This is an extension of thoughts I had about what Blachernae meant by the term "cause" in its opposition to Florence. I suggested there that Blachernae had in mind a distinction between originating and sustaining cause and that thinking about causality in this way might prove fruitful as a method of "talking across" the Eastern and Western theological divide. Of course, a number of people much more intimately familiar with the Scholastic teaching pointed out that the Latin view of causality certainly could not be expressed in this way, a conclusion with which I actually agreed. But I did not have in mind finding a common language between the views; rather, I had in mind using this distinction as a way of mapping how concepts were serving in the respective metaphysical explanations. That is what I hope to do here.
I. Cause in the Trinity
The unique problem with the idea of "cause" in the Trinitarian context is that it can't possibly be real. The Trinity is an eternal, unchanging reality, and literally everything that we know of causality involves change. But Scripture uses the terms "Father" and "Son" in a way that clearly licenses something like what we understand as causal relations, specifically begetting of offspring. If we try to purify the concept of all of its material attachments and connections to the changeable world to the extent that we can, we would likely be left with the notion of a relation and specifically an asymmetric relation between two things. Modern philosophy includes things like grounding relations and contingency relations that are asymmetrical in this sense without necessarily being causal, so the idea that "causal" relations might signify a broader logical concept is not inconceivable.
Historically, there appear to be two main approaches to how these Trinitarian relations are viewed: the relational model and the emanational model. I believe that Russell Friedman has correctly identified them in a way that applies far beyond the immediate medieval context of his work Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham. Each of these models is based on a different use of the term "relation" by Aristotle. One is relation as it is defined in the Categories, sometimes called a "relative" or "relative property," and the other is relation as used in the Metaphysics, specifically in this case concerning how a son (offspring) is "related" to a father who begat him. The major difference between these two approaches is that the latter is much more tied to nature, while the former essentially only involves relata that are not necessarily in any specific natural relationship to one another.
The distinctive feature of Latin anti-Homoian theology is that it was highly focused on power applied to causal relations and irreducibility and less concerned with matters of nature (essence). The notion that "Latin theology begins with the essence" is based on de Regnon's assumption that nature and operations were so intimately connected that theology focused on powers must necessarily be "essence-based." But the better term for it would be "relations-based" in the sense that the intersubjective causal relations within the Trinity were the real focus. This is covered well by Michel René Barnes in Augustine and Nicene Theology, and Barnes's conclusions follow Friedman and Paul Thom (The Logic of the Trinity) in finding the core concept of Latin theology to be these causal relations between irreducibly distinct Persons, as opposed to concepts about the essence like divine simplicity.
In contrast, it is fair to say that Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic cosmology, which was already focused intently on the reason for emanations, drove a much more intense interest in the ousia side of relations. The causal relations in Neoplatonism were responsible for the hierarchy of being emanating from the One, so as a philosophical matter, the nature of the One was of significantly more interest. Consequently, Origen and Origen-influenced theologians, such as the Cappadocian Fathers, naturally gravitated more to thinking about the nature of emanation in their understanding of hypostasis. By contrast, the less Origen-inclined Fathers, which included essentially the entire Latin West and the Alexandrian bishops (despite their proximity to Origen), tended not to concern themselves much with nature as opposed to the revealed divine works themselves. (Indeed, Cyril's use of terminology in this regard reflected a freer use of terms like ousia and physis, which eventually led to the miaphysite view, yet another historical misunderstanding over terminology.) Barnes speaks to the difference between West (power-based) and East (nature-based) theology as follows:
It is John 14:10 that becomes the basis for subsequent Latin arguments for the unity of power and the common operation between the Father and Son (and eventually, the Holy Spirit), and it is unity of power that becomes the dominant way of describing the unity between the Father and the Son among Latins with sympathy for Nicaea or with animus for anti-Nicenes. The language of unity of substance is dominant for Ossius of Cordova, Potamius of Lisbon, and Marius Victorinus. It is not dominant in the theologies of Phoebadius of Agen, Zeno of Verona, Faustinus, Niceta of Remesiana, Damasus of Rome and all the letters associated with him, and Ps.-Rufinus of Syria, which thus takes us from 359 to approximately 405. All these Latins lead with the concept of divine power rather than the concept of divine substance: Phoebadius, for example, understands the Sirmium (357) prohibition on essence language as meaning that he would not be allowed to preach the "one power." Hilary's exilic work and Ambrose of Milan's major writings are difficult to categorize because they represent *Latin* theologies confused with and by *Greek*.
This "almost common-sense" understanding of power in Latin theology, derived more from Cicero than any Greek philosopher, can be distinguished from the technical use of the term "power" in relation to nature in response to Eunomianism, an approach that Barnes documents in The Power of God: Dunamis in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology. Eunomian theology, which was a practical non-event in the West according to Barnes in ANT, became a central focus for the Cappadocians exactly because of its focus on what a nature is and how it was known. The Cappadocians famously distinguished the knowability of natures from knowledge of their powers and energies, which made complete sense in the context of the absurd Eunomian rationalism. But what makes this dynamic specifically interesting is that it situates Cappadocian theology very clearly on the emanational side of the divide, which was already true of their use of Origen's term hypostasis. (It is telling that Basil, who clearly fell on the Origenist side, famously disputed Athanasius for his flexibility with respect to Marcellus of Ancyra, who came out of the Latin tradition.) Notably, St. Gregory the Theologian in his Theological Orations used the Father-Son relation in the biological sense as paradigmatic. For example, in the Third Theological Oration, he says:
But they say, The Unbegotten and the Begotten are not the same; and if this is so, neither is the Son the same as the Father. It is clear, without saying so, that this line of argument manifestly excludes either the Son or the Father from the Godhead. For if to be Unbegotten is the Essence of God, to be begotten is not that Essence; if the opposite is the case, the Unbegotten is excluded. What argument can contradict this? Choose then whichever blasphemy you prefer, my good inventor of a new theology, if indeed you are anxious at all costs to embrace a blasphemy. In the next place, in what sense do you assert that the Unbegotten and the Begotten are not the same? If you mean that the Uncreated and the created are not the same, I agree with you; for certainly the Unoriginate and the created are not of the same nature. But if you say that He That begot and That which is begotten are not the same, the statement is inaccurate. For it is in fact a necessary truth that they are the same. For the nature of the relation of Father to Child is this, that the offspring is of the same nature with the parent. Or we may argue thus again. What do you mean by Unbegotten and Begotten, for if you mean the simple fact of being unbegotten or begotten, these are not the same; but if you mean Those to Whom these terms apply, how are They not the same? For example, Wisdom and Unwisdom are not the same in themselves, but yet both are attributes of man, who is the same; and they mark not a difference of essence, but one external to the essence. Are immortality and innocence and immutability also the essence of God? If so God has many essences and not one; or Deity is a compound of these. For He cannot be all these without composition, if they be essences.
...
How shall we pass over the following point, which is no less amazing than the rest? Father, they say, is a name either of an essence or of an Action, thinking to bind us down on both sides. If we say that it is a name of an essence, they will say that we agree with them that the Son is of another Essence, since there is but one Essence of God, and this, according to them, is preoccupied by the Father. On the other hand, if we say that it is the name of an Action, we shall be supposed to acknowledge plainly that the Son is created and not begotten. For where there is an Agent there must also be an Effect. And they will say they wonder how that which is made can be identical with That which made it. I should myself have been frightened with your distinction, if it had been necessary to accept one or other of the alternatives, and not rather put both aside, and state a third and truer one, namely, that Father is not a name either of an essence or of an action, most clever sirs. But it is the name of the Relation in which the Father stands to the Son, and the Son to the Father. For as with us these names make known a genuine and intimate relation, so, in the case before us too, they denote an identity of nature between Him That is begotten and Him That begets. But let us concede to you that Father is a name of essence, it will still bring in the idea of Son, and will not make it of a different nature, according to common ideas and the force of these names. Let it be, if it so please you, the name of an action; you will not defeat us in this way either. The Homoousion would be indeed the result of this action, or otherwise the conception of an action in this matter would be absurd. You see then how, even though you try to fight unfairly, we avoid your sophistries. But now, since we have ascertained how invincible you are in your arguments and sophistries, let us look at your strength in the Oracles of God, if perchance you may choose to persuade us out of them.
This is the textbook illustration of the action-passion relation in the Metaphysics, so it's a clear use of "relation" in the emanational sense. St. Gregory is therefore showing consubstantiality (homoousion) based on the begetter/begotten relation, as opposed to showing it directly from common power. This represents a different metaphysical approach from Augustine, who used relation in the sense of the Categories, following the Latin trajectory of power-to-relation. Likewise, the begetter/begotten context of emanation (going out of) situates the analogy squarely within the Neoplatonic tradition, while Augustine's psychological analogies are focused on causal production that does not exit the mind. So even before Constantinople, we are at a point where the causal relation is being differently understood along relational/emanational lines.
Another way to think about the relative emphasis of nature was the focus of Neo-Arianism in the East on agen(n)etos, the Father as "unoriginate" and "unbegotten." Eunomius was focused on the concept of the Father being unorginate as defining His unique nature, and this was not a view that ever appeared in the West. Thus, the Cappadocians deployed the concept of relation from the Metaphysics in response to Eunomius's philosophical error, but there is no indication that this was intended to exclude or replace the Latin view. Rather, it was intended to exclude the attempt by Eunomius to define the nature based on its activities.
This is the immediate patristic context for the ekporeusis of the Spirit, which can have a different technical meaning depending on how it is used. In the emanational context, ekporeusis has a stronger context of "coming out" or "going away." In the relational context, ekporeusis is more neutral, similar to the Latin processio. And once again, Cyril here has a freer use of the term indicative of the relational background of his theology. In terms of this linguistic difference, I found Wesley Scott Biddy's explanation in his dissertation titled "Creator Spirit, Spirit of Grace" to be enormously helpful. He reports the findings of Juan Miguel Garrigues, probably the most significant influence on the 1995 Clarification on the Filioque. I agree with Thomas Crean's argument in Vindicating the Filioque that Garrigues's firm distinction is overblown, but the summary Biddy gives below is nonetheless useful:
[I]n one of the most helpful sections of his paper, Garrigues discusses the differences between the words use for the Spirit's procession in the Greek and Latin versions of the Creed. The Greek ekporeusis denotes a passage out of an origin that distinguishes what goes forth from that in which it originates. The Latin procedere "has the inverse connotation," i.e., it means "to go forward giving place to that from which one moves away and to which by that very fact remains connected." Thomas Aquinas gives examples of processio that convey a "progression starting from the origin of what moves forward while maintaining with [the origin] a homogeneous link of communion: it is the same stroke which proceeds from [a] point into [a] line [drawn from a point], the same light which proceeds from the sun in [a] ray, the same water which proceeds from the spring into the stream." In each of these examples, "[t]he origin is not apprehended first of all as the principle from which a distinction issues," as in the Greek verb ekporeuomai, "but as the starting-point of a continuous process."
To apply this to causality, we can compare what I will call the "metaphysically thick" analogy of the emanational model to the "metaphysically thin" analogy of the relational model. In the thick analogy, what is being considered is the reason in the nature that causes the emanation, the end to which the emanator emanates. In that respect, Barnes in PG (p. 83) describes Aristotle's view as follows: "One important use of dunamis by Aristotle is in his argument for teleological causes in biological processes, primarily in the teleological nature of reproduction. Aristotle compares the formation of a fetus to the building of a house, for in both 'the process is for the sake of the actual thing [ousia], the thing is not for the sake of the process' [quoting Parts of Animals]." In the thick metaphysical analogy, therefore, it is absolutely necessary to maintain the monarchy of the Father as the single principle for the sake of which the emanations take place. There can only be one reason for the emanation of the other Persons, and this natural mode of existence cannot be shared on pain of creating multiple principles (arche) of the Godhead. In later Scholastic theology, this corresponds to St. Bonaventure's doctrine of the Father's primacy, and to the disagreement between St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas on whether the Father is Father because He generates (relational) or whether He generates because He is Father (emanational).
[Update -- My friend Nathaniel McCallum pointed out to me that citation from Arisotle here is inapt because the passage from Aristotle actually refers to the house existing for its own sake, not the sake of the artisan. That's true, and to clarify, I had in mind a "translation" of the concept to the Trinitarian context, in the same way that the "power" of begetting is "translated" into Trinitarian terms. In other words, just as the power of "begetting" takes on a different sense here, the power of "building" would likewise mutatis mutandis take on a different sense. Here, what I had in mind was the fact that the ousia to which the activity is ordered is the plan that the artisan has in mind (the formal cause), which is done for the sake of reasons (the final cause) (ST I, q. 36, a. 3, ans.) in an analogous way to the fact that begetting is ordered to reproducing an instance of the begetter's own ousia. But unlike the case of either begetting or building in the creaturely context, the ousia just is the incomposite being of God Himself, so this reference back to the begetter or builder (relation) is one of identity of substance, not merely likeness in some way. But it is a fair point that I did not actually take that concept itself from Aristotle; I instead believe it was the background for the use of the analogy in the Trinitarian concept of causality.]
The thin analogy abstracts causal relations from the nature entirely, basically reducing the notion of "origin" to a logical concept similar to the mathematical use of the term: that to which something else relates. Indeed, there is so little connection to the concept of cause that Latin theology does not use the term causa but instead principium (beginning) along with the weaker verb procedere. This fits perfectly with the mathematical example of the point as the beginning of the line, the principle from which the line proceeds. Indeed, one clear example of the Trinity along those lines is that the point is the principle of the line, the point and the line are together the principle of the plane, and the point remains the principle for the sake of which both line and plane are drawn. (I have previously offered the spherical coordinate system as a similar example of logical dependence.)
The reason I have found the notion of "image" (or more specifically "perfect image") so useful is that it is a concept that works in both the thick and the thin analogy. In the thin analogy, "image" relates back to the prototype, and in the case of perfect image, this is a relation of image and prototype in their respective wholeness. Thus, a "perfect image" is a relation in the metaphysical sense of the relation model. In the thick analogy, the vertical causality in emanationism means that lower beings in the hiearchy of being will be in some sense the image of what is above them, but only a perfect image will reproduce identically the prototype. This is the reason that St. Basil, for example, was able to say with the homoiousians that if the Son was perfectly like in nature to the Father, this would be the same doctrine taught by homoousios. It would only be differences, image in a less-than-perfect sense, that would put the Son on the level of creation, as something other than the "natural image" or offspring that is identical in nature. It is in this sense that "perfect image," whether it is labeled with the word "causal" or not (i.e., whether it is used to ground the natural reason for emanation in the emanational paradigm or whether it is a causal relation in the relational paradigm), ends up serving the same conceptual purpose in both paradigms.
II. Causality in Cappadocian pneumatology
The development of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit during the pro-Nicene period and through Constantinople took place largely after this distinction between the relational and the emanational model had already take place. Specifically, the background of the Cappadocian theology traces back to St. Gregory of Neocaesarea (the Wonderworker), who was a pupil of Origen and who was responsible for a mass conversion of people in his region from paganism to Christianity.
The longer version of Gregory's Creed is as follows:
There is one God, the Father of the living Word, who is His subsistent Wisdom and Power and Eternal Image: perfect Begetter of the perfect Begotten, Father of the only-begotten Son.
There is one Lord, Only of the Only, God of God, Image and Likeness of Deity, Efficient Word, Wisdom comprehensive of the constitution of all things, and Power formative of the whole creation, true Son of true Father, Invisible of Invisible, and Incorruptible of Incorruptible, and Immortal of Immortal and Eternal of Eternal.
And there is One Holy Spirit, having His subsistence from God, and being made manifest by the Son, [to wit to men]: Image of the Son, Perfect Image of the Perfect; Life, the Cause of the living; Holy Fount; Sanctity, the Supplier, or Leader, of Sanctification; in whom is manifested God the Father, who is above all and in all, and God the Son, who is through all.
There is a perfect Trinity, in glory and eternity and sovereignty, neither divided nor estranged. Wherefore there is nothing either created or in servitude in the Trinity; nor anything superinduced, as if at some former period it was non-existent, and at some later period it was introduced. And thus neither was the Son ever wanting to the Father, nor the Spirit to the Son; but without variation and without change, the same Trinity abides ever.
The shorter version of this text on the Holy Spirit is recounted by St. Gregory of Nyssa in his biography of Thaumaturgus as follows:
Ἑν πνεῦμα ἅγιον, ἐκ θεοῦ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχον, καὶ διὰ υἱοῦ πεφηνὸς, εἰκὼν τοῦ υἱοῦ τελείου τελεία, ζωὴ ζώντων αἰτία, ἀγιότης ἀγιασμοῦ χορηγός, ἐν ᾧ φανεροῦται θεὸς ὁ πατήρ, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ θεὸς ὁ υἱός, ὁ διὰ πάντων.
One Holy Spirit, having substantial existence from God, manifested through the Son, perfect image of the perfect Son, living cause of living things, sanctity and provider of sanctification, by whom God the Father is manifested, who is over all and in all, and God the Son, who is through all.
Let's ignore the "to wit to men" part, which is a later interpolation and which does not appear in Gregory Nyssen's version of the creed. If we take this as representative of the (Origenist) emanational view, then there is a distinction drawn here between having existence (hyparxis) from (ek) and being "manifested" (pephenos) by (dia) the Son. Another synonym for "manifested" -- phaneroutai -- is used at the end, and this use of synonyms for manifestation is typical. It corresponds to the relatively narrow use of ekporeuesthai as compared to other verbs for procession, such as proienai. Those familiar with Eastern theology will therefore certainly recognize these distinctions over and over: ekporeuesthai/proienai, from/through, having existence from/manifested by. As I will discuss in greater detail later, the connection of these distinctions to the economy/theology distinction or the essence/energies distinction is much weaker; I am persuaded that the arguments for such an "energetic procession" are entirely unconvincing. But this distinction between from and through pertaining to origin definitely exists.
If we turn back to the thick analogy for begetting, this makes sense. The Father is that for the sake of which emanations take place, in like matter to a natural father being that for the sake of which begetting takes place in Aristotle. This, therefore, is cause or arche in the sense of the reason for emanations, in like manner to the cause of begetting being the father and not the offspring. In that specific sense, the Father is the only cause of the Trinity. (For convenience in distinguishing the terms, I will sometimes refer to this sense as "E-cause," referring to its use in the emanational model.) It is not intended to explain how emanations take place, which is essentially incomprehensible and therefore not the proper subject of a thick analogy to natural begetting, but rather why they take place. That distinction is critical, and it should not be forgotten, because it pertains directly to how God transcends human understanding contra the Eunomians and contra any subordinationist tendencies lingering from Origen. This concept that for the sake of which is how the thick analogy to natural begetting serves to establish both the monarchy of the Father by nature and the Son's identical nature with the Father without breaching the divine transcendence.
This is all well and good with respect to the Son, Who is begotten, but it becomes somewhat complicated in the case of procession (ekporeusis), a mode of emanation that has no natural analogy but is only revealed. Here, it is unquestionable that the Father must remain the E-cause, since the Father must be the reason for all emanations to avoid Origenist subordinationism. But there is also a defining relationship between the Son and the Spirit that excludes the Spirit simply being another Son based on how each relates to the Father. In E-cause terminology, this defining relationship is non-causal (since there is only one E-cause), but it is nonetheless real in the sense of being an eternal relationship in the Trinity. As long as we do not take this sense of E-causality too literally, in terms of cause and effect, there is no essential contradiction between the Father being the sole reason for the sake of which the other Persons exist and there being an asymmetric dependency in the defining relationship between the other Persons. In the emanational model, that relationship could even be a symmetric relationship of mutual contingency; this is the assertion of a spirituque to balance the filioque.
In any case, the introduction of this concept of defining relationship that is non-causal in the sense of E-causality seems to be the purpose of the distinction of "manifestation" in Gregory's creed. Likewise, when the creed mentions "having hyparxis from," this seems to refer to the reason for emanation rather than a cruder analogy to material causality. Otherwise, the metaphysical analogy to natural begetting would've become too thick to apply in the divine context; it would be explaining how emanations take place as opposed to why.
By contrast, this crude analogy to natural begetting as production (rather than emanation) seems to be exactly what the creed attributed to Theodore of Mopsuestia is contemplating. Based on Thomas Crean's translation (p. 207), the section on the Holy Spirit reads (with my emphasis in bold):
We believe in the Holy Spirit, who is from the substance of God, who is not a Son, who is God by substance, being of the substance of which is God the Father, from whom according to substance he is. "For we have not," he says, "received the spirit of the world but the Spirit who is from God," separating him from all creation and joining Him to God, from whom he is in a proper manner beyong that of all creation; we consider creation to be from God not according to substance but by a creative cause; and we neither consider him a Son, nor as taking His being from the Son [oute dia Yiou ten hyparxis eilephos].
This uses very similar language as Thaumaturgus's creed (ek theou ten hyparxis echon) but there is a critical conceptual distinction here. While Gregory speaks of the Spirit having (echon) existence out of God (ek theou), which has the emanational context of Origen, Theodore here seems to have production by which existence is received (eilephos), which seems to confuse existence (hyparxis) with ousia. My sense is that this confusion is the same confusion that left the later Nestorian theology would be incapable of distinguishing ousia from hypostasis due to the Syriac concept of qnoma (expressed nature) being unable to pick out the nature from its instantiation. Notably, it rules out the reception by the Holy Spirit (lempsetai) in John 16:14 from being a reception of nature from the Son, even though this will end up being the standard interpretation in the West. As a result, Theodore seems to interpret the Spirit's having existence from the Father in a much more materialistic sense, viz., that which produces another thing, as opposed to the reason for emanations that characterizes Origenist and Cappadocian theology. For that reason, I would not consider this Antiochene tradition representative of the emanational model that is employed in Cappadocian theology. It needs to be converted from its own metaphysical idiom in order to avoid conflict with the Cappadocian tradition, much as as similar conversion was required to avoid the Nestorian implications.
Returning then to Cappaodican theology, this brings me to a significant disagreement Fr. Crean. I must first comment that this is an excellent text that I consider (along with Erick Ybarra's The Filioque) to have essentially reset the scholarship on this subject from where it has more or less rested since Ed Siecienski's The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy. Fr. Crean has made many critical observations that ought to have been made of the 1995 Clarification on the Filioque long ago. But I do believe that he has missed this distinction between relational and emanational models, which can help to explain differences between the Florentine view and the Cappadocian view.
In characterizing the Cappadocian view, Fr. Crean says (p. 122) "for St. Gregory, as for St. Basil, the words aitia or aition as used of the Father do not mean simply cause or principle, but rather 'first cause' or 'principle without principle.'" As far as I can tell, he is exactly correct; this is what I mean by E-cause. But Fr. Crean does not probe into why they make this distinction or how it was used. He makes two cursory references to the use of the phrase "image of the Son" by Gregory Thaumaturgus, an important point to be sure, but does not discuss the distinction between "having existence from" and "manifested by/through" that is the context in which it is raised. This leaves Fr. Crean (at p. 129-30) by his own admission without any real explanation for why St. Gregory Nazianzus writes as he does:
So striking, in fact, is the way in which the saint implies the hypostatic procession from the Son without ever stating it that I am inclined to think he acted thus by deliberate choice. Why he might have done so has already been suggested, when we considered Oration 31: a reluctance to give a new means of attack to his opponents or a new cause of perplexity to those wavering between Eunomianism and orthodoxy. More generally it seems that he had in mind the principle that he formulated when explaining why the New Testament had not explicitly spoken of the Holy Spirit as God: "You see lights breaking upon us, gradually; and the order of Theology, which it is better for us to keep, neither proclaiming things too suddenly, nor yet keeping them hidden to the end" (Oration 31, no. 37).
But this is not really an explanation of why making such a distinction is at all related to giving "a new means of attack to his opponents or a new cause of perplexity." That explanation is supplied by the thick analogy to natural begetting in the emanational model, which considers that for the sake of which natural begetting takes place. It is this analogy to natural production, applied to Neoplatonic emanation, that makes the need to establish the Father as the sole arche, as the sole reason for emanation, paramount to avoid Origenist subordination. So while Fr. Crean accurately discerns what the Cappadocians are saying about aitia, he does not hit correctly on why they are saying it, that is, the differences in metaphysical explanation that lead to it. In that respect, as we find with St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, those underlying differences in metaphysical explanation are likely dispositive for the different ways in which they exposit the doctrine.
III. Causality in Latin theology
We move now to the relational model. The Latin model, as summarized by Barnes, operates by three principles: (1) unity of works and power, (2) causal relations, and (3) irreducibility of Persons (subjects). With respect to "causal relations," Barnes has in mind the context of power; it is the causal explanation that the Person has the power to do divine works. In that respect, passages about what a Person "hears" or "receives" from another Person in terms of things like knowledge therefore directly map on to the eternal causal relations between those Persons. This relies on a thin metaphysical analogy for begetting with essentially no connection to biology; the preferred Latin analogy is the internal activities of the mind which "produce" ideas, not biological offspring. In application of these principles, the works of the Son in John 14:10, for example, illustrate that the Son receives His power from the Father and is therefore in the Father. This mutual indwelling is how the Son can say "I and the Father are One" with respect to divinity. So causality in this context refers to any derivative or dependent relation of power, which I will call "R-cause" (relational cause) to distinguish it from "E-cause."
Barnes has identified St. Niceta of Remesciana as probably the first systematic application of this Latin theology to the Holy Spirit. But even then, the Alexandrian saint Didymus the Blind (translated into Latin by St. Jerome) has notably already made a similar application to John 16, illustrating the common background for Roman and Alexandrian theology. Barnes sets the work of Niceta in context as follows:
The first Latin descriptions of the Holy Spirit in terms of the interior life of the Trinity occur in the writings of Marius Victorinus and Hilary of Poitiers, both of whom contribute significantly to Augustine's mature pneumatology. It is Hilary who offers a description of the Holy Spirit as interior or inner-Trinitarian 'Gift.' Ambrose of Milan is often treated as the first Latin theologian to articulate a theology of the full divinity of the Holy Spirit, and certainly his _On the Holy Spirit_ is the first lengthy Latin treatise on the Third Person. In fact, however, Ambrose's pneumatology follows in the foosteps of the earlier accomplishments of the Latin theologian, Niceta of Remesciana (as well as owing heavily to the Alexandrian, Didymus the Blind). It is Niceta who first articulates a Latin theology of the Holy Spirit that fully redresses the limitations of pneumatology since Tertullian.
Niceta describes in detail the power and operations of the Holy Spirit: he says explicitly that it is only by the causal trail of power and operations that we know the Father and the Son are divine, and the same hermeneutic holds in the case of the Holy Spirit. We cannot fully know the nature of the Holy Spirit unless we know his works. Niceta then argues strongly that the Holy Spirit creates in common with the Father and Son: he cites both Psalms 33 and 104 as authorities for this judgment, restoring them as testimonies to the Holy Spirit's creative activity (and not only to the Son's). In short, like the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit creates, lives like, foreknows, fills all things, judges all, and is good. These activities are works that the Holy Spirit performs in common with the Father and the Son, exhibiting the one power that they all share in common, and which is the sign of their common divinity.
Barnes notes that in the second half of the fourth century, when Niceta was writing, there were some Latins and Greeks who would "press the point that either the Holy Spirit is a creature or he is not; and if not, then he is either unbegotten or a Son." In response to this assertion, Niceta gives his own account as follows:
Niceta replies by saying that the Holy Spirit is not a creature -- as his works and power reveal -- and we cannot limit the causal options in God to unbegotten or begotten. Scripture gives us a causality other than generation; namely, procession (John 15:26). This type of causality is not obvious to unaided reason, but once revealed by Scripture a meaningful and coherent account (logic) of God's natural productiveness can be developed. With this perspective, an exegetical pattern emerges from Scripture: "spirit" passages associated with God's "breathing" or "exhaling" are images of the Third Person's origin from the Father through "procession."
But while he has established the foundation for later Latin theologians to infer causal relations between the Son and the Spirit, such as from John 20:22, Niceta himself does not draw such inferences. Barnes notes that "the weakness of Niceta's pneumatology that results in the historical occlusion of his contribution to late-Nicene doctrines of the Holy Spirit is that it lacks any account of the internal (inner Trinitarian) relationship of the Spirit to the Father and the Son. In this regard Niceta offers less than Victorinus and Hilary, and thus it is with the aid of these latter two authors that Augustine develops his doctrine of the Holy Spirit's procession from the Father and the Son." Nonetheless, Niceta has connected causality and exegesis in a new way in the context of the Spirit, and that approach will be influential on St. Ambrose of Milan's later treatise (which depended on concepts from St. Niceta, St. Didymus, and St. Basil).
Ultimately, St. Augustine is the one who takes all of these ideas to fruition in what Barnes calls his "last pneumatology" in Tractate 99 on John and his works against Maximinus. There St. Augustine finally deploys the Latin theology in a fully causal and power-based account of the Spirit's origin. Specifically, Augustine connects the Spirit's work both in creation and in the economy of salvation together with the Latin theological rules of R-causality to provide a full causal account of the filioque that he initiated in de Trinitate. Barnes cites as an example of his conceptual development that Augustine uniquely relies on the Power going out of the Son as described in multiple Lukan passages to illustrate the causal relation between the Son and the Spirit. This is an argument that had not been used in Latin theology before, but it fits perfectly with the rules of inference that Latin theology uses.
IV. E-causality and R-causality
To recap, we have arrived at two distinct accounts of causality in the Trinity associated with the emanational and relational models.
E-causality: That for the sake of which emanation of the Persons takes place, in analogy to the sense in which natural begetting is "for the sake of" the father who begets. This account is associated with Origen, St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, and the Cappadocian Fathers.
R-causality: That with respect to which something is defined, in analogy to the point as the generator of a line and the line as the generator of a plane. It is also analogized to the interior productions of the mind. This account is associated with the Alexandrian and Latin Fathers.
The doctrine of the Holy Spirit was developed during the pro-Nicene period, so the separation between the Latin-Alexandrian view and the Cappadocian view was already in play. In "The filioque impasse resolved," I argued that this separation was due to the rejection of the vertical causality of the Neoplatonic model used in Origen, which (as per Khaled Anatolios) was rejected explicitly by Athanasius. I have since come across a dissertation by Barnes's student Kellen Plaxco titled "Didymus the Blind, Origen, and the Trinity," which convincingly makes the argument that Didymus likewise rejected this aspect of Origenism. (Plaxco's explanation of Origen's use of "perfect image" is likewise instructive for the use of "perfect image" in St. Gregory Thaumaturgus's creed.) Meanwhile, in the West, the Intelligible Triad used by Origen to model the Trinity was not influential at all based on Barnes's survey of Latin theologians. The mistaken belief that the Neoplatonic Intelligible Triad was influential in Latin theology appears to trace to Olivier du Roy's assertions about Augustine, which had been blindly followed by numerous scholars in both East and West until the recent critical work of Barnes and Lewis Ayres. In contrast, the Cappadocians, while clearly rejecting any of Origen's subordinationism, nevertheless showed greater affinity for the emanational model purified of those implications.
The difference in the approaches manifests itself in the clearest passage concerning the cause of the Holy Spirit: John 16:12-16.
“I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth, for he will not speak on his own authority, but whatever he hears he will speak, and he will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, for he will take what is mine and declare it to you. All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you.
The E-causal account is concerned to affirm that the Father is the only cause for emanations. In the context of causality here, the emanational model will emphasize that what the Holy Spirit receives is what the Father has, downplaying or denying that the Son actually gives anything. The R-causal account, on the contrary, reads "what is mine" as establishing a defining relationship between the Son and the Spirit, so that what the Spirit receives is defined relative to the Son as well as the Father.
As an example of R-causality, the work On the Holy Spirit, a Latin translation by St. Jerome of Didymus's work, reads as follows:
Here again, to ‘take’ is to be understood, so as to be in harmony with the Divine Nature. For as the Son, when He gives, is not deprived of those things which He gives, nor, with loss to Himself, imparts to others, so also the Spirit does not receive what what He had not before. For if He receive what before He had not, when the gift is transferred to another, the Giver is emptied, ceasing to have what He gives. As then above, when disputing of incorporeal natures, we understood, so now too we must know, that the Holy Spirit receives from the Son that which had been of His own nature, and that this signifies, not a giver and a receiver, but one substance. Inasmuch as the Son is said to receive of the Father that, wherein He himself subsists. For neither is the Son ought besides what is given to Him from the Father, nor is the substance of the Holy Spirit other, besides what is given Him by the Son.
Even if we don't accept that this work was authored by Didymus, although that is highly likely, the Latin redaction shows exactly what we would expect in the Latin view and what we see in numerous Latin authors. To deny R-causality in this passage would simply be to deny the entire Latin theology of the Trinity.
We can take St. John Damascene as an example of the E-causal account. In On the Holy Trinity (trans. Nicholas Roumas), he uses language from St. Gregory Thaumaturgus's creed with the interpolation "that is, to men" in the following description of the Spirit:
one holy Spirit, having its existence from God, and sprouting [manifesting/pephynos] through the Son, that is, to men. Perfect image of the Son, life, cause of life, holy source of holiness, bestower of sanctification, in whom is manifested God the Father, who is upon all and in all, and God the Son, who is through all
In The Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith 1.8, John explicitly invokes the analogy to natural generation:
For He could not have received the name Father apart from the Son: for if He were without the Son , He could not be the Father: and if He thereafter had the Son, thereafter He became the Father, not having been the Father prior to this, and He was changed from that which was not the Father and became the Father. This is the worst form of blasphemy. For we may not speak of God as destitute of natural generative power: and generative power means, the power of producing from one's self, that is to say, from one's own proper essence, that which is like in nature to one's self.
Like the Cappadocians, then, he will have the concerns to make the Father the exclusive E-cause. This provides the context for what nearly appears to be a self-contradiction in John's work. First, there is this statement in 1.8, which is similar to On the Holy Trinity:
And we speak likewise of the Holy Spirit as from the Father, and call Him the Spirit of the Father. And we do not speak of the Spirit as from the Son: but yet we call Him the Spirit of the Son. For if any one has not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His, says the divine apostle [Rom. 8:9]. And we confess that He is manifested and imparted to us through the Son. For He breathed upon His Disciples, says he, and said, Receive the Holy Spirit [John 20:29].
Then these are in 1.12:
And the Holy Spirit is the power of the Father revealing the hidden mysteries of His Divinity, proceeding from the Father through the Son (ek Patros di Yiou ekporeumenon) in a manner known to Himself, but different from that of generation.
...
But the Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Father but the Spirit of the Father as proceeding from the Father. For there is no impulse without Spirit. And we speak also of the Spirit of the Son, not as through proceeding from Him, but as proceeding through Him from the Father. For the Father alone is cause.
As might be expected, I must again disagree with Fr. Crean's assessment of St. John Damascene, for exactly the reason I have above: I believe Fr. Crean has missed this distinction between the emanational and relational models. (That being said, I agree with his general conclusion that St. John did not actually oppose the filioque.)
Fr. Crean says the following:
Since we have argued above that Damascene has in mind an active role for the Son in the procession, it would follow here that he intends [by saying the Father alone is cause] to simply affirm that the Father alone is principle without principle, and hence that he is not really denying the Filioque. According to [José] Grégoire, St. John has no polemical intent in his Trinitarian writings except against Arians and Manichees. At the same time, he apparently lacks the concept of the Father and Son as a single principle of the procession, as well as Augustine's explanation of what it means for the Holy Spirit to proceed principaliter from the Father. For this reason, Damascene is not able to produce a fully satisfactory synthesis of his thought, a sign of which fact is the absence of any explanation in his work of the "rest" of the Holy Spirit in the Son. One may say that while the deeper tendency of his thought is in favor of the Filioque, a habit of language has grown up that obstructs the expression of the doctrine.
There is a much simpler explanation; what St. John is denying is that any other Person is that for the sake of which the Persons are emanated (the E-cause). He is not denying the R-causality of the Son and, on the contrary, he says many things that affirm it at least implicitly. As Fr. Crean observes "to be 'between' the Father and the Son, while it is not explained by either Nazianzen or Damascene implies that a relation to both the Father and the Son is intrinsic to the person of the Holy Spirit." In particular, Fr. Crean critiques Damascene's use of the image of the Spirit "resting on/in" the Son, but this is surely nothing other than the description of the Spirit as the eternal anointing/Kingdom of the Son used by St. Gregory of Nyssa and others. This is definitely R-causality -- that the Spirit is defined relative to the Father and the Son -- albeit with due care not to compromise the E-causality (monarchy) of the Father. Certainly, the "habit of language" is not to use the term aitia (cause or principle) or the preposition ek in connection with the emanation of the Spirit (procession) except in connection with the Father in order to avoid any possibility that his E-causality would be compromised.
As to the relation to St. Augustine that Fr. Crean cites, if I am correct, the reason that Augustine would have relatively little traction at the East is exactly that the East was operating primarily in the emanational model, especially after Pseudo-Dionysius, while the Western use of the relational model made Augustine a supremely magisterial figure in Latin theology. Damascene's mental model is that of emanation, so the psychological analogy to internal production would have been much riskier in that context, even though he is comfortable using elements of the analogy even in his own writing. Perhaps the best evidence that they can be reconciled is that St. Bonaventure, who was steeped in Augustine theology and the psychological model, could develop his own emanational model based directly on St. John's work. As Friedman describes, "[t]he later-medieval emanation account itself had its roots in various texts by Augustine, by John Damascene (John of Damascus, d. ca. 750), by Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109), and most particularly by Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) in his word De trinitate [esp. Books IV-VI]." Given that Bonaventure is revered as the Seraphic Doctor of the Church, it is hard to imagine clearer evidence that Damascene's account, which focuses on E-causality and emanations, nevertheless does not conflict with the R-causal account that Augustine developed based on relations in the Categories.
Perhaps I may gently chide Fr. Crean for living up to his order's calling a bit too zealously. As Friedman recounts, "[i]t was only in the middle of the thirteenth century, however, that the relation account and the emanation account began to be considered mutually exclusive, so that a theologian could not be a proponent of both the one and the other. As mentioned above, Dominicans overwhelmingly held the relation account, whereas Franciscans held the emanation account. In fact, in the late thirteenth century there arose rival trinitarian traditions, a Dominican trinitarian tradition clustered around the relation account, and a Franciscan trinitarian tradition centered on the emanation account." While Friedman notes that this is "a very broad shorthand," "these groups of theologians form 'traditions' in the sense that each involved a different general approach to the Trinity that in turn led to a relatively stable complex of views; these views were handed down from scholar to scholar within the tradition and were further developed in conscious opposition of the views of the other tradition." Importantly, Friedman then says that "[t]his divergence of views is already clear in Bonaventure and Aquinas." But if we do not take the Angelic Doctor as excluding the Seraphic and if we see this divergence of views as a permissible diversity in concept concerning the inconceivable, then I would say that Bonaventure can teach us much about what the Cappadocians and the Damascene had in mind.
V. Resolving historical conflicts with the E-causal and R-causal models
If my account is correct, then the distinction between the relational and emanational model likely dates back to different schools of Origenist though. Specifically, St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, Origen's pupil who firmly established Christianity in the Cappadocian region, and St. Didymus the Blind, who inherited Origen's Catechetical School in Alexandria and who greatly influenced St. Athanasius, developed emanational and relational theological accounts of the Trinity. Latin anti-monarchian theology was a common influence in both Rome and Alexandria, with the so-called "Rome-Alexandria axis" certainly persisting during this time period, so the common features of the relational model in Rome and Alexandria were extensive. But even in Alexandria, the acceptance of the relational mode was not monolithic, since there remained Origenist monks who adhered closely to the older theology of Origen himself. But in terms of the dominant account in Alexandria, the Alexandrian relational theology ended up developing along more or less the same lines as the Latin theology, even though the technical use of the category "relation" was a specifically Augustinian development in the West. To the extent that there was friction between the models, then, one would expect that friction to manifest itself long before the later East-West (and even later Dominican-Franciscan) conflicts.
A. The Synod of the Oak
I would argue that the first such conflict was between St. Theophilus of Alexandria and St. John Chrysostom at the Synod of the Oak. Theophilus was dealing with the problem of "uncorrected" Origenism, which had not been purged of the vertical causality and Middle Platonic influence, as contrasted with Athanasius's own Christianized view. This resulted in the Origenist monks known as the Tall Brothers fleeing eastward to the protection of the Emperor in Constantinople, where Chrysostom was Patriarch. St. John was steeped in the emanational model of Antiochene and Cappadocian theology, so he undoubtedly saw similarities between the Origenist theology and his own. The Emperor summoned Theophilus to answer for his condemnation of these monks, whom Chrysostom considered innocent. But through some astute maneuvering on the part of Theophilus (and notably after a failed attempt to enlist the support of St. Epiphanius of Salamis against Chrysostom), Theophilus managed to get St. John deposed as Patriarch. This was highly controversial among the people of Constantinople, who ended up recalling Chrysostom to the patriarchate, but his political enemies remained influential, and he was eventually deposed and exiled shortly before his death. Nonetheless, both St. John Chrysostom and St. Cyril of Alexandria, who supported Theophilus in having Chrysostom condemned, are revered among the greatest Doctors of the Church. This seems to be a clear example of how the difference between emanational and relational models could create division even among unquestionably orthodox Fathers.
B. The Nestorian controversy
The next major incident also involved Cyril. In this case, it related to the reconciliation between Cyril and John of Antioch concerning the Nestorian controversy. In this case, the conflict was triggered not by the emanational model itself but by the cruder "production" model of Theodore of Mopseustia. Mar Theodore had claimed that the Spirit "does not receive his existence" from the Son. Following this tradition, Theodoret objects to Cyril's account of the Holy Spirit in his ninth anaethema against the Nestorians as follows (quoted from Crean at p. 208):
We will confess that the Spirit is proper to the Son, receiving this as a religious expression, if [Cyril] means that he is of the same nature as him and proceeds from the Father. But if he means in the sense of from [ek] the Son, or having existence through the Son [di Yiou ten hyparxis echon], we reject this as impious blasphemy.
Cyril's response (quoted from Crean at p. 209) follows exactly the R-causal account of the Spirit by the Son, using the exegesis of John 16 as per the relational model, while also taking care to deny that the Son is the E-cause of the Spirit:
The Spirit was and is his, just as the Father's.... The Holy Spirit proceeds from God and the Father, according to the word of the Savior, but he is not foreign to the Son, for he has all things with the Father. And he himself taught this, saying about the Holy Spirit: "All that the Father has are mine. Therefore I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you."
This is, of course, how every Latin and Alexandrian theologian takes John 16. The Son is the R-cause of the Spirit, since the Spirit's existence is defined relative to the Son, but not the E-cause of the Spirit in the sense of that for the sake of which the Spirit is emanated. Thus, in response to Theodoret's production model, Cyril replies with the relational model. He later reiterated this explanation at in his explanation of the Ninth Anathema, approved by the Council of Ephesus (quoted from Crean at pp. 201-202):
Although the only-begotten Word of God became man, yet he remained God, having all things which the Father has beside paternity; and he worked divine signs, having as his own the holy Spirit, who is from himself [to ex autou], and substantially innate to him [ousiodos emphekos auto].
But much like Nestorius himself in the Bazaar of Heracleides, Theodoret can never quite get his head around the Alexandrian theology. Like Nestorius, Theodoret viewed Chalcedon as a repudiation of Cyril's theology at Ephesus, a complete misunderstanding resulting from the divide between the relational and emanational models (or, in Theodoret's case, the cruder version of production rather than emanation). In explaining to John of Antioch why Chalcedon supposedly repudiated the twelve anathemas, Theodoret says (at Crean p. 210) "the Holy Spirit is not of the Son nor derives existence through the Son [ouk ex Yiou e di Yiou ten hyparxis echon], but proceeds from the Father, and is proper to the Son as being of one substance." According to Fr. Crean, Martin Jugie believed that when this phrase had been used in Theodoret's theology, Theodoret only "wished to make a double denial that the Holy Spirit was a creature." I agree with Fr. Crean that this explanation is inadequate. For my own part, I think Theodoret's error is due to his more primitive understanding of emanation as simple production, which he inherited from Theodore of Mopsuestia. Regardless, Siecienski's assertion in The Filioque that Cyril somehow acceded to Theodoret's assertion that the Spirit does not derive His existence from the Son (in the sense of R-causality) is completely implausible, while the distinction between the emanational and relational models provides a ready explanation for the misunderstanding between Alexandria and Antioch.
C. Justinian and Second Constantinople
The post-Chalcedonian era saw unprecedented disruption in the Christian East. Dioscorus of Alexandrian broke off his miaphysite church from the rest of the East, thereby also breaking one of the only major paths of regular communication between West and East. This separation was further exacerbated by the resurgence of Homoian Arianism among the Goths, which turned the attention of the Roman Church to its own survival. In addition to the Christian world's having been split in half by these developments, the aforementioned Origenist monks, especially those in the tradition of Evagrius of Pontus, had their own resurgence, and Monophysitism outside of Alexandria had become more widely influential in the Christian East, although under heavy persecution.
This was the environment in which the Christian author who claimed the title of Dionysius the Areopagite first wrote. As Rosemary Arthur recounts in Pseudo-Dionysius as Polemicist,
Christological disputes at the time of [Pseudo-Dionysius's] writing were the single most important cause of disunity in the Church. The Monophysite party was particularly unfortunate in this respect, divided as it was into numerous sub-groups, each accusing the other of heresy. Riven as it was by dissension and political intrigue, and distressed by persecution, the church of the early sixth century was in sore need of a theological authority to whom to appeal. The Monophysites had turned to Cyril of Alexandria for support, but even he was also claimed by the opposition in support of their views. As for the scriptures, the longstanding dispute between Antiochene and Alexandrian exegetes meant that there was no agreement here either. What was needed was an authority of the apostolic or sub-apostolic period who just happened to address the problems of the sixth century! Care needed to be taken here, because the Monophysites were already suspected of producing forgeries in defence of their arguments. The work had to be produced anonymously, since no Monophysite theologian would be accepted by the Chalcedonians or vice versa. Any overt admission of the author's Origenism would also have been a disadvantage at the time of writing, which is likely to have been between 527 and 529 AD. The accession of Justinian is of some relevance here.
Arthur believes that Sergius of Reshaina, the translator of the Dionysian corpus into Syriac, was likely the author. As Arthur relates, Sergius had the Syrian background for the Dionysian angelology, and he had been trained in Alexandrian so that he would have exposure to Neoplatonism, Judaica, and even alchemy and theurgy, all of which are demonstrated in Dionysius's writings. Arthur's summary of Sergius's unique biography is worth examining:
Sergius' ability to be on good terms with all sorts of people whose religious views were quite different from his own has led to some uncertainty about his true allegiance. If one takes a charitable view of his activities, he was sufficiently moderate and conciliatory to be entrusted by Ephraim of Antioch with a mission to Pope Agapetus in Rome in 536 AD, a time when the Monophysite bishops were being persecuted. A less charitable view would be that he knew where his best advantage lay, and was prepared to exploit it in the interest of his own personal success. When Ephrem of Antioch offered him money to betray the Monophysites by turning Agapetus against them, Sergius was only too willing to accept. This has led to an assumption that he was a Chalcedonian. He is also said to have been on good terms with the Nestorians. His close friend and pupil Theodore, to whom he dedicated several treatises, was a Nestorian priest, later bishop of Merv. Abd-Isho includes Sergius in his list of Nestorian writers. He is also described as a Nestorian priest in Georr's introduction to Sergius' translation of the Categories of Aristotle. Although nominally a Monophysite, Sergius' real sympathies seem to have lain with the Origenists. A physician by profession, Sergius was educated in Alexandria.
On the Chalcedonian side, there was a similarly broad-minded figure in the form of Leontius of Byzantium, himself a former Nestorian turned Chalcedonian by the writings of Cyril of Alexandria. Johannes Zachhuber provides an in-depth analysis of Leontius in his survey of Byzantine theology titled The Rise of Christian Philosophy and the End of Ancient Metaphysics. Like Sergius of Reshaina, Leontius was sympathetic to the Origenists (to the point that he has been mistaken for one), while seeing the Nestorians and the Monophysites as two wrong extremes in the way that Sabellianism and Arianism were two wrong extremes about the Trinity. In particular, Zachhuber notes that Leontius "never embraces the more radically Cyrillene interpretation of the Council's creed, often dubbed neo-Chalcedonianism, that is found in John the Grammarian and, later, in Pamphilus, Theodore of Raithu, and Leontius of Jerusalem."
Zachhuber summarizes Leontius's approach as follows:
Throughout his works, it is evident how much Leontius took the Capadocian philosophy for granted as the incontrovertible foundation for Patristic thought. Problems arising from his confrontations with opponents of Chalcedonian Christology are inevitably tackled on the basis of Cappadocian terms and concepts; it is perfectly evident that he believed these to form the conceptual basis for the solution of the Christological problem as much as, in their time, they solved the trinitarian conundrum.
Dionysius and Leontius unquestionably were the basis of the Byzantine theological synthesis that came after. And given the factions that they were attempting to reunite under the Chalcedonian banner, it is clear that the emanational model dominated the discussion. It was the one common factor of Nestorian, Cappadocian, and Origenist theology, and it had the prospect of reaching Eastern Monophysites as well, which practically rendered the older Alexandrian relational model obsolete. The prospect of reunion on the basis of a new theological synthesis was an object of obsession for the Emperor Justinian. It is at this point that the emanational and relational models will collide once again.
Justinian sought to gain support from the Miaphysites and the Origenists by condemning their old enemies, the Nestorians, in the form of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Ibas of Edessa, and Theodoret of Cyrus. He condemned the writings, which became known as the Three Chapters, and ordered his hand-picked Pope Vigilius to do the same. At this point, the Latin-speaking bishops, who knew only the relational model and often did not even know Greek well enough to meaningfully interpret the writings anyway, saw themselves as being asked to undermine Chalcedon, which taught the faith exactly as they understood it. If Chalcedon had no objection, then how could these writings be incompatible with the faith? Vigilius had this position in mind when he journeyed to Constantinople, immediately excommunicating Patriarch Mennas for signing the condemnation, which Vigilius saw as a rebuke of Chalcedon.
At Constantinople, Vigilius was persuaded that, while the men themselves were not condemned by Chalcedon, it was still possible that their writings could be. On that basis, he reviewed certain passages from the Three Chapters and concluded that they were worthy of condemnation, issuing his Iudicatum against them. This triggered an explosive reaction among the Latin bishops, who knew that it was going to undermine their ability to defend the authority of Chalcedon and who knew nothing of what so-called errors may have been in the Three Chapters. In response, Vigilius rescinded the condemnation and pleaded with the Emperor not to order them condemned before holding a general council. Justinian agreed to the council, but then reissued the condemnation anyway.
The point here is not a dogmatic one. The Latins always believed Chalcedon; Vigilius repeatedly affirmed Chalcedon in his assessment of the Three Chapters. Chalcedon was their standard for orthodoxy, and nothing ever changed in that regard. What happened is that the Emperor attempted to drag the papal authority into this Eastern struggle over the orthodoxy of the emanational model, a struggle to which the West was more or less indifferent they knew essentially nothing about it. And Justinian's misunderstanding, his failure to see the difference in the emanational and relational models, only exacerbated the alienation between East and West that had already resulted from the loss of Alexandria. After this, there would be no meaningful theological interchange between East and West, so that they began to drift further and further apart.
As an example of how far Justinian's personal obsession was driving the Fifth Ecumenical Council at the expense of good will, once it became clear that the condemnation of the Nestorians was not going to obtain reunion with the Origenists, he immediately turned on them as well. This was such a late addition to the Council that it isn't even clear whether the condemnation of Origenism was actually part of the Council (the records of the acts in the West do not record it). And just as with the Latin theology, Justinian was careless with Origenist theology. His real target was (or should've been) the Evagrian Origenism that proliferated in the East, but instead, he condemned not only Evagrius and Origen himself but also other historical figures, such as Didymus the Blind and Leontius of Byzantium, who had actually been critical of Origen's teaching when they reproduced it. Ironically, if Justinian had followed the more pluralistic model of the Fathers rather than trying to force everyone into one Great Byzantine Synthesis, he might have actually succeed in bringing about greater unity.
D. Maximus and the monothelites
While I may have had some disagreement with Fr. Crean, his chapter on St. Maximus the Confessor is masterful. The care he has taken in exegesis, especially in the Letter to Marinus, has elucidated the logic in Maximus's writing on this subject clearly and sensibly. The key observation that Fr. Crean makes is that the phrase en alle lexei te kai phone, which is often translated as "in their mother tongue," actually should mean "in the characteristic and accustomed" speech, meaning in their theological idiom. In other words, through his long experience in the West, Maximus has correctly perceived that there is a different theological language between East and West, but despite this difference, they can share the same dogma. Correctly understood, the remainder of the passage does not accuse the Latins of any inability, difficulty or harm in expressing themselves in Latin, as it is often interpreted, but rather points out that they will be subject to "the deceits of those who have lapsed," i.e., the Monothelites. As Fr. Crean (p. 234) puts it, "St. Maximus is thus warning that the phrase procedere ex Filio leaves the Latins open to the tricks or guile of those who have lapsed from the faith, meaning the monothelites."
What Maximus perceives here is that this language will be (deliberately, in the case of the Monothelites) misinterpreted to assert that the West is denying the sole E-causality of the Father. In other words, Maximus is the last theologian to have a deep understanding of both theological paradigms in the way that Cyril did, although others (specifically Pope Hadrian and Pope Leo III) will continue to see compatibility between the views. Maximus is unique because he was the last significant figure to be deeply engaged in both theological cultures. As a result, Maximus invokes the same from/through distinction found in the emanational model, which protects the monarchy (E-causality) of the Father while still allowing R-causality of the Son, along the same lines as Cyril. This appears to be the last such consciously "bilingual" approach. St. John Damascene, as we have seen previously, is squarely within the emanational model. While Damascene doesn't contradict the R-causal model, he does not show anything like Maximus's awareness of it.
Likewise, Siecienski shows no awareness of the two models. He discusses Maximus's view at p. 77 (my emphasis in bold):
The last point becomes important in discussing the relationship of the Son and Spirit in Maximus's thought, since the Father who spirates is always the Father of the Son (with whom he is in eternal relation). In the "trinitarian order" (taxis), the Spirit, being third, proceeds from the First Cause (i.e. the Father) in such a way that he comprehends the Father's eternal relation to the only-begotten Son. Thus while he does not derive hypostatic origination from the Son, his procession from the Father does presuppose the Son's existence.
...
In this text [exegesis of Zech. 4:2-3 on the lampstand image] one notes the centra mediatory role of the incarnate Logos, who not only illumines humanity but also pours forth the gifts of the Spirit upon the Church. In this senset it can be said that the Spirit, like a light, flows from the Father through the Son. This passage clearly echoes Gregory Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, both of whom had utilized the image of light and flame to show the flow from the unoriginate source (the Father) through another (the Son) to shine forth in another (the Spirit). Yet in context all three fathers appear to be referencing the economic manifestation of the Trinity and the way Christians come to experience, in time, the gifts of the Spirit.
The bolded assertions, which are essentially completely external to the writings of the authors to which he is appealing, show the influence of the emanational model. But even worse, it is not the emanational model; it is the crude "production" model of Theodore of Mopseustia and Theodoret, which corrupts Siecienski's reading of both the Alexandrian and Latin Fathers. Had he recognized that the E-causal account does not exclude the R-causal account, Maximus can be read in complete continuity with the emanational model of the Cappadocians (though not the production model of Theodoret). He affirms E-causality for the Father alone but does not contradict R-causality for both the Father and the Son, just as St. Gregory Nazianzus did and St. John Damascene will later do.
Siecienski apparently makes the same mistake with respect to the subsequent reception of Maximus's writings in the West. In discussing the use of Maximus by Anastasius the Librarian, Siencienski quotes at p. 108 the following passage:
Moreover, we have from the letter written by the same Saint Maximus to the priest Marinus concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, where he implies that the Greeks tried, in vain, to make a case against us, since we do not say that the Son is a cause or principle of the Holy Spirit, as they assert. But, not incognizant of the unity of substance between the Father and the Son, as he proceeds from the Father, we confess that he proceeds from the Son, understanding processionem, of course, as "mission" [Sed, unitatem substantiae Patris ac Filii non nescientes, sicut procedite ex Patre, ita eum procedere fateamur ex Filio, missionem nimirum processionem intelligentes].
Leaving aside how persuasive Anastasius is as an orthodox Latin theologian representative of the tradition (which is somewhat doubtful), Siecienski's assertion that the term "mission" here as purely economic definitely conflicts with Latin theology. Given the use of the term "mission" in both prior and subsequent Latin theology, this would be an entirely normal use of the Latin theological rules to infer the eternal causal relationship from the economy. Assuming that Anastasius is not coming out of nowhere with his views here, he would have distinguished the Father's E-causality (the sense in which He is the only cause or principle) from the Father and the Son's R-causality. That he is referring to R-causality in this context is confirmed clearly by the fact that he is speaking of the eternal unity of substance between the Father and the Son "as [the Spirit] proceeds from the Father." Anastasius attributes this to linguistic differences rather than conceptual differences, suggesting that, unlike Maximus, he does not perceive two distinct models at work here. Yet that does not prevent him from affirming the traditional position that E-causality and R-causality are not in conflict with one another.
E. The Caroline Books and Nicaea II
In a clear demonstration that the failure to under the other paradigm goes both ways, the Frankish theologians displayed their ignorance of the emanational paradigm in responding to Patriarch Tarasius's
confession that "the Holy Spirit is not from the Father and the Son according to the most true and holy rule of faith but proceeds from the Father and the Son." If Theodoret exemplifies the crude version of the emanational model, the Frankish theologians surely represent the crude version of R-causality. They see the filioque as excluding the unique property of the Father as that for the sake of which the emanations take place (i.e., the E-cause). Pope Hadrian, in response, correctly interprets the Eastern Fathers as affirming the E-causality of the Father without thereby denying the R-causality of the Father (in this case, couched in the Augustinian account of relations that were cited in the Caroline Books). While not offering a sophisticated account of how the relational and emanational models differ, Pope Hadrian does at least acknowledge that the crude Frankish understanding of the relational model will not suffice to reject the Eastern understanding. Pope Hadrian is therefore another example of how a Latin theologian affirming the relational model (R-causality) in the filioque need not contradict the emanational model's assertion of the Father as the sole E-cause.
The same approach was maintained by Hadrian's successor Pope Leo III. While agreeing that the doctrine of R-causality represented in the filioque was essential dogma and saying that "it is forbidden not to believe such a great mystery of the faith," he likewise recognized that the Nicene Creed served a valuable purpose in keeping East and West together. Pursuant to that end, he had two silver shields struck, in both Greek and Latin, omitting the filioque. But this was little more than a diplomatic gesture for Constantinople; the Creed was in ordinary use, and in any case, there was no doctrinal error involved in using it. And unlike Maximus, Popes Hadrian and Leo do not show understanding that there is a different model at work in the East, only that their own Latin model is compatible with what the Eastern Fathers say.
F. The Photian Schism
At this point in history, we reach what appears to be the flashpoint for the conflagration that destroys what few ties remain between the East and West on this issue. The conflict between the papacy and St. Photius, the patriarch of Constantinople, ends up permanently entrenching the division between East and West to the point that they can no longer even agree on what councils are ecumenical between them.
Siencienski's description of Photius (p. 101) is apt (my emphasis in bold):
Although Photius was a man of great learning, his knowledge of Latin theology appears to have been rather limited. For this reason, his attacks on the filioque, contained in both the Encyclical to the Eastern Patriarchs (Epistle 2) and the Letter of the Patriarch to Aquileia (Epistle 291), are attempts not to refute the Latins' patristic evidence, but rather to attack the logical consequences of a "double procession" from both Father and Son. Photius's chief arguments, which became the foundation upon which the Orthodox case against the filioque was built, can be summarized as follows:
1. If "the Father is one source of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the Son another source of the Holy Spirit, the monarch of the Holy Trinity is transformed into a dual divinity."
2. "If [the Spirit's] procession from the Father is perfect and complete -- and it is perfect, because he is perfect God from perfect God -- then why is there also procession from the Son?"
3. "If the Son participates in the quality or property of the Father's own person, then the Son and the Spirit lose their own personal distinctions. Here one falls into semi-Sabellianism."
4. "Because the Father in principle and source, not because of the nature of the divinity but because of the property of his own hypostasis ... the Son cannot be principle or source."
5. "By the teaching of the processions from the Son also, the Father and the Son end up being closer to each other than the Father and the Spirit, since the Son possesses not only the Father's nature but also the property of his person...."
6. The procession of the Spirit from the Son makes the Son a father of the Spirit's being; thus "it is impossible to see why the Holy Spirit could not be called a grandson!"
But this is essentially an admission that the entire Orthodox case against the filioque, even to the present day, is based on the same failure to understand the difference in the emanational and relational models that we have seen repeated over and over in history. The anti-Islamic background of Photius's likely source Niketas Byzantinos (according to Siecienski) only makes this worse; Islamic monotheism is similar to Origenism in its subordinationism based on Neoplatonic vertical causality. It is extraordinarily likely, then, that Photius and Niketas are both reading the West in the context of the Neoplatonic Triad, even though that bears no relation to the relational model, which explicitly rejects Origenism in exactly this sense. The fatal error here is that the "quality or property" of being E-cause traditionally means that the Father is that for the sake of which the emanations take place; it says nothing about how the emanations take place, which is a theological mystery. This logical overstep in turn causes Photius and Niketas both to draw the conclusion that even R-causality is ruled out, a conclusion that might have been avoided if either understood what R-causality actually was and how it differed from E-causality. Siecienski is correct in this regard: the Orthodox rejection of the filioque is based on a logical error by Photius resulting from a failure to understand the relational model. In my opinion, this model, taken to its logical conclusion, would end up falling into the same trap that Theodoret did, but later developments would take it on a different path.
VI. Lyons vs. Blachernae: conflict or misunderstanding?
From the time of Photius through the time of Lyons and Florence, this essentially remained the status quo. Photius's misunderstanding of the West was in the background of all of the disputes over the filioque, and the West had little to no understanding of the emanational model used in the East and so was unable to communicate the distinction between E-causality and R-causality. That was the situation except for one extremely rare ecumenical exchange noted by Siecienski: the dialogue between Anselm of Haverberg and Nicetas of Nicomedia in 1136. Incredibly, they seem to have worked the issue out completely. As Siencienski describes the encounter at p. 122:
Anselm agreed completely, claiming that the Latins also affirmed that the Father is "principal author and causal principle both of the generation in relation to the Son and of the procession in relation to the Holy Spirit" (Est itaque Pater principalis auctor et causale principium tam generationis ad Filiuim, quam processionis ad Spiritum sanctum). The encounter ended on this note of agreement, Nicetas allowing that the Son had a role in the procession of the Spirit, Anselm affirming that the Father remained the principal source (arche) of the divinity. Yet despite the significance of the gathering, events conspired against future exchanges building upon the consensus reached.
What Siecienski means is that the political squabbles between East and West over papal authority introduced entirely extraneous factors to theological discussion. What Siecienski fails to explain, and indeed fails to understand, is why this would not be a legitimate solution to the entire problem as a return to the traditional patristic understanding. In short, they realized that affirming monarchy in E-causality does not contradict a true R-causal relation between the Son and the Spirit, which was exactly what both Western and Eastern Fathers taught. The only thing that is needful here is to recognize that there are different uses of the term "cause" and "origin."
In any case, whether today's historians learn anything from the encounter or not, it definitely had no impact at the time. But there was a major development: as recounted by Russell Friedman, St. Bonaventure developed the first full-blown emanational model in Latin theology based on St. John Damascene. The complication was, of course, that the emanational and relational models did not coexist peaceably in Western theology any more than they did at any other time in history. Nonetheless, this was useful in demonstrating that the E-causal account of the emanational model did not fundamentally conflict with the R-causal model of the filioque, for the simple reason that Bonaventure held to both simultaneously. And this is critically important, because Bonaventure was actually present at the Council of Lyons, though he unfortunately died in Lyons before its completion. (St. Thomas Aquinas had passed away en route.)
With Bonaventure's influence, we arrive at the statement of Lyons, which balances E-causality and R-causality in a highly traditional way:
We profess faithfully and devotedly that the holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles, but as from one principle; not by two spirations, but by one single spiration. This the holy Roman church, mother and mistress of all the faithful, has till now professed, preached and taught; this she firmly holds, preaches, professes and teaches; this is the unchangeable and true belief of the orthodox fathers and doctors, Latin and Greek alike. But because some, on account of ignorance of the said indisputable truth, have fallen into various errors, we, wishing to close the way to such errors, with the approval of the sacred council, condemn and reprove all who presume to deny that the holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, or rashly to assert that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles and not as from one.
R-causality requires that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as the Spirit is defined relative to the Father and the Son. But this does not violate E-causality, which is the reason for the affirmation as from one principle, affirming that the Father is that for the sake of which both the Son's emanation and the Spirit's procession occur. In the sense of E-cause, then, the Father would be the only cause. The Son and the Father are one principle relative to the Spirit precisely because the Father is E-cause, the reason for the Son's begetting. This affirms both a true sense that the Father and the Son are the cause of the Holy Spirit and a true sense in which the Father alone is the cause of the Spirit, which is exactly what St. Bonaventure teaches.
But then came Blachernae (1285). Blachernae was the anti-Lyons, a clash between the pro-Lyons unionist John Beccus and Gregory of Cyprus. Between Lyons and Blachernae, the pro-union Emperor had been succeeded, so there was a movement to repudiate the union with the West. The acts are reproduced from Papadakis's translation in Crisis in Byzantium are here. Anne-Sophie Vivier-Muresan's analysis of Gregory of Cyprus and Gregory Palamas concerning the eternal manifestation of the Holy Spirit, upon which I will also rely, can be found here.
Vivier-Muresan quotes one of the most significant passages of Gregory's Tomus, which captures the relevant point:
To the same, who affirm that the Paraclete, which is from the Father, has its existence through the Son and from the Son, and who, again, propose as proof the phrase “The Spirit exists through and from the Son”. In certain texts [of the Fathers], the phrase denotes the Spirit’s shining forth and manifestation. Indeed, the very Paraclete shines forth and is manifest eternally through the Son, in the same way that light shines forth and is manifest through the intermediary of the sun’s ray; it further denotes the bestowing, giving and sending of the Spirit to us. It does not, however, mean that it subsists through the Son and from the Son, and that it receives its being through him and from him.
Another relevant portion is the following from Papadakis's Crisis in Byzantium (the bracketed statements are his):
For there is no other hypostasis in the Trinity except the Father's, from which the existence and essence of the consubstantial [Son and Holy Spirit] is derived. According to the common mind of the Church and the aforementioned saints, the Father is the foundation and soruce of the Son and the Spirit, the only source of divinity, and the only cause. If, in fact, it is also said by some of the saints that the Spirit proceeds "through the Son," what is meant here is the eternal manifestation of the Spirit by the Son, not the purely [personal] emanation into being of the Spirit, which has its existence from the Father. Otherwise, this would deprive the Father from being the only cause and the only source of divinity, and would expose the Theologian [Gregory of Nazianzus] who says "everything the Father is said to possess, the Son, likewise, possesses except causality.
This is Gregory's famous distinction between "existing through" and "subsisting through"/"having existence from," which parallels the distinction made in Thaumaturgus's creed between "having existence from" and "manifested through." But in making this distinction, Gregory Cypriot follows Photius's elision concerning E-causality: that for the sake of which has elided into the mechanism by which. That is not the traditional use of the concept; the traditional use restricted itself to the first sense and would therefore not have excluded R-causality (as indicated by the disagreement between Cyril and Theodoret on exactly this issue). So while the traditional emanational model was entirely unproblematic, since Bonaventure could reconcile John Damascene with the filioque, this Photian emanational model has created an entirely new difficulty that is not easily solved. Gregory is attempting to reconcile this Photian modification with the traditional patristic view; Gregory Nazianzus here means E-cause, not "cause" in the sense that Gregory Cypriot is using it, which I will refer to as "P-cause."
In terms of how Gregory is employing the existing through/subsisting through distinction, I agree with Vivier-Muresan that this has nothing to do with an eternal energetic procession or the economic roles of the Persons. Vivier-Muresan explains her "main argument" as follows: "since Gregory knows the distinction between the Spirit’s hypostasis and energy and is not reluctant to use it in some texts, we may legitimately wonder why he does not put it at the heart of his demonstration, if that constitutes the base of his doctrine. Why does he strive instead to subtly distinguish between 'to have his existence' (ὕπαρξιν ἔχειν) (from the Father) and 'to exist' (ὑπάρχειν) (through the Son), between 'coming into being' and 'manifestation'/ 'revelation'/ 'shining forth' (φανέρωσις, ἔκφανσιϛ, ἔκλαμψις), endorsing here the argumentation of Nicephore Blemmydes, whereas he knew his work was disputed?" (N.B., it is interesting to note here that Blemmydes developed a paraconsistent logical model of the Trinity based on the ternary exclusive or (3XOR) logic that Basil Lourié has analyzed extensively in several papers, and that this model ended up being influential on Joseph Bryennios and in turn Mark of Ephesus.) In response to Vivier-Muresan's query "[c]ould we not say that the distinction between hypostasis and energy does not hold, in his theology, the key role that A. Papadakis and others give to it?," I agree with her that we certainly could say that. While Gregory does discuss economic activity and energies, he does not connect it to "manifestation" at the eternal level.
I suspect the reason that many people have been willing to follow Papadakis and others in attributing this to "eternal energetic procession" is that is is difficult to make any sense out of what Gregory is thinking otherwise. If we take this as a causal account instead, which it very much seems to be, we could then echo John Beccus's question: "how does it not exceed all irrationality to confess that the Spirit exists through the Son and from the Son, even specifying these things with the term 'to exist' along with the terms 'naturally' and 'substantially,' and at the same time to deny the Spirit’s existence through the Son and from the Son?" The theology/economy distinction is relatively easy to understand; the modifications to the philosophical concept of causality in the context of the Trinity, many of which go entirely unstated, are far more complex.
This leaves the East at Blachernae divided among three causal theories, which are all documented by Papadakis. There is Gregory's modified account of Photius's emanational model, what I am calling the P-causal account. There is a conservative view disclaiming any modification of the Photian model, which ends up being given its best support in the form of Gregory's own student Mark, who gave a report to Blachernae (reproduced by Papadakis) that cast considerable doubt about the Tomus. And there is Beccus's view, which is the traditional emanational model. The resolution of the council is essentially to say that Photius must definitely be right, but how his modification of causality can be explained in any way, much less reconciled with the patristic view, is left entirely in the air. To give an example of exactly how ridiculous the outcome was from the perspective of the three views, Beccus was condemned by the council, Gregory ends up being forced to resign after the council, and George Moschabar, Gregory's archivist who took the conservative side against Gregory for political reasons, ends up being chastised by the council for his incompetence. Yet with regard to Moschabar's rebuke, Papadakis notes the following (pp. 145-46, my emphasis in bold):
What landed [Moschabar] in even greater difficulties, however, was the reading of one of his polemical tracts to the assembled theologians. This document, for which he was immediately taken to task, brought into question not only his competence as a theologian, but his interpretation of the phrase "through the Son." His interpretation did not identify "through" with the eternal manifestation, as did Gregory's, or with "from," as did the unionists, but with the preposition syn, meta (with the genitive), or ama, which were translated as "with" or "together." True, it was an interpretation which later Palamite theologians and Mark of Ephesus at Florence would find useful. However great its subsequent popularity it could not convince Gregory or the unionists.
This admission by Papadakis illustrates the state of utter disorder in which trying to save the Photian modification to causality left Byzantine theology after Blachernae. They couldn't accept that Beccus was right about St. John Damascene, even though he almost certainly was. But their alternative explanation of John's position was so unclear that an interpretation of John Damascene that Blachernae condemned as incompetent ends up being normative for later anti-filioquists. This is simply indefensible, but it is the pattern that we have seen over and over and over again: when people confuse their mental models of casuality with the object itself, not accounting for the limitations they have in the Trinitarian context, this sort of conflict among orthodox Christians seems unavoidable.
But perhaps this is not the end of all hope, precisely because the models may not involve the denial of any doctrine when those limitations are brought back into view. The emanational and relational models themselves were reconcilable precisely because the notion of "causality" was not univocally applicable to the divine being, so we could speak of E-cause and R-cause in a narrower and more abstract sense that did not entail any contradiction. So is there a sense in which P-causality can likewise be understood in a way that would not exclude R-cause (properly understood)? I believe there is, if we likewise view P-cause in terms of its logical content abstracted from its materialistic association.
I previously wrote that one analogy to Gregory's P-causal view would be the distinction between originating and sustaining cause. That is to say, what Gregory seems to have in mind with manifestation is not the Spirit's coming into existence but rather being sustained in existence by the relationship with the Father and the Son. In terms of conceptual compatibility, I note that in the quotation from Parts of Animals above, Aristotle actually makes an analogy between the begetting of offspring and the building of a house (which involves originating and sustaining causes) both being activities done for the sake of the doer, so this would not be as much of a leap as one might initially suspect. Now, if we take the eternal context here, the divine Persons are not subject to corruption and need nothing to sustain them, so we must remove the idea of change from the mental model. What this distinction would mean, then, is that there are two different causal aspects to the existence: an originating aspect and a sustaining aspect. But if we understand causality in its logical sense as a relationship and if we view originating causality and sustaining causality as nothing more than distinct relationships, then calling the Father the alone P-cause would not actually be excluding every sort of hypostatic causality, only originating causality. Strictly viewed in terms of a distinction between causes as subjects, this distinction between "originating" and "sustaining" would serve the same logical purpose as the distinction between "principle-not-from-principle" (E-cause) and "principle-from-principle" in the R-causal model.
Unlike E-causality, the distinction between originating and sustaining causes is not a distinction that makes any sense at all in the R-causal account. The R-causal account says that whatever is that by which something is defined is causal of that thing, and it would make no sense at all to say that the definition was originated in one way and sustained in another way. Definitions are by their nature timeless in this context. While it makes sense to say that something is the first cause or first origin in R-causality, a strict application of the distinction drawn by P-causality would be incoherent. On the other hand, if we strip the distinction between "originating" and "sustaining" to the bare idea of logical priority, then this is amenable to reconciliation with the R-causal account, in the way that the point is generator of the line and the line is the generator of the plane. Therefore, just as the traditional E-causal model can be reconciled with the R-causal model with appropriate limitations, the P-causal model can likewise be reconciled.
What this suggests is that, even though the task is more difficult, the models can in principle be asserted in a way that does not entail that one directly contradicts the other. Rather, they would intersect in an area where the exact details would be unknowable and subject to our conceptual limitations. In that case, that none of the affirmations in any of the models would require denying the applicability of any other model, as long as they are not taken too literally. If they are taken too literally, as Theodore and Theodoret did, then there could be conflict, but that would result from an error in thinking about the divine nature. But assuming that we take what I consider to be reasonable limitations in causal analogies to the Trinity, none of these models seem to contradict the doctrine of the Trinity. Unfortunately, as with the differences between the emanational model and the relational model, the fact that those reasonable limitations are unstated leads to unnecessary conflict.
VII. Florence: where P-cause meets R-cause
In the intervening years between Blachernae and Florence, it is fair to say that the P-causal model was undeveloped. If anything, subsequent theologians seem to have backed off of it as much as possible, as recounted by Vivier-Muresan with respect to Gregory Palamas:
Indeed, the Byzantine author does not write that the Son eternally bestows the energy of the Spirit but rather, in a quite awkward phrase, that he has the power to do so (αὐτὸ τὸ χορηγεῖν ἔχειν ἔχει), as if he wanted to avoid formally recognizing an eternal manifestation of the Spirit through the Son. In this formula (αὐτὸ τὸ χορηγεῖν ἔχειν ἔχει), should we not rather see the image, borrowed from Gregory the Theologian, of the Son as “intendant of the Spirit”? In this case, reference is made to the eternal rest of the Spirit on the Son. In other words, the articulation between the theological level and the economic one is here designated: that is because the Spirit, in his hypostasis, rests eternally on the Son and abides in him that, in the economy, the divine energies are sent in the Spirit from the Father through the Son.
The context here is that Palamas uses manifestation language only for the economy. In theology, the connection between the economy and theology is that the Spirit "rests on" the Son, which is the basis of the Son's power to send in the economy. The Spirit as the anointing of the Son, the reason for His power, is what Palamas has in mind for the eternal procession of the Spirit "resting on" or "with" the Son, as indicated in Vivier-Muresan's summary (my emphasis in bold):
Our first conclusions are therefore confirmed: for Palamas, the eternal procession of the Spirit “through the Son”, as it was formulated by the Fathers, concerns not the energy but his hypostasis and must be understood as the close connection between the begetting of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, indissociable from one another. This connection corresponds to the rest of the Spirit on and in the Son. Note in passing that Palamas recognizes a dynamic dimension to this rest, as a movement from the Father to the Son, as indicated by this commentary on Cyril of Alexandria:
"The divine Cyril also concludes in his Treasure that the Spirit physically exists in the Son from the Father and he concludes that he passes in the Son from the Father [παρὰ πατρὸϛ διήκειν ἐν υἱῷ] naturally and essentially, and that it is through him and his annointing that the Son sanctifies everything."
Therefore, the triadology of Palamas appears to be distinct from the Cypriot’s view. More precisely, Palamas seems to step back since he assumes a position that the latter claimed to move beyond. As he refuses to take into account the literal sense of the preposition “by/through” (διά), considered as only synonymous with the prepositions σύν and μετά meaning “with”, he aligns with a theology that the patriarch explicitly rejected as being insufficiently faithful to the tradition of the Fathers. He does not evoke any eternal “manifestation” (ἔκφανσις, φανέρωσις) of the Spirit through the Son; he formally recognizes that the Son has the eternal power to bestow the Spirit (understood as uncreated energies) but does not use the term “manifestation” nor “procession” on this matter. Moreover, this idea is only briefly mentioned and does not allow us to draw any parallel with the wide developments of Gregory of Cyprus on the eternal shining forth of the Spirit through the Son. On the contrary, Palamas obviously does not assume this last theme and is more generally hostile to the formulation of an eternal existence of the Spirit through the Son.
Essentially, the situation has only become worse since Blachernae. Gregory Cypriot's attempts to develop the Photian position along the lines of the Cappadocians (i.e., the P-causal account that seems to have a prospect of at least possibly being reconciled with the R-causal account) have been abandoned. Palamas has essentially followed the position of Moschabar that was considered an incompetent reading of John Damascene at Blachernae. Moreover, the idea that Palamas is referring to an eternal energetic procession here is as unsustainable as it was with Gregory Cypriot. Palamas's position here cannot be reconciled with the Fathers, with Gregory Cypriot, or with Blachernae, and the description of this position as "generally hostile" to the filioquist interpretation is apt.
In this case, apart from the polemical context of the works themselves, Palamas also seems to have taken two mental images too literally: (1) cause as mechanism, following Photius's overstep and (2) anointing as a kind of literal "resting on" in the material sense. I do not see any way to save Palamas's polemical position here; in following Photius's implicit denial of the R-causal position, absent the subsequent correction made by Gregory Cypriot to save it, Palamas has fallen into the same ditch that Theodoret did. I agree with Fr. Christiaan Kappes's assessment that Palamas's use of the nous-logos-eros triad in the Trinity could very easily be reconciled with Bonaventure's own emanational model, which follows John Damascene. But given that Palamas follows the botched exegesis of Moschabar on the nature of procession itself, that obstacle would also need to be overcome.
At Florence, then, it is fair to say that the difference between conceptual models in East and West, which dated all the way back to the pro-Nicene period, had never been greater. In perhaps the worst coincidence in all of the centuries of paradigm conflicts, the two leading representatives are at the extremes of their respective views: the staunch Palamite theologian Mark (Eugenicus) of Ephesus and the Dominican friar John Montenero. Respectively, they represented the uncorrected Photian position, which was likely impossible to reconcile with the West under any circumstances, and the pure R-causal model, which was the more difficult version of Latin theology to explain in Eastern terms. The only person who clearly perceived the views of both sides was the Greek theologian (and later Catholic cardinal) Bessarion, who had resolved to listen to the Fathers and who correctly discerned that they did not exclude the R-causal account of the West. But I would (objectively, I believe) attribute that to Bessarion's own brilliance as a theologian and exegete, not the eloquence of the Latin presentation, which seems to have been bungled quite badly.
On that point, I have to register one last point of disagreement with Fr. Crean. Fr. Crean disputes Nicolas Lossky's claim that Florence was largely "a dialogue of the deaf, which had very little chance of succeeding." I agree with Fr. Crean that Lossky's position that "the theological separation of Greeks and Latins was so great that, without realizing it, they gave different meanings to the final definition of the Filioque" is unsustainable. Lossky's assertions that the Greeks "understood [the Filioque] in regard to the eternal manifestation or divine economy" based on the essence/energies distinction are implausible for the simple reason that the essence/energies distinction had nothing to do with eternal manifestation, not at Blachernae and not even in Palamite theology. Lossky is right, but for the wrong reasons; the problem is that the causal models at work are too different to enable clear communication. What seems to have happened is that the Greeks who were operating in the more traditional E-causal model, including Bessarion, were able to satisfy themselves that the Latin R-causal account was acceptable, in line with Bonaventure's theology. Those with a Palamite theology, both at Florence and within the East generally, were unsatisfied.
What would've needed to happen in order for Florence to accomplish its aim would've been for the concerns raised by Palamite theology to have been addressed. In other words, someone would have needed to make the effort to attempt to understand Eugenicus's philosophical model with the same care that Eugenicus himself undertook to familiarize himself with Scholasticism. (Fr. Crean at p. 408 notes that, as against a claim by Vlassios Phidas, Eugenicus was both comfortable and willing to engage in Scholastic argumentation.) It is in that respect that Florence truly did end up being a "dialogue of the deaf," as outlined by Fr. Christiaan Kappes in his article "A Latin Defense of Mark of Ephesus at the Council of Ferrara-Florence," which somewhat surprisingly is not considered in Fr. Crean's book.
Importantly, Fr. Kappes points out that the Western emanational model of the Franciscans could have been a path to do so, given that Mark had studied this with his student George-Gennadius Scholarios and Emperor John VIII in preparation for Florence (my emphasis in bold):
While the imperial trio studied together, Scholarius apprised his one-time schoolmaster and the emperor about Latin sources that made the union more promising; namely, the words of the Franciscan John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308). Scholarius likely convince Mark that Palamism and Latin theology coincided via the "formal distinction" of Duns Scotus. Scholarius also informed Mark that the "Subtle Doctor" too argued the Byzantine position on the Filioque (that is, there exists no philosophical necessity to explain the production of the Holy Spirit with reference to the Son). The imperial commission's study of Scotism uniquely explains the emperor's success in persuading Mark to refrain from directly addressing the issue of Palamism at the upcoming council. Eugenicus had already been well informed about Franciscan opposition to Thomistic theology in the 1420s under emperor Manuel II. Manuel had spoken openly of his knowledge of the irreconcilability of Franciscan and Dominican theological tenets years prior (ca. 1400). Even after Mark began his apologetic studies against Latin theology, he was nonetheless gracious to his Latin interlocutors, exemplified by aiding a future opponent, Nicholas of Cusa (d. 1464), to obtain Greek manuscripts in Constantinople.
This is identically the difference between Aquinas (relational) and Bonaventure (emanational) identified by Friedman. Recall that in the emanational model, the paternity/primacy of the Father is the reason that he emanates, and the formal distinction between the modes of emanation (intellect and will) is the basis for the distinction between the Son and the Spirit with no distinction between the Son and Spirit being required, as there is in the relational account. In other words, this is a recognition on the Eastern side that harmony exists between traditional Eastern theology and the Western account. This would have been a golden opportunity for meaningful dialogue, had the Latins capitalized on it. The problem was that, because the Dominican Montenero was presenting, he gave the same answers that he would have given to his own co-religionists in the Scotist camp. Fr. Kappes cites the following example:
Amusingly, Mark's defense of the formal distinction (distinctio formalis a parte rei) was made before his Dominican interlocutors (with no noted objections from conciliar Scotists) on the subject of the divine persons at Florence. Mark appealed to Basil (nowadays, Gregory of Nyssa), assuming the equivalent of the formal distinction, or the difference between an immanent universal and its exemplifications. In fact, this is the necessitous root for Scotus's very doctrine of the Trinitarian distinctions. Montenero was a Dominican and naturally argued Aquinas's approach to the divine essence, which presumes Aristotle's simplicity criterion in its hermeneutic of St. Augustine. Both theologians' metaphysical presuppositions were diverse enough to explain Montenero's discombobulation at the Ephesine's mode of approaching talk of the divine essence. Montenero merely reflects the Thomistics rejection of formalities (energeia/teleiotetes) in the divine essence, implying a rejection too of univocity of the concept of being (ens) as predicated of God and creatures. Montenero defended a party line firmly established against Scotism via the Dominican, John Capreolus (ca. 1380-1444). It is beyond the scope of the present inquiry to decide between the Thomistic camp and that of the Byzantines. I only wish to draw the reader's attention to the fact that Mark's metaphysical approach was not "puerile"; rather, it was concentric with the formidable via Scoti.
This tendency by Montenero to priortize winning the argument over obtaining understanding eventually proved to be fatal to the prospect of meaningful dialogue. Fr. Kappes describes an incident involving comparative exegesis of Basil's Ad Eunomium in which Montenero was so determined to contradict everything that Eugenicus said that he "read Basil to claim that there is a proper difference in the 'dignity (dignitas/axioma)' of persons reflected in the order of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." Eugenicus, expecting Montenero to recent once it was pointed out that this would entail subordinationism, was shocked to see Montenero try to defend this position. One might say that this was one isolated incident, but it destroyed (probably rightly) Mark's belief that the presentations were about anything other than "Latin philoneikia (love of debate)." After having been subject to indignity after indignity (which Fr. Kappes documents in detail), this absurdity was the last straw. Thus ended the hope of any true reconciliation between the Palamite view represented by Mark and the West, and so went the prospects of Eastern and Western reunion as a whole.
VIII. Conclusion: how can we proceed?
If I am correct, then the distinction between relational and emanational models identified by Friedman among the Scholastics replicates a division between Origenist inheritances through Didymus the Blind (Alexandria) and Gregory the Wonderworker (Cappadocia). These models are in turn built on differing analogies of causality in the Trinity, and as these models became more and more disconnected, the theology of the East and West drifted further and further apart. The most problematic development is this regard was when Photius and Niketas Byzantinos made a slight but critical change in the understanding of causality in their anti-Western polemics. This took the East off of what up until then had been a parallel path, and the division has been increasing more or less steadily since then.
If I am correct, then there are a number of historical mistakes that have contributed to misunderstandings on this point:
- The debate over the filioque has nothing to do with Latin theology being essentialist and Cappadocian theology being personalist, contra de Regnon's error.
- The Latin view has nothing to do with the Neoplatonic Intelligible Triad or vertical causality generally, contra du Roy's error.
- The debate over the filioque has nothing to do with the essence/energies distinction, contra Lossky and essentially every other Neo-Palamite theologian who has followed him.
- In every significant difference between Alexandrian and Antiochene theology, including exegesis (of John 16 particularly), Christology (logos-sarx vs. logos-anthropos), and deification ("Alexandrian Tradition II" vs. Cappadocian, as per Norman Russell), Alexandria aligns with Rome and the relational model, which rebuts the idea of a monolithic Cappadocian theology in the patristic era.
That would mean that the 1995 Clarification ends up being more or less useless for exactly the same reason that Met. John Zizioulas thought it was promising. Zizioulas asks:
Does the expression "principaliter" necessarily preclude making the Son a kind of secondary cause in the ontological emergence of the Spirit? The Filioque seems to suggest two sources of the Spirit's personal existence, one of which (the Father) may be called the first and original cause (principaliter), while the other one (the Son) may be regarded as a secondary (not principaliter) cause, but still a "cause" albeit not "principaliter".
The discussions both at the time of St. Photius and at Lyons and Florence-Ferrara seem to have paid special attention to this delicate point. It is not accidental that the Greek theologians ever since the time of Photius insisted on the expression: μόνος αίτιος ο Πατήρ i.e. the Father is the sole cause of the Son as well as of the Spirit. This concern does not seem to be fully covered by the Augustinian expression principaliter. The second Council of Lyons is unclear on this matter when it says that the Father as Father of His Son is "together with Him the single principle from which the Spirit proceeds".
The reason that Greek theologians have said this "since the time of Photius" is that it had no basis in the patristic testimony, nor was this idea of "secondary cause" (in the sense of R-cause) ever viewed as problematic until Photius spontaneously decided it was. There was so little warrant for this change that Gregory Cypriot subsequently had to invent his own distinction between "existing from" and "subsisting from" in order to try to reconstruct Photius's theology, a distinction which no one had ever heard before according to both Beccus and Gregory's own student Mark. And in the subsequent centuries both Gregory Palamas and Mark of Ephesus will not even try to defend that distinction, instead arguing that John Damascene taught what Photius did, a reading that Gregory Cypriot and Blachernae as a whole considered entirely implausible.
It is not for the West to explain how Photius was somehow right about the Latin Fathers when he was wrong and, based on his reading of Augustine, probably even knew he was wrong. It will not do to cite the essence/energies distinction, essentialist theology, Neoplatonism, the theology/economy separation, "temporal procession," "eternal energetic procession," or any of the manifold excuses that seem to crop up every time this is discussed. Photius misjudged the Latin tradition; there is simply no way to avoid it. And eisegesis of the Latin Fathers based on the temporal/eternal procession distinction in a way that contradicts the traditional understanding of John 16 will fare no better. We know this is implausible.
Correcting this error requires only consistency. Do not be more Orthodox than the Fathers, who clearly saw this sort of pluralism as possible while remaining faithful to the doctrine. Do not be more Photian that Photius, who reunited with Rome despite knowing that Rome retained the filioque as doctrine. Do not be more Palamite that Palamas, who saw something he could accept in Augustine's psychological analogy. Do not be more Eugenican than Eugenicus, who showed every sign of being willing to reconcile his own doctrine with the Franciscan model if given a full and fair opportunity to do so.
There are plenty of issues remaining over which the East and the West can fight with the papacy as the most glaring example. But we can at least reconcile on this one, if we are only willing to reason together.
