cantalamessa's arguments are uncharacteristically simplistic.
I agree with Levering completely that the theological reasoning of AL ch. 8 provided no additional help to the situation and did not even reiterate the teaching that was already out there. I believe it is thoroughly inadequate to catechize the faithful on the indissolubility of marriages, and as a theological justification for the change in discipline, it is worse than nothing. I've said multiple times that AL, or at least chapter 8, should never have been written, not because it says anything false but because it doesn't say nearly enough of what is true. Like a number of badly-written Magisterial documents (e.g., Unam Sanctum), it will likely end up having made the situation worse. So we agree that while AL doesn't teach any doctrinal contradiction (i.e., it does not teach heresy in a binding or non-binding way), it is practically confusing rather than illuminating, making the teaching harder and not easier to understand.
But Levering's conclusion about the pastoral strategy seems to be at the very heart of what should be the discussion about AL. The problem with Gordon's mistake is that it doesn't even recognize that this is an issue. Gordon (erroneously) thought that people who promised to be continent could go to Communion publicly and didn't have to spend the rest of their lives with their arms crossed in front of their chests in their home parish in front of their own children, in front of the judgmental stares of the entire congregation despite their being in a state of grace. So from Gordon's perspective, this must be all about getting more remarried people to Communion than FC would have allowed, lowering the bar on continence. But that's not the situation that AL is concerned to address or, at least, there is no evidence that this is the situation that it's trying to address. The situation AL seems to be concerned about is that there is literally no path for the remarried to return to public Communion in their own parish. The "heroes" that Gordon described, who faithfully walk the path of continence for decades, never once get to return to Communion.
So the real question, which I have never seen anyone mention, is whether CCC #2384 should be revised when it says that remarriage is "a situation of public and permanent adultery." In other words, merely living in the situation is an active sin against the bond of marriage. Even if the people were not culpable for the original situation, are currently maintaining it only for grave reasons, are remaining continent (and thus not incurring any mortal sin), and are in the state of grace under FC, this "situation" is nonetheless objectively incompatible with the symbology of the Eucharist. So let's look at Fr. Cantalamessa's argument, which I believe is not careful enough:
Now it is true in the case of believers who are divorced and remarried that their encounter with Jesus already happened in Baptism, and so on the surface they are similar to the Samaritan woman after her encounter with Christ. But there is the problem: was that baptismal encounter really an encounter, a personal encounter? Have these people ever really known the love of Christ? We describe "nominal" Christians today as those who have receive Baptism without ever becoming "real believers" through their own decision, but in fact we act (and the law acts!) as though they were real Christians who were provided with all the means of grace to overcome the obstacles encountered in a marriage.
However, even if at one time these people were "real" Christians, that is, convinced and practicing Christians, is it in line with the gospel to exclude the possibility of a real repentance for them according to the practices during the first centuries whereby people were readmitted to full communion with the Church? The way Jesus deals with the Samaritan woman and, as we have seen, with the sinful woman who clasped his feet -- it is not at least equivalent to what he does in giving himself in the Eucharist? If the Eucharist is "his true body born of the Virgin Mary," then in both cases (the reality and the sacrament), are we not dealing with the same identical Jesus?
We can use the kindest and most encouraging words toward divorced and remarried people who desire to live a Christian life, but the reality does not change. To refuse them sacramental absolution and the Eucharist in every case, even when they are repentant and have resolved to follow a path of reintegration into the community, means saying to them that they are in a state of mortal sin, that is, objectively separated from God, with the consequences we are aware of if they should die in such a state. Given the present increasing trend in society, this would lead before long to having a Christian community that was formed, for the most part or nearly so, of "dead" members, because the Eucharist is the sacrament of the living.
St. Paul recognizes the possibility of divorce and remarriage for people who become believers if a spouse refuses to follow the other person in that decision (see 1 Corinthians 7:15). This is the so-called Pauline privilege, or "privilege of faith," recognized by the Code of Canon Law. That exception does not apply to baptized divorced people in all of its juridical requirements, but there is, nevertheless, an unmistakable analogy that can be made in so many cases of divorced Christians (even if not in all).
According to traditional canon law, at least in the past, simple conversion to the Catholic Church, even from another Christian confession, Protestant or otherwise, authorized people to obtain ipso facto the right to divorce and remarry. Should we not allow the same thing for a person who has had a true and profound conversion to Christ and then cannot live with the first spouse?
I agree with Levering that the answer is "no." If the person has not received baptism from the Church, then it makes sense to consider whether that person has the legal capacity to exercise the full scope of capability, including contracting Sacramental marriages. But if we open this up to every poorly catechized Catholic, then it would defeat the idea that baptism is the process by which the Church fully incorporates members into the Mystical Body, which creates a far more fundamental problem. So Fr. Cantalamessa's argument here, which is essentially the Orthodox argument for oikonomia in cases of divorce, is completely untenable for the Catholic doctrine of marital indissolubility. In any case, there is nothing in AL to suggest this sort of regularization. But that's not the end of the discussion for our purposes.
Fr. Cantalamessa legitimately raises the issue of whether the Eucharist should be denied to people who are not in a state of mortal sin, and we know from FC that it is possible for remarried Catholics who continue to live under the same roof to be in the state of grace and to receive Reconciliation. With regard to public reception of the Eucharist, there is also the matter of Trent concerning the Eastern Rite Christians in Venice, who were in communion with Rome but who were remarried according to the Orthodox tradition. To avoid contention over the matter, Trent did not directly excommunicate those who believed that remarriage was possible but only those who accused the Church of error in Her teaching concerning the indissolubility of marriage. It is hard to see how this was not a practical determination that the remarried were not publicly culpable for adultery in a way that would bar them from the Eucharist. And indeed, we say essentially the same thing with respect to intercommunion with the Orthodox in cases of need today.
Certainly, one could argue that there's a clearer public sign in membership within an Eastern Rite or an Orthodox church, but there's no reason that such a public sign would be relevant to the appropriateness (or lack thereof) of remarriage as a sign with respect to the Eucharist. So while I see very good reasons why the Sacramental discipline of FC might be better at conveying the indissolubility of marriage and why it might be superior for the parish to support the remarried at bearing this Cross, Levering's assertion that the discipline is simply inadequate to the doctrine seems overstated.
But let's suppose that the objection to AL is not an absolute principle of incompatibility between remarriage and the Eucharist but rather that the exception is being applied so broadly. This is where I would point out that the scope of the exception has not been mandated by AL but rather has been commended to the judgment of the bishops, who are in a better situation to assess whether local conditions (like the one in Venice at the time of Trent) can reasonably allow the admission of the remarried to the Eucharist without undue scandal. The Polish Church, for example, has simply retained the discipline of FC. The problem, and it is no small problem, is that bishops who wrongly interpret AL as permission to excuse the firm purpose of amendment will take the opportunity to do so.
This is not merely a hypothetical possibility. The Maltese bishops made the heretical assertion in paragraph 10 of their guidelines that "the choice of living 'as brothers and sisters' becomes humanly impossible and give[s] rise to greater harm," which directly contradicts the Second Council of Orange and Trent on the possibility of one constituted in grace to keep the commandments. This is the basis for my strong disagreement with Pedro Gabriel's position in The Orthodoxy of Amoris Laetitia, which I see as making exactly the same mistake. But that is not because anything taught in AL contradicts dogma (as Levering admits it does not), but because AL so poorly reiterated the relevant moral teaching that it can easily be abused in this way. For me, it is very difficult to see how papal teaching that was actually interpreted heretically without one word of rebuke from the Pope could possibly be a good thing. So I share Levering's position that I cannot give a defense of Amoris Laetitia; it strikes me as an entirely foreseeable pastoral disaster. Unfortunately, we have no assurance from God that Popes will effectively govern and discipline the Church.
Conclusion
At the end of the day, I agree with Fr. Vincent Twomey, who is uniquely positioned in terms of qualifications to assess this situation. As he says, there is an orthodox interpretation of AL, which is about Sacramental discipline and how the Church treats the remarried publicly, and there is a heterodox expansion of the teaching of AL, which would excuse the requirement of firm purpose of amendment and intention to remain continent as a condition for absolution. Gordon's mistake makes it impossible to distinguish the two, and that mistake is based his not realizing that FC has an absolute ban on the remarried from public Communion, even those who are continent. Gordon's mistake is somewhat understandable due to AL itself failing to clearly reiterate prior teaching and the utter lack of discipline against people who have openly made the heterodox expansion of AL's teaching. Lastly, I think that we should have a reasonable discussion about Matthew Levering's position that AL's relaxation of the absolute ban in FC is pastorally inadequate to the doctrine of indissolubility of marriage. But AL was written so badly that it's only forced that discussion to the wayside.
