The doctrine of the indefectibility of the Church on which the infallibility of the Magisterium is based is poorly understood. The Church's indefectibility is also referred to as passive infallibility, which is that the Church as a whole cannot fail to remain in the faith precisely due to the obedience of the faithful to the Magisterium. In that regard, the infallibility of the Magisterium is not an additional gift on top of the authority of the Magisterium itself; it is an essential organic operation of the Mystical Body of Christ. The indefectibility of the Church is also not a separate source of infallibility distinct from the authority of the Magisterium but rather a protection conferred just by obedience.
One can think of the Magisterium as performing a similar function to the immune system in the human body. If it fails, there is no way in principle for the body to protect it from disease (heresy, in this analogy). If there were the analogical equivalent of an "autoimmune disease," the immune system turning on the body, there would be no way in principle for the body to protect itself. Just as the immune system's failure would mean a failure in the means by which the body preserves its life, so a failure in the operation of the Magisterium would be a failure in the means by which the Church preserves Her indefectibility. This is why the term "see of pestilence" is aptly used to describe how a failure of papal function would appear.
This does not mean that the living Magisterium somehow needs to be constantly functioning in this capacity, but it does need to be constantly able to function for the indefectibility of the Church to persist in the Mystical Body of Christ. Thus, in the case of a papal interregnum, the Church will in due course select a Pope through appropriate means and offer Her peaceful acceptance to his reign, which is itself docility to the office. During this time, the process of papal selection it itself the operation of the indefectibility of the Church, and it is this activity that is the sign of the ongoing Magisterial principle at work, even though there might even be competing claims of antipopes during this process. Perhaps the most dramatic example of such a process to reach peaceful acceptance was the Great Western Schism, which lasted nearly forty years. The aftermath of the Council of Constance, which ended up resolving the matter, shows that the function the Church exercises here is not the Magisterial power itself, only the investment of someone with the power to exercise papal authority.
This principled view of indefectibility -- that the passive infallibility of the Church always corresponds to infallibility of the Magisterium in its proper function -- can be contrasted with the unprincipled view of William of Ockham, which resulted from his nominalist philosophy. Ockham believed that the indefectibility of the Church was completely accidental to individuals, corresponding to the circumstance of at least one believing Christian in the world holding the true faith by whatever circumstance. He did not believe that the indefectibility of the Church operated by the principle of obedience to the Magisterium (passive infallibility). This unprincipled and nominalist view of indefectibility is the sole basis for the so-called "recognize and resist" approach, which is a philosophical error that, while never (at least to my knowledge) having been explicitly condemned by the Church is still a theological error. That is an implicit denial of the doctrine of the Church's indefectibility, albeit not an explicit one.
Fortunately, we have a test case for the true doctrine of the Church on this point, as there was "a certain candidate for a doctoral degree of theology at the Rhine college in Utrecht" who ran afoul of the Catholic scholar Johann Baptist Cardinal Franzelin, S.J., who is possibly the most authoritative scholar of this history of the Magisterium. The Utrecht candidate made two errors on the indefectibility of the Church: (1) the obedience of the faithful was only required by definitive infallible Magisterial teaching, and (2) the obedience of the faithful was itself a separate source of infallible teaching. Franzelin convincingly rebuts both falsehoods, and the important aspect for our purposes is that he affirms that obedience is required not only for definitive teaching but also for non-definitive teaching. I have included below both of the relevant excerpts from Franzelin's On Divine Tradition (1875) and from an earlier version of his work in the Dublin Review.
Franzelin notes that "the formal cause by which [the bishops] are constituted as the Teaching Church to which has been promised Christ's guardianship and the assistance of the Spirit of truth in teaching, is the visible head of the Church set up by Christ, and the union and agreement of the members with that head." From a philosophical perspective, then, the living Pope himself is the formal cause and principle of the active infallibility that preserves the indefectibility of the Church. It is simply not possible for the Pope or the bishops in communion with him collectively to teach a defection from the faith. Franzelin outlines this intimate connection between the passive infallibility of the faithful and the active infallibility of the Magisterium as follows:
Meanwhile it is certain that Suarez and a great many doctors that acknowledge a consensus of Catholics of this sort, although they do not see infallibility in it, just the same they judge that it so gravely suffices for the security of doctrine as well as for the argument of truth that it would not be lawful to oppose it without a note of temerity, and I say all these doctors held our principle, whereby we assert an infallible authority is not required to oblige a religious assent (that is distinct from the assent of faith immediately or by the medium of the divine) in theological matters, rather "a supreme authority in a human mode," since it is one thing to judge that the authority does not err in a proposed doctrine, and another for the authority to be infallible.
It is this religious assent to the "supreme authority in the human mode" that involves a theologically certain judgment that the authority does not err in a proposed doctrine, even though the authority is not infallible in the sense of trust in the God who neither deceives nor is deceived. Rather, it is based on the certain consequence of the divine promise that St. Peter will confirm the brethren and that the gates of Hell will not prevail against his Church. In the generic sense of not committing error, both of these forms of certainty connote "infallibility," in the sense that the proposed doctrine cannot err in some or another respect. But that term is typically reserved for certainty based on the assent of faith to the divine property itself, so that the definitively proposed belief is infallibly true. With respect to religious assent, the certainty is only that the proposed direction is infallibly safe. By "infallibly safe," we mean that obedience to the direction will necessarily not involve denial of doctrine (infallible security of doctrine).
Thus Franzelin says:
The Holy Apostolic See, to which the divinely constituted custody of the deposit was consigned, as well as the office and duty of feeding the universal Church for the salvation of souls, can prescribe theological decrees, or insofar as they are bound with theological matters, when they must be followed or to forbid that something be followed, not especially from the intention of infallibly deciding a truth with a definitive judgment, but rather, apart from necessity either simply or for certain circumstances to provide for the security of Catholic doctrine. Although in declarations of this kind there might not be an infallible truth of doctrine because hypothetically there is not an intention of deciding this matter; nevertheless, it is infallible security.
Franzelin quotes the doctors of the Church concerning obedience as follows: "Whatsoever in turn man in place of God commands, so long as it might be certain to not displease God, is to be obeyed as if God commanded it." The certainty of infallible security is then exactly this: certainty not to displease God. One may be certainly secure that nothing commanding religious assent (in the sense Franzelin uses it) will ever be something that would displease God. Franzelin writes "I mean, both objective of the doctrine declared (absolute or relative), and subjective in so far as it is safe for all to embrace it, and unsafe and incompatible with the submission due to the divinely-constituted magisterium to reject it." It is important to note that this is both objective and subjective safety, although, strictly speaking, only subjective safety is required by the dogma of indefectibility in itself, construed as passive infallibility.
Franzelin's position that obsequium religiosum is required for non-definitive teaching is reflected likewise in Lumen Gentium 25:
Among the principal duties of bishops the preaching of the Gospel occupies an eminent place. For bishops are preachers of the faith, who lead new disciples to Christ, and they are authentic teachers, that is, teachers endowed with the authority of Christ, who preach to the people committed to them the faith they must believe and put into practice, and by the light of the Holy Spirit illustrate that faith. They bring forth from the treasury of Revelation new things and old, making it bear fruit and vigilantly warding off any errors that threaten their flock. Bishops, teaching in communion with the Roman Pontiff, are to be respected by all as witnesses to divine and Catholic truth. In matters of faith and morals, the bishops speak in the name of Christ and the faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with a religious assent. This religious submission of mind and will must be shown in a special way to the authentic magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not speaking ex cathedra; that is, it must be shown in such a way that his supreme magisterium is acknowledged with reverence, the judgments made by him are sincerely adhered to, according to his manifest mind and will. His mind and will in the matter may be known either from the character of the documents, from his frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or from his manner of speaking.
Although Franzelin's position on infallible authority is not explicitly dogmatized here, as noted previously, it would certainly be philosophical error to understand religious assent in any other way. If we understand this teaching in the context of the indefectibility of the Church, the conclusion is unavoidable. Moreover, the "special way" of showing submission "in such a way that his supreme magisterium is acknowledged with reverence" clearly maps to the "supreme authority in the human mode" that Franzelin describes, and this mode is what Franzelin describes with the term religious submission. If the papal Magisterium were not infallibly safe, it could not command religious assent in a way that would not implicitly violate the indefectibility of the Church. It would be only the accidental indefectibility of Ockham, not the essential and principled indefectibility conferred by the divine promise.
Some mistakenly assert that the religious submission given to the Pope's non-definitive teaching is identical to the religious submission given to bishops, since the same term is used. This ignores the reference to the supremacy of the papacy in this regard. It is entirely legitimate to question whether individual bishops are teaching in unity with the Pope, which Franzelin points out as follows: "For the same reason, since the authority of a Bishop is not supreme, even in regard to its proper object, the supreme Magisterium of the Holy See is always at hand where a suspicion rightly arises against the doctrine of one or even of many Bishops." Our religious submission to the supreme authority in the human mode, i.e., the papal Magisterium, is of a different kind than submission to individual bishops outside of their unity with the Pope. The lesser submission owed to individual bishops is subject to the supreme authority of the Pope; the greater submission owed to the Pope cannot be subject to any higher obligation.
There are at least two distinct ways for the Pope to non-definitively teach doctrine: (A) the exercise of what Franzelin calls the "universal ecclesial providence" and (B) offering a theological opinion as a private theologian (even in a public document). (A) commands obedience to the papal Magisterium in the "special way" of Lumen Gentium; as Franzelin puts it, "the authority is so sacred by the force of the supreme and universal Magisterium, that, although it is not granted the status of ex cathedra for defining doctrine to be held by the Universal Church, but for prescribing from a definition of this kind some doctrine which is or is not to be followed, obedience is due." In contrast, (B) only requires adherence to teachings with religious submission in the sense of prudent deference to the religious authority of the office. (Unlike Lumen Gentium, Franzelin reserves "religious submission" only to case (A) requiring obedience, even though case (B) can also be considered religious submission in a broader sense.) The degree of deference required to the Pope as a private theologian in case (B) is the subject of the more recent document Donum Veritatis, which deals with the obligations of speculative theologians but which fairly can apply to criticism of papal theological opinions even by other bishops.
It is case (B) that Franzelin has in mind with the case of Honorius:
So also there may be and there are public Pontifical documents, in which certain matters connected with faith or morals are the subject of warning, recommendation, or blame, or whose purpose is to forbid the spread of any opinion or error, but whose scope is not to proclaim a definitive sentence binding the whole Church, and which, for that reason, are not pronouncements ex cathedra. "For the Pontiffs often reply to the private questions of this or that bishop, by explaining their own opinion on the matters set forth, not by passing a sentence by which they will the faithful to be bound in believing" (Melch. Canus, 1. vi., c. 8, ad. 7). To this category are justly referred, for instance, the two letters of Honorius I. to Sergius of Constantinople.
It might appear at first glance that Franzelin is lumping every non-definitive statement into either Magisterial or private opinion. But this is not the case; Franzelin is only pointing out that statements that the Pope does not specifically will to bind the faithful cannot possibly be considered ex cathedra. He does not say that only ex cathedra statements are binding to religious assent, which would contradict his later thesis against the Utrecht candidate, and he does not say that private opinions bind people to religious submission in any sense. It suffices to say that what Honorius says was never intended to be binding on the faithful, so the question of infallible safety is irrelevant in this case.
Franzelin thus establishes a threefold structure of papal Magisterial authority:
1. Extraordinary Papal Magisterium: Ex cathedra teaching, which is both definitive and binding.
2. Non-definitive Magisterial teaching
(A) Authoritative Papal Magisterium ("authentic" magisterium in the proper sense): Universal ecclesial providence exercising the supreme Magisterium in the human mode, "theological decrees, or insofar as they are bound with theological matters, when they must be followed or to forbid that something be followed, not especially from the intention of infallibly deciding a truth with a definitive judgment, but rather, apart from necessity either simply or for certain circumstances to provide for the security of Catholic doctrine," requiring religious submission of the intellect and will in a special way, infallibly safe to obey.
(B) Non-authoritative Papal Magisterium: Private opinion expressed in public documents on "certain matters connected with faith or morals are the subject of warning, recommendation, or blame, or whose purpose is to forbid the spread of any opinion or error, but whose scope is not to proclaim a definitive sentence binding the whole Church," requiring "religious submission" only in the sense of deference to authority akin to the deference to individual bishops. This is teaching given publicly in office, but not exercising the authority of that office to require adherence to specific teaching. [N.B., enjoining silence falls into this category because it does not require adherence to anything; "[Universal ecclesial providence] is not argued about those decrees, wherein nothing other than silence was enjoined (as, for example, we know Paul V did concerning the doctrine on the assistance of divine grace)." But other disciplinary decrees that implicitly require adherence to teaching do fall in this category.]
The easiest way to understand what connects (2)(A) to (1) and distinguishes each of them from (2)(B) is the exercise of the authority to bind and loose. (2)(B) does not bind the conscience, although it does require prudent deference to the advice given. If there is no authoritative statement that something must be followed or forbidding that something can be followed, even in the absence of a definitive statement on the point, then whatever opinion is given remains non-authoritative. This distinguishes, for example, the Tomus of St. Leo to Flavian, which was clearly intended to state the doctrine that binds the Christian faithful, from the letters of Honorius, which offered statements of opinion rather than binding theological conclusions.
In that respect, the argument made by Jeremy Holmes and John Joy in Disputed Questions on Papal Infallibility that it is possible for the Pope to exert less than his full Magisterial authority is certainly correct. Holmes notes that "[s]ometimes the father only interposes his paternal office slightly, and the child knows that a slight reason would be enough to justify transgressing his father's request." In case (2)(B), the Pope teaches in public office, but without the authority of the supreme Magisterium, as a private theologian and bishop, which is exactly this case. But Joy errs when he denies that the Pope can exercise his supreme Magisterial authority "in the human mode," less than ex cathedra but nonetheless commanding obedience with theological certain infallible security. Thus Joy maintains "the pope, when he exercises his non-infallible teaching authority, as he typically does in encyclical letters, apostolic exhortations, letters to bishops, etc., does not speak therein with the full authority of the Church (as he does when he speaks ex cathedra), but rather with his own authority as the pope." This was the error of the Utrecht candidate that denies religious submission and infallible security for such teachings, and Franzelin has explained in detail why that position is erroneous. Joy's argument turns on a fallacy, and I will now respond to that argument directly.
Responding to a traditionalist argument
It turns out that the view of the Utrecht candidate that religious submission (and the concomitant lack of error) applies only to infallible teaching has made a comeback among traditionalists, despite Franzelin's rebuttal. John Joy, in responding to Franzelin's view of infallible security, makes the inexplicable claim that "[Franzelin] failed to consider the possibility of authoritative papal teaching that would be in conflict with the previous teaching of the Church" (Disputed Questions on Papal Infallibility, p. 21). On the contrary, he rejected it explicitly as a contradiction of the indefectibility of the Church! But Joy's fallacious argument has been adopted relatively widely, so it is important to understand why Joy's response is inadequate. Here, I will consider a version of that argument adopted by my friend Erick Ybarra.
(1) The limiting conditions of the Pope’s infallibility means that not all of his magisterial/teaching acts are infallible.
(2) Not being infallible is equivalent to being fallible. [Joy: "For what is not infallible is fallible; and what is fallible is able to fail."]
(3) The result of (1) and (2) is that the majority of the Pope’s magisterial teaching is delivered in a fallible mode.
(4) A fallible teaching mode leaves the possibility of teaching errors
(5) If the Pope teaches in a fallible teaching mode, then it is possible for the Pope to err in his magisterium
(6) In consideration of (4) and (5), it is possible that the faithful of the Church will be faced with a Pope who attempts to teach an erroneous doctrine from his teaching office.
(5) If the Pope teaches in a fallible teaching mode, then it is possible for the Pope to err in his magisterium
(6) In consideration of (4) and (5), it is possible that the faithful of the Church will be faced with a Pope who attempts to teach an erroneous doctrine from his teaching office.
(7) There are only two likely consequences (for there are many that we could speculate upon) that would yield from the sequence of thought in (1) to (6):
(8) Either it is lawful for the faithful to recognize the Pope’s office (and its limitations) and to also resist assenting to the erroneous doctrine coming from his fallible magisterium
(9) Or it is not lawful to do so, and the faithful are obliged to always give the assent of mind and will (religious assent), at least, to anything the Pope teaches that is manifest from his magisterial office, even when this means the faithful will be obliged to give assent to erroneous doctrine that contradicts the gospel and divine revelation.
(8) Either it is lawful for the faithful to recognize the Pope’s office (and its limitations) and to also resist assenting to the erroneous doctrine coming from his fallible magisterium
(9) Or it is not lawful to do so, and the faithful are obliged to always give the assent of mind and will (religious assent), at least, to anything the Pope teaches that is manifest from his magisterial office, even when this means the faithful will be obliged to give assent to erroneous doctrine that contradicts the gospel and divine revelation.
Premise (2) is the fallacy of denying the antecedent (P->Q does not imply ~P->~Q). As Franzelin correctly observes, "it is one thing to judge that the authority does not err in a proposed doctrine, and another for the authority to be infallible." What differs in the two cases is the certainty that we have concerning the lack of error. In the case of the extraordinary Magisterium, we have the assent of faith (either divine or ecclesial) that the proposed doctrine is infallibly true. In the case of universal ecclesial providence, we are theologically certain that the doctrine is infallibly safe, that is, that is certain not to displease God. People who deny the latter are bad philosophers, even censurable as temerarious, but not heretics. Lastly, in the case of private opinion that is not made binding by the supreme Magisterium in any sense, we owe only prudent deference. It is the failure to distinguish the second category from the third that is the mistake resulting from the fallacious premise (2). The fallacious premise results in an equivocation between religious submission to bishops simpliciter and religious submission to the supreme papal Magisterium in a special way, even though this distinction is made explicitly in Lumen Gentium.
As I mentioned, I think that people who deny infallible safety in the objective sense are at worst temerarious and not heretical. Since this is the reason for denying the teaching of Lumen Gentium pertaining to the "special way," I likewise do not think that this is a denial of the doctrine of Lumen Gentium, although I do believe that it results in an incorrect interpretation of that document. But there is something disturbing in the new adoption of the Utrecht candidate's argument that only infallible teachings demand religious obedience, an argument that Franzelin took painstaking steps to refute in his later publication of On Divine Tradition.
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Excerpts from Franzelin's writings
Franzelin, Johann Baptist, S.J., On Divine Tradition (1875; trans. Ryan Grant, 2016)
Thesis XII: The Consensus of the Faithful, Scholion I, Principium VII, pp. 179 et seq. (non-italicized text is original emphasis; bold is my own)
The Holy Apostolic See, to which the divinely constituted custody of the deposit was consigned, as well as the office and duty of feeding the universal Church for the salvation of souls, can prescribe theological decrees, or insofar as they are bound with theological matters, when they must be followed or to forbid that something be followed, not especially from the intention of infallibly deciding a truth with a definitive judgment, but rather, apart from necessity either simply or for certain circumstances to provide for the security of Catholic doctrine. Although in declarations of this kind there might not be an infallible truth of doctrine because hypothetically there is not an intention of deciding this matter; nevertheless, it is infallible security. I say security, both the objective of declared doctrine (either simply or for such certain circumstances), and subjective insofar as it is safe for all to embrace it; it cannot happen that they would refuse to embrace it, because it is not safe and not without a violation of due submission toward the divinely constituted Magisterium. Someone that would deny this distinction within a final and definitive teaching of the Pope speaking ex cathedra as well as among those doctrinal provisions and prohibitions, let him be compelled to have all edicts of the Holy See pertaining to doctrine in whatever way and in one and the same appraisal of definitions ex cathedra, which is indeed from ecclesiastical history, from the practice of the Holy See, and especially from the most studious declaration of a definition ex cathedra promulgated by the Vatican Council, and he will manifestly be shown to be wrong. On the other hand, the distinction between infallible truth and between security of doctrine must be dutifully observed, in so much as they must be understood according to that which was placed in principle, which are spoken of in the corollaries that have been drawn out.
[*N.B., Franzelin writes in a footnote about "a certain candidate for a doctoral degree of theology at the Rhine college in Utrecht," whose dissertation ends up being the foil for Franzelin's argument.]
Corollarium 1. The authority of the Magisterium established by Christ in the Church, as far as the matter we are taking up, ought to be considered two-fold: a) just as in individual acts it is under the assistance of the Holy Spirit for an infallible definition of truth, or as it is the authority of infallibility; b) if in terms of the extent, just as the Magisterium does the same thing with the authority to shepherd that was divinely consigned to it, still its whole focus (if one may speak this way) is ultimately not in defining a truth, but insofar as it will have seemed necessary or opportune and sufficient to the security of doctrine, which we can perhaps call the authority of universal ecclesiastical providence, or doctrinal providence.
Corollarium 2. The authority of infallibility can not be communicated by the Pope to others as though to his ministers and those working in his name. Therefore, when a definition of infallibility might be said to be "promulgated" through some holy Roman congregation, this mode of speaking is not proper, as a Congregation, in this hypothesis, merely exists in the mode of consulting; defining on the other hand is for the Pontiff alone. They ought, therefore, to indicate those proofs by which we already said it is necessary to render the intention of the Pope to define ex cathedra manifest.
The authority of universal ecclesiastical providence, as we called it above, is not indeed independent but dependent upon the Pontiff; it is communicable and by the Pontiff himself it is communicated to a greater or lesser extent among certain congregations of Cardinals. For that reason, even the decisions of the most holy Congregations may rightly be called and by ecclesiastical use are customarily called decreta sanctae Sedis.
It is clear from the aforesaid, that every definition ex cathedra is at any rate, a definition of the Holy See insofar as by the whole focus of the supreme Magisterium, the agent, "defines a doctrine on faith or morals to be held by the universal Church"; nevertheless, not every decree of the Holy See, even if it pertains to doctrine, is a definition ex cathedra; lastly a definition ex cathedra, which is only of the pope insofar as the divine assistance was promised to him in Blessed Peter, can never be called in its own and genuine sense a decision of a Pontifical Congregation.
Corollarium 3. It is false, that the authority on account of which one owes the assent of the intellect is only the authority of God the revealer or the Church, or the Pope defining infallibly, since there are many other degrees of religious assent. At present, it must be distinguished between the assent of faith properly and immediately divine on account of the authority of God the revealer, and the assent of faith which we spoke of above that is by the medium of the divine, on account of the authority of infallibly defining a doctrine as true but not as revealed; then the religious assent due on account of the authority of universal ecclesiastical providence in the sense which we have a little early in the exposition of the principle.
Evidently, this assent does not treat on that, which we call religious, on doctrine to be held by the force of a decree as infallibly true or to be rejected as infallibly false or to be noted or to be through another censure of infallible authority for this would be against the hypothesis. Just the same, the authority is so sacred by the force of the supreme and universal Magisterium, that, although it is not granted the status of ex cathedra for defining doctrine to be held by the Universal Church, but for prescribing from a definition of this kind some doctrine which is or is not to be followed, obedience is due. Our adversaries [quoting the Utrecht candidate] do not deny this obedience is indeed due, but they restrict it merely to the omission of external acts, and consequently, even to reverential silence "lest one who might teach some doctrine, nay more that he may write on some matter or offer his judgment"; but by no means except through an ex cathedra definition can an "observance of mind (obsequium mentis) such that one someone would lay aside his opinion and embrace the contrary with so firm a certitude that he would profess to adhere to it with an oath," be demanded. Yet, whenever a Sacred Congregation where a definition ex cathedra does not yet exist, demands an obsequium mentis of this sort, as in the case of Gallileo, "the Holy Congregation of the Inquisition exceeded the limits of its power." We, on the other hand, believe that in judgments of this sort, even published short of a definition ex cathedra, obedience is demanded and must be furnished, which includes an obsequium of the mind, but certainly that it would be infallibly judged that a doctrine were true or false (to the extent that our adversary seems to have understood our opinion). Rather that it will be judged that a doctrine contained in such a judgment is secure, and for us this is certainly not from the motive of divine faith (or account of God the revealer or the Church teaching infallibly), but from the motive of sacred authority, whose office is without a doubt to provide for the soundness and security of doctrine, to be embraced with the obsequium mentis and to reject what is contrary. This is not argued about those decrees, wherein nothing other than silence was enjoined (as, for example, we know Paul V did concerning the doctrine on the assistance of divine grace), but the discussion is on the responses and the decrees, in which some doctrine is ordered to be followed or not to be followed. Therefore, this is proposed to those to which it pertains, not only to be silent but in that sense, in which it is declared, must be taught and defended, and for that reason the obsequium of the mind is included; if not then you would suspect perhaps that hypocrisy and feigning were commanded. Next, since, in theological doctrine its own place and even its own characteristic reasoning, on account of which the assent demanded, is not internally observed, rather, the authority proposing truth, that sacred universal authority of doctrinal providence by the force of its office is the most sufficient motive from which a pious will can and ought command a religious or theological consensus of understanding. I reckon that our opinion rests upon very grave arguments.
...
[Corollarium 3, Section (d)(𝛾), p. 196]
Now, because our opponent asserts that Suarez teaches that such a consensus of Catholics is infallible, it will be worthwhile to describe his doctrine. On the infallibility of church in belief, Suarez teaches three things [De Fide, disp. V, sect. 6]. Firstly, that the Church cannot defect through heresy; secondly it cannot err through ignorance, "in these matters which it believes, as it were, are certain de fide"; thirdly, in these matters which it believes are not, as it were, de fide, but so much that the contrary opinion would merit some censure, it must be held that it does not err, nevertheless on infallibility in all these matters in which a doctrine attains more nearly or remotely to faith, it will be more or less certain that the Church does not err on those points. Concerning what seems to us to be the authority of a consensus of theologians, we will speak more of later on in Thesis XVII. Meanwhile it is certain that Suarez and a great many doctors that acknowledge a consensus of Catholics of this sort, although they do not see infallibility in it, just the same they judge that it so gravely suffices for the security of doctrine as well as for the argument of truth that it would not be lawful to oppose it without a note of temerity, and I say all these doctors held our principle, whereby we assert an infallible authority is not required to oblige a religious assent (that is distinct from the assent of faith immediately or by the medium of the divine) in theological matters, rather "a supreme authority in a human mode," since it is one thing to judge that the authority does not err in a proposed doctrine, and another for the authority to be infallible.
...
[p. 211]
Corollarium 4. The authority of universal ecclesiastical and doctrinal providence, in itself resides firstly in the sole shepherd of the whole Church and in no other individual person. Nevertheless, just as it is said to each Bishop, "feed the flock of God, which is among you," so without a doubt, the authority if particular providence is adequate for the flock subordinated to it in regard to the yoke of sound doctrine, in subordination and in union with the supreme and universal shepherd, the Roman Ponitff. It happens, by necessity of this subordination and unity in doctrine, that the head should merely be reduced to preaching and safeguarding doctrine whether by an explicit definition or a consensus of the Church, or even through the decisions of universal providence that have already been proposed, but not for deciding controversial questions on his own between Catholics. For the same reason, since the authority of a Bishop is not supreme, even in regard to its proper object, the supreme Magisterium of the Holy See is always at hand where a suspicion rightly arises against the doctrine of one or even of many Bishops.
On the contrary, in the internal forum, as well as the sacred authority in the order for the direction of the spiritual life (by the force of the sacred office established by Christ, since a solely scientific authority is not suitable in its own mode for the director of souls), to the point that the faithful, in doubtful matters that touch upon conscience, could at some time (when other, safe roads are not clear), be held to conform their own practical judgment to the authority of the ministers of God. Without a doubt Jesus Christ, the head, disposes and rules the whole Church and its individual parts in the internal and external life, but not without his visible vicars, through all ranks from the high even to the low, so that the principle of authority and spiritual obedience should pervade the whole body and all the members by different degrees, by forms and modes.
Generally, the evangelical counsel of obedience not only of the will, but also of the intellect, proves most profitably that the infallibility of teaching is not a necessary condition to furnish subjection and obedience of the intellect.
Rather, from the common doctrine of the Saints, such as Suarez among many, and St. Alphonsus describe in summary: "someone under obedience that doubts, whether the matter commanded is lawful or not, is held to lay aside doubt, and thus, can and ought to obey." Sts. Bernard, Bonaventure, Ignatius, Bl. Humbert the Dominican, Dionysius the Carthusian and others teach in one consensus: "Whatsoever in turn man in place of God commands, so long as it might be certain to not displease God, is to be obeyed as if God commanded it." Still, every one of these would be altogether false unless one under obedience were held to subject the intellect to an authority in doubtful matters of this sort, not even in speculative opinion but in practical judgment on the honesty of his actions, although this would not be infallible either speculatively or practically. Therefore, this is the doctrine of the saints, which St. Alphonsus calls common and certain, if it is true, then it is false that one could or never ought to subject the intellect to a superior authority unless it is infallible.
Franzelin, Johann Baptist, S.J., “Tractatus de Divina Traditione et Scriptura.” The Dublin Review. Vol. XVII. July, 1871. pp.258-268.
F. FRANZELIN ON THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT OF INFALLIBILITY
WHAT has been so far discussed concerning the magisterial and ministerial means for preserving Tradition, seems to demand a more distinct statement of principles at least, concerning the Subject and Object of the power of infallibly teaching and judging. The full exposition and demonstration, however, of this most important point belongs to its own proper Treatise on the Church and the Roman Pontiff.
Principle I.—Indefectibility in the truth of that Faith which is one in Catholicity, or infallibility in believing has been, by God, promised to and conferred upon the Universal Church, which is "the house of God, the pillar and ground of the truth" (1 Tim. iii. 15), " built upon a rock, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt. xvi. 18). Whatever, therefore, the universal Church believes as of faith, that by Christ's promise and ordaining is evidently infallibly true. Of this infallibility in believing, which is commonly called passive, the Subject is the universal Church herself.
The Church is kept in the unfailing truth of one Faith by the Holy Ghost by means of an authentic ministerial and magisterial power, though the Pastors and Doctors whom Christ has given for the building up of the body of Christ (Eph. iv. 11, 12), to teach the Church of God with authority; to which was to be due from all the faithful, as corresponding effect, consent and "obedience of faith." Wherefore to this magisterium instituted, by Himself, Christ promised and upon it He conferred infallibility in teaching all that He himself and the Holy Ghost had taught.*
* Because the magisterium, furnished with this charisma of infallibility, by its ministerial action guards, proposes, develops, and protects revealed doctrine, and keeps all the faithful in unity of faith: hence infallibility in teaching is commonly called active, and has for its end indefectibility in believing, which through the " obedience of faith " is the passive infallibility of the whole body of the Church.
The Subject then of this infallibility in teaching are all and only those, to whom has been entrusted by God the right and office of teaching with authority the Church Universal.
(a) Thus the Teaching Church.—that is the body of Pastors and Doctors in union, agreement, and subordination towards the visible head of the Church,—is infallible : and that in her universal and consentient preaching of doctrine on faith or morals; in her solemn judgments or definitions of the same doctrine. For to the Teaching Church so constituted has been said : "All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth: go ye therefore and teach all nations; baptizing them .... teaching them to keep all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and behold l am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world" (Matt, xxviii. 18, seq.). "And I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, to abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth. .... He will teach you all things, and will suggest to you all things whatsoever I have told you (a ilirov iftiv[Greek])" (John xiv. 16, 26).
These promises do not appertain to the individual successors of the Apostles, because individually they do not succeed the Apostles in the office of teaching with authority the whole Church ; an office which in the Apostles (excepting only Peter, head of the Church, who was always to continue in his successors) was not ordinary, but extraordinary and personal to themselves: but the promises were made to the body of the Apostolic succession in common, in so far as they are the Teaching Church. But they are not the Teaching Church, except in so far as they remain united, consentient, and subordinated towards the visible head of the whole Church.
Wherefore the efficient cause of the infallibility of the teaching Church, whether in its universal preaching or in its solemn definitions and judgments, is without doubt the promised assistance of the Spirit of truth; but the condition without which the successors of the Apostles are not the Teaching Church, and the formal cause by which they are constituted as the Teaching Church to which has been promised Christ's guardianship and the assistance of the Spirit of truth in teaching, is the visible head of the Church set up by Christ, and the union and agreement of the members with that head ; just as the form of the unity of the visible Church in general is the Church's visible head itself. Hence it is that the ordinary office of infallibly teaching,— that is, the office instituted in the case of the Apostles to be passed on to their Successors,—was explained by Christ our Lord in words which were addressed, never to the individuals, but always to the entire College in union with Peter.
(b.) For the opposite reason, the words of Christ by which the primacy and infallibility of magisterium included in the primacy is promised and granted to Peter, designate him alone not only as expressly distinct from the rest, but also in relation to the rest as who should confirm and shepherd them. "Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jona and I say to thee, thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt, xvi.). "Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not, and do thou turn and (tjriorpti/iac[Greek]) confirm thy brethren" (Luke xxii.). "Jesus says to Simon Peter: Simon, son of John, lovest thou me more than these? He says to him: Feed my lambs feed my sheep" (John xxi.).*
Thus Peter, as ordinary endowment for himself and for each of his Successors, received from Christ the power and office of feeding and teaching the Universal Church in faith and morals, in such sort that this very power, conferred in the person of Peter upon each of his Successors, demands by divine institution the obedience of faith and consent of the whole Church; and that hence the infallibility of the whole Church in believing cannot stand, except in so far as upon the head of the Church, successor of Peter, together with such right of exacting consent of faith, there has been simultaneously conferred infallibility in teaching; when (that is) he proposes a doctrine on faith or morals, with such a definitive sentence as binds the whole Church to consent. The Subject then of infallibility is Peter's Successor himself; through the divine assistance which has been promised to him per se, as teacher of the Church, and not on condition of the concurrent judgment or consent of the other pastors and doctors who, compared with the Pontiff so teaching the Church, are the most noble part of the Church so built upon this rock that the gates of hell may not prevail against it, are brethren to be confirmed, sheep to be shepherded; although, compared with the faithful they continue pastors and doctors, to propose to the faithful, to teach and to defend with authority the defined doctrine itself.
"It is a revealed dogma of faith that the Roman Pontiff when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when in discharge of his office as Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, he defines, in virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, is endowed, by the divine assistance promised him in Blessed Peter, with that infallibility with which our Divine Redeemer willed that the Church should be furnished in defining doctrine of faith or morals; and, therefore, that such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves and not in virtue of the consent of the Church " ("Definition of Vatican Council," Constit. I., de Eccl. Christi, cap. 4).
Corollary A.—There is not a twofold adequately distinct Subject of the infallibility promised by Christ to definitions of doctrine on faith or morals; but [the Subject of infallibility] is both the visible head of the Church regarded per se; and the same visible head taken as ordering and informing the body of the teaching Church, which, thus constituted, is itself infallible by the assistance of the Spirit of truth. This inadequate distinction in the Subject of infallibility is pointed out in the Vatican definition itself just before cited.
Corollary B.—Whatever is to be believed with Catholic faith or is to be held with theological certainty, on the objective extent of infallibility [ec extensione quoad objectum] vested in the Church defining or in a general Council, the same, in the same way, is to be believed and held on the infallibility vested in the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra. This is the very point defined by the Vatican Council.
Corollary C.—The antecedent consent of the Church may indeed be the objective means by which the Pontiff arrives at the knowledge of the definability of a doctrine: but it is not of itself and from the nature of the case the sole and necessary means of knowing; for doctrines on faith or morals may be recognized as definable from other sources and by other means as well, and questions hitherto doubtful and controverted even within the borders of the Church may be defined. And by no means is such consent of the Church or Bishops, whether antecedent, concomitant, or subsequent, necessary by way of authentic judgment concurring with the judgment or definition of the Pontiff. The Gallican opinion requiring this consent of the Church as necessary to the infallibility of the Pontiff's definitions,—in such sort that the sole Subject of infallibility should be the body of the teaching Church, namely the Pope with the bishops,—is now a heresy directly and explicitly condemned by the Vatican Council. The subsequent consent of the whole Church, however, is always the effect of the Pontiff's definition.
Corollary D.—According to the declaration of the Vatican Council itself, the Pontiff is said to speak ex cathedra " when in discharge of his office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians he defines, in virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the universal Church." For the Apostolic Chair is nothing else than the supreme authentic magisterium, whose definitive doctrinal sentence binds the universal Church to consent. This intention of defining doctrine, or of teaching with definitive sentence and with authority obliging consent of the universal Church, should be made plain and cognizable by clear signs. No settled form however, to be necessarily used by the Pontiff in making known this his will, is essential. For although there be certain solemn forms which of themselves express a speaking ex cathedra, and which accordingly the Pontiff uses only when speaking ex cathedra,—such as, for example, dogmatic Bulls,—yet this form is not so essential and exclusive, that without it the Pontiff cannot, as Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, define doctrine on faith or morals to be held by the whole Church, condemn in the same way errors opposed to it, and make plain his will to that effect.
Corollary E.—In the documents themselves of Councils and Pontiffs in which it is without doubt proposed to publish definitions of doctrine, there may be, and usually are, contained many things which it is not intended to define: obiter dicta which are usually enunciated indirectly; mostly, also, the arguments brought to prove the definitive sentence itself, &c. Although these things are of weighty authority, yet they are not infallible definitions.
So also there may be and there are public Pontifical documents, in which certain matters connected with faith or morals are the subject of warning, recommendation, or blame, or whose purpose is to forbid the spread of any opinion or error, but whose scope is not to proclaim a definitive sentence binding the whole Church, and which, for that reason, are not pronouncements ex cathedra. "For the Pontiffs often reply to the private questions of this or that bishop, by explaining their own opinion on the matters set forth, not by passing a sentence by which they will the faithful to be bound in believing" (Melch. Canus, 1. vi., c. 8, ad. 7). To this category are justly referred, for instance, the two letters of Honorius I. to Sergius of Constantinople.*( In the Tract, de Incarnat. we have spoken of the (by no means heretical) sense of these letters.) That doubt may arise as to whether certain Pontifical documents contain a pronouncement ex cathedra and definition of doctrine, we do not deny: but the same thing occurs sometimes in respect of Conciliar documents also; a fact of which we have an example in the diverse opinions which have existed and still exist in some quarters on the Instructions for the Armenians published in the Council of Florence, on the point whether the teaching therein contained, especially on the matter and form of the Sacraments, is to be considered dogmatic or merely as practical instruction. Whenever such doubts occur, theologians properly warn us "that in discriminating these matters the judgment of wise men, and (more especially) the sense and consent of the Church, is of much force" (Tanner de Fide, q. 4, dub. 6, n. 262).
This will be sufficient for our scope on the Subject of infallibility. Our present treatise is more particularly concerned with the doctrine on the Object of infallibility.
Principle II.—The Deposit of the Christian Faith, strictly understood, embraces all and only those things, which have been explicitly or implicitly revealed to the human race by God to be believed, done, or followed ; in other words, which have been made known by Catholic revelation (as distinct from private divine revelations) for the eternal salvation of mankind.
Corollary A.—In the Deposit of the Faith are contained theoretical doctrines (and among these also truths which, in so far as they are cognizable by reason, are commonly said to appertain to natural religion)—practical laws (and among these also the natural law written in the hearts of men as reasonable beings), as also certain perpetual and fundamental institutions, such as the Church, its power, its form of government, &c. In other words, these are contained in the Deposit), revealed and supernatural dogmatics, ethics, politics.
Corollary B.—Only truths revealed by God, when duly proposed may and ought to be believed with divine faith; because faith is assent on account of the authority of God revealing.
Corollary C.—In the Deposit of Faith may be objectively contained truths, not yet duly proposed, so that all should be bound to believe them as revealed with divine faith.
Principle III.—With truths revealed and duly proposed are connected and related many things, without which those revealed truths themselves either could not, or could not so well, in all their fulness, be guarded, developed, and defended; although these [connected truths] are either not themselves revealed, or are not yet duly proposed to be believed with divine faith.
Such are many theoretical and practical truths in that triple order, dogmatic, moral, and (so to speak) constitutive, which we have pointed out; as truths theologically certain, e.g., on the procession of the Holy Ghost by way of love in connexion with the mystery of the Blessed Trinity; on the sanctification of the humanity of Christ by the created gifts also, on its [enjoyment of ] the Beatific Vision from the first moment of its existence, in connexion with the mystery of the Incarnation, &c.: then again certain circumstances bound up with revealed truths, when these are to be practically applied, e.g., if there is question of the genuine sense of texts in such and such books, in so far as they are agreeable or opposed to the Deposit of Faith; facts again of themselves historical, e.g., the legitimate celebration of a particular Council, &c.; furthermore, certain special dispositions of divine providence pertaining to the better estate and government of the universal Church, e.g., if there is question of the opportuneness or moral necessity of political independence and temporal dominion in the case of the Supreme Pontiff, in order to the [good] government of the Church, &c.
Corollary A.—The Deposit of Faith is violated; not only by direct denial of revealed truths and by heresy, but may also be attacked, and in the mind of the faithful exposed to dangers, by errors contrary to truths, not in themselves revealed, yet connected with revealed truths, and consequently theological or religious.
Corollary B—Although the Deposit of Faith strictly understood comprises revealed truth only, nevertheless the deposit to be guarded in its entirety, with all its outworks and modes of application, is of wider extent: "O Timothy, keep the Deposit, avoiding profane novelties of words" (1 Tim. vi. 20).
Principle IV.—The authority (infallible under the promised assistance of the Holy Ghost) of that authority to which Christ has entrusted the office of infallibly keeping the Deposit, and of guarding it against threatening errors, appertains in the first place to guarding, setting forth, and developing the truths which, in the strict sense, make up the Deposit itself of the Faith; that is to say, revealed truths: and by consequence, to warding off errors directly opposed to them,—in other words, to condemning heresies. This is the fundamental revealed dogma of the Catholic faith; and hence its denial is not a heresy only, but the very root of all heresies.
Herein it is contained and hence it immediately follows, that the infallibility promised for guardianship of the Deposit reaches to the whole extent of the Deposit to be guarded; that is, to truths even in themselves not revealed, in so far as they are in contact with revealed truths, and are needed to the custody, proposition, development, and defence of the latter. This extension of infallibility, by consent of all theologians, is a truth so certain in theology that its denial would be most grave error, or even, according to many, heresy : although up to the present time it has not been explicitly condemned as heresy. (Vide Card, de Lugo de Fide, disp. xx., n. 106, 114; Baiiez, 2, 2, q. 11, a. 2, concl. 2 ; Suarez de Fide, disp. v., sect. 6, n. 4, 5, 8 ; sect. 8, n. 4.)
Corollary A.—Not only revealed truths, but also truths connected with revealed, in so far as the connexion extends, may be infallibly defined by the infallible magisterium; and similarly, not only heresies may be condemned, but minor censures may be pronounced with infallible authority under the assistance of the Holy Ghost. Because therefore a doctrine is not defined as in itself revealed; or because errors are not one by one condemned with the note of heresy, but are proscribed with no particular censure or with minor censures, or with several censures in globo; for these causes, taken by themselves, it cannot be affirmed without grave error that a definition is not infallible, or is not a pronouncement ex cathedra.
Corollary B.—No Catholic may deny that [the quality of] infallible definitions [belongs to] the dogmatic Constitutions of the Council of Constance ag. inst the articles of Wycliffe and John Hus, confirmed by Martin V.; of Leo X. against Luther (" Exsurge"); of Clement XI. against the Jansenists (" Unigenitus "), &c., in which propositions are condemned under different censures in globo; as also the Constitution of Pius VI. against (the synod of) Pistoja (" Auctorem Fidei"), in which a very large number of propositions are severally proscribed under minor censures. And this Corollary, which is certain on other grounds also, in turn demonstrates the truth of the Principle laid down, because without it the present Corollary itself could not stand.
Corollary C.—A quality which is defined to belong to a proposition, infallibly belongs to it in the sense and way intended in the definition. Hence those who are of opinion, for instance, that a proposition is said to be temerarious which is asserted against strong reasons and weighty authority without due foundation, also affirm that it is this quality, and not per se the falsehood of the proposition, which is defined in the censure of temerity. This same thing, —viz. that the definition does not touch the falsehood of the proposition, but some other quality worthy of condemnation,—they more especially affirm in the case of censures, by which propositions are branded as scandalous, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears. (Vide Card, de Lugo de Fide, disp. xx., n. 114 ; Canum, 1. xii., c. 11, ad finem.) And at all events, when the Council of Vienne considered that an opinion (that about the infusion of grace and the virtues in the case of infants) was to be chosen as the more probable" this per se is not a definition of the truth (of the opinion), but only of its greater probability. (Cf. de Lugo, 1. c. n. 115-129.)
Corollary D.—The Infallibility of the Church and of the Roman Pontiff is believed with divine faith, on the authority of God revealing; an opinion proposed by the infallible definition of the Church or the Pontiff as true but not as revealed, is believed on the revealed authority of the proponent. Whence we may call mediately divine that faith, which some call ecclesiastical.
Principle V.—If the Church is infallible in guarding the Deposit of Faith at least in the strict sense, and therefore in declaring the true sense of revealed dogmas,—she is, by this very fact, infallible in judging of the true sense, the import and extent (intensione et extensione), of her own authority and infallibility; or, which comes to the same thing, in judging of the conditions and objects on which authority belongs to her by divine right and on which the assistance of the Spirit of truth has been promised her. For this authority and infallibility is undoubtedly a revealed dogma.
Corollary.—It involves a contradiction, to admit the infallibility of the Church in revealed dogmas, and at the same time to deny the authority of a definition admitted actually to exist, on the ground that the point defined is not a dogma of the Faith.*
* In order that I may not seem, in a plain matter, to be fighting against shadows, here is a proof of this contradiction, openly published in our own day by schismatical priests (presbyteris sectariis). "The conditions therefore required for the judgment of the Pope to be certainly infallible are two: 1st, that the judgment turns upon matter revealed; 2nd, that it be accompanied by the consent of the Episcopate. Failing this second condition, it is not certain that the judgment is infallible; failing the first, it is certain that it is not infallible However unanimous (which they are not) the Pope and the bishops might be in deciding that the Church has need at this time of the temporal power of the Pope, and in declaring excommunicate all who think otherwise, this decision, as coming not from the teachers of the Church and the custodians of revealed truth but from private doctors, would have no authority to bind consciences.''—Mediatore, August 9,1862.
Principle VI.—As it is certain from the principles of revelation itself, as they are understood and proclaimed by the Church, that truth appertains to her infallible magisterium, and errors are subject to her infallible judgment, for no other end than the custody of the Deposit of the Christian religion, and its protection and advancement among the faithful;—so is it equally certain that in most sciences, as they are, and ought to be, cultivated by mankind on principles purely natural and from sources non-revealed, in philosophy especially, theoretical and practical, in history, geology, ethnography, &c. there are found truths, which are likewise revealed or are connected with revealed truths. The reason is, because revelation contains not only superrational truths, but many cognizable by reason also and from natural sources; in other words, because revelation and natural sciences have in many points a common object-matter. Equally is it evident, that in these sciences, not indeed by right use of reason, but by its abuse and through ignorance, hypotheses may be laid down as principles, and conclusions may be deduced, opposed, directly or indirectly, to truths of revelation, rational or superrational; and consequently (since truth cannot contradict truth) containing errors cognizable and capable of condemnation on revealed principles.*
(* "As theology (sacra doctrina) is founded on the light of faith, so is philosophy on the natural light of reason. Whence it is impossible that the truths of philosophy should be contrary to the truths of faith And whatever in the sayings of philosophers is found contrary to the Faith, that does not belong to philosophy, but is rather an abuse of philosophy arising from defect of reason."—S. Thom. in Boeth. Trin. Proleg., q. 2, a. 3.)
The Church's magisterium therefore teaches truths of this sort, and may infallibly judge of errors of this sort, not by teaching human sciences on their principles, but by judging of them on hers.* Wherefore the infallible Church never judges, and in virtue of her promised infallibility the Holy Ghost can never even permit her to pass a definitive judgment, on truths or errors, except in order to the custody of the Deposit and in virtue of her divinely-imposed office of guarding the Deposit.
(*"The proper knowledge of this science (theology) is that which comes from revelation, and not that which comes from natural (objective) reason. And hence it does not appertain to it to prove the principles of the other sciences, but only to judge of theln. For whatever in other sciences is found to contradict truths of this science, is wholly condemned as false."—S. Thom,, i. q. 1, a 6, ad 2.)
Corollary A.—Although philosophy and the other natural sciences rest on their own proper principles, which are known or so far as they are known, not from revelation and the authentic magisterium of the Church, but by reason and from natural sources ;—nevertheless the magisterium of the Church can, and indeed ought, from revealed principles, point out for avoidance errors opposed to the integrity and safety of the Deposit to be guarded. Catholic scientific men, therefore, should keep this standard before their eyes. Reason prescribes this course, lest they fall into error; faith prescribes it, lest they fall into error contrary to the truths thereof.
Corollary B..—Those who profess themselves Catholics and consequently acknowledge the authentic magisterium of the Church, and yet affirm that philosophy, in the mode explained, is not subject to this norm, that the progress of science is impeded by the same, that the Church should let philosophy correct her own mistakes (Syllab. Pontif., propp. x., xi., xii., xiv.),— such men demand liberty to embrace error by an abuse of philosophy, and deny the Church's right and duty of providing for the integrity and soundness of the doctrine of faith.—Vide Con. Vatic. Constit. de Fide, cap. 4, can. 2.
Principle VII.—The Holy Apostolic See, which has had committed to it the custody of the Deposit, the power of shepherding the universal Church for the salvation of souls, may prescribe theological opinions or opinions bearing on theology as to be followed, or proscribe them as to be avoided, not solely with the intention of infallibly deciding the truth by definitive sentence, but also without such intention; from the need and with the intention of looking to the security, absolute or relative, of Catholic doctrine. In such declarations, although there is no infallible truth of the doctrine, because by the supposition there is no intention of deciding such truth; yet there is infallibly security :* security, I mean, both objective of the doctrine declared (absolute or relative), and subjective in so far as it is safe for all to embrace it, and unsafe and incompatible with the submission due to the divinely-constituted magisterium to reject it.
(* That these two things, infallible truth and infallible security, do not coincide, is clear even from the fact that otherwise no probable or more probable doctrine could be called sound and secure.)
Corollary A.—The authority of the magisterium instituted by Christ in the Church is to be regarded, in the present matter, from a twofold point of view :—a, as in individual acts it is aided by the Holy Ghost to define the truth infallibly,—in other words, as it is the infallible authority; , as the same magisterium acts ; with the pastoral authority indeed divinely entrusted to it, but not with all its intensity (if we may say so), nor as defining the truth in the last resort, but so far as shall have seemed needful or opportune and sufficient for security of doctrine; and the magisterium in this point of view we may perhaps call the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision.
Corollary B.—The authority of infallibility cannot be communicated by the Pontiff to others, as his ministers acting in his name. If at any time, therefore, an infallible definition is published by any sacred Congregation at Rome, the Congregation itself merely performs the function of consultor and ministerial promulgator, while the Pontiff alone defines. Here then must be found those tokens which, we have said above, make clear the Pope's intention.
The authority of universal ecclesiastical provision, as we have termed it, not indeed independently but in dependence upon the Pontiff, is communicable, and is by the Pope himself communicated with greater or lesser extension, to certain sacred Congregations of Cardinals.
Corollary C.—It is a mistake (to suppose) that the only authority to which intellectual assent is due, is that of divine revelation or of an infallible definition of the Church or the Pope. There are manifold degrees of religious assent. For our present purpose [it is sufficient to ] distinguish assent of faith properly and immediately divine, on the authority of God revealing ; assent of faith which we called above mediately divine on the authority of him who infallibly defines a doctrine as true, but not as revealed; religious assent, on the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision in the sense explained.
This very doctrine has been clearly set forth by the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX., in his letter of December 21st, 1863, to the Archbishop of Munich, beginning, "Tuas libenter accepimus." "We wish to believe that [those who attended the literary Congress at Munich] were not desirous of restricting the undoubted obligation of Catholic teachers and writers to those points only which are proposed by the infallible judgment of the Church as dogmas of faith to be believed by all . . . . For, even though the question concerned that submission which is to be yielded in an act of divine faith, yet that would not have to be confined to points defined by express decrees of Ecumenical Councils or of Roman Pontiffs and this Apostolic See, but to be extended to those things also which are handed down as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed throughout the world, and are accordingly held to appertain to the faith by the universal and consistent consent of Catholic theologians. But since the question concerns that submission by which all Catholics are bound in conscience who apply themselves to the speculative sciences with a view to conferring new benefits on the Church by their writings, hence the members of the same Congress should recognize that it is not enough for learned Catholics to receive and revere the aforesaid dogmas, but that they must also submit themselves to the doctrinal decisions put forth by Pontifical Congregations, and to those heads of doctrine held by common and consistent consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions so certain that opinions opposed to those heads of doctrines, though they cannot be called heretical, yet deserve some other theological censure."
Further, although the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision (as we have called it, resides primarily and directly in no individual except the pastor of the whole Church, yet a particular [power of] provision, subordinated to the Chief Pastor, belongs to each bishop in his own diocese. Nay, in foro interno, and in order to the direction of the spiritual life, it belongs in a way to the directors of souls. And this example (as in general the evangelical counsel of obedience, not only of the will but also of the intellect) is perhaps the easiest way of explaining, how infallibility in him who gives a command is not a necessary condition [for the propriety] of intellectual submission and obedience.
Corollary D.—The infallible authority and supreme magisterium of the Pontiff defining, had never anything whatever to do with the case of Galileo Galilei, and with the Abjuration of opinions enjoined him. For not only did not even a shadow of a Pontifical definition enter into that case, but in the whole of that decree of the Cardinals of the Holy Office, and in the form of Abjuration, the name even of the Pontiff is never found expressed. The documents may be read in full in "John Baptist Riccioli Almagist," Nov., p. 11, 1. ix., sect. 4, c. 40, p. 496, seqq. Nevertheless, in the then state of the question, the matter not having been yet cleared up, since the truth of the astronomical system, at that date by no means proved, supplied no foundation for interpreting the passages of Scripture in any other than the obvious sense, and since the most learned men of that time in physics and astronomy, as Tycho Brahe, Alexander Tasso, Christopher Scheiner, Antonio Delfino, Justus Lipsius (vide Riccioli, 1. c. p. 495), judged Galileo's opinion contrary to Scripture, it was certainly the business of the authority of ecclesiastical provision to take care that the interpretation of Scripture was not injured by conjectures and hypotheses, which seemed by no means likely to most people at the time. No examination of doctrine was instituted preparatory to its definition for the universal Church, for no one thought of such a thing; but a criminal process was held in the year 1633, in which, under these circumstances, no other judgment could be come to, than that which is contained in the final sentence of the judges. "In order that your serious and harmful error and transgression* may not remain altogether unpunished, and that you yourself may become more cautious for the future and be an example to others to abstain from such faults, we decree that the book of the Dialogues of Galileo Galilei be forbidden by public edict, and yourself we condemn to the common (formalem) prison of this Holy Office for a period to be fixed at our will; and as a wholesome penance we command that for the next three years you recite once in the week the seven penitential psalms; reserving to ourselves the power of moderating, changing, or taking away, wholly or in part, the aforesaid pains and penalties." **—Vide "Revue des Sciences Ecclesiastiques," 2C serie, t. iii., pp. 105 seqq. 217 seqq.
(* Galileo had broken the command enjoined him in 1616, which he had promised to obey, to the effect that " for the future he should not be allowed to defend the aforesaid false opinion, or teach it any way by word or writing." —Vide "Riccioli," 1. c. p. 498.)
(** This is not the place to speak of the falsehoods by which, long after the affair was finished and after Galileo's death, imaginary tales began (to be spread) about threats and tortures used against him. To refute them, it will be enough to read merely the narration of Vincenzo Viviani, Galileo's pupil and friend, in "Opp. Galilei, ed. Ticini," 1744., t. i., p. 64. See also "Marino Marini Galileo e 1' Inquisizione." Roma. 1850. "La Verite" sur lc Proces de Galilee," (" Melanges Scientifiques, etc., de M.
Biot." Paris. 1858, tom. iii. pp. 1, seqq.)
