tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-89712392024-03-17T08:21:32.883-04:00Crimson CatholicSharing the Christian metaphysics of Xavier Zubiri and the fullness of Western Tradition under the patronage of St. Cyril of Alexandria and St. Bonaventure. Except as otherwise noted, copyright for all blog entries is held by Jonathan Prejean 2004-2023; all rights reserved.CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comBlogger309125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-62645399621873936962024-03-12T08:10:00.007-04:002024-03-17T08:21:01.097-04:00The circular firing squad on Pope Francis<div style="text-align: left;">Introduction</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">I. The pastoral Magisterium</div><div style="text-align: left;">II. When truth functions as law</div><div style="text-align: left;">III. The fence and the circle of orthodoxy</div><div style="text-align: left;">IV. Criticizing Magisterial failures</div><div style="text-align: left;">V. Docility to Magisterial teaching and papal criticism</div><div style="text-align: left;">VI. Magisterial authority for the faith among the Jesuits</div><div style="text-align: left;">VII. Applying the theory to <i>Donum Veritatis</i> and <i>Ad Tuendam Fidem</i></div><div style="text-align: left;"> A. <i>Donum Veritatis</i> and the pastoral Magisterium<br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"> B. Confusion in <i>Donum Veritatis</i><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"><i> </i>C. The theological concept of "adherence"<br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"> D. Magisterium as government in <i>Donum Veritatis, Ad Tuendam Fidem</i>, and canon law<br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">VIII. A case study in the circular firing squad: Fr. Nicola Bux and <i>Fiducia Supplicans</i></div><div style="text-align: left;">IX. Confusion in Magisterial scholarship and recent papal overreach</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">Conclusion</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /><u>Introduction</u><br /><div style="text-align: justify;">The <i>de facto</i> schism between conservative Catholics concerning Pope Francis, which is really nothing short of a civil war at this point, is certainly the most disturbing phenomenon that I've ever seen as long as I've been Catholic. I'm not here referring to a schism from the Church, although there is certainly a side in this conflict that seems to be tempted to the "tradical" position. I mean the internal vitriol that has destroyed friendships and atomized the discussion into positions that are at least apparently contradictory with essentially no effort to reconcile them. Every disagreement is division at this point, resulting in the "circular firing squad" phenomenon in which we turn on others who agree that there is a problem rather than endeavoring to solve the problem.</div></div><p></p><div style="text-align: justify;">The problem is, at least as far as I can tell, that Pope Francis is governing the Church in a manner that is very likely going to be harmful to souls. In a world filled with moral therapeutic deism in which the sole commandment is "be nice, and do as ye will," taking up the Cross in humility, turning away from sin, and sacrificing one's self for others, which is objectively necessary for a relationship with God, is not something that comes naturally. This is the Gospel, and the Church has no power to rewrite it than to rewrite Scripture. All of the blessings and Sacraments in the world, whatever nominal affiliation one may have with the Church, are in vain without that <i>metanoia</i>. The only purpose of the Church is to provide the graces and assistance of God to this end, which is the very mercy of God, and the pastoral practice of the Church is judged solely with respect to that end. The 1983 Code of Canon Law closes with the invocation of this principle: "the salvation of souls, which must always be the supreme law in the Church, is to be kept before one's eyes."</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This division is, it seems to me, solely over a highly esoteric question of the nature of Magisterial teaching, and every person who says "what you identify is not the problem" is therefore taken to say "there is no problem." If one says "you shouldn't call the Pope a heretic," then the other says "but he is clearly teaching heresy!" The difficulty here is an excess of paternalism and clericalism in the Church that has been confused with doctrine. This has led to a ridiculously broad understanding of the Magisterial role as an "authoritative teacher," resulting in some frankly absurd epistemic conclusions about "levels of adherence" and "theological notes" that do nothing to help to answer a very simple question: <i>am I bound in conscience to believe this is true</i>?</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">My goal is to simplify this entire discussion using <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/divine-revelation-as-normative-authority.html" target="_blank">my concept of divine revelation as normative authority</a>. This becomes a very simple explanation: the Magisterium is the government concerning the law of faith for the Kingdom of God. The Magisterium authoritatively promulgates rules of faith binding on the conscience, which are either cognitive rules of the practice of theological science (normative principles acting as rules for interpreting divine revelation and the content of the faith) or rules of will (laws of discipline). In other words, even if the Magisterium is teaching truths, it is teaching them specifically <i>in the mode of functioning as rules</i>. Anything that the Magisterium does outside of the promulgation of these rules of faith is simply non-binding. As a matter of prudence, we should account for it just as we account for any other source of wisdom, but we judge it in the same way we judge whatever anyone says.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>I. The pastoral Magisterium</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The reason that I think this has been complicated is the loss of a distinction mentioned by <a href="https://www.ncronline.org/news/theology/putting-churchs-shifts-spheres-authority-historical-perspective" target="_blank">the late Magisterial scholar Dr. Richard Gaillardetz</a>:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Thus in the 13th century we can find St. Thomas Aquinas writing of both the "magisterium of the pastoral chair" </i>(magisterium cathedrae pastoralis)<i>, by which he meant the teaching authority of the bishop, and the "magisterium of the teaching chair" </i>(magisterium cathedrae magistralis)<i>, by which he meant the teaching authority of the "doctor" or theologian. Of course, Thomas insisted that these magisteria functioned in different ways; <b>only the bishops could normatively assert Catholic doctrine</b>. As Jesuit Fr. John O'Malley has noted, theologians began to be educated in ways that differed from the formation of bishops, who often were more preoccupied with matters of canon law. The conditions were set for a new bishop-theologian relationship. This relationship would flourish when bishops and theologians acknowledged the interdependence of their respective spheres of expertise and authority; it degenerated when cooperation gave way to competition and struggle.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is confirmed by <a href="https://onepeterfive.com/traditional-theology-magisterium/#_ftnref2" target="_blank">Magisterial scholar John Joy</a>:</div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>If “magisterium” refers to teaching authority in general, what do we mean by the term “authentic magisterium”? <b>St. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between a kind of magisterium exercised by the pastors of the Church and a kind of magisterium exercised by professors and teachers in an academic setting</b>. A teacher in an academic setting has a certain kind of authority acquired by his learning, but this is not such as to be able to demand that his students accept his teaching as true simply on the basis of his authority. <b>But the pastors of the Church exercise an “authentic magisterium” </b></i><b>(magisterium authenticum)</b><i><b> rather than a merely academic magisterium</b>. “Authentic” in this case does not mean “genuine” as it often does in English, but “authoritative.” The magisterium of the Church is called “authentic” or “authoritative” because <b>those who exercise this magisterium are “authorized” to speak in the name of Christ and with his authority</b>:</i></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>"Among the principal duties of bishops <b>the preaching of the Gospel occupies an eminent place</b>. For bishops are preachers of the faith, who lead new disciples to Christ, and <b>they are authentic teachers, that is, teachers endowed with the authority of Christ </b></i><b>(doctores authentici seu auctoritate Christi praediti)</b><i>, <b>who preach to the people committed to them the faith they must believe and put into practice</b>, and by the light of the Holy Spirit illustrate that faith."</i> [Lumen Gentium <i>25</i>]</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Yet despite the clear distinction made here between pastoral and teaching magisterium (<i>viz</i>., teaching as rules versus teaching as truths), those categories continue to be confused in the ordinary Magisterium of the pope and the bishops, who are magisterial in both the pastoral and teaching sense. We can avoid this conundrum if we say that the Magisterium is said to "teach" authentically exactly and only in this sense of authoritatively promulgating truths <i>as rules</i>, principles regulating the practice of theology and the interpretation of divine revelation. It is not as if this mode of teaching is anything particularly unusual. A secular government is considered a "teacher" of moral truths by passing relevant laws; institutions promulgate standards of weight and measure that function as rules by which the truth of matters are judged. In a larger theological sense, the natural law itself is nothing but the divine truth of the eternal law <i>promulgated as normative rules</i> by the act of divine authority. This is analogous to the sense in which St. Thomas says (<i>ST</i> I-II.90.4) "The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally." So I find the most helpful understanding of the episcopal role as ministers to be specifically this: <i>promulgation of divine truth as a rule.</i><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>II. When truth functions as law</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">What does it mean for truth to function <i>as a rule</i>? This means that it is a truth of practical rather than speculative reason -- truths as they relate to the practice of the Christian life. I rely here on the account provided in Stephen Brock's <i>The Light That Binds</i>, his work on St. Thomas's account of the natural law. He explains the distinction in the section titled "The Imitation of Nature" in Chapter 5 as follows: </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>First let me pick up on something that I argued for earlier: that the good is primarily a speculative notion, and only secondarily (though naturally and immediately) practical. It not only moves the natural inclination of our own wills, but also, and even first of all, explains the inclinations of natural non-human things. For this reason, it seems to me that we can also say that the first precept of natural law </i>[seek the good and avoid evil]<i>, which is founded upon the good, also applies to such thing. True, our understanding of it does not function to direct the actions of such things. But surely its </i>truth<i> applies to them -- indeed to all things whatsoever. For every being, it is true that it ought to do and pursue the good and avoid the bad, in the way of doing so that is suitable to its nature. The first precept is already an irradiation and a participation of the eternal law, which is the law "by which it is just that </i>all things<i> be perfectly ordered."</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>If only some principles are called practical, it must be because only they are intrinsically apt to direct action. They alone are rules of action, precepts. But must their truth be confined to the sphere of human action? For Thomas, the difference between practical intellect and speculative intellect is not a difference with respect to the nature of the intellect </i>[<i>ST</i> I.79.11]<i>. Likewise, the difference between practical truth and speculative truth is not a difference with respect to the nature of the truth </i>[<i>ST</i> I-II.64.3]<i>. It is only a difference in what the truth is used for, the end in view of which it is considered. Truth is speculative inasmuch as it is considered for its own sake, as satisfying the desire to understand something. It is practical inasmuch as it is considered for the sake of directing action according to it. But I see no reason why the same principle cannot be applicable to the consideration of both speculative and practical matters and used for either purpose</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">...</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Our understanding of a natural thing cannot be practical in the sense that is actually directs the natural activities of the thing. But surely it can give rise to what Thomas calls "certain practical judgment," as to "whether it ought to be so or not" </i>[<i>ST</i> I-II.93.2<i>ad</i>3]<i>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Thomas says that "human acts can be ruled by the rule of human reason, which is gathered from the created things that man naturally knows" </i>[<i>ST</i> I-II.74.7]. <i>He says this quite generally. He does not make an exception of the first precept. Things of all kinds tend to do and pursue what is good for them and to avoid what is bad. We see this, and it immediately makes sense to us. We see that it is just what anything ought to do -- ourselves included. And we tend to regulate our own conduct accordingly. This would be an example of reason imitating nature.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As Brock points out, this makes sense when we understand the sense in which the eternal law itself functions as a rule. Aquinas defines the law as "an ordination of reason, for the common good, promulgated by him who has care of the community" (<i>ST</i> I-II.90.4). The eternal law is the ordination, taken as a whole in God's own mind, by which God governs the universe. The natural law is then "nothing other than a participation of the eternal law in the rational creature" (<i>ST</i> I-II.91.2). And the fundamental principle connecting the eternal law and the natural law is seeking the good and avoiding the evil, a principle that is self-evident from human existence given basic consideration and thus "known naturally" by the awareness of human existence. Good in this context is the being of the thing <i>insofar as it is desired for the perfection of the thing</i>, so that practical reason for rational beings is knowing things with respect to their relation to beatitude. But what is known naturally is the general concept; it remains for teaching and experience to learn how specific goods are to be handled prudently.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This, then, is the reason for confusion with respect to the pastoral magisterium and the teaching magisterium: the truths are the same, but the pastoral magisterium pertains to the principles of practical reason, while the teaching magisterium pertains to the truths of speculative reason. It is knowing revealed truths in their aspect as good, <i>viz</i>., their relation to Christian life having eternal life as its end, that defines the pastoral magisterial role. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">When the bishop teaches, governs and sanctifies his diocese, this means that he is the minister of this government: the minister of the intellectual rules of interpretation, the laws of practice, and the Sacraments. He certainly has a broader pastoral role as an authority figure, but <i>qua</i> bishop, the "teaching" mode refers to the <i>magisterium cathedrae pastoralis</i>, as minister for the teaching of the universal Church. And in that sense, he does not teach on his own authority but within his role as part of the universal Church, meaning that he can err in his individual capacity but not when he teaches <i>with</i> the college of bishops under the headship of Rome. When individual pastors act <i>outside</i> of this office, they act <i>ultra vires </i>with respect to this Magisterial authority <i>-- </i>outside of the powers that they possess in the pastoral Magisterium -- and thus teach only as private theologians and sages, who are subject to error. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But it is also fitting from a cultural perspective that such powers are situated in a high office that enjoys social respect and wise counsel, so that the officeholder's teaching will enjoy respect and that their government can be peaceful. Even though the term "religious submission of the intellect and will" could in principle include both senses (<i>viz.</i>, this "fitting" sense of respect for a wise teacher and the formal sense of respect for the office), part of proper religious submission is the intellectual division between them. The distinction between these two modes is a difference of <i>kind</i> and not <i>degree</i>, just as the distinction between the pastoral and teaching magisteria is a distinction of <i>kind</i> and not <i>degree</i>. If we confuse those modes, the confusion will result either in <i>hypermagisterialism</i>, rendering religious submission to the teaching magisterium in the mode of the pastoral magisterium, or <i>hypomagisterialism</i>, rendering only the mode of submission required for the teaching magisterium to the pastoral magisterium. The failure to make this fundamental distinction between the teaching magisterium and the pastoral magisterium is at the root of contemporary confusion.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This applies likewise to the Pope. The office of the head, the Pope, is essential for preserving the unity of faith persistently and at all times, so that the indefectibility of the Church itself depends entirely on the Pope's office as head. The priests derive their preaching authority from the bishops, and the Pope is the principle that coheres the teaching authority of the bishops (the pastoral Magisterium) in the faith so that an individual bishop's acts in this regard can be recognized as the teaching of the universal Church. That is in turn one of the normative principles governing the interpretation of divine revelation: religious submission to this order of government. But again, the Pope's authority in this regard is in the <i>pastoral Magisterium</i>, the promulgation of divine truths as rules, not just anything he might happen to teach as a theologian. The more recent papal teaching, especially after Pope Leo XIII, has included much more of the teaching magisterium than the pastoral magisterium even in documents that as a whole are part of the authentic Magisterium, and this lack of a clear separation has in no small part contributed to the confusion. For that reason, I think it worthwhile to distinguish this mode of binding pastoral teaching from the teaching magisterium. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>III. The fence and the circle of orthodoxy</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The pastoral office can then be subdivided into the <i>authority of the shepherd </i>(the shepherd as an official in the government) and the <i>purpose of the shepherd</i>. The <i>purpose</i> of the shepherd is to save souls. The <i>authority</i> of the shepherd is the normative authority necessary for the means of salvation to be guarded and preserved, <i>viz,</i>, the preservation of the Church as such. The <i>indefectibility of the Church</i> means that the authority cannot fail at the universal level <i>in that specific task for which it was given</i>, which is hardly to say that it cannot fail from time to time in its purpose of saving souls, even by official acts. But what they cannot do is to wield their authority in a way that corrupts the function of the Church as a whole.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Perhaps it may help to consider the visible Church as a fence around the sheepfold. All people within the fence are not necessarily spiritually alive, and all people outside the fence are not necessarily spiritually dead. But only those within the fence have a good reason for their hope. If there are spiritually dead sheep -- goats and wolves that appears to be sheep -- into the fence, it is harder for the sheep within to see the circle of orthodoxy, but they can still see the fence. It is the circle of orthodoxy that defines what it means to be a good sheep, and the circle of orthodoxy is only within the fence. Whether other people outside the circle of orthodoxy are or are not saved is left in God's hands; our role as sheep is simply to do our best to stay within the circle of orthodoxy, which means first and foremost staying within the fence. And the fence is the Church, and even more specifically, the visible, public act of worship in spirit and truth by the Church. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The <i>purpose</i> of the shepherd is to keep the sheep within the circle of orthodoxy, but it is extremely clear that they may do this job well or poorly. But they certainly cannot fail to maintain the <i>fence</i>, the visible institution of the Church, because if they did that, then it would be impossible in principle for the sheep to be able to remain within the circle of orthodoxy. Likewise, if they commanded the sheep outside the fence or outside of the circle of orthodoxy as shepherds, this would fundamentally violate the very purpose of their authority. So in the pastoral Magisterium, which is to say the promulgation of divine truth as rules of intellect or will for the faithful as a whole, the indefectibility of the Church requires that they must at least be <i>infallibly safe</i>, which is to say that following the rule promulgated by the office cannot require leaving the circle of orthodoxy or the Church as a whole.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As Bl. Pope Pius IX says in <i>Mortalium Animos</i>, "These <b>two commands of Christ, which must be fulfilled, the one, namely, to teach, and the other to believe</b>, cannot even be understood, unless the Church proposes a complete and easily understood teaching, and is immune when it thus teaches from all danger of erring." The "teaching" here is this specific sense of the pastoral Magisterium, which can be easily understood in principle, much as the concept of "obeying the law" can be understood in the context of a secular government. And much as with the law, this doesn't mean cognitively understanding every aspect of the law; it means this very simple concept of recognizing who is the government and who is subject to the government. That the Magisterium will teach and will not fail to teach in this sense -- that they have the divine authority to promulgate these rules for the Kingdom of God -- is a command of Christ Himself, not a mundane authority that the faithful can "recognize and resist."</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>IV. Criticizing Magisterial failures</u></div></div></div></div><p></p><div style="text-align: justify;">The subject of Magisterial (especially papal) criticism is essentially the cause of the circular firing squad, and if I am going to disarm everyone, then it's important to resolve it. First, the answer is "obviously yes, even the Pope can be criticized." Nobody on earth denies this. What has happened is that there has been confusion between <i>doctrinal or disciplinary dissent</i> and <i>legitimate criticism of the Pope</i>. That confusion has in turn led to these issues' having been entangled with <i>theological dissent, </i>the <i>charism of infallible safety</i>, <i>the possibility of a heretical Pope</i>, and even <i>schism</i>. In point of fact, all of these result from the same underlying problem: confusion about what the circle of orthodoxy is and how the Pope's teaching and conduct relate to it. If we understand the Pope as promulgator of rules for the faith within the broader teaching role, it will be easier to see these distinctions.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Unquestionably, the Pope can be charged with hypocrisy in his Magisterium; I am not aware of any alleged "popesplainer" who denies this. Papal hypocrisy is the charge that the Pope, by his actions in office, is contradicting the truth as it has been taught. And as Matthew Levering has pointed out, every such instance of hypocritical teaching necessarily contradicts Christian teaching by, if nothing else, leading people to a contradiction of the commandment to Christian charity (referred to in Church teaching as "scandal").</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Doctors of the Church have not really shown any unwillingness to say that the Pope is failing to live up to his calling in this way. St. Catherine of Siena said:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>So by the fragrance of their virtue they would help eliminate the vice and sin, the pride and filth that are rampant among the Christian people — <b>especially among the prelates, pastors, and administrators of holy Church who have turned to eating and devouring souls, not converting them but devouring them</b>! And it all comes from their selfish love for themselves, from which pride is born, and greed and avarice and spiritual and bodily impurity. They see the infernal wolves carrying off their charges and it seems they don’t care. Their care has been absorbed in piling up worldly pleasures and enjoyment, approval and praise. And all this comes from their selfish love for themselves. For if they loved themselves for God instead of selfishly, they would be concerned only about God’s honor and not their own, for their neighbors’ good and not their own self-indulgence.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Ah, my dear babbo, see that you attend to these things! Look for good virtuous men, and put them in charge of the little sheep. <b>Such men will feed in the mystic body of holy Church not as wolves but as lambs</b>. It will be for our good and for your peace and consolation, and they will help you to carry the great burdens I know are yours. <b>It seems to me, gracious father, that you are like a lamb among wolves. But take heart and don’t be afraid, for God’s providential help will always be with you</b>. Don’t be surprised even though you see a great deal of opposition, and see that human help is failing us, and that those who should be helping us most disappoint us and act against us.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While this is a the gentlest of rebukes, it is still a rebuke. Even the statement "[i]t seems to me ... that you are like a lamb among wolves" implicitly includes the charge "but you might not be." Likewise, "God's providential help will always be with you" invokes the "divine assistance" to the papal Magisterium (the gift of infallibility and the charism of infallible safety), but in no way implies that it will prevent or has prevented the Pope from allowing the wolves to run rampant to the point of "eating and devouring souls." If he were to exercise his office to correct the problem, he would have divine assistance in doing so, but he is not exercising his office, so he does not have that providential help.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Likewise, St. Bernard of Clairvaux says:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>It was once predicted [of the Church], and now the time of its fulfillment draws near: </i>Behold, in peace is my bitterness most bitter<i> [Is. 38:17]. It was bitter at first in the death of the martyrs; more bitter afterward in the conflict with heretics; but <b>most bitter of all now in the [evil] lives of her members</b>. She cannot drive them away, and she cannot flee from them, so strongly established are they, and so multiplied are they beyond measure. It is that which makes its bitterness most bitter, even in the midst of peace. But in what a peace! Peace it is, and yet it is not peace. There is peace from heathens, and from heretics; but not from her own sons. At this time is heard the voice of her complaining: </i><b>I have nourished and brought forth children, and they have rebelled against me</b><i> [Is. 1:2]. They have rebelled; <b>they have dishonoured me by their evil lives, by their shameful gains, by their shameful trafficking, by, in short, their many works which walk in darkness</b>. There remains only one thing -- that the demon of noonday should appear to seduce those who remain still in Christ, and in the simplicity which is in Him. He has, without question, swallowed up the rivers of the learned, and the torrents of those who are powerful, and (as says the Scripture) he trusteth that he can draw the Jordan into his mouth [Job 40:23] -- that is to say, those simple and humble ones who are in the Church. For this is he who is Antichrist, who counterfeits not only the day, but also the noonday; who exalts himself above all that is called God or worshipped -- whom the Lord Jesus shall consume with the Spirit of His Mouth, and destroy with the brightness of His Coming [2 Thess. 2:4, 8]; for He is the true and eternal Noonday: the Bridegroom, and Defender of the Church, Who is above all, God blessed for ever. Amen.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It would be ridiculous to say that this is not a criticism of the hypocrisy of the Pope; anyone who is familiar with the history knows the corruption of the time and the failure of the Popes to deal with it. And this was despite Bernard's having vigorously defended the authority of the Pope against an antipope. And note that "the simple and humble ones who are in the Church" will remain faithful despite all of this, even though "the rivers of the learned, and the torrents of those who are powerful" will be swallowed up, consistent with the Scripture passages that it is love and not knowledge that saves. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Nor does Bernard spare <a href="https://regensburgforum.com/2018/10/01/cries-for-reform-in-the-tradition-bernard-of-clairvaux/" target="_blank">episcopal malfeasance in office</a> generally.</div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><b>You steal the keys rather than receiving them.</b> The Lord asks about such through the prophet. “<b>They have reigned but not by me</b>. They have chosen princes but I did not call them to the thrones they occupy” (Hos 8:4). Whence comes such zeal for preferment, such shameless ambition, such folly of human presumption? Surely none of us would dare to take over the ministry of any earthly king, even the most minor, without his instructions … or to seize his benefices or conduct his affairs? Do not suppose then that God will approve of what he endures from those in his great house who are vessels fit for destruction (Rom 9:22).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Many come, but consider who is called. Listen to the Lord’s words in their order. “Blessed,” he says, “are the pure in heart , for they shall see God” and then, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.” The heavenly Father calls the pure in heart who do not seek for themselves but for Christ, and not what will profit them but what will profit many. “Peter,” he says, “do you love me?” “Lord, you know that I love you.” “Feed my sheep,” he replies. <b>For when would he commit such beloved sheep to someone who did not love them? This question of who is found to be a faithful servant is much debated among clerks</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><b>Woe to unfaithful stewards who, themselves not yet reconciled, take on themselves the responsibility for recognizing righteousness in others, as if they were themselves righteous men</b> (Is 68:2). Woe to the sons of wrath (Eph 2:3) who profess that they are ministers of grace. Woe to the sons of wrath who are not afraid to usurp to themselves the rank and name of “peacemaker.” Woe to the sons of wrath who pretend to be mediators of peace, and who feed on the sins of the people. Woe to those who, walking in the flesh, cannot please God (Rm 8:8) and presume to wish to please him.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Is it possible for there to be a Pope who "has reigned but not by [God]" and who has therefore stolen the keys rather than receiving them? Assuredly it can be the case that the Pope can be an "unfaithful steward ... not yet reconciled." We know that it has been the case. It is very clear that the Pope can <i>in some sense</i> teach contrary to the faith in office, in the sense of hypocrisy if nothing else. So whatever the charism of safety means, it cannot possibly mean that it is always safe or even subjectively safe to follow papal teaching in the broad sense, since the definition of scandal is that it leads to error. And the example of these Doctors of the Church shows that, whatever infallible safety may mean, it cannot mean that the Pope cannot be charged for his failures in this regard, even if these failures clearly pertain to the "ordinary papal" or "non-infallible" Magisterium. So how should we understand these failures?</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>V. Docility to Magisterial teaching and papal criticism</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Given that Doctors of the Church have clearly criticized Popes for hypocrisy (implicitly teaching contrary to the faith that they ostensibly hold) and given that they also clearly affirmed the gift of divine assistance to the Bishop of Rome, there must be some meaningful reconciliation between the two. And given that ecumenical councils have clearly criticized and even condemned Popes for for their teaching in office, it clearly cannot be the case that the gift of divine assistance means that the Pope cannot teach error <i>simpliciter</i> in office. But those councils likewise affirm that the Apostolic See itself has always held the faith intact, and it is impossible to distinguish the Apostolic See from the papal office that the Bishop of Rome holds. As Catherine said, "God's providential help will always be with [the Pope]," but it is clearly the case that there must be some exercise of the office to do so.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">So we must draw a number of conclusions from this situation:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">1. The Pope can certainly err in office, by hypocrisy if nothing else, in a way that teaches contrary to the faith.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">2. But there is some specific exercise of the pastoral teaching office not limited to <i>ex cathedra</i> teaching that enjoys the providential help (or "divine assistance") that Catherine describes. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">[<i>N</i>.<i>B</i>., the great scholar of the Magisterium <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/10/the-infallible-security-of-papal-non.html" target="_blank">Johann Baptist Cardinal Franzelin</a> describes this as "universal ecclesial providence."]</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">3. In any case, if there is a Pope who "reigns but not by [God]" and who has therefore stolen the keys rather than receiving them (<i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., misused his authority in office), Catholics may not deny his reign (his authority in office) but may presumably resist his hypocrisy both privately and openly.</div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">[<i>N</i>.<i>B</i>., this seems to be contemplated in Canon 212, section 3: <i>According to the knowledge, competence, and prestige which they possess, they have the right and even at times the duty to manifest to the sacred pastors their opinion on matters which pertain to the good of the Church and to make their opinion known to the rest of the Christian faithful, without prejudice to the integrity of faith and morals, with reverence toward their pastors, and attentive to common advantage and the dignity of persons.</i>]</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I posit that this specific exercise is the case when the Pope acts as promulgator of rules for the science of theology and interpretation of divine revelation, which rules can be safely obeyed without risk of loss of salvation. That is the only proper sense of the term "teaching Church" (<i>Ecclesia docens</i>) is applied to the authentic Magisterium. This is where I have to manifest a slight disagreement with Cardinal Franzelin, which disagreement relates more generally to the late-Scholastic concept of authority developed among Jesuit theologians, especially Suarez and Bellarmine. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>VI. Magisterial authority for the faith among the Jesuits</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I credit <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GCqTpHlekgw&list=PLTkdKVFbIe_26lxWe3YpwOW0rrfQYmnaW&index=9" target="_blank">Christian Wagner</a> for having clearly laid out how Suarez introduced a distinction in the submission of faith which allows for the idea of a "new revelation" delivered through Magisterial decisions, albeit not in the apostolic mode. I believe that Suarez has correctly identified the distinction that I have in mind concerning papal teaching but has drawn the incorrect conclusion. It is true that what the Magisterium promulgates as rules of faith are binding, but they are not binding by "ecclesial faith," as if whatever the Magisterium commands must be binding by faith on the basis of faith in the authority of the Magisterium.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Following Wagner, it may help to think of the positions on whether doctrine taught by the Magisterium is "of faith" as follows:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">1. <u>Thomist</u>: Whatever is virtually contained in revelation, either formally and immediately revealed -- that which is only nominally distinct from what is formally and immediately revealed, or else a theological conclusion logically connectible to revelation with metaphysical certainty -- is <i>definable</i> by the Magisterium. One can think of such truths as being "of faith" but not "by faith" in terms of not being the object of submission for the habit of faith until they are defined. In neither case can anything be defined by the Magisterium that is not either in revelation or metaphysically certain conclusions from them.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">2. <u>Scotist/nominalist</u>: The same understanding of virtuality obtains, but these schools would say that we must implicitly submit to the theological conclusions by faith but only realize explicitly that we are doing so when it becomes apparent to us (either by theological reasoning or by Magisterial definition). But again, the content of faith is limited to whatever is virtually contained in revelation as outlined above.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">3. <u>Suarian/Jesuit</u>: Anything that is not formally and immediately revealed in revelation is "formally confused," if it requires either a nominal distinction or a metaphysically certain theological conclusion to formalize. But Suarez also introduces a new version of virtuality in which the Magisterium defines a new concept under the circumstances of historical exigency, the authority of which is based on faith in the authority of the Magisterium.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I believe Suarez has thus confused <i>revealed truths</i> <i>of speculative knowledge</i> with <i>truths as a rule of practical knowledge</i>. The authority of the Magisterium is to promulgate truths as rules, not to promulgate "new revelation." It is to authoritatively speak to how those revealed truths apply to the Christian life, not to issue binding speculative conclusions of theology, although the latterr can certainly fal within the broader ambit of the Magisterium in extraordinary cases. On the other hand, Suarez's concern can't be disregarded here; his fundamental point is that the Magisterial authority has a necessary connection with historical contingency. And this can correctly be understood with the Magisterium working as a government regulating the Church for the common good, the salvation of souls, by which means the indefectibility of the Church is maintained. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Consider St. Thomas on why people deny the faith [<i>ST</i> II-II.1.10.<i>obj</i>2 and <i>ad</i>2]:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>[Objection 2] It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as stated above (Article 9). <b>Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ</b>, as stated above (Article 7). <b>Since then this reason ceased with the advent of the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more and more explicit</b>. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the symbol.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">[Reply] <b>The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the teaching of Christ and the apostles</b>. But since, according to 2 Peter 3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction, it was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly against the errors which arose.</div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Note the connection here with "evil-mindedness," although there is not an express acknowledgment that there is a distinction between knowing the law speculatively and knowing it as a principle of practical knowledge (choosing the good and avoiding evil). Still, St. Thomas has the Magisterium (here, the Pope) drawing up a symbol to respond to the addition of new errors, and the (unstated) cause of the evil-mindedness is disregulation, the failure to acknowledge divine truths <i>qua</i> principles of practical knowledge. It is true that the principles themselves may not need to be more and more explicit, but their practical application is nonetheless always in need of a government. This is the need for the Magisterium, and Suarez clearly sees this after Protestantism emerges. The problem is that Suarez has lost St. Thomas's thread on how truths can function as rules of practical knowledge.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div>German Grisez, the Thomist theologian of the natural law, thus distinguishes Suarez's view of <a href="https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1106&context=nd_naturallaw_forum">the first precept of the natural law (do good; avoid evil)</a> as follows:</div><br style="text-align: left;" /><div><i>Although too long a task to be undertaken here, a full comparison of Aquinas's position to that of Suarez would help to clarify the present point. See WALTER FARRELL, O.P.,THE NATURAL MORAL LAW ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AND SUAREZ 103-155 (Ditchling, 1930). We at least can indicate a few significant passages. Suarez offers a number of formulations of the first principle of the natural law. He manages to treat the issue of the unity or multiplicity of precepts without actually stating the primary precept. DE LEGIBUS II, 8, 2. Previously, however, he had given the principle in the formulation: "Good is to be done and evil avoided." Id. at II, 7, 2. But there and in a later passage, where he actually mentions pursuit, he seems to be repeating received formulae. The formula (Id. at II, 15, 2) referring to pursuit subordinates it to the avoidance of evil:"Evil is to be avoided and good is to be pursued." Perhaps Suarez's most personal and most characteristic formulation of the primary precept is given where he discusses the scope of natural law. There his formulation of the principle is specifically moralistic: The upright is to be done and the wrong avoided. (Id. at II, 7, 5: "Honestum estfaciendum, pravum vitandum.") <b>Here too Suarez suggests that this principle is just one among many first principles; he juxtaposes it with Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. As to the end, Suarez completely separates the notion of it from the notion of law. He considers the goodness and badness with which natural law is concerned to be the moral value of acts in comparison with human nature, and he thinks of the natural law itself as a divine precept that makes it possible for acts to have an additional value of conformity with the law. Id. at II, 6. In neither aspect is the end fundamental. For this reason, too, the natural inclinations are not emphasized by Suarez as they are by Aquinas. </b>Although Suarez mentions the inclinations, he does so while referring to Aquinas. Id. at II, 5, 1-2. Before the end of the very same passage Suarez reveals what he really thinks to be the foundation of the precepts of natural law. It is not the inclinations but the quality of actions, a quality grounded on their own "intrinsic character and immutable essence, which in no way depend upon any extrinsic cause or will, any more than does the essence of other things which in themselves involve no contradiction." (We see at the beginning of paragraph 5 that <b>Suarez accepts this position as to its doctrine of "the intrinsic goodness or turpitude of actions," and so as an account of the foundation of the natural law precepts, although he does not accept it as an account of natural law, which he considers to require an act of the divine will</b>.) Later Suarez interprets the place of the inclinations in Aquinas's theory. As Suarez sees it, the inclinations are not principles in accordance with which reason forms the principles of natural law; they are only the matter with which the natural law is concerned. Id. at II, 8, 4. In other words, in Suarez's mind Aquinas only meant to say of the inclinations that they are subject to natural law. This interpretation simply ignores the important role we have seen Aquinas assign the inclinations in the formation of natural law.</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div>I agree with Brock's interpretation as against Grisez on how the natural law is truly a law, but that distinction does not matter much for the criticism here of the Suarian view. Grisez seems to be correct that Suarez "completely separates the notion [of the first principle] from the notion of law" and holds that the natural law as law results from "a divine precept that makes it possible for acts to have an additional value of conformity of the law." Because Suarez disagrees with St. Thomas on the natural law being promulgated <i>by creation itself</i>, in the form of truths that regulate as rules under the aspect of the good, he is forced to rely on sheer divine authority to account for "the additional value of conformity to the law." This carries forward to Suarez's understanding of the Magisterium.</div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Suarez says the following in <i>Defense of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith against the Anglicans</i> I.11.14-15 [<i>trans.</i> Peter L.P. Simpson, Lucairos Occasio Press 2012-13] :</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>But a twofold interpretation of Scripture must be distinguished, one we can call authentic, the other common or private. <b>Which distinction the adversaries seem to conceal or ignore, although however a similar one is frequent among the jurists in the interpretation of their civil laws. For one is authentic, that is, has the force of law, about which the laws themselves say that to him it belongs to interpret the law to whom it belongs to make the law; the other is doctrinal only which, although it not have that authority, yet it has its own utility for human governance</b>. In this way, then, some authentic interpretation of Scripture is necessary; and not less in things which pertain to faith and morals than in others, nay the more the more that in them a sure and indubitable sense is necessary. Nor is it significant that they are customarily clearer, because it is always possible for them to contain ambiguities from the variety of significations or senses, and chiefly because they are all wont to be perverted by heretics, as <b>Augustine testifies, bk. 2, </b></i><b>De Nuptiis</b><i><b>, where he speaks thus: "It is no wonder if the Pelagians try to twist our sayings into the senses they want, since they are accustomed, after the habit too of other heretics, to do it even in the case of the Sacred Scriptures, not where something is obscurely said, but where the testimonies are clear and open</b>." For these reasons, therefore, an authentic interpretation is necessary. But besides this one a doctrinal interpretation is also necessary for the edification and utility of the Church and for resisting heretics, because: "All scripture given by inspiration of God is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: That the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works," as Paul said, 2 Timothy 3:16-17.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><b>The first interpretation, then, cannot be done by a private spirit, and about this everything we have said proceeds; for this interpretation is what pertains to the foundation of faith, and therefore only by him can it be done to whom Christ specifically promised the key of knowledge; and then is testimony received, not from man, but from God through man. For Christ himself promised to his Church both his own assistance and the magisterium of the Holy Spirit. But the second interpretation of Scripture, since it does not of itself have infallible authority, can be human and be done by private authority, provided it not be done rashly and at will, but in such a ways that it not be repugnant either to other places of Scripture, or to definitions of the Church, or to the common sense of the Fathers. Nor, however, is even this sort of interpretation permitted to everyone, but to the doctors of the Church who have been called to this office; but to others, although the reading of Scripture can sometimes be useful according to the capacity of the reader, yet not for interpreting it, but for understanding it simply, in the way that it is expounded commonly in the Church. Nor too is [Scripture] to be read for examining the faith by one's own knowledge, but rather to be read by faith for drawing out of it other advantages and fruits</b>; and in this sense do the Fathers speak in the places cited, and Basil too can be looked at, in serm. 'De Vera et Pia Fide', and in </i>Regulae Breviores<i>, interrogat.95, where he teaches this very well, albeit briefly.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">If there is no normative authority regulating the practice of faith, no government able to promulgate truths of faith <i>as rules</i>, then the normative sense of Scripture is not formally sufficient to function as a rule of faith <i>even though the testimonies are clear and open</i>. So even though "[t]he truth of faith is sufficiently explicit" in a speculative sense, <i>it is only so for those with the habit of faith regulated by the government of the Church</i>. No matter how clear the interpretation may be, the "variety of significations or senses" makes it possible to understand them differently, so that the <i>normative sense of Scripture</i> is always going to be subject to uncertainty without a government. This is the same reason that government is required to prevent anarchy, because no matter how clear the law may be, there is always the possibility of reasonable disagreement in how it is to be interpreted and applied to any particular context. Thus, even known truths are insufficient <i>qua</i> rules, which is the basis for <i>formal insufficiency</i> of Scripture. It cannot, in and of itself, define its own normative sense.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">So, as per Suarez, what is necessary even for private interpretation is that it be regulated, and the Magisterium is the government that promulgates principles of divine revelation as rules, which is to say that they are viewed under their aspect of seeking the good and avoiding the evil. But as I said, it seems to me that the problem with Suarez here is exactly that he has lost the thread of St. Thomas's understanding of the natural law as law, likely because he is trying to reconcile opposed Thomist and Scotist positions on this point. But his intuition about the need for regulation is entirely correct; only his understanding about how truths functions as rules for the intellect in the manner of law is lacking.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This need for regulation is the principle that Franzelin (another Jesuit) has in mind when he says "a solely scientific authority is not suitable in its own mode for the director of souls" in the following passage from <i>On Divine Revelation </i>[<i>trans.</i> Ryan Grant, Sensus Traditionis Press 2016, p. 211-12]:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div><i>On the contrary, in the internal forum, as well as <b>the sacred authority in the order for the direction of the spiritual life (by the force of the sacred office established by Christ, since a solely scientific authority is not suitable in its own mode for the director of souls)</b>, to the point that the faithful, <b>in doubtful matters that touch upon conscience, could at some time (when other, safe roads are not clear), be held to conform their own practical judgment to the authority of the ministers of God</b>. Without a doubt Jesus Christ, the head, disposes and rules the whole Church and its individual parts in the internal and external life, but not without his visible vicars, through all ranks from the high even to the low, so that the principle of authority and spiritual obedience should pervade the whole body and all the members by different degrees, by forms and modes.<br /><br />Generally, <b>the evangelical counsel of obedience not only of the will, but also of the intellect, proves most profitably that the infallibility of teaching is not a necessary condition to furnish subjection and obedience of the intellect</b>.<br /><br /></i></div></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Rather, from the common doctrine of the Saints, such as Suarez among many, and St. Alphonsus describe in summary: "<b>someone under obedience that doubts, whether the matter commanded is lawful or not, is held to lay aside doubt, and thus, can and ought to obey</b>." Sts. Bernard, Bonaventure, Ignatius, Bl. Humbert the Dominican, Dionysius the Carthusian and others teach in one consensus: "<b>Whatsoever in turn man in place of God commands, so long as it might be certain to not displease God, is to be obeyed as if God commanded it</b>." Still, <b>every one of these would be altogether false unless one under obedience were held to subject the intellect to an authority in doubtful matters of this sort, not even in speculative opinion but in practical judgment on the honesty of his actions, although this would not be infallible either speculatively or practically</b>. Therefore, <b>this is the doctrine of the saints, which St. Alphonsus calls common and certain</b>, if it is true, then it is false that one could or never ought to subject the intellect to a superior authority unless it is infallible.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Note that Franzelin here says that "this [teaching] would not be infallible either speculatively or practically," but this is precisely the problem with the Suarian view. To be infallible neither speculatively nor practically disregards the middle ground that truths can function as practical rules, <i>viz</i>., as laws of the practice of theology and the interpretation of the normative sense of revelation. To be infallible practically would imply that such rules cannot achieve their practical aim of the salvation of souls, as if they could not fail to be put into practice by those who are guided, which is clearly false. But in trying to find a middle ground between these forms of speculative and practical infallibility, Franzelin thus relies on the sheer virtue of the "evangelical counsel of obedience." But given the different modes of submission of the intellect and will, he should've instead said that this infallible safety for submission of the intellect applies only to truths <i>promulgated as rules</i>, which direct the Christian to the pursuit of the good of eternal life. Yet if we look to St. Thomas on the nature of faith, this is exactly what faith as distinguished from intellect does:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>ST II-II.4.1 Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not?"</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div><i><br /></i></div><div><i>I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.<br /><br />In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are known by their acts, and acts by their objects, <b>faith, being a habit, should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object</b>. Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (II-II:2:3), which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the will's command. <b>Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the intellect, i.e. to the true</b>. And since faith, through being a theological virtues, as stated above (I-II:62:2), has one same thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity, be in proportion to one another. <b>Now it has been already stated (II-II:1:4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to the Apostle</b> (Romans 8:25): "We hope for that which we see not": because to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has already, but for what one has not, as stated above (I-II:67:4). <b>Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for."</b> For we are wont to call by the name of substance, <b>the first beginning of a thing, especially when the whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first beginning</b>; for instance, we might say that the first self-evident principles are the substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained in them virtually. <b>On this way then faith is said to be the "substance of things to be hoped for," for the reason that in us the first beginning of things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of faith, which contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made evident when we were speaking of happiness</b> (I-II:3:8; I-II:4:3).<br /><br />The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect, considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words, "evidence of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for the result of evidence. <b>For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another reading has "conviction," because to wit, the intellect of the believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it sees not</b>. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a definition, he may say that "<b>faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent</b>."<br /><br /><b>In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that appear not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the substance of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for.</b><br /><br /></i></div><div><i>Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of this one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.: QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we believe what we do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11) that "faith is an assent without research," and when others say that "<b>faith is that certainty of the mind about absent things which surpasses opinion but falls short of science</b>," these all amount to the same as the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear not"; and when Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "<b>faith is the solid foundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing forth the truth in him</b>," comes to the same as "substance of things to be hoped for."</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Just as, in a sense, the forest was lost for the trees concerning the relationship between natural law and eternal law (and ultimately First Truth), so has the holistic sense of the virtue of faith that St. Thomas presents here been lost. By contrast, the three views concerning the truths of faith presented above (Thomist, Scotist, and Suarist) are all concerned about <i>specific truths of speculative reason</i> and the problem of how these are "virtually contained" in prior truths owed the assent of faith. Suarez and Franzelin are trying to supplement the inadequacies of this account via sheer Magisterial authority, but St. Thomas here gives a clear and rational purpose for that authority: <i>to promulgate revealed truths as rules for the habit of faith</i>. This provides a non-arbitrary principle for a government to regulate the voluntary aspect of faith <i>under the aspect of good or end</i> "whereby eternal life is begun in us," which is a better account of how truths are virtually contained in the "substance of things hoped for" that distinguishes "the virtue of faith" from "faith commonly so called, <b>which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for</b>."</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In contrast with St. Thomas's account of the Magisterium based on promulgation of normative rules, the Jesuit account of Magisterial authority puts too much weight on the sheer divine authority of the Magisterium and not enough on how truths can serve as rules of practical knowledge, which is the role of government under its secular and sacred aspects. And as a general matter, this overemphasis on sheer authority in religion results in both <i>hypermagisterialism </i>with respect to religious authority and a disproportionate emphasis on <i>obedience to conscience</i> as opposed to <i>prudence</i> in moral theology. So it is fair to say that the loss of St. Thomas's sense of <i>truths as regulative principles</i> falling under <i>the virtue of prudence</i> has had drastic consequences for the life of the Church, both for the role of the Magisterium and the Church's moral teaching. And this seems to be manifest not only with respect to the contemporary circular firing squad on papal criticism but also the post-Tridentine decay of moral theology documented in Matthew Levering's <i>The Abuse of Conscience</i>. We need to get back to this Thomist understanding of law in terms of truths of practical knowledge, which, even "natural law" Thomists seem to have largely lost, at least according to Brock's account.</div><br /><u>VII. Applying the theory to<i> Donum Veritatis</i> and <i>Ad Tuendam Fidem</i></u></div><div><u><i><br /></i></u></div><div><u>A. <i>Donum Veritatis </i>and the pastoral Magisterium</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">With all of this in mind, we can turn some of the more significant documents on the non-infallible papal Magisterium: <i>Donum Veritatis</i> and <i>Ad Tuendam Fidei</i>. In my previous article, I had not considered <i>Donum Veritatis</i> in view of divine revelation as normative authority and the Magisterium as government. That was because I considered <i>Donum Veritatis</i> as relating specifically to the speculative task of the theologian in terms of levels of intellectual authority (more or less, theological notes), but I believe that this was a mistake on my part. Now that I have reread it with the notion of rules of practical knowledge in mind, I believe that <i>Donum Veritatis</i> also explicitly relates to the authority of the Magisterium to promulgate rules -- the "givens" that have "the force of principles" -- for practice of theology and how these rules are to function in the practice of theology. The relevant sections are as follows:</div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; text-align: start;"><br /></span></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>15. Jesus Christ promised the assistance of the Holy Spirit to the Church's Pastors so that they could fulfill their assigned task of teaching the Gospel and authentically interpreting Revelation. In particular, He bestowed on them the charism of infallibility in matters of faith and morals. This charism is manifested when the Pastors propose a doctrine as contained in Revelation and can be exercised in various ways. Thus <b>it is exercised particularly when the bishops in union with their visible head proclaim a doctrine by a collegial act, as is the case in an ecumenical council, or when the Roman Pontiff, fulfilling his mission as supreme Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, proclaims a doctrine "ex cathedra"</b>. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;">16. By its nature, the task of religiously guarding and loyally expounding the deposit of divine Revelation (in all its integrity and purity), implies that the Magisterium can make a pronouncement "in a definitive way" on propositions which, even if not contained among the truths of faith, are nonetheless intimately connected with them, in such a way, that the definitive character of such affirmations derives in the final analysis from revelation itself.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">What concerns morality can also be the object of the authentic Magisterium because the Gospel, being the Word of Life, inspires and guides the whole sphere of human behavior. The Magisterium, therefore, has the task of discerning, <b>by means of judgments normative for the consciences of believers</b>, those acts which in themselves conform to the demands of faith and foster their expression in life and those which, on the contrary, because intrinsically evil, are incompatible with such demands. By reason of the connection between the orders of creation and redemption and by reason of the necessity, in view of salvation, of knowing and observing the whole moral law, <b>the competence of the Magisterium also extends to that which concerns the natural law</b>.</div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">Revelation also contains moral teachings which per se could be known by natural reason. Access to them, however, is made difficult by man's sinful condition. <b>It is a doctrine of faith that these moral norms can be infallibly taught by the Magisterium</b>. </div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;">17. Divine assistance is also given to the successors of the apostles teaching in communion with the successor of Peter, <b>and in a particular way, to the Roman Pontiff as Pastor of the whole Church, when exercising their ordinary Magisterium</b>, even should this not issue in an infallible definition or in a "definitive" pronouncement but in <b>the proposal of some teaching which leads to a better understanding of Revelation in matters of faith and morals and to moral directives derived from such teaching</b>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">[N<i>.</i>B.<i>, the "particular way" here corresponds to the "special way" of religious submission of mind and will taught in </i>Lumen Gentium <i>25</i>.]</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="text-align: start;"><i>One must therefore take into account the proper character of every exercise of the Magisterium, considering the extent to which its authority is engaged. It is also to be borne in mind that <b>all acts of the Magisterium derive from the same source, that is, from Christ</b> who desires that His People walk in the entire truth. For this same reason, <b>magisterial decisions in matters of discipline, even if they are not guaranteed by the charism of infallibility, are not without divine assistance and call for the adherence of the faithful</b>.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;">...</div><div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>23. When the Magisterium of the Church makes an infallible pronouncement and solemnly declares that a teaching is found in Revelation, the assent called for is that of theological faith. This kind of adherence is to be given even to the teaching of the ordinary and universal Magisterium when it proposes for belief a teaching of faith as divinely revealed.</i></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span><i><br /></i></span><span><i>When the Magisterium proposes "in a definitive way" truths concerning faith and morals, which, even if not divinely revealed, are nevertheless strictly and intimately connected with Revelation, these must be firmly accepted and held.</i></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span><i><br /></i></span><span><i>When the Magisterium, not intending to act "definitively", teaches a doctrine <b>to aid a better understanding of Revelation and make explicit its contents, or to recall how some teaching is in conformity with the truths of faith, or finally to guard against ideas that are incompatible with these truths, the response called for is that of the religious submission of will and intellect</b>. This kind of response cannot be simply exterior or disciplinary but must be understood <b>within the logic of faith and under the impulse of obedience to the faith</b>. </i></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span><i><br /></i></span><span><i>24. Finally, in order to serve the People of God as well as possible, in particular, by warning them of dangerous opinions which could lead to error, the Magisterium can intervene in questions under discussion which involve, in addition to solid principles, certain contingent and conjectural elements.<b> It often only becomes possible with the passage of time to distinguish between what is necessary and what is contingent</b>. </i></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span><i><br /></i></span><span><i>The willingness to submit loyally to the teaching of the Magisterium on matters per se not irreformable must be the rule. It can happen, however, that a theologian may, according to the case, raise questions regarding the timeliness, the form, or even the contents of magisterial interventions. Here the theologian will need, first of all, <b>to assess accurately the authoritativeness of the interventions which becomes clear from the nature of the documents, the insistence with which a teaching is repeated, and the very way in which it is expressed</b>. <br /></i></span><span>[N.B., <i>this refers to the "manifest mind and will" of the Pope.</i>]<br /></span><span><i><br /></i></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span><i>When it comes to the question of interventions in the prudential order, it could happen that some Magisterial documents might not be free from all deficiencies. Bishops and their advisors have not always taken into immediate consideration every aspect or the entire complexity of a question. <b>But it would be contrary to the truth, if, proceeding from some particular cases, one were to conclude that the Church's Magisterium can be habitually mistaken in its prudential judgments, or that it does not enjoy divine assistance in the integral exercise of its mission</b>. In fact, the theologian, who cannot pursue his discipline well without a certain competence in history, is aware of the filtering which occurs with the passage of time. This is not to be understood in the sense of a relativization of the tenets of the faith. The theologian knows that <b>some judgments of the Magisterium could be justified at the time in which they were made, because while the pronouncements contained true assertions and others which were not sure, both types were inextricably connected. Only time has permitted discernment and, after deeper study, the attainment of true doctrinal progress</b>.<br /></i></span><br /></span></div><div>This provides us with a helpful outline of what <i>specific acts</i> of non-infallible papal teaching are entitled to religious submission of mind and will in the "special way" described in <i>LG</i> 25, in order to preserve adequate respect for the exercise of the papal office. Those specific acts are as follows:</div><div><br /></div><div>Category A. Magisterial decision in matters of discipline, which require "adherence of the faithful."</div><div><br /></div><div>Category B. Non-definitive doctrinal teachings (1) "to aid a better understanding of Revelation and make explicit its contents," (2) "to recall how some teaching is in conformity with the truths of faith," and (3) "to guard against ideas that are incompatible with these truths," which are subject to religious submission of the intellect and will if it is clear from the manifest mind and will of the Pope <i>that the teaching is in one of these three categories</i>. More specifically, these are the teachings that I understand to be promulgation of rules for the practice of theology and interpretation of divine revelation, <i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., the pastoral Magisterium. </div><div><br /></div><div>Category C. Interventions in the prudential order, in which one cannot from isolated examples "conclude that the Church's Magisterium can be habitually mistaken in its prudential judgments, or that it does not enjoy divine assistance in the integral exercise of its mission." In addition, some judgments may be timebound or contingent in some aspects so that they would be inapplicable in other times while being justifiable in application at the time they were made (<i>e.g</i>., judicial burning of heretics, capital punishment).</div><div>[<i>N.B.</i>, obviously, given the cases of habitual papal hypocrisy identified above, this refers not to individual officeholders but to the Church as a whole over the course of history to the point of concluding that the Magisterium lacks divine authority in the area of competence.]</div><div><br /></div><div>In each of these cases, the Magisterium is authoritatively promulgating teaching <i>as a rule</i>. And just as with <i>ex cathedra</i> teaching, these categories apply to <i>specific teaching acts</i> and not to documents as a whole. The additional requirement is that the Magisterial act must be manifestly fall in the category of "judgments normative for the consciences of believers," which makes the act to be a promulgation of truth as rule. Otherwise, the Pope would merely be teaching as a private theologian, not exercising the "universal ecclesial providence" that Franzelin describes. It is those binding teachings, and only those binding teachings, that are entitled to religious submission of the mind and will in the "special way" in <i>LG </i>25. Otherwise, Sts. Catherine and Bernard would have amounted to public dissenters from Magisterial authority, in contravention of the sorts of prudential guidelines of <i>DV</i> 30, and this is clearly not the case.</div><div><br /></div><div><i>Dissent</i> must instead refer to the act of refusing a judgment binding on the conscience. That seems to be the best explanation for the references to the binding nature of teaching and conscience in <i>DV</i> 33 and 38:</div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="text-align: start;"><i>Dissent has different aspects. In its most radical form, it aims at changing the Church following a model of protest which takes its inspiration from political society. More frequently, <b>it is asserted that the theologian is not bound to adhere to any Magisterial teaching unless it is infallible</b>. Thus a Kind of theological positivism is adopted, according to which, <b>doctrines proposed without exercise of the charism of infallibility are said to have no obligatory character about them, leaving the individual completely at liberty to adhere to them or not</b>. The theologian would accordingly be totally free to raise doubts or reject the non-infallible teaching of the Magisterium particularly in the case of specific moral norms. With such critical opposition, he would even be making a contribution to the development of doctrine.</i></span><br />...<br /></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Finally,</span> argumentation appealing to the obligation to follow one's own conscience cannot legitimate dissent. This is true, first of all, because <b>conscience illumines the practical judgment about a decision to make, while here we are concerned with the truth of a doctrinal pronouncement</b>. This is furthermore the case because while the theologian, like every believer, must follow his conscience, <b>he is also obliged to form it</b>. Conscience is not an independent and infallible faculty. It is an act of moral judgement regarding a responsible choice. <b>A right conscience is one duly illumined by faith and by the objective moral law and it presupposes, as well, the uprightness of the will in the pursuit of the true good</b>. <br /><br />The right conscience of the Catholic theologian presumes not only faith in the Word of God whose riches he must explore, but also love for the Church from whom he receives his mission, and respect for her divinely assisted Magisterium. <b>Setting up a supreme magisterium of conscience in opposition to the magisterium of the Church means adopting a principle of free examination incompatible with the economy of Revelation and its transmission in the Church and thus also with a correct understanding of theology and the role of the theologian</b>. The propositions of faith are not the product of mere individual research and free criticism of the Word of God but constitute an ecclesial heritage. If there occur a separation from the Bishops who watch over and keep the apostolic tradition alive, it is the bond with Christ which is irreparably compromised.</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div><u>B. Confusion in <i>Donum Veritatis</i></u></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">In large measure, <i>Donum Veritatis</i> has not resolved the issue of dissent, and I believe there is a reason for this confusion. Among others, it was this statement that "here we are concerned with the truth of a doctrinal pronouncement" that suggested (to me, at least) that <i>Donum Veritatis</i> pertained to a method for evaluating the truth of <i>specific speculative propositions of theology</i>. This is why I thought <i>DV</i> applied generally to the <i>non-infallible speculative teaching</i> of the Magisterium, in which the Magisterium is essentially acting in its capacity of the teaching Magisterium rather than the pastoral Magisterium. But the term "truths" (plural) is only used in this sense for definitive Magisterial statements in <i>DV</i> 23, which is to say propositions that are either in or necessarily connected to divine revelation. Indeed, when viewed from the perspective of the Magisterium as promulgator of rules in the pastoral Magisterium, it seems that <i>DV</i> is saying the opposite: that it is not the truth of specific propositions but the ordered pursuit of <i>the truth</i>, which is to say First Truth, under the governance of the Magisterium that <i>DV </i>contemplates. This fits better with the statement claim that "propositions of faith are not the product of mere individual research and free criticism of the Word of God but constitute an ecclesial heritage," which clearly points to the Church as a continuous body under the authority of the Magisterium.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Of course this raises the most important question: <i>why didn't they just say this</i>? And I believe the answer goes back to two things. First, the question of how doctrines are "of faith" and, more generally, how speculative truths can be binding as rules has been a vexed one since Trent. In that respect, I believe that Lawrence J. King has correctly described the situation in Chapter One of <a href="https://cuislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/cuislandora%3A40891/datastream/PDF/view" target="_blank">his 2016 dissertation on the non-infallible Magisterium</a>: "<span style="text-align: start;">It was during the High Middle Ages that canonists and theologians began to systematically discuss <b>what adherence the Christian faithful should give to specific doctrines</b>." But this was in turn connected to <i>what exactly the Magisterium had authority to define for the faithful</i>, and there was no clear answer on that point either. So this entire issue of exactly what adherence to Magisterial teaching meant was never resolved.</span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: start;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In addition, the treatment of this issue has also suffered from the more general conflic</span>t between <i>nouvelle theologie</i> and "Neo-Thomism," which had led <i>ressourcement</i> theologians -- including Popes St. John Paul II and Benedict XVI -- to take a dim view of the manualist tradition. King describes this in his introduction as follows:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: start;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: start;">In the wake of the Second Vatican Council, discussion of the Church’s teaching authority </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: start;">split into various streams. </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: start;">Some theologians held that the preconciliar manualists’ theology of </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: start;">the magisterium was completely outdated, arguing that it was based on a purely verbal model of </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: start;">manualist tradition, arguing that it showed that the conciliar documents were full of doctrinal </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: start;">revelation and indefensible historical claims. </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: start;">Other theologians completely accepted the </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: start;">errors, or at least ambiguous statements that lent themselves to such interpretation. The </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: start;">theological “center,” sidelined into debates on various specific questions </span><span style="text-align: start;">(</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: start;">such as the authority of </span><span style="text-align: start;">Humanae vitae</span><span style="text-align: start;">)</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: start;">, was making few contributions to the fundamental study of the theology of the magisterium. It was unclear whether theologians of different views could debate topics related </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: start;">to the Church’s teaching authority within a common framework.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span>But where King takes a relatively optimistic view that the work of Francis Sullivan helped theologians to move to a more common framework, I see exactly the opposite. Much as with the increasingly fractured and chaotic understanding of conscience since Trent, documented in Levering's <i>The Abuse of Conscience</i>, the notion of Magisterial authority, especially since the Reformation, has splintered into blatantly conflicting theories with no clear unifying principles. Sullivan is, it seems to me, simply repeating Suarez's confusion between the pastoral and teaching magisteria. This is further exacerbated by the exasperating tendency of the <i>ressourcement</i> theologians to "reclaim" a doctrine from the pre-modern era which entails a significant reinterpretation of that doctrine, while <i>pretending that the intervening Scholastic tradition never happened</i>! If that is an exaggeration, it is only a slight one. </span><span>As Christian Brugger explained in </span><a href="https://reasonandtheology.com/2023/09/07/catholicism-and-the-death-penalty-w-e-christian-brugger/" target="_blank">his interview on the Reason & Theology YouTube channel</a><span>, Pope St. John Paul II appears to have done exactly this on the issue of capital punishment, which has produced worse and worse divisions among Catholics on the point. And this is a repeated theme since Vatican II: an inadequate account of continuity argued based on sheer Magisterial authority results in nothing but conflict, even among people who likely would endorse identical theological conclusions for different reasons.</span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /><u>C. The theological concept of "adherence"</u></span></div><div><br /></div><div>In particular, what has been glossed over is a massive ambiguity over the theological concept of <i>adherence </i>in the context of <i>the virtue of faith</i>. Here we can recall what St. Thomas said:</div><div><br /></div><div><i>In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that appear not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the substance of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for.</i><br /><br /><div style="text-align: justify;">The problem is that Ratzinger, the Augustinian theologian, has made a context shift from Scholasticism, although it might be a fair one. The key Scriptural text for the adherence of the soul to God is Ps. 63:8 [62:9] "my soul clings to You." The Hebrew verb is <i>dabaq</i>, which means "to cleave to" (often in the familial sense) or "to hang onto" (as with a captured quarry). In the Vulgate, this is translated with adhesion: <i>adhesit anima mea post te</i>. But St. Augustine frequently translates it theologically as <i>agglutinata est anima mea post te</i>, "my soul <i>is glued</i> after You." This situates the passage in a pneumatological context described by the Augustinian scholar Joseph Lienhard, SJ in "'The Glue Itself Is Charity': Ps. [63:8/]62:9 in Augustine's Thought" in <i>Presbyter Factus Sum.</i></div></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div>Lienhard surveys Augustine's theology of <i>gluten</i> as follows:</div><div><br /></div><div><i>Augustine cites Ps [63:8/]62:9 with </i>adhaesit <i>four times. Three instances are early, and the word that catches Augustine' attention is </i>post. Post ["after"] <i>suggests to him the right order of things, and the psalm verse is a warning against pride and an exhortation to humility.... In chapter 45 of </i>De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus<i>, entitled </i>Aduersus mathematicos<i>, Augustine is trying to place the human mind in the right order of things. The mind judges visible things and realizes that it is superior to them. But it also realizes, on account of defect and progress in wisdom, that it is mutable, and finds immutable truth above itself.... Finally, in chapter 66 of the same work, Augustine is treating Romans 7 and 8. Ps 62:9 again suggests humility. The desire to sin is useful, he says, because the soul realizes that it cannot extricate itself from servitude to sin. Its swelling diminishes, all pride is extinguished, and the sinner says sincerely, </i>Adhaesit anima mea post te<i>. He is no longer under the law of sin, but under the law of justice; the sinner discovers the right </i>ordo<i>.</i></div><div><i>...</i></div><div><i>From 388 on, Augustine began to use </i>gluten<i> as a metaphor for the bond of love. At first he used it without reference to the Scriptures; then he found a passage in Job [38:38] which confirmed his usage. </i>[<i>NB, this "confirmation" is mostly in Augustine's mind; as Lienhard says, "[t]he verse makes so little sense that Augustine was sure to find a profound meaning in it."</i>]<i> Charity as glue becomes a minor, but not insignificant, theme in Augustine's works.</i></div><div><i>... </i></div><div>Gluten <i>is </i>caritas:<i> this becomes a fixed equation in Augustine's mind, and he uses it several more times, without reference to Ps 62:9 --- in a sermon he preached around 412, and twice in </i>De trinitate<i>.</i></div><div><i>...</i></div><div><i>Around 396 or 397, Augustine added another dimension to his use of the image of </i>gluten: <i>he makes the subject of the verb </i>agglutinare<i> the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is the agent within the Trinity who binds or glues us to the Godhead.</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div><i>Augustine first uses this image in the </i>De doctrina christiana<i>, without reference to the Scriptures. He writes: "For when we come to [Christ], we also come to the Father, because the Father, to whom the Son is equal, is known through His equal. And the Holy Spirit binds and, as it were, glues us. By the Holy Spirit we can abide in the highest and the immutable Good."</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div><i>At about the same time, 397 or so, Augustine wrote the famous definition of friendship in the </i>Confessiones...:<i> "Friendship cannot be true unless you glue it together among those who cleave to one another by the charity 'poured forth in our heats by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.'" There is a new element here: Augustine quotes Rm 5:5. God, he says, bonds the friendship "by the charity 'poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.'" The crucial role of Rm 5:5 in Augustine's thought is well known. In his work </i>On the Trinity<i>, the verse from Paul allowed Augustine to call the Holy Spirit charity. And Rm 5:5 was his most convincing scriptural refutation of Pelagianism</i>.</div><div><br /></div><div>It is this concept of "adherence" through charity that I think Ratzinger had in mind when he wrote that, for example, the discipline of the Church requires "adherence of the faithful." Given that Ratzinger's experience was primarily with religious epistemology of St. Bonaventure and that the <i>ressourcement </i>theologians tended not to explicitly invoke or survey the manualist tradition, it may be that he was not even familiar with the diversity of the schools in this idea of adherence or that he simply took for granted that the Augustinian view was accepted by all of the schools. Regardless, because faith has this mixed quality as an intellectual habit, the Dominican school's view that the epistemological mode of submission here is <i>via </i>the intellect's adherence to first principles <i>as </i>first principles in the normal mode of discursive reasoning is hardly implausible. That would certainly be a reasonable interpretation of <i>ST</i> I.82.2 concerning the will and its relation to the intellect:</div><div><br /><i>I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the <b>intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles</b>, so <b>the will adheres to the last end</b>, as we have said already (Article 1). <b>Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will.</b> For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.<br /></i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div>But the adhesion involved in the act of faith is more complicated, and I do not think this notion of intellectual adhesion alone is sufficient for St. Thomas's account (<i>ST</i> II-II.2.2)</div><div><br /><i>I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends on the relation of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.<br /><br />If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (II-II:1:1). One of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of faith is "to believe in a God"; because, as stated above (II-II:1:1) nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith is "to believe God," since, as stated above (II-II:1:1) <b>the formal object of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent to Its sake to whatever he believes</b>.<br /><br />Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in God." <b>For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect of an end</b>.</i><br /><br />This seems consistent with the previous article (<i>ST</i> II-II.2.1) concerning how faith relates to the cogitative power. St. Thomas notes that it is not through discursive reasoning (deliberating from the information one has observed) that one achieves faith but that it nonetheless is in some way similar to a situation where one does not directly see the object of knowledge (as in the beatific vision). It is this act of the intellect that is the act of faith. <br /><br /><i>Accordingly, if "to think" be understood broadly according to the first sense, then "to think with assent," does not express completely what is meant by "to believe": since, in this way, <b>a man thinks with assent even when he considers what he knows by science, or understands</b>. If, on the other hand, "to think" be understood in the second way, then this expresses completely the nature of the act of believing. For among the acts belonging to the intellect, some have a firm assent without any such kind of thinking, as when a man considers the things that he knows by science, or understands, for this consideration is already formed. But some acts of the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent, whether they incline to neither side, as in one who "doubts"; or incline to one side rather than the other, but on account of some slight motive, as in one who "suspects"; or incline to one side yet with fear of the other, as in one who "opines." But <b>this act "to believe," cleaves firmly to one side</b>, in which respect belief has something in common with science and understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion. <b>Hence it is proper to the believer to think with assent: so that the act of believing is distinguished from all the other acts of the intellect, which are about the true or the false</b>.<br />…<br />Reply to Objection 3. The intellect of the believer is determined to one object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore <b>assent is taken here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the will</b>.</i></div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This seems to be the modal distinction between the teaching magisterium and the pastoral magisterium. With respect to the teaching magisterium, it pertains specifically to theology as deliberative reasoning (speculatively speculative truth) and specifically to <i>how propositions are discursively reasoned from revealed truths to which one has assented</i>. This is essentially the Thomist account of the Magisterium <i>as teacher</i>, and it sets the criteria for which new definitive dogma may be definable by the Magisterium in terms of speculatively speculative truth. But to the extent that dogma and doctrine pertains to <i>practically speculative truths</i> or <i>practically practical truths</i>, which are <i>under the aspect of the good</i>, this is where the Magisterium as promulgator of truths as rules is critical to preserve the order and unity of charity in the faith, so that the motive of the will to cleave firmly to one side can be suitably preserved.</div><div><br /></div><div>It seems at least consistent with St. Thomas's view that the adherence of faith to non-infallible Magisterial teaching is in the mode of a rule, which is clearly the case with the assent of faith to infallible teaching. <i>ST</i> II-II.5.3 famously says:</div><div><br /></div><div><i>I answer that, Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith.<br /><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth. Consequently <b>whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith</b>. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will.</i></div></i><br /><div style="text-align: justify;">But we can then say that this describes the assent of faith <i>to a very specific kind of rule</i>, which falls into the general category of rules promulgated by the Magisterium, <i>viz</i>., the law of faith. So I would propose to resolve what I view as the confusion of the Suarist account as follows. First, the distinction must be made between the teaching magisterial role and the pastoral magisterial role. The pastoral magisterial role -- a government promulgating rules of faith under the aspect of the good (what is to be preferred and avoided) -- is the essential function of the Magisterium. The teaching magisterial role is, in and of itself, only incidental to the pastoral magisterial role, simply because the ability to promulgate truths as rules must necessarily include the ability to authoritatively define what those truths are. That exercise of binding in the <i>speculatively speculative</i> manner is then rightly called <i>extraordinary</i> exercise of the authority to promulgate rules. The <i>ordinary Magisterium</i> is the promulgation of rules that are infallibly safe to follow from a practical perspective, sufficient to preserve the indefectibility of the Church, but are not necessarily timeless and universal formulations of the underlying principles. And the <i>ordinary and universal Magisterium</i> refers to when such timeless and universal formulations are non-definitively taught in such a way that the timeless and universal formulation of the underlying principle can be identified, including when the Pope in his own pastoral Magisterium ratifies or confirms such a formulation as a rule. </div></div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">From a theological perspective, this situates the Holy Spirit's gifts of knowledge, understanding, and wisdom in the virtue of faith in a way that harmonizes with Augustine's account of the unity of charity. First, wisdom, the right ordering of truths relative to one another, falls under charity, and the Magisterium is established by the Sacrament of Order and is itself a government, which maintains order in a society. And with respect to the gifts that are specifically related to faith as an intellectual habit -- that is, understanding and knowledge -- each has a corresponding practical aspect (<i>ST</i> II-II.8.3 and <i>ST</i> II-II.9.3). With respect to understanding, St. Thomas explicitly ties the practical application to the eternal law: "The rule of human actions is the human reason and the eternal law, as stated above [<i>ST</i> I-II:71:6]. Now the eternal law surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost" (<i>ST </i>II-II.8.3 <i>ad 3</i>). All of this is compatible with the role of the Magisterium as promulgator of rules for the faith demanding adherence of both mind and will. It is likewise compatible with St. Thomas's understanding of "lifeless faith," which involves the intellectual acceptance of the truths of faith in the manner of discursive reasoning without the virtue of charity but which is still a gift of God (<i>ST</i> II-II.6.2).<br /></div><div><br /></div><div>It also seems consistent with the Magisterium's own description of its roles, such as Pope Leo XIII's description in <i>Sapientiae Christianae</i>:</div><div><br /><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>Wherefore it belongs to the Pope to judge authoritatively what things the sacred oracles contain, as well as what doctrines are in harmony, and what in disagreement, with them; and also, for the same reason, to show forth what things are to be accepted as right, and what to be rejected as worthless; what it is necessary to do and what to avoid doing, in order to attain eternal salvation. For, otherwise, there would be <b>no sure interpreter of the commands of God</b>, nor would there be <b>any safe guide showing man the way he should live</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;">If I am correct in this understanding of the Magisterium, then it is not the case that the Thomist account of development of dogma and Magisterial definitions is incorrect or that the Scotist/nominalist or Suarist accounts correct a deficiency in that account. Rather, the problem is that an account that is highly specific to an extraordinary case -- that of speculatively speculative truths being authoritatively promulgated as such -- has been extended far beyond its reasonable application to the authority of the Magisterium. And as in the case of natural law and conscience, St. Thomas's account of truth in its <i>speculatively practical </i>role under the aspect of the good has been disregarded despite its utility. In fact, as I suggested above, I now believe Ratzinger had exactly this concept in mind when he wrote <i>Donum Veritatis</i>. But because he did not address the Scholastic tradition on this point, he did not make clear how his view should be placed in continuity with the larger tradition. And as with the case of Pope St. John Paul II's development of the teaching on capital punishment, his explanation would have benefited from a more explicit treatment.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><u>D. Magisterium as government in <i>Donum Veritatis, Ad Tuendam Fidem</i>, and canon law</u></div><div><u><br /></u></div><div>Turning to Ratzinger, then, there is evidence of the account of the Magisterium as promulgator of rules of faith in canon law, even though the explicit justification has not been presented. The 1983 Code of Canon Law implemented the teaching of <i>Lumen Gentium </i>25 concerning the non-infallible Magisterium. Canon 752 <i>specifically employs the language of a precept </i>in the context of religious submission, <i>not</i> the language of truth or error that would normally be found in the purely intellectual mode of assent:</div><div><br /><i>Although not an assent of faith, a religious submission of the intellect and will must be given to a doctrine which the Supreme Pontiff or the college of bishops declares concerning faith or morals when they exercise the authentic magisterium, even if they do not intend to proclaim it by definitive act; therefore, the Christian faithful are to take care <b>to avoid those things which do not agree with it</b>.<br /></i><br />Moreover, this was the <i>same sort of language</i> (adherence and avoidance) used for the assent of faith to truths of the Catholic faith in the version of Canon 750 promulgated at the same time:</div><div><br /><i>A person must believe with divine and Catholic faith all those things contained in the word of God, written or handed on, that is, in the one deposit of faith entrusted to the Church, and at the same time proposed as divinely revealed either by the solemn magisterium of the Church or by its ordinary and universal magisterium which is <b>manifested by the common adherence of the Christian faithful under the leadership of the sacred magisterium</b>; therefore <b>all are bound to avoid any doctrines whatsoever contrary to them</b>.<br /></i><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The unfortunate ambiguity is in the use of the term "proposed," and it reflects the disregard of the prior manualist tradition. From the Scholastic perspective, one would immediately be led to a <i>proposition</i> in the sense of <i>discursive reasoning</i>, which is exactly why it appears to be an extension of <i>speculatively speculative truths</i> in the Magisterial context. But the surrounding context indicates that even these are being contemplated as proposed <i>under the aspect of the good</i> for purposes of the Magisterial role, so that even though they must of necessity be accepted propositionally to affirm truth and avoid error in discursive reasoning, the role of the Magisterium in them is to <i>bind the conscience to obedience of these truths as rules</i>. This is "<span style="text-align: left;">the knowledge of human actions, <b>as ruled by the eternal law</b>," as St. Thomas describes the supernatural gift of knowledge in </span><i style="text-align: left;">ST </i><span style="text-align: left;">II-II.8.3</span><span style="text-align: left;"> </span><i style="text-align: left;">ad 3</i><span style="text-align: left;">. The more accurate term for this role might have been "promulgated," but this would likewise have need to have been qualified similar to the sense in which God is said to "promulgate" the natural law, in order to convey the inner sense of assent as opposed to merely external obedience. Sadly, for want of a better term for how the Magisterium enables "a participation of the eternal law in the rational creature" (</span><i>ST</i> I-II.91.2), the confusion introduced by Suarez between the teaching magisterial role and the pastoral magisterial role has only been exacerbated.<span style="text-align: left;"> </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This preceptual understanding of speculative truths is, I believe, what <i>DV</i> 23 has in mind with the injunction that "<span style="text-align: start;">[t]his kind of response cannot be simply exterior or disciplinary but must be understood within <b>the logic of faith and under the impulse of obedience to the faith</b>." Because faith is not a sheerly cognitive power governed by the science of thought (logic), there are additional <i>normative</i> rules governing the act of faith based on assent to authority. And this is how the pastoral Magisterium enters into the practice of theology even as a science: as being ruled by eternal law. Dissent should instead properly be understood with respect to this <i>lawful authority to promulgate rules</i> rather than the very narrow class of <i>infallibly true statements in the teaching magisterial role</i>. Otherwise, we can be in the bizarre situation of disagreement with Magisterium <i>in its teaching magisterial role</i> being dissent and somehow being forced to accept "infallibly safe error." The point of <i>DV</i> is exactly the opposite; it says what <i>practical</i> rules apply to the practice of theology even when one might have a <i>speculative disagreement </i>with the Magisterium in the teaching magisterial role, where it can be subject to error. In short, <i>disagreement with the teaching Magisterium is not a proper basis for dissent from the pastoral Magisterium</i>.</span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: start;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: start;">The Magisterium-as-government account also provides a clearer explanation of <i>Ad Tuendam Fidem</i>, the <i>motu proprio</i> that further clarifies the role of the Magisterium in <i>Lumen Gentium </i>25. The new addition to Canon 750 does not use specifically preceptual language, such as "avoid," but it does use "held" from <i>sententia definitive tenenda</i>, which is the language of adherence.</span></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Each and every thing which is proposed definitively by the magisterium of the Church concerning the doctrine of faith and morals, that is, each and every thing which is required to safeguard reverently and to expound faithfully the same deposit of faith, is also to be </i><b>firmly embraced and retained</b><i>; therefore, one who </i><b>rejects those propositions which are to be held definitively</b><i> is opposed to the doctrine of the Catholic Church.</i></div></i><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Here again, this does not appear to be the purely intellectual mode of assent, the assent to truths in the manner of discursive reasoning, but specifically the assent to those truths <i>under the aspect of the good</i> (<i>viz.</i>, "it is good for me to cling firmly to X and to avoid Y that is contrary to it"). It is not merely that which I know to be true as if by strong evidence but rather an act of clinging to the authority of the Magisterium, by the Holy Spirit that binds the Church in the unity of charity. That act, the act of fidelity and loyalty to the authority of the Church, is the response of the soul to truths promulgated by the Magisterium as rules. It is the manner in which the soul clings to God. Without this, the submission to the Magisterium could be merely lifeless faith.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This seems to be consistent both with the explanation in <i>Ad Tuendam Fidem</i> and the further commentary on the concluding Profession of Faith by Cardinals Ratzinger and Bertone. <i>Ad Tuendam Fidem</i> 3 says the following:</div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The second paragraph, however, which states “I also firmly accept and hold each and everything definitively proposed by the Church regarding teaching on faith and morals,” has no corresponding canon in the Codes of the Catholic Church. This second paragraph of the </i>Profession of faith<i> is of utmost importance since it refers to <b>truths that are necessarily connected to divine revelation</b>. These truths, in the investigation of Catholic doctrine, illustrate <b>the Divine Spirit’s particular inspiration for the Church’s deeper understanding of a truth concerning faith and morals, with which they are connected either for historical reasons or by a logical relationship</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div>Importantly, <i>the modes of assent in the first and second paragraphs are explicitly connected to the role of the Holy Spirit</i> (section 8 of the commentary), firstly in the inspiration of Scripture and secondly in the life of the Church:</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">With regard to the </span><span style="text-align: -webkit-left;">nature<i> </i></span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">of the assent owed to the truths set forth by the Church as divinely revealed (those of the first paragraph) or to be held definitively (those of the second paragraph), it is important to emphasize that <b>there is no difference with respect to the full and irrevocable character of the assent which is owed to these teachings</b>. The difference concerns the supernatural virtue of faith: in the case of truths of the first paragraph, the assent is based directly on <b>faith in the authority of the word of God</b> (doctrines </span><span style="text-align: -webkit-left;">de fide credenda</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">); in the case of the truths of the second paragraph, the assent is based on <b>faith in the Holy Spirit's assistance to the Magisterium</b> and on the Catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the Magisterium (doctrines </span><span style="text-align: -webkit-left;">de fide tenenda</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">)</span></div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">A similar distinction applies to the question of logical and historical necessity. The commentary says at section 7:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">The truths belonging to this second paragraph can be of various natures, thus giving different qualities to their relationship with revelation. There are truths which are <b>necessarily connected with revelation by virtue of an </b></span><span style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><b>historical relationship</b></span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">, while other truths evince <b>a </b></span><span style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><b>logical connection<i> </i></b></span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;"><b>that expresses a stage in the maturation of understanding of revelation</b> which the Church is called to undertake. The fact that these doctrines may not be proposed as formally revealed, insofar as <b>they add to the data of faith </b></span><span style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><b>elements that are not revealed or which are not yet expressly recognized as such</b></span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">, in no way diminishes their definitive character, which is <b>required at least by their intrinsic connection with revealed truth</b>. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that at a certain point in dogmatic development, the understanding of the realities and the words of the deposit of faith can progress in the life of the Church, and the Magisterium may proclaim some of these doctrines as also dogmas of divine and catholic faith.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Yet these two modes of necessity can really only be connected if we consider <i>speculative truths under the aspect of the good</i>. That accounts both for discursive reasoning, which is expressed by a <i>logical connection</i>, and their <i>historical relationship</i> <i>to contingent elements</i>, which refers to this application of those truths to Christian life. That accounts for the recognition of <i>dogmatic facts</i>, the contingent events <i>subsequent to the closure of revelation</i>, that nonetheless must be accepted as truths of the faith, as explained among the examples in the commentary:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">With regard to those truths <b>connected to revelation by historical necessity and which are to be held definitively, but are not able to be declared as divinely revealed</b>, the following examples can be given: the legitimacy of the election of the Supreme Pontiff or of the celebration of an ecumenical council, the canonizations of saints (</span><span style="text-align: -webkit-left;">dogmatic facts</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">),</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;"> </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">the declaration of Pope Leo XIII in the Apostolic Letter </span><span style="text-align: -webkit-left;">Apostolicae Curae<i> </i></span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">on the invalidity of Anglican ordinations.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The necessity of these contingent elements is unquestionably by <i>recognition of the Church's supernatural participation in the eternal law</i>. The eternal law is God's ordination of creation by His eternal act of will, so all of these matters -- both revelation in Scripture and the Magisterial authority itself -- pertain to this ordering, in analogy to the way that the natural law does. That is the basis for the clinging of faith, that which is to be held by faith (<i>de fide tenenda</i>), with respect to these truths, not the ordinary mode of discursive reasoning that we find with respect to the natural law. Yet it is not a matter of sheer authority either, because the eternal law can itself be understood by reason and "the logic of faith." The pastoral magisterial role must be understood in this context, which renders the role of Magisterium as the promulgator of rules, the government for the law of the Gospel and the Kingdom of God, immediately apparent. Thus, <i>both the extraordinary authority to definitively teach dogma and the historical authority concerning dogmatic facts are derived from the same pastoral magisterial authority.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In light of this background, a consistent interpretation can be given to the religious submission of intellect and will to the non-infallible teaching of the Magisterium in the third paragraph of the Profession of Faith, which is covered by the (unchanged) canon 752. Section 10 of the commentary summarizes these teachings as follows:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The third proposition of the </i>Professio fidei<i> states: "Moreover, I adhere with religious submission of will and intellect to the teachings which either the Roman Pontiff or the College of Bishops enunciate when they exercise their authentic Magisterium, even if they do not intend to proclaim these teachings by a definitive act."</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>To this paragraph belong </i><b>all those teachings – on faith and morals – presented as true or at least as sure, even if they have not been defined with a solemn judgement or proposed as definitive by the ordinary and universal Magisterium</b><i>. Such teachings are, however, <b>an authentic expression of the ordinary Magisterium of the Roman Pontiff or of the College of Bishops</b> and therefore require </i>religious submission of will and intellect<i>. They are set forth in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of revelation, or to recall the conformity of a teaching with the truths of faith, or lastly to warn against ideas incompatible with those truths or against dangerous opinions that can lead to error.</i></div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The concluding sentence here explicitly invokes the language of the Category B teachings of <i>Donum Veritatis</i>, and it can hardly be a coincidence that Ratzinger included this reference to his prior work. Here I think that Ratzinger has crystallized exactly what <i>authentic Magisterial teaching </i>is, which is to say, <i>what counts as binding on the conscience in the pastoral Magisterium</i>. He does so with this very particular phrase: <i>authentic expression of the ordinary Magisterium</i>. This is precisely how I would define the exercise of pastoral magisterial authority to promulgate rules. And that to which we are bound to render religious submission of mind and will is exactly and only <i>that authentic expression of the ordinary Magisterium</i>! Only this counts as "teaching" for purposes of the pastoral magisterial role. Thus, we have confirmed that Ratzinger's notion of "authentic expression of the ordinary Magisterium" is entirely harmonious with the interpretation of <i>Donum Veritatis </i>that I gave above.</div><div><br /></div><div><u>VIII. A case study in the circular firing squad: Fr. Nicola Bux and <i>Fiducia Supplicans</i></u></div><div><br /></div><div>As an example of how this explanation can resolve apparent disagreements between people who share similar concerns, I would point to the highly relevant case of <a href="https://edwardpentin.co.uk/father-bux-fiducia-supplicans-does-not-belong-to-authentic-magisterium-calls-on-cardinal-fernandez-to-resign/" target="_blank">an interview with Fr. Nicola Bux on <i>Fiducia Supplicans</i></a>. In that interview, he made the following remark:</div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white; font-style: italic;">For sure, </span><span style="border: 0px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Fiducia Supplicans<i> </i></span><span style="background-color: white; font-style: italic;">does not belong to the “authentic Magisterium” and is therefore not binding because what is affirmed in it is not contained in the written or transmitted word of God and which the Church, the Roman Pontiff or the College of Bishops, either definitively, that is by solemn judgment, or with ordinary and universal Magisterium, proposes to believe as divinely revealed. <b>One cannot even adhere to it with religious assent of will and intellect.</b></span></span></div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This provoked <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0ALbIOknnY" target="_blank">a scathing response by Michael Lofton</a>, who is rightly concerned to protect the rightful authority of the Magisterium. But I think that Lofton has misunderstood Fr. Bux's position, especially given that Bux was a close friend and colleague of Ratzinger's. This is not to say that I would agree that everything that Bux has said (especially on the liturgy) comports with Ratzinger's views, but in this case, I believe it does.</span></div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Lofton's analysis starts at 5:55, and based on exactly what Bux said, he's exactly right. It <i>sounds like</i> Bux is limiting what would require religious submission of mind and will to the first two paragraphs of the profession of faith, and that would be such an obvious mistake that it's almost unthinkable that Bux would make it. Rather, what I think Bux is saying in the last sentence concerning <i>Fiducia Supplicans </i>is that <i>there are also no third paragraph teachings that require religious submission of intellect and will</i>. In other words, I think the correct interpretation of his statement would be "One cannot even adhere to it with religious assent of will and intellect [under the third paragraph of the profession of faith]." Even that statement would be both curious and cryptic, but it relates directly to the problem that I've covered at length above.</div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Lofton says at 10:55 that the standard for the authentic Magisterium is whether the teaching in question has "been proposed by the Pope in his ordinary Magisterium." Since <i>Fiducia Supplicans</i> was received in common form by the Pope and since <i>DV</i> 18 specifically says that documents from discasteries concerning faith and morals that are expressly approved by the Pope are in the ordinary Magisterium, this ought to be an easy case. Lofton also quotes Pope St. Pius X in <i>Praestantia Scripturae</i> concerning the Pontifical Biblical Commission, which had similar authority at the time.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">Wherefore we find it necessary to declare and to expressly prescribe, and by this our act we do declare and decree that <b>all are bound in conscience to submit to the decisions of the Biblical Commission relating to doctrine</b>, which have been given in the past and which shall be given in the future, <b>in the same way as to the decrees of the Roman congregations approved by the Pontiff</b>; nor can all those escape the note of disobedience or temerity, and consequently of grave sin, who in speech or writing contradict such decisions, and this besides the scandal they give and the other reasons for which they may be responsible before God for other temerities and errors which generally go with such contradictions.</div></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But this is exactly the point of ambiguity, and I think that Bux has in mind <i>Ratzinger's notion of authentic expressions of the ordinary Magisterium</i>. And it simply does not follow that everything -- or even <i>anything</i> -- in a document of the authentic Magisterium is an authentic <i>expression </i>of the ordinary Magisterium, to which all are bound in conscience to submit. And just as we need to identify <i>definitive teachings</i> with respect to the <i>extraordinary Magisterium</i>, so do we need to identify <i>authentic expressions </i>(<i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., those rules promulgated by the Magisterium that are binding on the conscience) with respect to the <i>ordinary Magisterium</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Here are Franzelin's thoughts on the matter, including the authority of Congregational decisions, from <i>On Divine Tradition</i> (1875; trans. Ryan Grant, 2016):</div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Holy Apostolic See, to which the divinely constituted custody of the deposit was consigned, as well as the office and duty of feeding the universal Church for the salvation of souls, can prescribe theological decrees, or insofar as they are bound with theological matters, when they must be followed or to forbid that something be followed, not especially from the intention of infallibly deciding a truth with a definitive judgment, but rather, apart from necessity either simply or for certain circumstances to provide for the security of Catholic doctrine. Although in declarations of this kind there might not be an infallible truth of doctrine because hypothetically there is not an intention of deciding this matter; nevertheless, it is infallible security. I say security, both the objective of declared doctrine (either simply or for such certain circumstances), and subjective insofar as it is safe for all to embrace it; it cannot happen that they would refuse to embrace it, because it is not safe and not without a violation of due submission toward the divinely constituted Magisterium. Someone that would deny this distinction within a final and definitive teaching of the Pope speaking ex cathedra as well as among those doctrinal provisions and prohibitions, let him be compelled to have all edicts of the Holy See pertaining to doctrine in whatever way and in one and the same appraisal of definitions ex cathedra, which is indeed from ecclesiastical history, from the practice of the Holy See, and especially from the most studious declaration of a definition ex cathedra promulgated by the Vatican Council, and he will manifestly be shown to be wrong. On the other hand, the distinction between infallible truth and between security of doctrine must be dutifully observed, in so much as they must be understood according to that which was placed in principle, which are spoken of in the corollaries that have been drawn out. </i></div></div><div><i>...</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>Evidently, this assent does not treat on that, which we call religious, on doctrine to be held by the force of a decree as infallibly true or to be rejected as infallibly false or to be noted or to be through another censure of infallible authority for this would be against the hypothesis. Just the same, the authority is so sacred by the force of the supreme and universal Magisterium, that, although it is not granted the status of ex cathedra for defining doctrine to be held by the Universal Church, but for prescribing from a definition of this kind some doctrine which is or is not to be followed, obedience is due. Our adversaries [quoting the Utrecht candidate] do not deny this obedience is indeed due, but they restrict it merely to the omission of external acts, and consequently, even to reverential silence "lest one who might teach some doctrine, nay more that he may write on some matter or offer his judgment"; but by no means except through an ex cathedra definition can an "observance of mind (obsequium mentis) such that one someone would lay aside his opinion and embrace the contrary with so firm a certitude that he would profess to adhere to it with an oath," be demanded. Yet, whenever a Sacred Congregation where a definition ex cathedra does not yet exist, demands an obsequium mentis of this sort, as in the case of Gallileo, "the Holy Congregation of the Inquisition exceeded the limits of its power." We, on the other hand, believe that in judgments of this sort, even published short of a definition ex cathedra, obedience is demanded and must be furnished, which includes an obsequium of the mind, but certainly that it would be infallibly judged that a doctrine were true or false (to the extent that our adversary seems to have understood our opinion). Rather that it will be judged that a doctrine contained in such a judgment is secure, and for us this is certainly not from the motive of divine faith (or account of God the revealer or the Church teaching infallibly), but from the motive of sacred authority, whose office is without a doubt to provide for the soundness and security of doctrine, to be embraced with the obsequium mentis and to reject what is contrary. This is not argued about those decrees, wherein nothing other than silence was enjoined (as, for example, we know Paul V did concerning the doctrine on the assistance of divine grace), but the discussion is on the responses and the decrees, in which some doctrine is ordered to be followed or not to be followed. Therefore, this is proposed to those to which it pertains, not only to be silent but in that sense, in which it is declared, must be taught and defended, and for that reason the obsequium of the mind is included; if not then you would suspect perhaps that hypocrisy and feigning were commanded. Next, since, in theological doctrine its own place and even its own characteristic reasoning, on account of which the assent demanded, is not internally observed, rather, the authority proposing truth, that sacred universal authority of doctrinal providence by the force of its office is the most sufficient motive from which a pious will can and ought command a religious or theological consensus of understanding. I reckon that our opinion rests upon very grave arguments.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Even Louis Cardinal Billot, SJ, says the same thing in <i>De Ecclesia</i>, as quoted in <a href="https://wmreview.co.uk/2024/01/18/infallible-safety-i/#_ftn8" target="_blank">this article by S.D. Wright</a> on the subject of the non-infallible Magisterium (and corroborated by King's assessment at p. 81):</div><br /><i>[W]hen the Sacred Congregations declare that some doctrine cannot safely be handed on (that is, it is not safe), we are bound to judge that this doctrine is, I do not say in itself erroneous or false or anything like that, but simply that it is not safe, and so in the future not to adhere to it because it is not safe.<br /><br />And if they declare that some other doctrine cannot safely be denied (that is, it is safe), we are bound to judge that this doctrine is, not only safe, but also to be followed and embraced as safe (<b>and I am not saying that it is in itself certain precisely in virtue of this decision</b>).<br /><br />But strictly speaking, that which now is not safe, especially in the composite sense of the decision, afterwards can turn out to be safe, if perhaps the competent authority, having discussed the matter again and in the light of new reasons, promulgates another decision….</i><div><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">There are two notable considerations here. First, Billot, someone who was well-known for ultramontane views of the papacy, sees the possibility of error and reformability in these decisions while still confirming their infallible safety. In other words, even those with an expansive view of papal infallibility recognize that it is not coextensive with the boundaries of infallible safety. Second, Billot specifically used the term <b>promulgates</b> to describe this activity of the Congregation, and unlike the other Jesuits we have considered here, Billot was of the Thomist school. It is significant that he used this particular term, which relates to the Thomist account of law, as opposed to "teaches" or another general term for the role of the Magisterium. That clearly conveys that these declarations are to be understood as <i>rules</i>, normative guidelines under the aspect of the good, and it is in this context that Billot speaks of infallible safety.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I think it is therefore reasonable to assume that Bux is following Ratzinger in this tradition of distinguishing the authentic <i>expression</i> of the ordinary Magisterium within a document from the teaching of a document issued by the ordinary Magisterium. If that is the case, then it is a legitimate question whether <i>Fiducia Supplicans</i> includes any authentic expressions of the ordinary Magisterium. With respect to any <i>new teachings</i>, which I believed is what Bux has in mind, I do not see any. Indeed, in terms of the <i>rules</i> promulgated by the Magisterium, they all seem to be the same rules that had been previously issued. For example: "For this reason, one should neither provide for nor promote a ritual for the blessings of couples in an irregular situation." "In any case, precisely to avoid any form of confusion or scandal, when the prayer of blessing is requested by a couple in an irregular situation, even though it is expressed outside the rites prescribed by the liturgical books, this blessing should never be imparted in concurrence with the ceremonies of a civil union, and not even in connection with them. Nor can it be performed with any clothing, gestures, or words that are proper to a wedding."</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">On the contrary, all of the new teaching seems to be speculation within the teaching magisterial role, none of would require religious submission of the mind and will according to the Magisterium-as-government account. In the teaching magisterial role, the Magisterium takes a similar role as the government does when issuing reports or other informational documents, which is to say that they are judged for their accuracy and truth in the same way that we make such judgments for anything else. Take, for example, the following theological assertions: "The value of this document, however, is that it offers a specific and innovative contribution to the pastoral meaning of blessings, permitting a broadening and enrichment of the classical understanding of blessings, which is closely linked to a liturgical perspective. Such theological reflection, based on the pastoral vision of Pope Francis, implies a real development from what has been said about blessings in the Magisterium and the official texts of the Church." "Within the horizon outlined here appears the possibility of blessings for couples in irregular situations and for couples of the same sex, the form of which should not be fixed ritually by ecclesial authorities to avoid producing confusion with the blessing proper to the Sacrament of Marriage." </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is the Magisterium as participating in a dialogue with theologians, and there is no obligation to agree with the assertions. A theologian may find them persuasive. He may not. He may certainly question the prudence or imprudence of issuing this kind of document under the surrounding conditions, and as these assertions are not binding as rules, there is no question of dissent in that regard. In any case, as has been made absolutely clear with the examples of African and Eastern churches, this in no sense binds anyone's conscience to issue such blessings, and by consequence, has no assurance of the safety of the souls of those who give them or those who receive them. Certainly, priests who care about the state of their own souls, to say nothing of those of their flocks, would certainly be prudent to ascertain exactly what they intend before issuing them. At most, <i>Fiducia Supplicans</i> might implicitly maintain as theologically safe the idea that there can be spontaneous blessings of any manner of things with due care that nothing unfit is being blessed, but that would again be nothing new. And the Eastern rites do not even necessarily allow that practice, even though it is a theological possibility in the broader sense. So Bux's conclusion that, at least in terms of new teaching, <i>Fiducia Supplicans </i>includes no new authentic expressions of the ordinary Magisterium does not seem particularly difficult to accept.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">So, <i>pace</i> Fr. Bux, we should affirm that there is a true sense in which <i>Fiducia Supplicans</i> was an exercise of the authentic Magisterium, for the simple reason that it is clearly an act of the ordinary papal Magisterium. But, <i>pace </i>Michael Lofton, it is certainly at least possible that there is no new teaching or theological development that is an authentic <i>expression</i> of the ordinary Magisterium, in the sense of promulgation of rules, that would be entitled to religious submission of intellect and will. Thus, a proper understanding of the Magisterium as government can resolve the conflict between the position. If we understand this under the aspects of the good, what is to be embraced and what is to be avoided, the distinction between authentic expressions of the ordinary Magisterium (the pastoral magisterial role) and the teaching magisterial role becomes apparent. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>IX. Confusion in Magisterial scholarship and recent papal overreach</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;">So why has this become so complicated? If I may be permitted a bit of oversimplication, the Suarian confusion between the teaching magisterial role and the pastoral magisterial role seems to be the the culprit, since Suarez's account was at least implicitly accepted by significant figures such as St. John Henry Newman. The confusion is then that the <i>theological notes</i> from the teaching magisterial role become mixed up with <i>levels of authority</i> in the pastoral magisterial role. The theological notes concern speculative truths <i>under the aspect of truth</i>, which is really a hermeneutic method akin to the way in which the authority of Scripture is in some sense <i>above</i> other theological authorities. In point of fact, under the aspect of truth as truth, propositions are either true or false regardless of the source behind them, and it is only a question of how one finds out whether they are true or not. Propositions of faith are no more or less true than any other propositions; the sole difference is in the motive for belief. So the "authority" of true propositions in terms of likelihood of truth is a different in kind from <i>normative authority</i>, which is the kind of authority founds in the pastoral Magisterium. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The problem with mapping Magisterial authority to the theological notes is that it creates a continuum-and-apex view of authority that turns ordinary and extraordinary Magisterial authority on its head. This leads to patent absurdities, such as <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/11/dom-john-chapmans-mistaken-account-of.html" target="_blank">Dom John Chapman's assertion</a> that Catholics in the time of Honorius should have listened to Honorius's heresy until it became clear that the teaching wasn't authoritative. That is a ridiculous stance to take; the intellect can no more give assent to falsehood than a man can flap his arms and fly. Yet this sort of approach to treating magisterial "weight" as if it were evidential weight is ubiquitous. One finds it in not only Chapman but also the recent magisterial scholarship of John Joy, Richard Gaillardetz, Avery Dulles, Francis Sullivan, and Lawrence King. Enough people have tried to make sense of this proposal based on degrees of intellectual assent that we can prudently determine at this point that it is hopeless. Only recognizing a distinction in <i>kind</i> and not <i>degree</i> in the authority of the pastoral Magisterium can provide a way out of this intellectual morass. By contrast, failing to do so can only produce <i>modal confusion</i> among Scripture, Tradition, and the Magisterium as authoritative modes of discerning First Truth. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The failure to do so is precisely what produces this false dichotomy between hypomagisterialism and hypermagisterialism. Unfortunately, hypermagisterialism appears to be running rampant in the current papacy, and the responses to date have been singularly ineffective, as best evidenced by the foolish and ill-advised <i>dubia </i>offered to Pope Francis's teaching and the buffoonish "filial correction" that was subsequently offered. Such documents are only appropriate as response in <i>the teaching magisterial role</i>, in which papal authority is not even implicated. And if those sorts of "corrections" are to be offered, it should be made extraordinarily clear whether they are being made of the Pope in his teaching magisterial role <i>with no binding authority as Pope</i> or else that they are charges of scandal, hypocrisy, or negligence with no implications concerning the Pope's authority, as Sts. Catherine and Bernard made. But again, the complete and utter failure to make these traditional distinctions between the pastoral and teaching magisteria has made these sorts of responses indistinguishable from hypomagisterialism. Instead, the response should be a clear delineation of papal authority in the pastoral magisterial role as <i>promulgation of binding rules</i>, which means that the Pope only enjoys infallibility concerning the teaching magisterial role in extraordinary circumstances. As contrasted with what the "<i>dubia</i> cardinals" did, one should <i>first</i> establish that the Pope is or is not acting within the scope of his pastoral magisterial role and <i>only then</i> offer the criticism that is appropriate to the teaching magisterial role.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Let us then turn to responding to certain assertions made by Cardinal Fernandez. First, in <a href="https://www.ncregister.com/interview/exclusive-archbishop-fernandez-warns-against-bishops-who-think-they-can-judge-doctrine-of-the-holy-father" target="_blank">an interview with Edward Pentin</a>, Fernandez asserts:</div><br /><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>When we speak of obedience to the magisterium, this is understood in at least two senses, which are inseparable and equally important. One is the more static sense, of a “deposit of faith,” which we must guard and preserve unscathed. But on the other hand, there is a particular charism for this safeguarding, a unique charism, which the Lord has given only to Peter and his successors. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>In this case, we are not talking about a deposit, but about a living and active gift, which is at work in the person of the Holy Father. I do not have this charism, nor do you, nor does Cardinal Burke. Today only Pope Francis has it. Now, if you tell me that some bishops have a special gift of the Holy Spirit to judge the doctrine of the Holy Father, we will enter into a vicious circle (where anyone can claim to have the true doctrine) and that would be heresy and schism. Remember that heretics always think they know the true doctrine of the Church. Unfortunately, today, not only do some progressives fall into this error but also, paradoxically, do some traditionalist groups.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is blatant confusion of the teaching magisterial role and the pastoral magisterial role. "Obedience" (and really "assent") to truth in Scripture is to the authority of divine revelation itself, the God Who reveals and Who can neither deceive nor be deceived. The "living and active gift" that Fernandez apparently has in mind is the Suarian "new revelation," and I hope that I have made abundantly clear at this point why that confuses the pastoral and teaching roles. If we completely deny that there is such a thing, then Fernandez's authority claim here is vacuous. Any theologian or even any layperson is entitled to prudently judge the ordinary Magisterium in <i>the teaching magisterial role</i>, which is entitled to no more deference than any other private theological work. With respect to truth, the maxim is true that "even a cat can look on a king."</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is an important point to reiterate. Barring the extraordinary (and extraordinarily rare) exercise of the infallible Magisterium, <i>the Pope has no charism</i> <i>at all</i> with respect to his acts in the teaching magisterial role. On the contrary, especially in those areas where the Pope has invited "dialogue" and "reflection," <i>it is literally impossible that a rule binding on the conscience was promulgated</i>. If I am free to offer a different opinion, then I am by definition not bound in conscience, because nothing has even been offered that is "true or at least sure" to which I must adhere.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Fernandez (and perhaps even Pope Francis himself) constantly seem to want to have it both ways, trying to demand religious submission without acting in the mode where religious submission is warranted. Ironically, the <a href="https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_ddf_doc_20240104_comunicato-fiducia-supplicans_en.html" target="_blank">explanatory press release on <i>Fiducia Supplicans</i></a> actually confirms Fr. Bux's assessment that there is nothing of the authentic Magisterium in the new teaching of the document, <i>but Fernandez still attempts to demand religious submission to it</i>. The only teaching binding on the conscience is in Section 1, "Doctrine," and it only refers to what has been taught (and taught perennially) as doctrine <i>de fide</i>. But then Fernandez attempts to invent some sort of binding obligation that simply does not exist.</div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span face="Tahoma, Verdana, Segoe, sans-serif" style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Documents of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith such as </i>Fiducia supplicans<i>, in their practical aspects, may require more or less time for their application depending on local contexts and the discernment of each diocesan Bishop with his Diocese. In some places no difficulties arise for their immediate application, while in others it will be necessary not to introduce them, while taking the time necessary for reading and interpretation.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;">Some Bishops, for example, have established that each priest must carry out the work of discernment and that he may, however, perform these blessings only in private. <b>None of this is problematic if it is expressed with due respect for a text signed and approved by the Supreme Pontiff himself, while attempting in some way to accommodate the reflection contained in it</b>.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;">Each local Bishop, by virtue of his own ministry, always has the power of discernment in loco, that is, in that concrete place that he knows better than others precisely because it is his own flock. Prudence and attention to the ecclesial context and to the local culture could allow for different methods of application, but not <b>a total or definitive denial of this path that is proposed to priests</b>.</div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;">...</div><i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The real novelty of this Declaration, <b>the one that requires a generous effort of reception and from which no one should declare themselves excluded</b>, is not the possibility of blessing couples in irregular situations. It is the invitation to distinguish between two different forms of blessings: “liturgical or ritualized” and “spontaneous or pastoral”. The Presentation clearly explains that «the value of this document […] is that it offers a specific and innovative contribution to the pastoral meaning of blessings, permitting a broadening and enrichment of the classical understanding of blessings, which is closely linked to a liturgical perspective». This «theological reflection, based on the pastoral vision of Pope Francis, implies <b>a real development from what has been said about blessings in the Magisterium and the official texts of the Church</b>».</i></div></i><div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;">This clearly begs the question: <i>how can there possibly be an obligation to "accommodate the reflection" of the teaching Magisterium?</i> There is no such obligation <i>if no rule binding the conscience has been promulgated</i>!<i> </i>This is by no means saying that the question of how to implement a rule is trivial; the <i>practically practical</i> is different from the <i>speculatively practical</i>. Rules still must be applied in concrete circumstances, after all. But an obligation to implement first requires a rule, and speculative discussion about whether there is such a rule and what that rule is are entirely incompatible with promulgating such a rule as normative. In this case, Fernandez hasn't promulgated a rule at all. It is "come on, guys, you have to play along," but there is no such obligation, nor does to the Pope have any <i>charism</i> of truth concerning these theological discussions.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Indeed, Pope Francis's <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/254712/full-text-pope-francis-letter-to-new-doctrine-chief-archbishop-fernandez" target="_blank">charter for Fernandez in the DDF</a> maintains that no such rules are being promulgated at all:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;">Moreover, you know that the Church "grow[s] in her interpretation of the revealed word and in her unerstanding of truth" without this implying the imposition of a single way of expressing it. For "Differing currents of thought in philosophy, theology, and pastoral practice, if open to being reconciled by the Spirit in respect and love, can enable the Church to grow." <b>This harmonious growth will preserve Christian doctrine more effectively than any control mechanism</b>.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The problem seems to be exactly <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/11/what-exactly-does-pope-francis-have-in.html" target="_blank">what I pointed out previously</a>: the "People's theology" that Francis and Fernandez endorse is a theological school, not an ecclesiology. To the extent they want to offer that theology for discussion among the theologians as to its utility and prudence, then it is fair game for discussion. And much like the liberation theology from which it sprang, it will probably be deemed deficient as a theological method. What they can't do it to dogmatize (or even command) adherence to a school with no essential connection to divine revelation, which is an act in teaching magisterial role. Yet that is exactly what they claim to be doing.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Take this example of "liturgical and ritualized" and "spontaneous or pastoral." The doctrine of sacramentals was laid out in <i>Sacrosanctum Concilium</i>:</div><i><br />59. The purpose of the sacraments is to sanctify men, to build up the body of Christ, and, finally, to give worship to God; because they are signs they also instruct. They not only presuppose faith, but by words and objects they also nourish, strengthen, and express it; that is why they are called "sacraments of faith." They do indeed impart grace, but, in addition, the very act of celebrating them most effectively disposes the faithful to receive this grace in a fruitful manner, to worship God duly, and to practice charity.<br /><br />It is therefore of the highest importance that the faithful should easily understand the sacramental signs, and should frequent with great eagerness those sacraments which were instituted to nourish the Christian life.<br /><br />60. Holy Mother Church has, moreover, instituted sacramentals. These are sacred signs which bear a resemblance to the sacraments: they signify effects, particularly of a spiritual kind, which are obtained through the Church's intercession. By them men are disposed to receive the chief effect of the sacraments, and various occasions in life are rendered holy.<br /><br />61. Thus, for <b>well-disposed members of the faithful</b>, the liturgy of the sacraments and sacramentals sanctifies almost every event in their lives; <b>they are given access to the stream of divine grace which flows from the paschal mystery of the passion, death, the resurrection of Christ, the font from which all sacraments and sacramentals draw their power. There is hardly any proper use of material things which cannot thus be directed toward the sanctification of men and the praise of God</b>.<br /><br />62. With the passage of time, however, <b>there have crept into the rites of the sacraments and sacramentals certain features which have rendered their nature and purpose far from clear to the people of today; hence some changes have become necessary to adapt them to the needs of our own times</b>. </i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">If even ritualized blessings ("the rites of the ... sacramentals," including the liturgy itself) can be subject to this lack of clarity, how much more is it the case with so-called spontaneous blessings? But this is essentially the nonsense at the heart of the People's theology and liberation theology; that political participation in the Body of Christ is something to be open to all in a kind of spiritual "town" that it "open to being reconciled by the Spirit in respect and love." But the Church is not a political entity except in the accidental sense. The Church is a supernatural institution essentially ordered to salvation by God. Pope Francis has himself condemned liberation theology for originating in made-made Marxism, but his own justicialism is no better as a basis for the supernatural ordering of the Church. This is the fundamental error of liberation theology, confusion of the natural and supernatural orders of the Church, and it is one that Pope Francis himself repeats.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/07/does-amoris-laetitia-dogmatize.html" target="_blank">Amoris Laetitia</a>, <a href="https://www.pillarcatholic.com/p/ad-theologiam-promovendam-a-brief" target="_blank">Ad Theologian Promovendam</a></i>, and <i>Fiducia Supplicans</i> were all attempts to substitute this political openness ("here comes everybody" and "make a mess") at the expense of the ordering of the sacramentals to the Sacraments themselves and, in the ultimate sense, the supernatural end of man. That is a theological claim, not an authoritative doctrinal claim, and the faithful have every right to respond "no thanks, I'm Thomist" (or Scotist or even Suarian). From a doctrinal perspective, those theological claims are nothing but explanations that may be good ones or bad ones. Just as the reasoning in the authentic Magisterium has absolutely no binding force, being an act of the teaching magisterial role rather than the pastoral magisterial role, so do these theological musings lack binding force. Such theological reasoning can be badly wrong to the point of misleading the faithful into perdition; we have the cases of Honorius's "profane treachery" and John XXII's speculations on soul sleep as examples. And as I have indicated, I believe that the "People's theology" endorsed by Francis and Fernandez is little better than liberation theology as a school and that it has produced the same confusion concerning right disposition for the Sacraments that was already identified in <i>Sacrosanctum Concilium</i>. And if the question is whether I or anyone else owes religious submission to this misguided theological fringe, I must reply with a firm "no."</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>Conclusion</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In order to disarm the circular firing squad among conservatives, I have offered a careful distinction between the Magisterium in its pastoral magisterial role and its teaching magisterial role, only the first of which is properly considered the <i>Ecclesia docens</i> in the formal sense. In the pastoral magisterial role, the Magisterium acts as a government, a promulgator of rules binding on the conscience for the practice of Christian life and the law of faith, including truths contemplated under the aspect of the good. There must be a manifest mind and will to promulgate such a rule, such as when the Magisterium presents a doctrine as the constant and universal teaching of the Church or offers it as a guide that is "true or at least sure," which may be determined by contextual considerations such as "<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";">the nature of the documents, the insistence with which a teaching is repeated, and the very way in which it is expressed." </span>Such acts of promulgation are called authentic <i>expressions</i> of the ordinary Magisterium, and these (and only these) receive divine assistance of the Holy Spirit and are thus are owed religious submission of mind and will. This includes reverent silence under <i>DV</i> 28-31 even if one is intellectually unable to assent to their speculative content. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">By contrast, the acts of the Magisterium outside of authentic expressions are only acts of the teaching magisterial role, which are entitled only to the deference that we would give to a teacher based on greater wisdom or the like. The laity are free to charge the acts of the teaching magisterial role with error, imprudence, hypocrisy, or scandal, even publicly and even in mass media, under Canon 212 §3, provided that one does not thereby assert that the Magisterium "can be habitually mistaken in its prudential judgments, or that it does not enjoy divine assistance in the integral exercise of its mission." In my opinion, public charges of heresy against the Pope in the absence of clear public consensus of the theologians or the episcopate (the only bodies qualified to give a "filial correction" in these circumstances) violate this canonical prohibition and are therefore gravely imprudent.</div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-15133114795944687792023-12-09T13:52:00.000-05:002023-12-09T13:52:18.934-05:00Timothy Gordon's error on Familiaris Consortio<div style="text-align: justify;">I'm not what you would call a fan of <i>Amoris Laetitia </i>Chapter 8. As I've written before, I don't think it formally contradicts <i>Veritatis Splendor</i>, but it strikes me as a pastoral disaster that undermines the doctrine of Trent on Confession, mostly because it fails to clearly reiterate what that doctrine is. When you are making disciplinary changes, which is primarily what <i>Amoris Laetitia</i> does, reiterating the doctrinal foundation is a basic necessity of clarity. The doctrine that is recited, that of culpability for mortal sin, is mostly irrelevant to the change in discipline, which is why it's been a real challenge to interpret what <i>Amoris Laetitia </i>means. But when conservative opponents of Pope Francis themselves don't know the dogma, that doesn't help the problem. It makes the problem worse.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>Timothy Gordon's mistake</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It turns out that this misrpresentation of the dogma is <a href="http://youtube.com/watch?v=9dDkLMtShpk" target="_blank">the case with Timothy Gordon</a>, who, while asserting that <i>Amoris Laetitia</i> "abrogates" or "contradicts" <i>Familiaris Consortio</i>, makes a clear mistake about what <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> actually teaches:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>[58:01] You dream up one scenario that's theoretically conceivable, conceptually feasible, if not plausible. One person under the Sun that might have these odd trolley care circumstances, whereby hypothetically could apply to them, they could be a remarried person who actually needs to have sex, and the principle of double effect would cover them. It just so happens that the one Francis adumbrated is wrong.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>So you have remarried adulterers, both of whom have fallen away from the faith. Let's say the wife -- because these guys are feminists, the lady's always the good guy -- she comes back to the faith remarried, has an illegitimate child in her adulterous second union. Francis told us this several times. And she wants to follow paragraph 84 of </i>Familiaris Consortio<i>, meaning we're going to get twin beds, it's not going to be hot and sexy, we're not going to have sex anymore, we're going to live as brother and sister, as </i>Familiaris Consortio <i>paragraph 84 says. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>We have to -- that was JP2, by the way, in 1981, writing </i>Familiaris Consortio<i> and saying "fixed it for you, punks; you want to use a theological problem of moral theology to open the gate, and I just fixed it for you, whereas before remarried adulterers were not allowed to keep living together and receive Communion -- <b>if through something like the internal forum you get together, you put people on notice in your church, including your priest</b>, you can have Lucy and Desi beds pushed together, you promise not to have sex, fixed it for you, that was 1981.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>[1:14:30] </i>Familiaris Consortio <i>is 1981 -- <b>boom, you guys just have to make a promise</b> -- you remarried adulterers to get bunk beds or twin beds or whatever -- get twin beds and to do your best not to have sex. <b>If they slip up once or twice after making that promise, they just go to Confession, you see</b>. So this has all been adjudicated. That's 1981. </i>Familiaris Consortio. <i>You guys makes a promise; yeah, you're living around each other, you'll probably act not like a brother and sister once a decade or so. <b>You'll give in, just go to Confession, go to Communion, you're good</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>[1:25:30] If in </i>Familiaris Consortio<i>, after 20 years of living as brother and sister -- by the way, I have a lot of audience members who are actually doing this. I did a show on annulment yesterday, and they're like "we've been doing this for a while." They're heroes, and if they slipped up, once you go to Confession, <b>because you've affixed the promis</b>e. That's not what any of this is. That's not what the Kasper plan was. That's not what the family synods were. That's not what </i>Amoris Laetitia <i>was. That's not what the response to Cardinal Duka and the other five </i>dubia<i> cardinals were. That's not what </i>Amoris Laetitia<i> was all about. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The problem is that Gordon's interpretation of <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> (<i>FC</i>) is a complete fantasy. The teaching of <i>FC</i> concerning the exception in section 84 is that such people can only attend Communion <i>remoto scandolo</i>. That means they must either receive the Sacrament in private or that they must travel to a far-away parish where their marital status is unknown. The <a href="https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/intrptxt/documents/rc_pc_intrptxt_doc_20000706_declaration_en.html" target="_blank">authoritative interpretation of <i>FC</i></a> by the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts says the following:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">Those faithful who are divorced and remarried would not be considered to be within the situation of serious habitual sin who would not be able, for serious motives - such as, for example, the upbringing of the children - "to satisfy the obligation of separation, assuming the task of living in full continence, that is, abstaining from the acts proper to spouses" (</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; text-align: -webkit-left;">Familiaris consortio</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">, n. 84), and who on the basis of that intention have received the sacrament of Penance. <b>Given that the fact that these faithful are not living</b></span><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; text-align: -webkit-left;"><i> </i>more uxorio</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;"> is </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; text-align: -webkit-left;">per se</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;"> occult, while their condition as persons who are divorced and remarried is per se manifest, they will be able to receive Eucharistic Communion only </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; text-align: -webkit-left;">remoto scandalo</span></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;">The couple doesn't "put people on notice in your church" so that they can go to Communion. The presumption is that they cannot (and arguably <i>should not</i>) put their private lives on public display in this way, so that their private sexual conduct is "<i>per se</i> occult" (hidden from public inspection). There's no equivalent here to Josephite marriage, a public declaration that the people are solemnly vowing not to engage in sexual conduct, because they are not free to vow to the other person and they are under a solemn moral obligation to separate that is at best temporarily excused. One can't vow to unmarriage and cohabitation with a person. Moreover, there's no way to know in a publicly cognizable way whether they are abiding by such a vow anyway. And the priest cannot put himself in the position of publicly indicating his private judgment in the internal forum about the sins for which he has granted absolution. That creates exactly the situation the Pontifical Council goes on to describe:</div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><i>Naturally, <b>pastoral prudence would strongly suggest the avoidance of instances of public denial of Holy Communion</b>. Pastors must strive to explain to the concerned faithful the true ecclesial sense of the norm, in such a way that they would be able to understand it or at least respect it. In those situations, however, in which these precautionary measures have not had their effect or in which they were not possible, <b>the minister of Communion must refuse to distribute it to those who are publicly unworthy</b>. They are to do this with extreme charity, and are to look for the opportune moment to explain the reasons that required the refusal. <b>They must, however, do this with firmness, conscious of the value that such signs of strength have for the good of the Church and of souls</b>.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"><i><br /></i></span></div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;">There's no discretion there. The pastoral latitude for the priest is exactly this: if someone is divorced and remarried, and this is known in the parish, the priest must refuse Communion <i>even if he has absolved them under </i>FC<i> 84 five minutes before Mass</i>! There is literally no possible way for that couple to take public Communion ever, no matter how sincerely they vow to keep continent and how faithfully they keep that vow. They could have been living in separate rooms for twenty years raising their children and never once in that entire time be allowed take Communion in their own home parish. To the extent that such people were ever admitted to public Communion by a priest in their own parish and not <i>remoto scandalo</i>, that was <i>dissent against authoritative discipline</i> by those priests. (Granted, dissent against Sacramental discipline is now practically ubiquitous, which is why politicians who openly advocate for abortion rights are not barred from Communion, but it doesn't change that it is dissent.) If we are talking about the requirements of <i>FC</i>, though, it's absolutely clear that a priest is not even <i>allowed</i> to admit someone who is publicly known to be remarried, regardless of how sincerely and successfully that couple may be maintaining continence.</div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">And this isn't a close case, as if the Prejean interpretation that <i>FC</i> completely bars such people from public Communion were simply one possible interpretation of the text. It's not only the express teaching of <i>FC </i>but also what was confirmed in an official reiteration of the teaching. Gordon's error is therefore a "2+2=5" error; he says that they can be admitted to public Communion if they somehow "put people on notice," and <i>FC</i> says that they can't no matter what they do. That is simply not the disciplinary rule There's no such process for a "vow" or a "promise" or any other formal process. Even if they do exactly what Gordon says, the priest must ban them from Communion for the simple reason that they are still living together as married people do. It's this completely mistaken idea that <i>FC</i> opens the door to the Eucharist <i>in public in their own parish</i>, even though <i>FC </i>outright says that "the Church reaffirms her practice, which is based upon Sacred Scripture, of not admitting to Eucharistic Communion divorced persons who have remarried" without exception. <i>FC</i> 84 opens up the Eucharist <i>in secret</i> but not in public.</div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;">Not understanding this is why Gordon also gets the Buenos Aires guidelines on <i>Amoris Laetitia</i> (<i>AL</i>) wrong. In Gordon's mind, there is the "vow" or "promise" or some other formal procedure that is required for the couple before the accommodation under <i>FC</i> can be made. But all that is actually required by <i>FC</i> 84 is <i>firm purpose of amendment to live in continence by whichever person is coming for Reconciliation</i>. The kind of vow or promise that Gordon has in mind is certainly <i>evidence</i> of firm purpose of amendment, but it is by no means a <i>sine qua non</i> requirement for firm purpose of amendment. Instead, the <i>sine qua non</i> requirement is the intent to comply with positive moral obligations (the obligation to separate) and to flee near occasions of sin <i>in the absence of reasonable necessity</i>, as Gordon's guest "Classical Theist" clearly and correctly explained in the context of other habitual sins.</div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;">So we can distinguish the dogmatic and disciplinary teaching of <i>FC</i>, neither of which include any "vow" or "promise" to remain continent:</div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;">1. <u>Dogmatic</u>: Under <i>FC</i> 84, absolution can be granted to those who fail to satisfy the obligation to separate and thus remain in the near occasion of sin for reasonable necessity.</div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;">2. <u>Disciplinary</u>: People absolved under <i>FC</i> 84 can only take Communion <i>remoto scandolo</i>, period. They may never take Communion in public where their marital status is known.</div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><u>The doctrinal "change" of <i>Amoris Laetitia</i></u></div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: -webkit-left;">With this correction, the <a href="https://cruxnow.com/global-church/2016/09/guidelines-buenos-aires-bishops-divorcedremarried" target="_blank">Buenos Aires guidelines</a> can then be read appropriately:</div><i><br />5) Whenever feasible depending on the specific circumstances of a couple, especially when both partners are Christians walking the path of faith, a proposal may be made to resolve to live in continence. </i>Amoris laetitia<i> does not ignore the difficulties arising from this option (cf. footnote 329) and offers the possibility of having access to the sacrament of Reconciliation if the partners fail in this purpose (cf. footnote 364, recalling the teaching that Saint John Paul II sent to Cardinal W. Baum, dated 22 March, 1996).<br /><br />6) In more complex cases, and when a declaration of nullity has not been obtained, the above mentioned option may not, in fact, be feasible. Nonetheless, a path of discernment is still possible. If it is acknowledged that, in a concrete case, there are limitations that mitigate responsibility and culpability (cf. 301-302), especially when a person believes he/she would incur a subsequent fault by harming the children of the new union, Amoris laetitia offers the possibility of having access to the sacraments of Reconciliation and Eucharist (cf. footnotes 336 and 351).<br /><br />These sacraments, in turn, prepare the person to continue maturing and growing with the power of grace.<br /><br />7) However, it should not be understood that this possibility implies unlimited access to sacraments, or that all situations warrant such unlimited access. The proposal is to properly discern each case. For example, special care should be taken of “a new union arising from a recent divorce” or “the case of someone who has consistently failed in his obligations to the family” (298). Also, when there is a sort of apology or ostentation of the person’s situation “as if it were part of the Christian ideal” (297). In these difficult cases, we should be patient companions, and seek a path of reinstatement (cf. 297, 299).<br /><br /></i>Guideline 5 deals with the case <i>when the couple makes a "vow" or "promise,"</i> which is not a requirement for firm purpose of amendment. It seems impossible, therefore, to construe Guideline 6 as as anything other than a dogmatic teaching that such a "vow" or "promise"<i> is not a requirement for absolution under </i>FC <i>84</i>. Note that such a resolution is certainly to be commended pastorally, because it enormously reduces the likelihood of sin. That is why it is recommended in Guideline 5 as the first-line approach for these situations. But if that resolution is not feasible, it's not a <i>sine qua non</i> requirement for absolution over and above the normal resolution not to sin entailed in firm purpose of amendment. Guideline 7 then just points out that good cause and sincerity in the reasons for not separating and not fleeing the near occasion of sin need to be seriously assessed, rather than simply assumed. There is essentially no excuse for someone who, for example, remarried last week or who has left the previous family in dire and immediate need not to separate; there needs to be a real necessity. And the obligation to one's living spouse and family must absolutely be considered in evaluating what is considered good cause for mitigated culpability in the failure to separate.<div><br /></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;">Based on these Guidelines, then, <i>AL</i> is only teaching dogmatically that no such "vow" or "promise" or other resolution <i>with the other person</i> is required. That's not a contradiction. It's an innocuous doctrinal development that is entirely compatible with prior doctrinal teaching to say that there is no <i>special</i> version of firm purpose of amendment that applies to people in this situation, which is arguably not a new teaching at all. It teaches that it is not the case that <i>in addition to firm purpose of amendment</i>, one must also make some sort of promise or vow with the other person to remain continent. It suffices that the penitent sincerely intends to remain continent, combined with having good cause that mitigates culpability for the failure to separate or to flee from the near occasion of sin. And as Gordon pointed out, they correctly cited Pope St. John Paul II for the proposition that anticipated failure does not imply that they do not sincerely intend to remain continent.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">[N.B.: As an aside, the moral theology of culpability for less-than-complete consent to sexual acts and double effect, much less mere foreseeability of such consent, is too complex even to assess here. Suffice it to say that we are far beyond the "anything short of utmost resistance to the point of death is formal cooperation with the sexual act" approach. Consider the case of contraception in the <a href="https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/documents/rc_pc_family_doc_12021997_vademecum_en.html" target="_blank">1994 <i>Vadmecum</i></a>, wherein the act itself was intrinsically immoral, but <i>reluctant consent to the act</i> was not considered "already illicit in itself":</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i><b>Special difficulties are presented by cases of cooperation in the sin of a spouse</b> who voluntarily renders the unitive act infecund. In the first place, it is necessary to distinguish cooperation in the proper sense, from violence or unjust imposition on the part of one of the spouses, which the other spouse in fact cannot resist. This cooperation can be licit when the three following conditions are jointly met:</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>1. when the action of the cooperating spouse is not already illicit in itself;</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>2. when proportionally grave reasons exist for cooperating in the sin of the other spouse;</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i style="font-style: italic;">3. when one is seeking to help the other spouse to desist from such conduct (patiently, with prayer, charity and dialogue; although not necessarily in that moment, nor on every single occasion).</i>]</div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;">Of course, if <i>AL</i> were teaching that, <i>not even the firm intent to remain continent</i> were required for absolution, which is the Kasper program, then that would almost certainly be heretical. There are pathological cases involving invincible ignorance where this might be true, but the statement in <i>AL</i> that "more is involved than mere ignorance of the rule" seems to contradict invincible ignorance expressly. So we are talking about people who are at least <i>know presently </i>that they are under a grave obligation to separate and that adulterous sex would be sinful, even if they might not have known this <i>when they contracted the unlawful union</i>. But if the point were to contradict Pope St. John Paul II to remove the firm purpose of amendment, it would make no sense at all to cite Pope St. John Paul II's writings multiple times in <i>AL</i>, including a letter concerning Reconciliation. For that matter, it doesn't even make sense at all to mention Reconciliation in this context if there is nothing from which to repent. Gordon even points this out when he asks why Confession would even be required, but he inexplicably fails to connect the dots that it wouldn't be mentioned at all if they thought Confession weren't required. These repeated mentions of the Sacrament of Reconciliation are the clearest textual evidence that <i>AL </i>is <i>not </i>adopting the Kasper proposal that Confession is not even required, and this seems to be consistent with the widely held opinion that <i>Amoris Laetitia</i> was a rejection of the progressive proposal.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">From the doctrinal perspective, it isn't clear that there has been a change at all, because all <i>AL</i> did was to confirm that <i>FC</i> did not teach any special requirements for confession other than the normal requirement of firm purpose of amendment. Moreover, the extensive discussion on culpability for mortal sin could erroneously be taken to say that breaches in continence <i>do not even need to be confessed</i>, even though both <i>AL</i> and the Buenos Aires guidelines explicitly mention Reconciliation. But <i>AL</i> could have and should have reiterated the doctrinal teaching on Confession from Trent, mostly because that is what one does when offering a clear doctrinal explanation. If you are going to write more than a hundred pages, it seems relevant to spend a couple of paragraphs on the existing doctrinal teaching on the point. One might easily suspect that such studied ambiguity is intended to avoid directly condemning Kasper's progressive position, even while implicitly affirming the doctrine that contradicts it, which I think is an extraordinarily dangerous didactic approach. It puts one in mind of Pope Honorius, who, when given an opportunity to condemn heresy, inexplicably elected not to do so, which made his writings "dangerous to souls."</div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Nonetheless, Gordon still views this as a contradiction, because the requirement of a "vow" or "promise" has allegedly been removed. But this is only because of Gordon's mistaken view that <i>FC</i> requires some kind of formal, public process. That is in turn because he contemplates that this process would allow the couple to "put people on notice" in order to return to public Communion, but <i>FC</i> actually precludes that from happening. In fact, what the discernment process of <i>AL</i> is intended to do is not to remove the requirement of Confession or continence but rather to prevent the remarried from being banned from public Communion for life if they cannot regularize their marriages. In that respect, <i>AL</i> is creating exactly what Gordon mistakenly thinks <i>FC </i>already did: to create a path to public participation in the Sacraments for people who sincerely intend to remain continent. That brings us to the disciplinary question.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>The disciplinary change in <i>Amoris Laetitia</i></u></div></div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><i><br /></i></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;">By my lights, <i>AL</i> unquestionably was intended to change the <i>discipline</i> of <i>FC</i> that the remarried, even those who remain continent, are banned from public Communion unless and until their marriage is regularized. <i>FC</i> states this as follows:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>However, the Church reaffirms her practice, which is based upon Sacred Scripture, of not admitting to Eucharistic Communion divorced persons who have remarried. They are unable to be admitted thereto from the fact that their state and condition of life objectively contradict that union of love between Christ and the Church which is signified and effected by the Eucharist. Besides this, there is another special pastoral reason: if these people were admitted to the Eucharist, the faithful would be led into error and confusion regarding the Church's teaching about the indissolubility of marriage.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>Reconciliation in the sacrament of Penance which would open the way to the Eucharist, can only be granted to those who, repenting of having broken the sign of the Covenant and of fidelity to Christ, are sincerely ready to undertake a way of life that is no longer in contradiction to the indissolubility of marriage. This means, in practice, that when, for serious reasons, such as for example the children's upbringing, a man and a woman cannot satisfy the obligation to separate, they "take on themselves the duty to live in complete continence, that is, by abstinence from the acts proper to married couples.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">People have, for some reason, assumed that the statement in the second paragraph that Penance would "open the way to the Eucharist" modifies the teaching of the previous paragraph of not admitting such people to the Eucharist in public. This is false. They are still publicly banned as long as they continue to live under the same roof. This does not mean "but if you promise to remain continent, <i>then</i> we can readmit you to public Communion." On the contrary, you can then only be admitted to Communion <i>remoto scandolo</i>, either in parishes where you are unknown or in private.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Matthew Levering takes the position that the previous pastoral practice is necessary to safeguard the doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage. In commenting on this disciplinary change in <i>Engaging the Doctrine of Marriage </i>to allow the remarried to public Communion, Levering says the following:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Some readers have interpreted </i>[<i>Levering's book </i>The Indissolubility of Marriage] <i>as a defense of </i>Amoris Laetitia<i>. Let me be clear, therefore, that I affirm that </i>Amoris Laetitia <i>teaches the doctrine of marital indissolubility and also rightly insists upon the need for compassion toward people whose sacramental marriages have failed and who are in a new civil marriage without annulment. <b>But I think that there are formulations and theological arguments in </b></i><b>Amoris Laetitia </b><i><b>that are not adequate to the doctrine of indissolubility of marriage. Furthermore, the new pastoral strategy regarding Eucharistic communion runs counter to the reality of marital indissolubility, as I show in the book</b>. In favor of the view that knowingly violating the bonds of an indissoluble marriage should not necessarily be an impediment to Eucharistic communion in charity, a view that is mistaken, see also Cantalamessa, </i>The Gaze of Mercy, <i>73. Cantalamessa's arguments are uncharacteristically simplistic</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I agree with Levering completely that the theological reasoning of <i>AL</i> ch. 8 provided no additional help to the situation and did not even reiterate the teaching that was already out there. I believe it is thoroughly inadequate to catechize the faithful on the indissolubility of marriages, and as a theological justification for the change in discipline, it is worse than nothing. I've said multiple times that <i>AL</i>, or at least chapter 8, should never have been written, not because it says anything false but because it doesn't say nearly enough of what is true. Like a number of badly-written Magisterial documents (<i>e</i>.<i>g</i>., <i>Unam Sanctum</i>), it will likely end up having made the situation worse. So we agree that while <i>AL</i> doesn't teach any doctrinal contradiction (<i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., it does not teach heresy in a binding or non-binding way), it is practically confusing rather than illuminating, making the teaching harder and not easier to understand.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But Levering's conclusion about the pastoral strategy seems to be at the very heart of what <i>should</i> be the discussion about <i>AL</i>. The problem with Gordon's mistake is that it doesn't even recognize that this <i>is</i> an issue. Gordon (erroneously) thought that people who promised to be continent could go to Communion publicly and didn't have to spend the rest of their lives with their arms crossed in front of their chests in their home parish in front of their own children, in front of the judgmental stares of the entire congregation despite their being in a state of grace. So from Gordon's perspective, this must be all about getting more remarried people to Communion than <i>FC </i>would have allowed, lowering the bar on continence. But that's not the situation that <i>AL</i> is concerned to address or, at least, there is no evidence that this is the situation that it's trying to address. The situation <i>AL</i> seems to be concerned about is that there is <i>literally no path</i> for the remarried to return to public Communion in their own parish. The "heroes" that Gordon described, who faithfully walk the path of continence for decades, never once get to return to Communion.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">So the real question, which I have never seen anyone mention, is whether CCC #2384 should be revised when it says that remarriage is "a situation of public and permanent adultery." In other words, <i>merely living in the situation</i> is an active sin against the bond of marriage. Even if the people were not culpable for the original situation, are currently maintaining it only for grave reasons, are remaining continent (and thus not incurring any mortal sin), and are in the state of grace under <i>FC</i>, this "situation" is nonetheless objectively incompatible with the symbology of the Eucharist. So let's look at Fr. Cantalamessa's argument, which I believe is not careful enough:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Now it is true in the case of believers who are divorced and remarried that their encounter with Jesus already happened in Baptism, and so on the surface they are similar to the Samaritan woman after her encounter with Christ. But there is the problem: was that baptismal encounter really an encounter, a personal encounter? Have these people ever really known the love of Christ? We describe "nominal" Christians today as those who have receive Baptism without ever becoming "real believers" through their own decision, but in fact we act (and the law acts!) as though they were real Christians who were provided with all the means of grace to overcome the obstacles encountered in a marriage.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>However, even if at one time these people were "real" Christians, that is, convinced and practicing Christians, is it in line with the gospel to exclude the possibility of a real repentance for them according to the practices during the first centuries whereby people were readmitted to full communion with the Church? The way Jesus deals with the Samaritan woman and, as we have seen, with the sinful woman who clasped his feet -- it is not at least equivalent to what he does in giving himself in the Eucharist? If the Eucharist is "his true body born of the Virgin Mary," then in both cases (the reality and the sacrament), are we not dealing with the same identical Jesus?</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>We can use the kindest and most encouraging words toward divorced and remarried people who desire to live a Christian life, but the reality does not change. To refuse them sacramental absolution and the Eucharist in every case, even when they are repentant and have resolved to follow a path of reintegration into the community, means saying to them that they are in a state of mortal sin, that is, objectively separated from God, with the consequences we are aware of if they should die in such a state. Given the present increasing trend in society, this would lead before long to having a Christian community that was formed, for the most part or nearly so, of "dead" members, because the Eucharist is the sacrament of the living.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>St. Paul recognizes the possibility of divorce and remarriage for people who become believers if a spouse refuses to follow the other person in that decision (see 1 Corinthians 7:15). This is the so-called Pauline privilege, or "privilege of faith," recognized by the Code of Canon Law. That exception does not apply to baptized divorced people in all of its juridical requirements, but there is, nevertheless, an unmistakable analogy that can be made in so many cases of divorced Christians (even if not in all).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>According to traditional canon law, at least in the past, simple conversion to the Catholic Church, even from another Christian confession, Protestant or otherwise, authorized people to obtain </i>ipso facto <i>the right to divorce and remarry. Should we not allow the same thing for a person who has had a true and profound conversion to Christ and then cannot live with the first spouse?</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I agree with Levering that the answer is "no." If the person has not received baptism from the Church, then it makes sense to consider whether that person has the legal capacity to exercise the full scope of capability, including contracting Sacramental marriages. But if we open this up to every poorly catechized Catholic, then it would defeat the idea that baptism is the process by which the Church fully incorporates members into the Mystical Body, which creates a far more fundamental problem. So Fr. Cantalamessa's argument here, which is essentially the Orthodox argument for <i>oikonomia</i> in cases of divorce, is completely untenable for the Catholic doctrine of marital indissolubility. In any case, there is nothing in <i>AL</i> to suggest this sort of regularization. But that's not the end of the discussion for our purposes.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Fr. Cantalamessa legitimately raises the issue of whether the Eucharist should be denied to people who are not in a state of mortal sin, and we know from <i>FC</i> that it is possible for remarried Catholics who continue to live under the same roof to be in the state of grace and to receive Reconciliation. With regard to public reception of the Eucharist, there is also the matter of Trent concerning the Eastern Rite Christians in Venice, who were in communion with Rome but who were remarried according to the Orthodox tradition. To avoid contention over the matter, Trent <a href="https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/canon-fodder-0" target="_blank">did not directly excommunicate those who believed that remarriage was possible</a> but only those who accused the Church of error in Her teaching concerning the indissolubility of marriage. It is hard to see how this was not a practical determination that the remarried were not publicly culpable for adultery in a way that would bar them from the Eucharist. And indeed, we say essentially the same thing with respect to intercommunion with the Orthodox in cases of need today. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Certainly, one could argue that there's a clearer public sign in membership within an Eastern Rite or an Orthodox church, but there's no reason that such a public sign would be relevant to the appropriateness (or lack thereof) of remarriage as a sign with respect to the Eucharist. So while I see very good reasons why the Sacramental discipline of <i>FC</i> might be <i>better</i> at conveying the indissolubility of marriage and why it might be superior for the parish to support the remarried at bearing this Cross, Levering's assertion that the discipline is simply <i>inadequate</i> to the doctrine seems overstated.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But let's suppose that the objection to <i>AL</i> is not an absolute principle of incompatibility between remarriage and the Eucharist but rather that the exception is being applied so broadly. This is where I would point out that the scope of the exception has not been mandated by <i>AL</i> but rather has been commended to the judgment of the bishops, who are in a better situation to assess whether local conditions (like the one in Venice at the time of Trent) can reasonably allow the admission of the remarried to the Eucharist without undue scandal. The Polish Church, for example, has simply retained the discipline of <i>FC</i>. The problem, and it is no small problem, is that bishops who wrongly interpret <i>AL</i> as permission to excuse the firm purpose of amendment will take the opportunity to do so. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is not merely a hypothetical possibility. The Maltese bishops made the heretical assertion in paragraph 10 of their guidelines that "the choice of living 'as brothers and sisters' becomes humanly impossible and give[s] rise to greater harm," which directly contradicts the Second Council of Orange and Trent on the possibility of one constituted in grace to keep the commandments. This is the basis for my strong disagreement with Pedro Gabriel's position in <i>The Orthodoxy of Amoris Laetitia</i>, which I see as making exactly the same mistake. But that is not because anything taught in <i>AL</i> contradicts dogma (as Levering admits it does not), but because <i>AL</i> so poorly reiterated the relevant moral teaching that it can easily be abused in this way. For me, it is very difficult to see how papal teaching that was <i>actually interpreted heretically</i> without one word of rebuke from the Pope could possibly be a good thing. So I share Levering's position that I cannot give a <i>defense</i> of <i>Amoris Laetitia</i>; it strikes me as an entirely foreseeable pastoral disaster. Unfortunately, we have no assurance from God that Popes will effectively govern and discipline the Church.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>Conclusion</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;">At the end of the day, I agree with Fr. Vincent Twomey, who is uniquely positioned in terms of qualifications to assess this situation. As he says, there is an orthodox interpretation of <i>AL</i>, which is about Sacramental discipline and how the Church treats the remarried publicly, and there is a heterodox expansion of the teaching of <i>AL</i>, which would excuse the requirement of firm purpose of amendment and intention to remain continent as a condition for absolution. Gordon's mistake makes it impossible to distinguish the two, and that mistake is based his not realizing that <i>FC</i> has an absolute ban on the remarried from public Communion, even those who are continent. Gordon's mistake is somewhat understandable due to <i>AL</i> itself failing to clearly reiterate prior teaching and the utter lack of discipline against people who have openly made the heterodox expansion of <i>AL</i>'s teaching. Lastly, I think that we should have a reasonable discussion about Matthew Levering's position that <i>AL</i>'s relaxation of the absolute ban in <i>FC</i> is pastorally inadequate to the doctrine of indissolubility of marriage. But <i>AL</i> was written so badly that it's only forced that discussion to the wayside.</div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-53371698857313419062023-12-02T14:07:00.001-05:002023-12-02T14:07:35.785-05:00Swallowing the bitter pill<div style="text-align: justify;">The claim I will make here is not that Church discipline doesn't matter in the absolute sense, as if no one is hurt by the failures of the shepherds of the Church. Rather, what I am saying is that the claim that the Church is "indefectible" is purely supernatural in nature; it pertains to the supernatural aspects of grace and revelation. There is a supernatural reality that is there regardless of time or season. In the liturgy, we see eternity. <i>Compared to that supernatural reality</i>, the mundane things that we see barely exist. It is the ability to grasp that reality that defines the Christian life in faith, hope, and charity.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is likewise the sense in which the Eucharist is "the source and summit of the Christian life." It is the quintessential act of faith. The only thing that matters, from a disciplinary standpoint, is that the faithful have access to the Sacrament. That is the respect in which one judges scandal, the idea that a minister would suggest to the faithful that the Church as a whole does not embrace this supernatural reality. This is exemplified by Canon 915: "Those who have been excommunicated or interdicted after the imposition or declaration of the penalty and others obstinately persevering in manifest grave sin are not to be admitted to holy communion." But in the end, it is possible for the minister to fail at this task; the Cross that the laity bears is that they must not fail in their faith. When the ministers of the Sacrament fail to protect them from scandal, those in the pews must not lose their grasp on the pearl of great price, for which they have sold their lives.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Divine revelation is likewise preserved supernaturally, but because it comes in written form with the concomitant need of interpretation, the supernatural aspects are not contained in the very thing itself as they are with the Eucharist. Here, there is necessarily a supernatural activity of conservation, and that supernatural activity is what is recognized with the eyes of faith, just as the Eucharist itself is. And just as the Eucharist is the source and summit on the Christian life, the keys given to Peter are the supernatural principle for the conservation of divine revelation. They are capable, by their nature, only of binding to the truth, and this is the principle by which they are capable of sustaining revelation. Perceived by the eyes of faith, the fact that the keys bind only to truth is the visible sign that the Scriptures are what they say that they are. This is why those three things -- the celebration of the Eucharist (Tradition), the oracles of God (Scripture), and the keys of Peter (Magisterium) -- work inseparably for the faithful as the true sign of the God Who reveals. Just as we perceive the Real Presence in the Eucharist by faith, we perceive the God Who reveals in the Church by faith.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But just as the Eucharist can be recognized in the midst of scandal by the minister, so can the power of the keys. St. Bernard of Clairvaux speaks of the Church of his time in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=b1I7AQAAMAAJ&pg=PA224#v=onepage&q&f=false" target="_blank">Sermon 33 on the Song of Songs</a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>It was once predicted [of the Church], and now the time of its fulfillment draws near: </i>Behold, in peace is my bitterness most bitter [Is. 38:17]. <i>It was bitter at first in the death of the martyrs; more bitter afterward in the conflict with heretics; but most bitter of all now in the [evil] lives of her members. She cannot drive them away, and she cannot flee from them, so strongly established are they, and so multiplied are they beyond measure. It is that which makes its bitterness most bitter, even in the midst of peace. But in what a peace! Peace it is, and yet it is not peace. There is peace from heathens, and from heretics; but not from her own sons. At this time is heard the voice of her complaining</i>: I have nourished and brought forth children, and they have rebelled against me [Is. 1:2]. <i>They have rebelled; they have dishonoured me by their evil lives, by their shameful gains, by their shameful trafficking, by, in short, their many works which walk in darkness. There remains only one thing -- that the demon of noonday should appear to seduce those who remain still in Christ, and in the simplicity which is in Him. He has, without question, swallowed up the rivers of the learned, and the torrents of those who are powerful, and (as says the Scripture) </i>he trusteth that he can draw the Jordan into his mouth [Job 40:23] <i>-- that is to say, those simple and humble ones who are in the Church. For this is he who is Antichrist, who counterfeits not only the day, but also the noonday; who exalts himself above all that is called God or worshipped -- whom the Lord Jesus shall consume with the Spirit of His Mouth, and destroy with the brightness of His Coming </i>[2 Thess. 2:4, 8]; <i>for He is the true and eternal Noonday: the Bridegroom, and Defender of the Church, Who is above all, God blessed for ever. Amen.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Unquestionably, both then and thereafter, the Pope has been part of this failure, in some cases actively participating in it and encouraging it. But the authority of the keys is not different than the Eucharist in this regard; within his <i>charism</i>, the Pope is something more than he is. The keys he bears are more than human, even when wielded "in a human mode," as Johann Baptist Cardinal Franzelin describes the use of disciplinary authority. When the Pope exerts this supernatural power, it is like the case of the priest, a sinful man who confects something altogether beyond his power. The fact that the Pope may be an awful person, even in his exercises of disciplinary power, makes not one whit of difference to the efficacy of this power. He cannot negate his <i>charism</i> by his wrongful behavior any more than the priest can negate his own orders. As long as he has the office, he has the <i>charism</i> of the office. The only way that he can lose it is to leave voluntarily, for no power on earth can depose him.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The question, then, is always this: <i>is the Pope acting with the supernatural authority of his office</i>? If he is, we trust it, not because of the man but because of the Holy Spirit. And this is true whenever the Pope uses the keys, the supreme Magisterium, to bind, even if only "in a human mode." The use of the keys most aligned with the <i>purpose</i> of the office -- as steward of the deposit of faith -- is that of binding to doctrine. This is why <i>ex cathedra</i> pronouncements have the maximum degree of this personal protection, referrred to simply as <i>infallibility</i>. But disciplinary authority of the supreme Magisterium, which is incidental to this role, is no less supernatural in nature, meaning that it must likewise partake of the same Petrine gift in order to provide us with a rational basis for obedience to the Magisterium. If we could be commanded to adhere to a denial of the deposit of faith by the very power given to preserve it, that would render the faith itself fundamentally incoherent and irrational. It would consign Catholicism to sheer fideism. Therefore, as St. Robert Bellarmine says, "it is gathered correctly that the Pope by his own nature can fall into heresy, but not when we posit the singular assistance of God which Christ asked for him by his prayer" (<i>De Controversiis</i> book IV, ch. 7).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Yet, on the other hand, it would be foolish to claim that what the Mellifluous Doctor has described as a "bitterness most bitter" is easy to swallow. We cannot dismiss the very real harm and pain that is caused by these morally defective pastors. When the priesthood is full of wrongdoers, who "cannot be driven away or fled," that is in some way even worse than persecution or battles with heresy. But we can never go so far as to deny the supernatural power of the keys, which the eyes of faith always must have in sight. Along those lines, I must agree with the comments by "riverrun" here (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CsvS925YeA" target="_blank">around 5:30</a>) in discussing the authority of the episcopate (and especially the Pope) over the liturgy:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>We have episcopal government in this Church that's fundamental. If you're going to dispense with that to save the liturgy, you've lost everything that was worthwhile in the liturgy to dispense with. It's gone. So help me out. I want priests and bishops before I want to be able to do whatever I want with ritual. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>[12:13] "We're the shepherds; we're the guardians." Of course they are! Of course they are! If they aren't, then God help me! I'm doomed. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">And the papal supremacy over the liturgy is simply a specific case of Church discipline. The failure of the shepherds in Church discipline is absolutely a bitter pill to swallow. But if it causes us to vomit up the nourishing food that the faith provides us, then we ourselves will have failed in our calling, although perhaps not due to our fault. Isaiah 38:17 goes on to say why we suffer this: "Behold, it was for my welfare that I had great bitterness; but in love you have delivered my life from the pit of destruction, for you have cast all my sins behind your back." Even this bitter medicine -- the failings of our shepherds -- is for our good, if we only recall that the Church is the ark of our salvation with Her visible head who bears the keys of St. Peter. But if we let it lead us to resistance against the supernatural authority of the keys, we will have taken the pill to our own sorrow.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Denial of the unique and personal authority of the Pope, this supernatural power of the keys, is the definition of schism; it is the wrongful failure to submit to the power of the keys. Those who willfully deny this supernatural authority and its concomitant protection from universally binding the Church to heresy have already embraced schism in principle. Obviously, one can question whether this is the case with the Eastern Orthodox or the SSPX, who hold a fundamentally different account of what the authority of the keys entails. If the denial is not willful, then it is only by "blessed inconsistency," because they have done avoiding schism in everything but formal act. But the more troubling case is that of traditionalists who ostensibly accept the power of the keys but who rationalize disobedience by such inconsistency.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In short, to make one's view Church discipline a condition to obedience to the Pope is the same Donatist impulse that makes the moral fitness of ministers a condition to validity of the Sacraments. On the contrary, this supernatural reality is accepted by faith without regard to the failings of the ministers. And in the case of the keys, the supernatural authority does not depend on one's judgment of the job performance of the Pope. The idea that we get to decide what doctrine is, that we can somehow "read ourselves into the Church" by any path other than sheer obedience -- albeit rational obedience with moral certainty -- to Her governmental authority is a Pelagian fantasy. It is only the grace of obedience to the mystical Body of Christ, in whatever imperfect way, that gives us any hope of salvation.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is not to say that I have no sympathy with those who struggle with the bitter pill. How could we not? It seems inordinately cruel for those who love the celebration of Mass according to the older ritual would be prevented from preserving it. And although we can trust that God saves whomever He will save, so that not even one who is led away from the Catholic faith inculpably will be lost, the shepherds will be the ones to answer to God for their conduct in losing them from the community. But we must -- we simply must! -- avoid the Donatist impulse that would deny the supernatural authority of the Pope, including any suggestion that binding universal discipline over the liturgy or other matters can be heretical.</div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-72803334055747176602023-12-02T13:27:00.005-05:002023-12-02T13:41:46.735-05:00Gavin Ortlund: apostle of anarchy<div style="text-align: justify;">Gavin Ortlund perfectly illustrates the paradox of "conservative" Protestantism. In some ways, conservative Protestantism is a good thing because it inculcates (certain) good doctrinal beliefs and respect for holy Scripture. In that way, it is very common for conservative Protestantism to be a bridge to Catholicism or Orthodoxy for those who are open to the Fathers. But there is a long-standing and entirely chimerical tradition in Protestantism of falsely claiming that Protestantism originated in a return to the ancient faith, which burns the escape route from objective error. That might have been (barely) plausible during the time of the Reformation, but patristic support for Protestant distinctives has not been a methodologically legitimate historical thesis since the time of St. John Henry Newman ("To be deep in history is to cease to be a Protestant"). Indeed, I would argue that it hasn't been a serious historical thesis since the posthumous condemnation of Cyril Lucaris, Patriarch of Constantinople, in 1638 and 1642, which conclusively defeated the idea that Protestant distinctives came from a common tradition with the East, the delusion that both Luther and Calvin sincerely embraced. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Leaving aside the question of the exact moment when Protestant historical claims were debunked, it remains unquestionable that the neo-patristic revival in Orthodox scholarship has essentially annihilated all of the nineteenth-century Anglican arguments in favor of Protestantism, leaving them with absolutely no historical case. To invoke another sixteenth-century belief that has been entirely debunked, you might as well be a geocentrist today as to be a Protestant claiming that Protestantism existed as an orthodox tradition before the Reformation. The far more plausible Protestant view is the liberal view -- that the subjective disposition of faith can change from age to age based on the meaning of the Gospel in that time, rather than being a fixed body of historical dogmatic teaching, the latter of which is thoroughly untenable if one wishes to remain Protestant.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ortlund has demonstrated the implausibility of the Protestant position in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8adSmpvwVh0" target="_blank">a recent response to my friend Joshua Charles</a> on apostolic succession in the Fathers. I will focus primarily not on the errors that he makes in interpreting the Fathers but on the methodological errors that cause them.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ortlund's philosophical position is as follows:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(1) Post-apostolic ecclesial infallibility is a later accretion.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(2) The closure of revelation means that all such later accretions (and all other post-Apostolic developments) must always be subject to correction by Scripture.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(2) necessarily lacks a principle by which correction can take place; it is an explicit concession of the liberal position that the only principle for correction is the personal meaning of Scripture. Ortlund inconsistently claims that he believes in binding doctrine while simultaneously annihilating the only possible principle by which doctrinal correction could be binding, meaning that he has no good reason to believe that Scripture on any other doctrine can be corrupted or changed. That is already the liberal position, but Ortlund's is worse by my lights because he is positively attacking the government of the Church (apostolic succession).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Fortunately, Ortlund has an extraordinarily clear summary of his own argument. These are his words in the last several minutes of the Charles response starting around 27:45 that are directly relevant to this problem:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>A third objection is people say "well, if you deny that the Church has post-apostolic infallibility, then what you are saying is that God just abandoned His Church," but this is the fallacy of the excluded middle where people make you choose between two extremes as though the only options on the table are either (A) the Church has infallibility per se or (B) the Church is abandoned. But, of course, those aren't the only two options. Most Protestants hold to the indefectibilty of the church, for example, historically. <b>Basically, our position is pretty simple; we believe the church is alive and well and protected and guided and preserved and watched over by the Holy Spirit, and every nanosecond of church history she is alive, she never dies, her offices are divinely instituted and established, there are authoritative standards within her to be employed like councils, there are expressions of authority within the church like excommunication, but the church is fallible -- that's it. So she's not dead, and she's not abandoned, she's just capable of error so she has to measure herself by the superior standard of God's inspired Word. I think that's a pretty reasonable position.</b> </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The fourth objection is that people say "well, </i>sola Scriptura<i> wasn't in the early Church either," and my response to that is -- because we're saying post-apostolic infallibility is an accretion, they're saying "oh well, </i>sola Scriptura<i> is an accretion, too." My response to that is pretty simple, I would just say "yes, </i>[sola Scriptura]<i> is in the early church." First of all, it's inherent within the New Testament itself, in the Scripture's claims about itself. Scripture claims to be the inspired Word of God, so it is of unique authority. <b>All </b></i><b>sola Scriptura</b><i><b> is, is the application of that claim to a very specific question, namely, how does the rule of the church work with respect to infallibility?</b> So the idea is derived from the claims of Scripture about itself. It's not fully laid out, and it doesn't need to be. But the idea in the early church absolutely is present.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>If you'd like to give the Protestant view a really good shake and really give it consideration, read this book by William Whitaker written back in 1588, I think, and basically from page 670-704, he gives twenty examples of Church Fathers. He starts with Irenaeus, he talks about Augustine who basically -- they don't use the word "</i>sola Scriptura," <i>it's not always fleshed out with every nuance, and there he recognizes "<b>yeah, they're in a different context, but the basic idea that the inspired Word of God is of superior authority to any sort of ongoing capacities within the church -- whether an office, a council, anything like that -- these things are subordinate under Scripture</b>." We measure ourselves by Scripture, etc., etc. That basic idea is resonant in the thought of early Christians and some medieval Christians as well, and I've talked about that elsewhere. But you could read that as one testimony, and if you want a full case, you can see some of my other videos, like Augustine.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>But basically to sum up it up like this, I would say the idea of </i>sola Scriptura<i> does have a good foundation in the Scripture and in the early church, whereas the idea of post-apostolic ecclesial infallibility -- I've got to say this strongly, and I'm not trying to offend anybody or make anybody angry, but I've got to say it strongly, because of the level of triumphalism that comes against us. If you're one of the more gentle critics, let this one slide by you, OK? <b>This is only for the people who are very triumphalist: there is simply no foundation whatsoever for post-apostolic ecclesial infallibility. It is hanging on in midair, off the ground. Jesus and the Apostles who taught abundantly about the offices and nature of the church -- Ephesians 4, 1 Corinthians 12:28, and following the Pastoral Epistles, Hebrews, etc. -- not once is there any hint of this idea that there's going to be offices or capacities in the post-Apostolic church that are infallible</b>. That's simply not present early on in the Apostles or in the early church, so there's just no reason to believe it. It has no foundation. So when you have a claim like the bodily Assumption of Mary impressed upon us on the grounds that it does exist, what can we do but protest? </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>If you're wondering when it does come in, that's a complicated question: where does infallibility start evolving? I do have a video on papal infallibility specifically where I try to trace out some of that development on YouTube. If you want to -- I won't put it down in the video description, but you can hunt it down, it's not hard to find.... I haven't addressed other aspects like councils. Maybe I'll try to get to those one say to sum it up. As Protestants, we are not trying to reject the Church, we're not trying to be unruly or unsubmissive to the Church, far from it! We want to submit to the Church. We want to submit to Christ. We want to submit to the Apostles. Our desire is to be faithful to what Christianity is. <b>Our desire is to be faithful to what the</b></i><i><b> Apostles taught over and against that which is a later accretion that doesn't have a foundation in what the Apostles taught. That is what we are trying to do; we are trying to be faithful to Christ. We want to place our trust in that which is of divine constitution, not in later human accretion. And in saying that, we're not saying that the church died when those accretions are are going on, but the church can make errors, and errors come in. So that's the heart posture and desire of a Protestant position.</b> So I hope this video will clarify that and commend that for others to consider.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Being one of the said triumphalists, I have to say equally strongly that Ortlund's claims are completely incompetent even from the perspective of mundane history, whatever good intentions he may have. In fact, if you want to see some brutal honesty about exactly how ridiculous Ortlund's claims are as a matter of mundane history from an ordinary person just reading the sources, I strongly recommend the work of "Agnus Domini" on Ortlund's treatment of the apostolic succession <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O34wIym1vC4" target="_blank">here</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ws1n_ViOaYM" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="https://youtube.com/watch?v=Ws1n_ViOaYM" target="_blank">here</a>. I will instead point out that if we applied Ortlund's historical method in a completely mundane context, the results would be laughable.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>Analogy to Supreme Court authority</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div><div>Let's take an example of completely mundane secular authority. The present government of the United States of America was created by the Constitution in 1789. In that Constitution, the judicial power was granted to the Supreme Court, but nothing specifically provided for the power of judicial review -- to "say what the law is" concerning the Constitution. That power was established in the opinion authored by Chief Justice John Marshall in <i>Marbury v. Madison</i> fourteen years after; it was technically a "post-Founding development." But it would be absurd to make the <i>legal</i> argument based on history that every Constitutional decision the Supreme Court has ever made lacks legal authority because the Constitution doesn't explicitly provide for judicial review. That argument would be rejected out of hand as a denial of what actually happened in history: the power of judicial review was never really denied but rather accepted as an essential feature of the judicial power.</div><div><br /></div><div>A competent historian would look especially at two factors: (1) the common law tradition from which the Constitution emerged, and (2) the subsequent acceptance of the authority of Supreme Court decisions as having binding authority in the entire judicial system. That is because good historians look at the reasons for which people accept authority, not viewing it as an imposition of sheer power of one ruling class over another. (Note that I say "good historians" here because Ortlund's account of episcopal accretion would fit well with liberal interpretations in feminist and critical race theoretical approaches to history.) When one actually tries to understand the reasons for Chief Justice Marshall saying what he did, it hardly looks like a deliberate accretion of power by a self-serving Supreme Court. Rather, it is based on a recognition basic to legal systems generally -- and the common law system in particular -- that inability to render binding judgments concerning the law is anarchy. The judicial function is necessary for the rule of law to persist. If we said that Supreme Court decisions lacked authority because judicial review was a "later accretion," not recognizing its organic connection to the judicial authority and the subsequent incorporation into the law of society, we would negate the rule of law. There are certainly people who have complained about judicial review since, but the historical argument supporting the authority remains unshakeable.</div><div><br /></div><div>The situation is identical with Scripture; the judicial function is necessary for Scripture to function as a rule of faith. Ortlund tries to appeal to the nature of Scripture to make this situation somehow different, but it isn't. Ortlund says: "Scripture claims to be the inspired Word of God, so it is of unique authority. All <i>sola Scriptura</i> is, is the application of that claim to a very specific question, namely, how does the rule of the church work with respect to infallibility?" He has the question exactly right and gets the answer exactly wrong. The Constitution is clearly of "unique authority"; it describes itself and the laws made pursuant to the Constitution as "the supreme law of the land." But the absurdity of concluding from its unique authority that the Supreme Court lacks authority to render binding decisions concerning its meaning has already been demonstrated, nor does it follow that the Constitution itself is the <i>principle of correction</i> for Supreme Court decisions. On the contrary, without the authority of the Supreme Court to render such binding decisions as a normal judicial function, the Constitution, the supreme law of the land, would not have been able to function as a rule of law.</div><div><br /></div><div><div><div>In significant ways, Ortlund has confused the office of bishops with the exercise of its power, in exactly the way one could confuse the exercise of judicial review with the office of Supreme Court Justice. Ortlund equates the office of bishop with <i>monarchial territorial jurisdiction</i>, but that has nothing to do with the definition of the office. It is only one way in which that power can be exercised. As my Orthodox friend Perry Robinson recently pointed out, the requirements are actually that (1) there are three orders, (2) which are obtained by ordination that confers a spiritual gift through laying on hands and (3) only bishops can perform this ordination. But at 15:00, Ortlund offers a definition of apostolic success that doesn't actually correspond to this definition and which is actually misleading.</div><div><br /></div><div><i>Its technical meaning has four components.</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div><i>1. The office of bishop is distinct from the office of presbyter by divine right by apostolic appointment, and so the bishop rather than the presbyter is the successor of the Apostles;</i></div><div><i>2. Bishops have a regional jurisdiction in a kind of overarching hierarchical unity with one another;</i></div><div><i>3. Episcopal succession subsists in the laying on of hands from one bishop to another; and</i></div><div><i>4. Apart from valid apostolic succession, there is normally no validly ordained ministry and thus no efficacious Sacraments. </i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div><i>Baptism will often be an exception to that, but the Eucharist --- for example, no valid Eucharist apart from valid holy orders or ministry, and no valid holy orders apart from valid apostolic succession, this very tight and sort of mechanical way of understanding how the church -- how church ministry is transmitted from one time to another.</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div>(1) is false on multiple grounds. In the first place, Ortlund is using this to argue that the use of the <i>term</i> is exclusive, so that bishops cannot also be referred to as <i>presbyters</i>, which is entirely false. The greater order includes the lesser, which prevents the term itself from only and exclusively being used for the lower order. The word "deacon" is typically singled out because it lacks the fulness of priestly ministry, but it does still consecrate the man to service of the Church, which is why the title "servant" (which is nothing other than deacon translated) is applied to deacons, priests, and bishops. Similarly, both <i>presbyteroi</i> and <i>episkopoi</i> have the fullness of priestly ministry and apostolic succession in this primary sense of Christ's priesthood, which is why it is perfectly acceptable to say that the bishop is part of the priesthood. But it is likewise true that only bishops have the fullness of the apostolic succession in the sense of governance over the lesser orders, which is exactly why the exercise of monarchial territorial jurisdiction is fitting <i>but not necessary</i> for the episcopate. But the true aspect of governance is of the bishops acting collectively in union with one another as the government of the Church. This is why ecumenical councils exemplifying the union of the bishops have final and binding authority in the Church.</div><div><br /></div><div>(2) is simply false on its face. Regional jurisdiction is entirely inessential to apostolic succession. We could have continued to have multiple bishops governing collegially, as was done in early Rome and Corinth, indefinitely.</div><div><br /></div><div>(3) is true but misleading, because it fails to point out that not only <i>bishops</i> but <i>all orders</i> are ordained by the bishop. The key feature of apostolic succession is that only bishops ordain others to ministry in the Church, either the ministry of service <i>or</i> priestly ministry of any kind. (Note that <i>election</i> of bishops, which Ortlund mentions at 19:25, has nothing to do with anything; bishop-candidates were elected locally for long stretches of Church history.)</div><div><br /></div><div>(4) should therefore be stated more strongly: without ordination by a bishop, there is no priestly ministry of any kind, including most especially the Eucharist, the sacrifice of the order of Melchizedek.</div><div><br /></div><div>With the correct understanding of apostolic succession, then, there is an exact parallel between the office of bishop and the office of Supreme Court Justice:</div><div>A. The office is named and described in some detail in the founding documents in a way that clearly conveys governmental authority (the Supreme Court in the Constitution, bishops in Scripture).</div><div>B. The process of installation into that office was clearly described, and there are no recorded instances of an office holder being recognized as such without that process (appointment by the President in the Constitution, ordination by laying on hands by an Apostle or bishop in Scripture).</div><div>C. Within about a generation after the founding, that office exercised a power that was not explicitly laid out in the founding documents but which was widely accepted as appropriate for the office (judicial review for the Supreme Court, monarchial territorial jurisdiction for the episcopate).</div><div><br /></div><div>A claim that the power of judicial review was a later <i>ultra vires</i> accretion and that Supreme Court decisions are not valid law would not be taken seriously by any legal historian today, and it is not even three hundred years after the Founding. To say that the analogous claim is ridiculous in the context of the episcopate would be to understate the magnitude of the error; there is vastly more evidence for episcopal government in the centuries since Christ. Denial of this exercise of authority is the same dangerously foolish idea embraced by people who deny the authority of the federal government, such as the "Sovereign Individual" movement that advocates refusal to pay income taxes.</div><div><br /></div><div>The point is that what Ortlund is doing isn't what we would normally consider "history" at all. Normal history would say exactly the same thing about episcopal authority that it does about the authority of the Supreme Court. The office shows every sign of having been established in the New Testament and operating as intended for its governmental function. Unless we assume that the first century Christian audience simply had no idea what the office was or how it was intended to function other than what was written in epistles, an assumption that is frankly ridiculous to anyone who even reads the plain text of the New Testament, we would handle this historically in the same way we handle any other office. And if we do handle it this way, then the claim that later episcopal authority is an "accretion" is no less absurd than the claim that the Supreme Court power of judicial review is a "accretion" that is legally invalid under the Constitution. That standard for validity would be completely contrary to our ordinary historical understanding of what was believed at the time.</div><div><br /></div><div><u>Objections to the analogy</u></div></div><div><br /></div></div><div><u>A. Scripture's claims are different than that of the Constitution</u></div><div><br /></div><div>The simplest response to that objection is to look at how Ortlund himself characterized the issue: "All <i>sola Scriptura</i> is, is the application of that claim to a very specific question, namely, how does the rule of the church work with respect to infallibility?" I agree; a rule, a law, works the same way in the church as any rule for human beings in any human society. Scripture, <i>qua</i> the supreme law of the Church, works identically with the Constitution as the "supreme law of the land." The written consitution establishes a correlative government, and that is the way in which the written constitution sustains itself as a rule of law. If either Scripture or Constitution failed to do this, it would be a dead letter, incapable of functioning as a rule.</div><div><u><br /></u></div><div><u>B. Authority is not infallibility</u></div><div><br /></div><div>This argument is raised at 15:45; with respect to divine revelation, it is necessarily false for the reasons given in Michael Liccione's argument <a href="https://www.calledtocommunion.com/2011/02/mathisons-reply-to-cross-and-judisch-a-largely-philosophical-critique/" target="_blank">here</a> -- that is, it would be intrinsically incapable of distinguishing authoritative divine revelation from mere opinion, meaning that it fails to provide a sufficient rational basis for the normative commitment of faith. This is understandable by the same analogy to the Supreme Court within the rule of law.</div><div><br /></div><div>If one were to argue the distinction that the Supreme Court, as a collection of fallible political appointees is somehow "not infallible," the reply would be the old maxim about the Supreme Court: <i>the Supreme Court is not final because it is infallible; it is infallible because it is final</i>. That is, the Supreme Court cannot fail to be the final authority in the dispute, because that is its function within the rule of law, a rule of orderly behavior in the society. The only difference between rule of law and rule of faith in this sense is that the latter is established by God to lead not only to orderly behavior but also to truth. </div><div><br /></div><div>Note that "infallibility" in the sense of being incapable of error, which is more correctly called "inerrancy" in the case of writings like Scripture, is known as a <i>consequence</i> of its normative status within the government <i>viewed as a whole</i>. Human government can fail to achieve true "infallibility" in this sense in that it might be subject to future revision, but divine government as guarantor of truth cannot, which is why what the Church upholds as Scripture can be trusted as the divine law. Ortlund's claim that "receiving a gift of truth and promulgating infallibly are not the same thing" is radically false if Scripture is to serve as a rule of faith. This is why St. Augustine correctly says that his respect for Scripture is on account of the authority of the Church: "If you say, Do not believe the Catholics: you cannot fairly use the gospel in bringing me to faith in Manichæus; <i>for it was at the command of the Catholics that I believed the gospel</i>." </div><div><br /></div><div><u>C. Augustine denies the authority of the apostolic succession</u></div><div><br /></div><div>Note that when dealing with <i>Christian heretics who accept the apostolic succession</i>, such as the Arian heretic Maximinus or the Donatists, Augustine will appeal to Scripture rather than councils (including Nicaea), but he does not do so with the Manichaeans who accept Scripture but reject the apostolic succession. The latter are simply being irrational, as Augustine points out, while the former are essentially in an internal debate about the proper authority of the episcopate. Likewise, when dealing with Protestants, the logical approach is <i>not</i> to dispute with them about Scripture, since there is no fundamental agreement about the authority of Scripture, but <i>why they believe Scripture has authority in the first place</i>.</div><div><br /></div><div>Understood in that context, it is worth pointing out this howler from Ortlund concerning a quote from Augustine against the Donatists, which is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O34wIym1vC4" target="_blank">thoroughly debunked by Agnus Domini</a>.</div><div><br /></div><div><i>But who can fail to be aware that the sacred canon of Scripture, both of the Old and New Testament, is confined within its own limits, and that it stands so absolutely in a superior position to all later letters of the bishops, that about it we can hold no manner of doubt or disputation whether what is confessedly contained in it is right and true but that all the letters of bishops which have been written, or are being written, since the closing of the canon, are liable to be refuted if there be anything contained in them which strays from the truth, either by the discourse of some one who happens to be wiser in the matter than themselves, or by the weightier authority and more learned experience of other bishops, by the authority of Councils and further, that the Councils themselves, which are held in the several districts and provinces, must yield, beyond all possibility of doubt, to the authority of plenary Councils which are formed for the whole Christian world; and that even of the plenary Councils, the earlier are often corrected by those which follow them, when, by some actual experiment, things are brought to light which were before concealed, and that is known which previously lay hid, and this without any whirlwind of sacrilegious pride.</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div>Ortlund makes the absurd claim, which seems to be motivated not by dishonesty but rather but just how oblivious Ortlund really is to patristics, that this is a claim that "ecumenical councils can err." As Agnus Domini points out, it's not likely that Augustine even knew that there could be ecumenical <i>councils</i>, plural, since it is very likely that he didn't even know that Constantinople had happened. What he's referring to here are councils convened to assess the <i>common faith</i> of the entire Church, formed <i>for</i> the whole but not necessarily <i>out of</i> the whole, which are plenary in that sense of representing more than just local opinions. His argument would be senseless for <i>ecumenical councils</i> in which the whole world is present to share knowledge, and he doesn't even take this position with respect to the appeals to Rome, which Augustine sees as an appeal to the shepherd of the whole Church. </div><div><br /></div><div>The point is that when the bishops are lawfully resolving disputes <i>among one another</i>, they should be appealing to Scripture, just as the Supreme Court should be appealing to the Constitution in resolving legal disputes. But he clearly doesn't think he should deal with opponents within the apostolic succession, who actually accept the offices and the government, the same we he treats those entirely outside the apostolic succession. And this goes double for Ortlund's citation of St. Irenaeus.</div><div><br /></div><div><u>D. Irenaeus denies the authority of the apostolic succession</u></div><div><br /></div><div>Here is the truly vicious irony. If we interpret Ortlund's claim correctly, <i>he has cited direct patristic support against his own ministry</i>! That's not an exaggeration, and the truly stunning part is that he does it in the middle of falsely accusing Joshua Charles of dishonest quotation. This is the quote from St. Irenaeus in <i>Adv, Haer. </i>4.26, with the part Joshua quoted in bold:</div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Wherefore <b>it is incumbent to obey the presbyters who are in the Church,—those who, as I have shown, possess the succession from the apostles; those who, together with the succession of the episcopate, have received the certain gift of truth, according to the good pleasure of the Father</b>. But [it is also incumbent] to hold in suspicion others who depart from the primitive succession, and assemble themselves together in any place whatsoever, [looking upon them] either as heretics of perverse minds, or as schismatics puffed up and self-pleasing, or again as hypocrites, acting thus for the sake of lucre and vainglory. For all these have fallen from the truth. And the heretics, indeed, who bring strange fire to the altar of God—namely, strange doctrines—shall be burned up by the fire from heaven, as were Nadab and Abiud. But such as rise up in opposition to the truth, and exhort others against the Church of God, [shall] remain among those in hell, being swallowed up by an earthquake, even as those who were with Chore, Dathan, and Abiron. But those who cleave asunder, and separate the unity of the Church, [shall] receive from God the same punishment as Jeroboam did.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Those, however, who are believed to be presbyters by many, but serve their own lusts, and, do not place the fear of God supreme in their hearts, but conduct themselves with contempt towards others, and are puffed up with the pride of holding the chief seat, and work evil deeds in secret, saying, “No man sees us,” shall be convicted by the Word, who does not judge after outward appearance, nor looks upon the countenance, but the heart; and they shall hear those words, to be found in Daniel the prophet: “O thou seed of Canaan, and not of Judah, beauty hath deceived thee, and lust perverted thy heart. Thou that art waxen old in wicked days, now thy sins which thou hast committed aforetime are come to light; for thou hast pronounced false judgments, and hast been accustomed to condemn the innocent, and to let the guilty go free, albeit the Lord saith, The innocent and the righteous shalt thou not slay.” Of whom also did the Lord say: “But if the evil servant shall say in his heart, My lord delayeth his coming, and shall begin to smite the man-servants and maidens, and to eat and drink and be drunken; the lord of that servant shall come in a day that he looketh not for him, and in an hour that he is not aware of, and shall cut him asunder, and appoint him his portion with the unbelievers.”</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>Such presbyters does the Church nourish, of whom also the prophet says: “I will give thy rulers in peace, and thy bishops in righteousness.” Of whom also did the Lord declare, “Who then shall be a faithful steward (actor), good and wise, whom the Lord sets over His household, to give them their meat in due season? Blessed is that servant whom his Lord, when He cometh, shall find so doing.” Paul then, teaching us where one may find such, says, “God hath placed in the Church, first, apostles; secondly, prophets; thirdly, teachers.” Where, therefore, the gifts of the Lord have been placed, there it behooves us to learn the truth, [namely,] from those who possess that succession of the Church which is from the apostles, and among whom exists that which is sound and blameless in conduct, as well as that which is unadulterated and incorrupt in speech. <b>For these also preserve this faith of ours in one God who created all things; and they increase that love [which we have] for the Son of God, who accomplished such marvellous dispensations for our sake: and they expound the Scriptures to us without danger, neither blaspheming God, nor dishonouring the patriarchs, nor despising the prophets</b>.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ortlund's supplemental quote is from <i>AH</i> 3.3:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>For they were desirous that these men should be very perfect and blameless in all things, whom also they were leaving behind as their successors, delivering up their own place of government to these men; which men, if they discharged their functions honestly, would be a great boon [to the Church], but if they should fall away, the direst calamity.</i></div></i><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I'll start from the end; the fact that Irenaeus separately enumerates that "they expound the Scriptures without danger" means that Scripture cannot itself be the basis of judging Scripture, because this statement would be superfluous if it were impossible to expound Scripture with danger. So this is an assertion that their authority, their "gift of truth," makes them reliable expounders of Scripture, not the converse proposition claimed by Ortlund that reliably expounding Scripture gives one authority. But the truly important phrase that Ortlund has completely glossed over is that these reliable teachers are "those who, together with the episcopate, have received the certain gift of truth." The apostolic succession, which does include both bishops and presbyters, is <i>collectively</i> infallible by their shared faith. Individual bishops and presbyters can fall away through evil conduct, but the apostolic succession as a collective never can, which is the basis for the indefectibility of the Church. Anyone who believes in the indefectibility of the Church apart from the apostolic succession is simply irrational and fideistic.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is why Irenaeus explicitly condemns "<b>others who depart from the primitive succession, and assemble themselves together in any place whatsoever</b>," which is a perfect description of Ortlund's congregation. And if Ortlund were to do so willfully, Ortlund would a man we must "hold in suspicion," among those we should view "either as heretics of perverse minds, or as schismatics puffed up and self-pleasing, or again as hypocrites, acting thus for the sake of lucre and vainglory." To be clear, I think that Ortlund is clearly oblivious, albeit so prone to engage in "motivated reasoning" that it frankly appears like dishonesty to people who know better.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div>Along those lines, even with respect to the evil presbyters, Irenaeus tells how we can judge those who are instead good: "Paul then, teaching us where one may find such [faithful servants], says 'God hath <b>placed in the Church</b>, first, apostles; secondly, prophets; thirdly, teachers. <span style="text-align: justify;">Where, therefore, the gifts of the Lord have been placed, there it behooves us to learn the truth, [namely,] <b>from those who possess that succession of the Church which is from the apostles</b>.</span>'" As with the heretics, we judge goodness by unity with the Church, how that presbyter reflects unity with the one government of the Church. We do not judge them by expounding the Scriptures, because that cannot be done without danger by evil men; rather, we judge all things by unity with the Church government, and the Church within that unity judges rightly according to the Scriptures. It is that right judgment of the Church as a whole, as a single government, in which the indefectibility and infallibility subsists. Ortlund's self-contradictory position that "receiving a gift of truth and promulgating infallibly are not the same thing" could only be true if that authority were not <i>intended by God</i> to function as the once-for-all-time means of divine revelation. And that brings us to the Old Testament. </div><div><br /></div><div><u>E. The Old Testament did not have a final infallible authority</u></div><div><br /></div><div>But what about the Old Testament lacking final infallible authority? Just as the government of the United States under the Articles of Confederation was in some respects incomplete in its function, which is why the Constitution was written, so Israel was incomplete as a self-sustaining divine government. This is exactly why revelation was open: because the revelation was incomplete at that time. Thus, the principle of correction was subsequent special divine intervention through offices like prophet, judge, and king. But once revelation in closed, the rule of faith, the apostolic government, must be complete. There will no longer be any special divine interventions, but rather the stable presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church founded on Pentecost. Ortlund therefore denies the fulfillment of Israel in the Church of the New Covenant.</div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">If this apostolic succession, the plenary government of the New Testament instituted by Christ and inaugurated in their full office by the Holy Spirit, needed correction about the faith, then there would be no principle by which such correction could take place. This is why Ortlund's position necessarily degenerates into no rule of faith at all. By Ortlund's lights, the Incarnation and subsequent closure of revelation left us even worse off than Israel in the Old Testament, because we have neither self-sustaining government nor divine promise to specially intervene. By contrast, the Old Testament clearly demonstrated that the Scriptures alone were not sufficient to maintain the rule of faith without special divine intervention. In 2 Kings 22, Israel had degenerated into Ba'al worship and had forgotten the Law completely. Josiah's reforms on the discovery of the Book of the Law in chapter 23 were essentially immediately undone by his son, leading to the Babylonian captivity. 2 Kings 24:3-4 says "Surely this came upon Judah at the command of the Lord, to remove them out of his sight, for the sins of Manasseh, according to all that he had done, and also for the innocent blood that he had shed. For he filled Jerusalem with innocent blood, and the Lord would not pardon." This is an example of God's ongoing special intervention with Israel in the Old Testament, and it demonstrates that with respect to the ongoing application of the rule of faith, Israel was <i>defectible</i> and <i>corrigible</i>, while the New Testament Church is <i>indefectible</i> and therefore <i>incorrigible in principle</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">And just as separation from Israel would have been separation from God, so is separation from the one government of the Church. Indeed, without its government, the Church doesn't even exist as a polity. The idea of "Church" in Ortlund's mind is not merely invisible; <i>it's not even real</i>! It's like a square circle, a nonsense object collected from incompatible properties in the Meinongian sense. At least Israel was a real polity; Ortlund's view of the Church lacks even that level of reality. So we can return to Ortlund's vapid claim on indefectibility:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Most Protestants hold to the indefectibilty of the church, for example, historically. Basically, our position is pretty simple; we believe the church is alive and well and protected and guided and preserved and watched over by the Holy Spirit, and every nanosecond of church history she is alive, she never dies, her offices are divinely instituted and established, there are authoritative standards within her to be employed like councils, there are expressions of authority within the church like excommunication, but the church is fallible -- that's it. So she's not dead, and she's not abandoned, she's just capable of error so she has to measure herself by the superior standard of God's inspired Word. I think that's a pretty reasonable position.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is far from a reasonable position; it's a sheerly nonsensical position. In the first place, Ortlund doesn't even believe in a real "church"; he believes in a nonsense object that can't possibly exist. To call this nonsense object "she," as if it were some kind of real thing in the sense that we speak about the federal government of the United States, is delusional. There is no "she" to have offices and standards and authority. The idea that this imaginary "she," which does not and cannot possibly exist, has any real properties at all can't even rationally be discussed.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">If Ortlund thinks that the Church, like Israel, lacks infallibility, then Ortlund believes that the Church, like Israel is defectible and can only be brought back to the rule of faith by special divine intervention. But if Ortlund thinks that revelation is closed, then special divine intervention concerning the rule of faith is impossible. Those do not constitute a mutually compatible set of properties, so Ortlund believes in something that can't possibly exist. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>Conclusion</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">If you had someone telling you that the federal government were not actually the federal government but that the United States were actually run by a "shadow government" described by a contradictory and impossible set of properties, you would not accept that person's account as true, and you would likely have concerns about that person's mental health. But when Ortlund makes religious claims that are every bit as delusional, no one blinks an eye. That is a sign of how modernism has turned religion into something like aesthetic taste, like what flavor of ice cream one prefers, rather than real claims about reality. If Ortlund's (or any Protestant's) claims were treated as scientific rather than rhetorical, they would be laughed out of the discourse.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Reformation is over. "<i>Semper reformanda</i>" is as historically relevant as "the South shall rise again." There are people who believe it, and they are wrong from perspective of brute historical fact. At some point, we need to start dealing with it and not treating these claims as intellectually serious. A Protestant who is not knowingly and consciously liberal is either ignorant or incompetent concerning patristic history. There is no other option.</div></div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-79529106490479405002023-11-20T06:51:00.000-05:002023-11-20T06:51:10.369-05:00Dom John Chapman's mistaken account of infallibility<p style="text-align: justify;">Some of the greatest minds of the Church, in what appears to be a sign of desperation to preserve what they perceive as infallibility, end up coming to firm conclusions that are frankly ridiculous and that should have been held tentatively. Most of that is because infallibility was poorly defined until relatively recently (even as late as Vatican II with respect to the <i>obsequium religiosum</i>), and a number of these theologians just didn't have a clear grasp of how infallibility was supposed to function. The most glaring example that I've found is in the brilliant historian Dom John Chapman's defense of infallibility, in which he ends up saying things (mostly in a footnote) that are just hard to read with a straight face. (Ironically, it was published by the Catholic Truth Society in 1907.) Specifically, Fr. Chapman says the following of Honorius's letters:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>It was <b>natural for the Byzantines, therefore, to treat it as giving the Roman view</b>, <b>natural that it should be followed by Sergius</b> (whom in fact it bound since it was addressed to him), <b>natural that it should remain a tower of strength to heretics</b> <b>until it had been authoritatively declared by Rome to be no embodiment of her tradition</b>. Such a disavowal had become absolutely necessary as the complement of the Roman condemnation of the </i>ecthesis<i> and the </i>typus<i>, <b>which had both been founded on Honorius, as we saw</b>.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i><b>But once disowned by Rome, the words of Honorius were harmless against Rome. They were instantly reduced to their true value, as the expression of his own view</b>.*</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>(* Infallibility is, as it were, the apex of a pyramid. The more solemn the utterances of the Apostolic See, the more we can be certain of their truth. When they reach the maximum of solemnity, that is, when they are strictly </i>ex cathedra<i>, the possibility of error is wholly eliminated. The authority of a Pope, even on those occasions when he is not actually infallible, is to be implicitly followed and reverenced. That it should be on the wrong side of a contingency is shown by faith and history to be possible, but by history as well as by faith to be <b>so remote that it is not usually to be taken into consideration</b>. There are three or four examples in history. Of these the condemnation of Galileo is the most famous, and the mistake of Honorius makes a good (or rather bad) second. But in this case <b>the mistake was rectified within a few months</b>, and after that, no one followed Honorius in good faith.)</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>The infallibility of the Pope is for the sake of the Church. Wherever his fall would necessarily involve the Church in the same error, he is infallible. Therefore he is infallible whenever he binds the Church by his authority to accept the ruling, and only then. It is a matter of history that no Pope has ever involved the whole Church in error. It is a matter of history that Pope after Pope has solemnly defined the truth and bound the Church to accept it. It is a matter of history that Pope after Pope has confirmed Councils which decided rightly and wrongly. It is a matter of history that Rome has always retained the true faith. If this was wonderful in the 7th century, it is more wonderful after thirteen more centuries have passed.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;">At this point, Fr. Chapman's view of infallibility is completely unprincipled, and it's because he is, at least in this case, a bad philosopher. Adherence to error is never natural; in fact, it's exactly the opposite. The idea that obedience to the Pope binds one to error is therefore a metaphysical impossibility. Fr. Chapman here is watering down infallibility to the point of triviality in order to preserve it, but infallibility needs to be far more robust than this from a philosophical standpoint to function effectively. For example, Fr. Chapman's assertion that one can correctly believe that a statement is binding only to find out a few months <i>later</i> that the statement has been reduced to its "true value" would be a manifest absurdity. It would require conditional assent, rather than the assent of faith, to papal teaching. The position that Fr. Chapman defends here would make papal authority senseless for purposes of divine revelation, for exactly the same reason that Scripture does not function as divine revelation without inerrancy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The distinction that Fr. Chapman identifies, however, is a correct one: that the Pope is infallible "whenever he binds the Church by his authority to accept the ruling." But he makes the frankly ridiculous assertion that this is the case only "[w]hen they reach the maximum of solemnity, that is, when they are strictly <i>ex cathedra</i>." This is the same position taken by the liberal German bishops in the 1960s and all of the progressives that have since followed them, and it is absurd. Cardinal Franzelin pointed out that there are numerous instances where the Pope offers some kind of a definitive judgment from a disciplinary standpoint that does not amount to the kind of doctrinal definition required for an <i>ex cathedra</i> statement. Such commands are therefore <i>infallibly safe</i> to obey and can never lawfully be resisted. Thus, the pyramid Fr. Chapman describes is not a continuum; it has layers. At the apex are <i>ex cathedra</i> statements, which are infallibly true; at the next layer are those definitive disciplinary judgments that bind the entire Church in a human way, which are infallibly safe; at the next layer are private opinions that are to be "implicitly followed and reverenced," the deference to which is subject only to prudence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">One can rightly question the prudence of any judgment by the Pope, even of <i>ex cathedra</i> statements. One can plead for clarification or (where appropriate) reversal. What one cannot do is to question the <i>authority</i> of such statements, including the suggestion that the Pope himself has denied the faith or has led (or attempted to lead) the flock into heresy by such authoritative action. Fr. Chapman is correct that Pope Honorius was offering a private opinion along with his binding direction on how Sergius was to proceed (i.e., to adhere to the Chalcedonian faith), but Sergius was never bound (nor was anyone else) to Pope Honorius's private opinions. To say that there was binding but erroneous teaching in the letters is a contradiction in terms. What was condemned in the letters was never binding and never should have been followed.</p>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-85134942330561864752023-11-18T09:00:00.000-05:002023-11-18T09:04:57.896-05:00Articles on Pope Francis and Church Authority<p>To understand my view on how Church authority operates in the context of divine revelation, please read my article <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/divine-revelation-as-normative-authority.html" target="_blank">Divine revelation as normative authority</a> from April 2023. Other articles on this subject include the following:</p><p><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/11/did-theodorets-nestorianism-lead-to.html" target="_blank">Why Amoris Laetitia is back in the news</a> (September 2022)</p><p><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2022/11/can-i-venially-murder.html">Can I venially murder?</a> (November 2022)</p><p><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/a-quick-note-on-methodology.html" target="_blank">A quick note on methodology</a> (April 2023) (Relates to my apologetics approach for justifying Church authority)</p><p><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/the-right-way-to-recognize-and-resist.html" target="_blank">The right way to recognize and resist</a> (April 2023) (On permissible dissent from authority)</p><p><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/the-right-way-to-recognize-and-resist.html" target="_blank">Scripture dysphoria</a> (April 2023)</p><p><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/05/prospective-mitigation-trojan-horse-in.html" target="_blank">Prospective mitigation: the Trojan horse in Catholic moral theology</a> (May 2023)</p><p><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/05/prospective-mitigation-trojan-horse-in.html" target="_blank">Does Amoris Laetitia dogmatize progressive moral theology?</a> (July 2023)</p><p><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/09/amoris-laetitia-and-reconciliation.html" target="_blank">Amoris Laetitia and Reconciliation</a> (September 2023)</p><p><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/10/the-infallible-security-of-papal-non.html" target="_blank">The infallible security of papal non-definitive teaching</a> (October 2023)</p><p><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/10/the-infallible-security-of-papal-non.html" target="_blank">What infallibility actually means for Catholics</a> (October 2023)</p><p><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/11/what-exactly-does-pope-francis-have-in.html" target="_blank">What exactly does Pope Francis have in mind?</a> (November 2023)</p>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-22385243734884461282023-11-17T07:42:00.000-05:002023-11-17T07:42:52.976-05:00Justification as Quality<p style="text-align: justify;">I saw an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uqd4SsrCuUw" target="_blank">appearance on Parker's Pensées by the Calvinist philosopher Guillaume Bignon</a> that was intended to clarify the discussion on justification between Protestants and Catholics. At the end of the discussion, he asked for feedback, and that is the spirit in which I offer this article.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I do think that Bignon helped to explain the difference between initial justification and progressive justification. But in my view, it still missed some fundamental differences in unshared assumptions. First, Bignon's discussion did raise a critical point: that when Catholics speak of works being a part of justification, this refers to progressive justification, where the interesting question is about how justification is <i>obtained </i>and <i>retained</i>, which is what Protestants mean by justification. The real question is "what must I do to obtain eternal life?" While the discussion was quite helpful to bring some of those unshared assumptions forward, especially the distinction between possession of justification (saving grace) and growth in justification, I believe that he did not give enough attention to the underlying concept that distinguishes the views, namely, that justification/righteousness is a <i>quality</i> in Catholic theology and a <i>legal declaration</i> in Protestant theology. That unshared assumption strikes me as the most significant reason for Catholics and Protestants talking past each other.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><u>I. The Analogy to Physical Strength</u></p><p style="text-align: justify;">To illustrate what I mean, I will use another quality: physical strength. Let's say that we define "strong" as being able to bench press the bar with no added weight. If you are capable of that, you are qualitatively "strong," which is to say, you have the quality of strength. Otherwise, you are not qualitatively strong. There are no qualitative degrees in terms of having the quality or not, but there are quantitative degrees of strength. One person can be stronger than another, in terms of being able to bench far more weight, but that quantative difference does not deprive even the weakest person meeting the qualifications from having the quality "strong."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In Catholic theology, sanctifying grace, with its aspects of righteousness and eternal life, is called a supernatural quality of the soul. This can be understood by analogy to the quality of physical strength that I described above. It can quantitatively increase, so that one has more grace, becomes more righteous, and is more alive. But qualitatively, one either has it or doesn't. We refer to that as a "state of grace," but the state in this case is not something other than possession of the quality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is fundamentally different from the Reformed view, which understands justification and eternal life as achieved legal states, as opposed to possession of qualities. From the Reformed perspective, to the extent there is an increase, it could only be toward perfection of the state, as opposed to an increase in a quality. To put it another way, a state is either instantaneous or the end of a process of perfection. In Reformed theology, for example, this is an instantaneous process -- the regeneration of the sinner by the Holy Spirit the produces faith. From that perspective, any kind of process in becoming justified (regenerated), especially a contribution of works to that process, must be a Judaizing or Pelagian view. But, of course, believing that about Catholics would be a mischaracterization of the Catholic view based on confusing progressive justification with the possession of justification. Bignon points out that this misconception on the part of Reformed Christians is part of why the dialogue becomes confused, since Catholics do not believe that works contribute to the possession of justification, only to its increase. (One might legitimately query whether the Reformed idea that perfect obedience is pleasing to God is itself a version of Pelagianism, but we will leave that aside in this discussion.) </p><p style="text-align: justify;">To articulate the explanation in terms of quality further, the Catholic view likewise distinguishes bare possession of the quality with the degree of the quality. This is the sense in which possession of the quality is described as "initial" justification, not in the sense of "the first time" but in the sense of simple possession being the initial condition. It is the zero point on the scale of justification from which increase in justification is measured; in my analogy to physical strength, it is being able to lift the bar with no added weight. In terms of the possession of the quality, both the Catholic and the Reformed views hold that it is given purely by grace and the sovereign election of God. For the Catholic, the ordinary course of grace will be by receipt of the Sacraments of baptism and penance, but because it is by grace, nothing prevents God from providing the same grace outside of the ordinary course. The grace-inspired works that we perform while in possession of that quality are in no sense a completion of that possession. Possession of the quality alone, by grace alone, suffices for salvation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">To restate this, the works performed by the justified person and the graces subsequently received to quantitatively increase righteousness and eternal life do not relate to the qualitative possession of righteousness and eternal life, which is either present or not. Pelagianism is the belief that the qualitative possession of righteousness and eternal life is by works and not grace. Pelagius believed that it was the faith demonstrated in the request for grace and not the grace itself that was justifying. The Judaizing belief condemned in Scripture was that performing the works of the Law was this basis for obtaining the quality. Neither is acceptable in Catholicism; both are condemned.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In analogy to physical strength, the Catholic understanding of sin is based on the durability of this quality as against injuries. A venial sin is the equivalent of some minor injury that temporarily impairs the ability to exercise the quality but does not permanently disable the quality. It is reparable by the spiritual equivalent of physical therapy in a variety of ways. Purgatory is essentially the afterlife rehab to allow the quality to return to its proper function. Mortal sins are those that permanently disable the quality, like injuries that remove the ability even to lift the bar. In that case, the Sacrament of Penance is like spiritual surgery to restore the quality, which can also serve a rehabilitative purpose in the same way any grace can.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><u>II. Justification as Declaration</u></p><p style="text-align: justify;">It's helpful at this point to skip ahead to the end of Bignon's presentation [around 1:20:00] to illustrate why something has been missed. Bignon offers the interpretation of the question of justification by faith alone as follows: "are we legally acquitted [Protestant view of justification, P-justification] by faith alone [Protestant view of faith as <i>notitia</i> + <i>assensus</i> + <i>fiducia</i>, P-faith]?" This is, in Bignon's view, restating the question "what must I do to obtain eternal life?" But it also obscures a distinction about what we mean by legal acquittal, and that seems to be the core difference.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Let's then turn back to what we mean when we say that the Reformed view views justification as a legal state. Bignon talks about forensic justification [at 8:00] as a legal acquittal before "the tribunal," but given the context of the discussion, what is meant here is the judgment at death. So now we've got another distinction within P-justification based on whether it's possible for faith to be lost. The standard Calvinist position is that the justification received by faith, the legal status, is irrevocable: once saved, always saved. Lutherans (and most other Protestants) believe that apostasy is possible, so the legal status is revocable. That creates a distinction between PR (Protestant-Reformed)-justification and PL (Protestant-Lutheran)-justification.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">What this distinction highlights is that the question is even more complicated, because there is a difference between the legal declaration associated with possession of faith (which could itself be P-faith or C-faith) and the postmortem judgment. There may be a tendency at this point for people to just throw up their hands, because slogans like "works-salvation" against Catholics or "antinomianism" against Protestants are much easier to learn and to cast thoughtlessly at one's enemies. But Bignon and I are both opposed to that sort of lazy thinking, so in that spirit, I will not throw up my hands but instead firmly grasp the distinctions that need to be made.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So before we get into what the declaration is, let's start with what we mean by "possession of faith" in this context. We actually all agree on this, and what Bignon calls C-faith (intellectual assent) is not what Catholics mean when we discuss our own possession of faith. That is instead a Catholic caricature of what Protestants mean by faith, and we should all agree that this is just wrong. What we all mean by faith in terms of "saving faith" is faith situated in a complex of mental dispositions that naturally leads to obedience to God and love of neighbor. Protestants call that overall disposition <i>fiducia</i>; Catholics call it <i>fides caritate formata </i>(faith formed in charity).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">We can quibble about the exact metaphysical nature of saving faith and whether it can be sustained in the absence of charity later, but for our purposes, it doesn't matter. The Protestant definition certainly doesn't <i>exclude</i> the presence of charity in the Catholic sense; Calvin even interprets James 2 as requiring that good works will be present (I'll discuss this in greater detail below). So let's just use what Bignon calls P-faith as the common term, since this is the kind of faith that we all consider saving faith. The declaration, whatever that means, is associated with the possession of P-faith. And in that since we all can say that we are justified, in the sense of receiving the declaration, by P-faith alone. That is to say that no works are required for the possession of P-faith and the associated declaration.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">That seems like it would simplify things, yet it turns out we immediately diverge on <i>how</i> P-faith is associated with a legal declaration and <i>what</i> the legal declaration is. We can start with the declarations, and I will use the same lettering C-, PR-, and PL- lettering here. (I am using "Reformed" here to mean Calvinist; Arminians are in the Reformed tradition, but they follow the PL- approach.)</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i><u>C-declaration</u>: A permanent declaration that one has been adopted as Son and moved from the kingdom of Satan to the Kingdom of Christ, that all sins committed before this declaration will never again be counted under the law (acquittal of prior sins), and that one will thereafter be judged by the law of the Kingdom of Christ (the law of love)</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i><u>PR-declaration</u>: A permanent declaration that one has been adopted as Son and moved from the kingdom of Satan to the Kingdom of Christ, so that one's legal status is thereafter that of Christ and no sins, whether past or future, will ever be counted against the person</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i><u>PL-declaration</u>: A revocable declaration that the person has faith and </i>therefore<i> will not have sins counted against the person, which declaration is revoked if the person loses faith.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Then each system has a corresponding understanding of judgment:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i><u>C-judgment</u>: Does the person possess the quality of righteousness?</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i><u>PR-judgment</u>: Has this person been declared to have the legal status of Christ? (Everyone who does not have this legal status fails the judgment, because that person is descended from Adam and/or has committed at least one sin.)</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i><u>PL-judgment</u>: Does this person have saving faith at the time of death?</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;">What this has illuminated is that the PR- and C- views have more in common that the Protestant PL- view. So what Bignon has identified is a way that the Reformed tradition is in a specific sense "more Catholic" than the rest of Protestantism, and that proximity specifically consists in the <i>permanent quality</i> of the <i>first such declaration</i>. That means we can focus on the difference between the PR- and C- views, which are the closest, but we should also keep in mind what we have learned from the PL- view: that there might in principle be multiple such declarations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><u>III. PR-Declaration, C-Declaration, and Double Justification</u></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Perhaps the most instructive lesson on the difference in PR-declaration and C-declaration is the failure of the Regensburg Colloquy in 1541 to obtain agreement between the two camps. Given that this was the immediately prior context for the Council of Trent, which unequivocally committed Catholics to denying imputed justification as a matter of dogma, there is little doubt that this was an important milestone in the realization of the difference between the two. Bignon correctly identifies Anthony N.S. Lane as one of the clearest expositors of Calvin's doctrine of justification, and <a href="https://foundationrt.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Lane_Calvin_Justification.pdf">his summary of that doctrine</a>, titled "The Role of Scripture in Calvin's Doctrine of Justification," is to be highly commended for its clear explanation of the Regensburg concept of double justice (<i>duplex iustitia</i>). Understanding this concept is essential for understanding the difference between PR-declaration and C-declaration.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">What Lane's explanation highlights is that the question "what must I do to obtain eternal life?" is actually a question of "what must I do to be pleasing to God?" The answer to that question in Reformed theology is "to render perfect obedience to His commands," referring to having perfectly obeyed those commands at every moment of one's life. Sin refers to any failure to do so at any time. Imputed justification is what is necessary to make up the gap between perfect obedience and the obedience that one has rendered, which is injustice. Since it is clear in Reformed theology that Christ's passive obedience in sufficient to cover that gap for us, we need not consider whether there is also an active component in terms of Christ's having done what we failed to do. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reward, viewed strictly in terms of whether or not we receive it, is then based on the degree of our actual conformity to the perfect standard. In terms of the degree of reward, our degree of conformity is used as proxy for the degree of actual unity with Christ's own perfect righteousness. Given the regeneration by the Holy Spirit and faith itself is the means by which one is united to Christ and receives the declaration of righteousness, it is impossible that one has no degree of resemblance to Christ, so there will always be some degree of reward for the regenerate, which includes eternal life. This inevitability is established by the fact that the declaration itself is received only by grace based on the decree of election, so one's possession of the declaration in no way depends on the subsequent works performed. Those can change the degree of reward, but not whether one receives a reward.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The similarities between the Catholic and Reformed views on this point should be apparent, which was the basis for the agreement at Regensburg. Unfortunately, this papered over a real disagreement, which is the reason that Protestantism ends up being condemned at Trent. The relevant Tridentine teaching is that "<i>the alone formal cause [of justification] is the justice of God, not that whereby He Himself is just, but that whereby He maketh us just, that, to wit, with which we being endowed by Him, are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and we are not only reputed, but are truly called, and are, just, receiving justice within us, each one according to his own measure, which the Holy Ghost distributes to every one as He wills, and according to each one's proper disposition and co-operation</i>." That last statement "<i>according to each one's proper disposition and co-operation</i>" is the one that is routinely misinterpreted to suggest that works are somehow part of justification, but Bignon has correctly concluded that this is a mistake. What it shows instead is that the <i>formal </i>basis for both imputation and infusion is identical, and while that is expressed in Aristotelian terms, it is fundamentally just a description of what is pleasing to God.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In that respect, what the PR-declaration contemplates is that <i>obedience to God's commands</i> is pleasing. The C-declaration considers <i>the quality of righteousness </i>pleasing. The PR-declaration has in view <i>extensive perfection</i>, having always done everything perfectly. The C-declaration considers <i>intensive perfection</i>, whether one is capable of displaying supernatural virtue in individual acts and to what degree. These have corresponding accounts of why sin is displeasing; the PR-declaration contemplates that it spoils perfect obedience in an irreparable way, while the C-declaration considers it deleterious to retaining the fundamental quality (in the way that injuries are incompatible with the quality of physical strength). They have corresponding accounts of the fallen human nature; the PR-declaration considers all fallen humans to have failed in perfect obedience by association with Adam and to lack the capacity to render pleasing obedience, while the C-declaration contemplates humanity to be unable to develop the quality of righteousness without God's gracious intervention.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This difference in turn leads to a difference on imputation, <i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., what it means for sins "not to be counted against" someone. As the double justice approach at Regensburg illustrates, both the PR-declaration and the C-declaration involve imputation in terms of non-imputation of sins. So in the PR-declaration, this must be non-imputation of every failure to render perfect obedience. This means that Christ's own perfect obedience (justification before God) must be imputed to us, since He is the only man who has ever done what God commanded perfectly in order to achieve that legal status. Yet our regeneration means that we can do some things that are pleasing to God. This means that we are not completely vitiated (as is the case in total depravity) but that we will have rendered pleasing obedience in some partial way by being sanctified in union with Christ, by faith alone if nothing else. As per N.T. Wright, that partial obedience is what acts as the proxy for reward, including the reward of eternal life, following the legal acquittal for imperfect obedience. In other words, once we withstand the acquittal and negative judgment, the positive reward is based on what partial obedience we have rendered as the real-but-partial manifestation of our legal status.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Following Regensburg, we've now identified real similarities. Both the PR-declaration and the C-declaration involve imputation by God in order that past sins are not counted. Both involve a permanent and irrevocable legal declaration at the moment one is first justified by faith. But the Catholic view maintains that this is all based on possession of the quality of sanctifying grace, while the Reformed view is that faith is the mechanism by which one is incorporated into the mystical Body of Christ through which the declaration is made.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><u>IV. Legal Fiction</u></p><p style="text-align: justify;">With that as background, we can clarify an issue that is frequently confused in discussions on this point: the accusation that the Protestant doctrine of justification is a "legal fiction." In the first place, all that a legal fiction means is that the legal status is made by a legal declaration. Legal fiction is not narrative fiction in the sense of a made-up story contrary to the facts. When one is adopted, for example, one is truly the child of one's adopted parents under the law. To say that an adopted child is not "really" (or "ontologically") the child of his new parents is to deny the natural role of law and society in humanity. There are good reasons grounded in human nature for why one's normative legal and social obligations would be transferred to another parent, similar to the way one's legal and social obligations might be transferred to a new sovereign when one becomes a citizen of a different country than the country in which one was born. The legal fiction, the status created by the law, is a very real aspect of the society.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">What is really at the heart of the criticism is not that imputation is a legal fiction but that it is an <i>unjust</i> legal fiction. The grounding of law in human nature is based on justice. There are plenty of reasons why it is just to move one's obligations to new parents or a new sovereign. Indeed, the entire idea of Christianity is to restore the good order that prevailed in Eden, in which human nature was rightly ordered to God and to creation. But there can also be unjust legal fictions, such as when one has the ability and obligation to make restitution to the victim of one's wrongdoing but the obligation is dispensed. So the question is how to address the obligations to God, which are clearly singular, in a just manner.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So the real criticism of the PR-declaration is not that it is a legal fiction but that it is an <i>arbitrary</i> legal fiction. This ties into <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2022/03/james-whites-anthropomorphic-exegesis.html" target="_blank">my previous article</a> on the Calvinist view of God as an earthly sovereign. God's commands would in that case be demands about what He wants from creatures, as opposed to inherent expressions of His <i>eudokia</i> (good will) for creatures. If the natural purpose of man is to live in relation to God, then both the commandments <i>and their dispensation</i> can be understood in the context of man achieving his end in God.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So the real distinction is in the <i>retributive justice of God</i>. Although retribution is commonly understood as punishment, depriving the criminal of something he possesses (such as freedom or life) in satisfaction of an obligation to the sovereign's justice, this cannot be applied identically in the case of God, because earthly sovereigns are not immanent in all of creation. It does apply metaphorically, and it is the misinterpretation of this metaphorical sense in an anthropomorphic way that creates the problem.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The principle of retribution is literally just giving back to someone what is the person's due. In ordinary retributive justice, the idea is that the offender has done something to disturb the peace of society and is obliged to yield something back toward that end. This giving back is traditionally called propitiation. The related idea is expiation -- removal of the evil from the society. The person's act of giving back also entails a rejection of the evil he has done, although this is frequently a compelled sufferance (punishment). These concepts are applicable in the divine context, but not univocally. For one thing, everything we have belongs to God, so we have nothing to offer to Him in satisfaction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Thus, the modification of the concept specifically relates to the purpose of the created order, and this is an area where Reformed and Catholic theology has specific differences. Although both sides agree that God created <i>for</i> His own glory and <i>to demonstrate</i> His own divine attributes, they could not be farther apart in terms of how they interpret those concepts. In Reformed theology, this is a revelatory display to us and in us, very much akin to the revelatory purpose of Israel writ large for all of humanity. This is likewise related to a nominalist understanding of divine attributes in terms of the names put onto God based on human experience. In Catholic theology, it is a demonstration of God's absolutely unique relationship to creation as Creator, one of complete independence characterized solely by love and <i>eudokia </i>towards creation. The divine attributes are understood in the context of this fundamental ontological relationship, which makes them distinguishable according to either virtual (Dominican) or formal (Franciscan) distinctions. (The Palamite school of Eastern Orthodoxy would say that this is based on the essence/energies distinction, such that these divine attributes are associated with the divine energies.) Hence, the idea of satisfaction and atonement is based on Christ's unique offering, since He alone could freely give Himself as a sacrifice, and our real participation in His saving work.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">To illustrate the contrast, I explained in a previous article why <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2022/01/" target="_blank">Reformed theology is nominalist and voluntarist</a>, so the divine unity is resolved exclusively into the harmony and self-consistency of the divine will as an explanatory principle. Even the unity of the Persons in God is reduced to harmony of will (<i>koinonia</i>) among them. Likewise, union with Christ is harmony of will with Him. God's relationship with creation is reduced to one of divine command, which is why perfect obedience becomes the exclusive category for legal standing. One has either obeyed all of the divine commands at every point in his life, so as to have perfect harmony with the will of God, or one has not. Even categories of divine attributes, such as wrath or mercy, are grounded in divine command theory; they reflect decrees of the divine will toward creation. And because natures are explained only in terms of divine will, the legal category of the federal head becomes the basis of our unity in Adam or Christ, so that our legal status is primarily a question of our federal membership.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">By contrast, the Catholic view of all of these matters is grounded in <i>natural law</i>, which is to say that everything legal is an expression of the more fundamental Creator-creature relationship in nature (the eternal law, in scholastic terminology). Since the purpose of man is union with God, the real presence of that union, sanctifying grace, is the basis of the law. The point of divine commands is not to establish that relationship by acts of divine will but only to demonstrate it in a certain way. And it is this demonstration that makes obedience not an end in itself but an instrumentality. One way to play music intentionally is to play specific notes and specific chord progressions, but it is also possible to play intentionally by knowing how to play the instrument and the sounds that it makes. The former is like the Mosaic Law, which includes learning an extensive "music theory" about the relation to God, while the latter is the natural law accessible to Gentiles. In either case, the goal of learning to play is to make the skill of playing connatural to the person, and this is how faith is understood in Catholicism, as the <i>habitus</i> of the soul like virtues or skills.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This means that the C-declaration is not simply arbitrary but that it is grounded in the quality of righteousness that the person has simultaneously been given. This is likewise grace, but the two forms of grace (the legal declaration and the infusion of supernatural virtues) are not separated. But it is possible for someone to act inconsistently with this state of grace and thus to lose it, meaning that the declared legal status then stands as a judgment against the reality of the person's manner of life. In that case, the original declaration that one is a citizen of God has remained irrevocable; God has never repented of the C-declaration admitting the Christian to the Kingdom. But under the new standard of the law of Christ, that citizen would be judged a criminal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">So it is not the question of "legal fiction" that separates Reformed and Catholic views of justification; both admit that the citizenship in the new Kingdom is a legal status, a creation of law. The question that separates the views is "what is divine law?" Reformed theology views conformity with the law as perfect obedience to every command directed to the person by God, which is a voluntarist account of the law that contradicts natural law. With respect to the Mosaic Law, the purpose of those commands was to uniquely illustrate Christ as the only one capable of performing divine commands perfectly, so that they have not been abrogated so much as fulfilled after having served their purpose. But with respect to the moral law, those commands are eternal and unchanging, so they continue to require perfect obedience, although the lesson of Christ shows that no human being will be able to attain them. We even agree that there is a retributive aspect of sacrifice in the sense that something must be given back to God to atone for what was done with His gifts that man has no capacity to give.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Despite all of this agreement, the fundamental difference is that Reformed theology has no metaphysical category to account for <i>how</i> the sacrifice of Christ is imputed to us. Lacking any robust account of theosis outside of union of will, what Reformed theology asserts as being "in Christ" lacks any account for why Christ having assumed the human nature can have an effect with respect to individual sin. This does not allow any distinction between the legal declaration that one is a citizen of the Kingdom and ontological participation in Christ, since the mode of union with Christ <i>just is</i> the legal declaration of being in the Kingdom of Christ. The nominalism of the Reformed view thus excludes the category of theological virtue and the account of justification as a metaphysical <i>quality</i> of the person. Yet this ontological basis is required for the justice of the imputational account. So Reformed theology uses the same terms as Aquinas and Bonaventure, but their conceptual structure is entirely alien. There can be no no real sacrifice, no real atonement, and no real salvation in such a model, since there is no <i>theosis</i> based on our consubstantiality with Christ.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Lutheran theology, by contrast, does not involve this fundamental denial of the unity in the basis of salvation in Christ. This is why, unlike the failure at Regenburg, the Catholic Church and the Lutheran Church were able to achieve a <a href="https://www.lutheranworld.org/sites/default/files/Joint%20Declaration%20on%20the%20Doctrine%20of%20Justification.pdf" target="_blank">Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification</a> that highlights a fundamental agreement between the two sides on this subject. In both Catholic and Lutheran theology, the real participation in Christ (albeit articulated in nominalist terms in Lutheran theology) is the single basis for justification. As the Joint Declaration 4.2 maintains, "[w]hen persons come by faith to share in Christ, God no longer imputes to them their sin and through the Holy Spirit effects in them an active love. These two aspects of God's gracious action are not to be separated, for persons are by faith united with Christ, who in his person is our righteousness (1 Cor. 1:30): both the forgiveness of sin and the saving presence of God himself." This is not to say that Catholics and Lutherans agree on the <i>means of participation</i>; there, Luther's nominalism continues to be an obstacle, which leads to philosophical errors like (purely) imputed righteousness and the <i>genus majestaticum</i> in Christology. But that philosophical error does not amount to an outright denial of essential soteriology as it does in Reformed theology. So even though the PR-declaration and the C-declaration have more in common in terms of the <i>legal declaration itself</i>, this similarity between Catholic and Reformed theology masks a fatal disagreement on the legal basis of salvation itself (possession of the quality of righteousness vs. perfect obedience). So even though the apparent similarity with Calvinism on justification may appear greater, the PL-declaration view is far more similar to the Catholic account of union with Christ.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><u>V. Conclusion</u></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, Protestants do not agree with Catholics (or the Fathers, for that matter) on the nature of union with Christ in Christ's saving work; this is the point that I made in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/live/DSK40Gr8aqw?si=3K2yUwKhTZUzA2nz&t=1" target="_blank">my debate with Fr. James at William Albrecht's Patristic Pillars</a>. In that respect, pertaining specifically to justification as quality, Reformed theology is farther off the mark than Lutheran theology. But if we look specifically at the <i>legal declaration</i> and the concept of <i>legal fiction </i>involved in justification, we do find that this aspect of Reformed theology is more similar to the Catholic view than the Lutheran view.</p>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-90780377329214430132023-11-10T16:53:00.003-05:002023-11-10T16:53:49.034-05:00Did Theodoret's Nestorianism lead to denial of the Filioque?<div style="text-align: justify;">The argument for patristic denial of the <i>Filioque</i>, which has never struck me as particularly strong, relies quite heavily on an argument from silence concerning St. Cyril's response to John of Antioch. In particular, it asserts that Theodoret of Cyrus made an accusation against Cyril of disagreement with what Theodoret perceived to be the patristic tradition that the Spirit derived his existence from the Father alone, and that Cyril's <i>lack of response</i> to the charge confirms that he accepted the validity of Theodoret's critique. The use of the argument is summarized nicely by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6CcNU3YcX0" target="_blank">Brian Duong at 29:00 of this video</a>, but I believe that there may be an even worse problem in relying on Theodoret's position: it is based on Theodoret's Nestorian philosophy.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ed Siecienski presents a much-cited account of this argument at p. 49 of <i>The Filioque</i>, so let's use his version. First, let's start with his background on the situation. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Yet in none of these passages, or anywhere in his writings, does Cyril say that the Spirit </i>proceeds (ekporeuesthai) <i>from the Father and the Son. Rather he consistently maintains that the Spirit </i>progresses<i> or </i>flows forth (proienai, procheitai) <i>from the Son, which is something rather different. That Cyril intends to retain an important distinction between the two concepts becomes clear in his exegesis of John 15:26, where he writes:</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>"Jesus calls the Paraclete 'the Spirit of Truth,' that is to say, his consoling Spiriti, and at the same time he says that He proceeds from the Father </i>[para tou patros ekporeuesthai]. <i>Thus as the Spirit is naturally proper to the Son, who exists in Him and progresses through him</i> [di autou proion], <i>yet he is at the same time the Spirit of the Father." </i>[quoting the <i>Commentary on John</i>]</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>This distinction between </i>ekporeuesthai<i> and </i>proienai <i>allows Cyril, like Gregory of Nyssa before him and Maximus after him, to establish both a temporal and eternal relationship between the Son and the Spirit, yet one that does not involve the Son in the Spirit's </i>ekporeusis<i>. In Cyril's theology the Spirit proceeds from the Father </i>[ekporeuetai ek tou Patros] <i>but </i>[from the <i>Commentary on John</i>] <i>"is not a stranger to the essence of the only Son because he progresses naturally from him </i>[proeisi de physikos ex autes]." <i>Even if he never fully explicates the exact nature of this progression, Cyril is clear that the Spirit does not derive his </i>ekporeusis <i>or personal existence from the Son, a fact that becomes apparent in his debate with Theodoret of Cyrus</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">There is actually nothing in Cyril's writings to support this distinction. The same is true of Gregory of Nyssa or Maximus, but Cyril is acknowledged in the scholarship for his interchangeable use of these terms. First, there is Brian Duong's citation of Epistle 55 that uses <i>ekporeusis</i> as a synonym of <i>procheitai.</i> This use is synonymous with how Latins use the term <i>procedere </i>for the Spirit. Moreover, Siencienski's own source on Cyril's pneumatology, <i>The Theology of Cyril of Alexandria</i>, also shows Cyril using <i>ekporeuesthai </i>in the same way as <i>procedere</i>. In interpreting Cyril's use of <i>ekporeutai </i>for the <i>Son</i> in the <i>Commentary on John</i>, Brian Daley in his chapter "The Fullness of the Saving God":</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Cyril seems to be deliberately using the now-canonical terminology for the Spirit's origin to denote the Son's origin, as well, so as to identify both in terms of unity of substance and equality of status within the divine Mystery. In doing so, he shows concern about the negative implications of what would later be called a 'monopatrist' position on the origin of the Spirit: in the terms of the debates in which he was engaged, it could be taken to suggest that the Son and Spirit participate in different degrees in the one saving Mystery of God, which flows from the Father.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>While not being a 'filioquist', then, in the precise sense of the later controversies, Cyril does show a tendency, unusual in the Greek theological tradition, to stress the Son's role, alongside that of the Father, in being genuinely the source of the Holy Spirit. The reason for this role of the Son, Cyril often repeats, is his unity of substance with the Father, a fully divine status which the Son himself received in being begotten. Nor is it helpful to apply to Cyril's thought a distinction often found in Greek theology since Photius: that the Spirit can rightly be said to come 'from the Son' with regard to his mission in sacred history. As we have seen repeatedly here, Cyril avoids and even outright rejects any way of thinking or speaking that might appear to drive a wedge between God's being in itself and God's action in history, through Christ and the Spirit, to create, to save, and to sanctify.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I follow Fr. Thomas Crean in concluding that Daley's assertion here that Cyril is not a "filioquist" is simply wrong. But we don't even need to reach that issue in order to show that Siecienski is mistaken in his assertion about the technical use of <i>ekporeusis</i>. Cyril has been shown to have used <i>ekporeutai</i> in exactly the same way that Latins use <i>procedere</i>: to broadly indicate procession and not as a technical term for the Spirit's mode of procession. Furthermore, he specifically seems to have used the term in this broader way <i>to respond to Nestorian monopatrism</i>. Even if you believe, as Daley and Siecienski do, that Cyril believes in some sort of eternal relation other than a relation of origin between the Son and the Spirit (which I believe to be completely wrong), the point is that Cyril considers the Nestorian denial of this relationship to be at least dangerous if not outright heretical.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But Siecienski, by contrast, seems to think that Cyril is <i>conceding</i> Nestorian monopatrism. Siecienski says the following:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Cyril, in his ninth anathema against Nestorius, had stated that the Spirit was Christ's own Spirit, which led Theodoret to question whether Cyril was advocating the idea that "the Spirit has his subsistence from the Son or through the Son" </i>(ex Yiou e di Yiou ten hyparxis echon). <i>For Theodoret this idea was both "blasphemous and impious ... for we believe the Lord who has said: 'the Spirit of Truth who proceeds from the Father.'" Cyril denied that he held this teaching, leading Theodoret to confirm the orthodoxy of Cyril's trinitarian theology, since the Church had always taught that "the Holy Spirit does not receive existence from or through the Son, but proceeds from the Father and is called the </i>proprium <i>of the Son because of his consubstantiality."</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Siecienski seems to have absolutely no idea what Theodoret is actually saying here, because he doesn't understand Nestorian philosophy, which is evidenced here by the technical term <i>proprium</i>. That philosophy is helpfully summarized in Vasilije Vranic's dissertation "<a href="https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/182/" target="_blank">The Christology of Theodoret of Cyrrhus</a>," which updates Paul Clayton's magisterial work on the same subject. <i>Proprium</i> in Nestorian philosophy is used to establish a distinction between <i>hypostasis</i> and <i>prosopon</i>, as Vranic explains (pp. 94-96):</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>P. Clayton argues that the fact that Theodoret used the term </i>prosopon <i>to indicate distinction in the Holy Trinity does not necessarily mean that he used it as a synonym for </i>hypostasis<i>, but that the Antiochene tradition preferred this term "insofar as it indicates the outward perceptibility of the concrete reality being referred to. In the case of the Trinity's distinctions, this is pointed to in the earlier use of God as 'known' in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." Clayton concluses that "the probable metaphysical assumption" underlying Theodoret's Trinitarian theology is the Stoic doctrine of being. "Inasmuch as </i>prosopon<i> is the outward countenance of a hypostasis, and is thus that by which human sensibility experiences the </i>hypostasis<i>, it would have been easy for this Antiochene to use the former as a term of preference for indicating distinctions within the Godhead."</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Clayton is right to suggest that it would be an error to equate Theodoret's understanding of the term </i>hypostasis<i> with his understanding of the term </i>prosopon<i>. The two are not interchangeable, since, like the Cappadocians before him, Theodoret understood </i>hypostasis<i> to be a set of individuating characteristics belonging to a </i>prosopon<i>. However, Clayton's understanding of Theodoret's use of </i>prosopon<i> to mean "an outward countenance of of a </i>hypostasis<i>" reduces it to a mere mask, which sits very uneasily with how it is used in Chapter 3 </i>[of the <i>Expositio rectae fidei</i>]<i>. There the term </i>hypostasis <i>designates only a part -- the personal characteristics -- of a </i>prosopon<i>. <b>Thus, </b></i><b>hypostasis <i>functions as a </i>pars pro toto <i>for a </i>hypostasis</b>. <i>At the end of chapter 3, Theodoret says that the term "unbegottenness," "begottenness," and "procession" define the </i>hypostasis <i>of each of the persons of the Trinity. Theodoret affirms that each term designates only the property </i>(to idikon) <i>of the person </i>(prosopon). <i>Had Theodoret, in his Trinitarian theology, used the term </i>prosopon<i> for the merely outward expression of a </i>hypostasis<i>, as Clayton argued, it would be hard to see how he could escape a charge of Modalism, i.e., of teaching that the three </i>prosopa <i>in the Godhead are not actually three distinct personal entities but a single divine </i>prosopon<i>, while the differentiation among the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit is a mere outward countenance, a mask. Such a blunder surely would not have escaped the attention of an astute theologian such as Cyril of Alexandria.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Vranic is, it seems to me, correct both in his metaphysical assessment of Theodoret and in his later assessment that the <i>terminology</i> originates from the Cappadocians. In other words, he is correct to say that what Theodoret means by <i>prosopon </i>is not the <i>mere</i> appearance (<i>parsopa</i> in Syriac). But he is demonstrably wrong if he tries to find the "part for whole" (mereological) account of <i>hypostasis</i> in the Cappadocians (pp. 118-19, inaptly citing Prestige and Turcescu concerning the definition of <i>hypostasis</i>). It is clear that the Cappadocian understanding of <i>hypostasis</i> in this sense was <i>purely conceptual</i>, while the reality of the <i>hypostasis</i> and the <i>prosopon</i> were the same thing, which I believe is what Andrew Louth, (who was also cited for his disagreement with Vranic) was actually saying. That real identity between the two is clearly the basis of the subsequent phrase "<i>hypostasis</i> or <i>prosopon</i>" in Greek and Latin theology. There is one reality, viewed as <i>hypostasis</i>, <i>tropos hyparxeos</i>, or <i>prosopon</i> conceptually, but they are not three things or parts in the metaphysical sense, but rather one individual or concrete existence.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The fact that Theodoret has a real distinction between <i>hypostasis</i> and <i>prosopon</i> seems clear enough from the <i>Expositio rectae fidei</i> 3:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>In fact, they say, how - if what begets and what is begotten are differentiated, and what proceeds from that from which it proceeds (for the Father is uncreated, from whom the Son was begotten and the Spirit proceeded) - does the Son and the Spirit are the same as the Father? Because “uncreated”, “generated” and “proceeding” are not expressions of the essence, but rather modes of existence; The modes of existence characterize these expressions. For the manifestation of the essence is indicated by the name "God", since there is a difference between the Father and the Son and the Spirit according to the mode of existence, but they are the same by the definition of the essence. For by this the Father has being uncreated, the Son generatedly, and the Spirit proceedingly, the characteristics arising from the differentiation being visible; on the other the essential being of its substance is indicated, and is implied by the common name of “Divinity.” What I'm saying would be clearer this way. He who reflects upon the existence of Adam, the manner in which he was brought into being, will find that he was not begotten, for he was not born of some other man, but was formed by the divine hand. But the formation shows the mode of existence, since it indicates in what way he was created. In the same way, conversely, the mode of existence characterizes formation, since it is equally evident that it existed when it was formed. If you investigate the essence of him, by which he is united in common with the [men] who [have arisen] from him, you will find that the foundation of him is a man. For as the formation shows the mode of existence, the mode of existence characterizes the formation, and the definition of the essence shows that the foundation is a man, so we will also recognize it in God and Father. For if you inquire into his mode of existence, seeing that he has not been created by anyone else, you will call him “uncreated”; If you consider the name “uncreated”, you will recognize that it expresses the mode of existence. If you also wanted to know the very essence, by which he is united in common with the Son and the Spirit, you will explain it with the name of “God.” As “uncreated” and the mode of existence make each other known, the “God” is an indicator of the essence. For as Adam, although he had no birth, is united in common by the same essence with those who were begotten from him, in the same way no argument will be able to separate the communion, on account of his being uncreated, from the essence of the Father with the Son and the Spirit. Because “uncreated”, “generated” and “proceeding” are not indicators of the essence, but are designations of the substances; distinguishing the Persons and, particularly, showing the substance of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is sufficient for us. For just as we said that the uncreated directly distinguishes the substance of the Father, so, when we hear the designation "begotten" we understand it as a sign of the Son, and on the other hand, by means of the sign "proceeding" we recognize the particular Person of the Spirit. And these things are sufficient to demonstrate that “uncreated,” “generated,” and “proceeding” do not indicate the essence itself, but are distinctions of substances </i>(hypostatic being, hypostaseon einai)<i>, and thereby also indicate the mode of existence </i>(hyparxeos tropon)<i>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Theodoret is associating the <i>hyparxeos tropon</i> within the individual existence, the <i>prosopon</i>, which is "also" indicated by the part (the <i>hypostasis</i> or hypostatic being). But the <i>hypostasis</i> is not the identical reality with the <i>prosopon</i>, as it is in Cappadocian theology. Rather, it is the composition of <i>hypostasis</i> (the individuating mode) with <i>qnoma</i> (the expressed nature) that produces <i>prosopon</i>. While Theodoret is using the terminology of the Cappadocians, the underlying concept seems to come from his predecessor Theodore of Mopsuestia (translated by Fr. Thomas Crean in <i>Vindicating the Filioque</i> at p. 207):</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Spirit Himself bears witness, who proceeds from the Father. For if by the word "proceed" he had understood not a natural procession but some external mission, it would have been uncertain about which of the many spirits who are sent in mission he was speaking, concerning which the apostle Paul says: "Are they not all ministering spirits, who are sent in mission?" But here he notes <b>something proper, from which he can be known to have alone proceeded from the Father</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>[Commentary on John 15:26]</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;">We believe in the Holy Spirit, who is from the substance of God, who is not a Son, who is God by substance, being of the substance of which is God the Father, from whom according to substance he is. "For we have not," he says, "received the spirit of the world but the Spirit who is from God," separating him from all creation and joining Him to God, from whom he is in a proper manner beyond that of all creation; we consider creation to be from God not according to substance but by a creative cause; and we neither consider him a Son, </span><b style="font-style: italic;">nor as taking His being from the Son [oute dia Yiou ten hyparxis eilephos]</b><span style="font-style: italic;">.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;">[<i>Creedal statement attributed to Theodoret around the Council of Ephesus]</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">What Theodore seems to have in mind for "substance" here is the Syriac <i>qnoma</i>, the "real" existence of the nature as expressed, as contrasted with the abstract nature <i>kyana</i>. But he distinguishes this from the existence (<i>hyparxis</i>) of the <i>prosopon</i>, which is taken from the Father alone. So we see here the same composition between <i>hypostasis</i> (the idiomatic mode with its <i>propria</i>) and <i>qnoma</i> to produce <i>prosopon</i>, where the <i>hypostasis/hyparxis/proprium</i> comes from the Father alone. Nonetheless, the Spirit can properly be described as the <i>proprium</i> <i>of</i> the Son on account of the common <i>qnoma</i> from the Father, but not <i>from</i> [<i>ex</i>] the Son, since the Spirit does not receive existence from the Son.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The reason for the ambiguity between Theodoret's interpretation of the Cappadocians and the Cyrillian tradition seems to be what Johannes Zacchuber points out in <i>The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics</i>: concrete existence was barely even a subject of interest in pagan philosophy. As Zacchuber observes of the Cappadocian account, "[i]t also leaves unexplained the relationship between the 'substantial' and the 'accidental' component of the individual" (p. 69). It is that ambiguity that causes Theodoret to posit his own mereological account in which the <i>hypostasis</i> (<i>propria</i>) is a part of the <i>prosopon</i>, which is in turn composed of the <i>hypostasis </i>plus the concretely expressed nature (<i>qnoma</i> in Syriac, rather than <i>parsopa</i>). The <i>hypostasis </i>functions a bit like the property of haecceity in Scotist metaphysics, but it differs in including <i>individuating characteristics</i> (<i>propria</i>), which is unique to the Nestorian metaphysics.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In that respect, I think Vranic's attempt to exonerate Theodoret from the charge of Nestorianism is in vain; there can be no strict identity between <i>hypostasis</i> and <i>prosopon</i> required by Cyrillian Christology as endorsed by Chalcedon. If there is a real distinction, a real non-identity, between the <i>hypostasis </i>and <i>prosopon</i>, Nestorianism is unavoidable. I do believe that this error is <i>philosophical</i> rather than <i>dogmatic</i>, as evidenced by the <a href="https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/common-christological-declaration-between-catholic-church-and-assyrian-church-of-the-east-7988" target="_blank">Common Christological Declaration</a> between the Catholic Church and the Assyrian Church of the East. But the denial of the real identity between <i>hypostasis</i> and <i>prosopon</i> as the concrete existence of both divine and human natures cannot be consistently maintained with orthodox Christology.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Yet this distinction between <i>hypostasis</i> and <i>prosopon</i> is exactly the basis by which Theodoret asserts that "the Holy Spirit does not receive existence from or through the Son, but proceeds from the Father and is called the <i>proprium</i> of the Son because of his consubstantiality." It is not even coherent to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son according to essence (<i>ousia</i>) (as Cyril affirms) but not according to existence unless one accepts this distinction between the <i>qnoma</i> of the <i>prosopon</i> and the <i>hypostasis</i> (<i>hyparxis</i>). It is exactly this distinction that Chalcedonian orthodoxy rejects, so both the anti-filioquist argument and the assertion that Cyril was not a filioquist are based on Nestorian philosophy. For that reason, the rejection of the <i>filioque</i> based on Theodoret requires the implicit adoption of a Christological heresy.</div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-85135817146149118442023-11-08T06:50:00.005-05:002023-11-08T07:04:41.777-05:00What exactly does Pope Francis have in mind?<p style="text-align: justify;">Larry Chapp just wrote an excellent piece on Pope Francis's <i>motu proprio</i> on theologians, titled <i>Ad Theologiam Promovendam</i>. Dr. Chapp's article is titled "<a href="https://www.catholicworldreport.com/2023/11/02/new-papal-document-reads-like-a-conclusion-in-search-of-an-argument/" target="_blank">New papal document read like a conclusion in search of an argument</a>," and it correctly summarizes the sentiment that more or less any Catholic student of the <i>ressourcement</i> and the theology of Pope St. John Paul II would naturally have. But I think there is a more parsimonious explanation for Pope Francis, who himself canonized the Polish Saint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">First, here is Dr. Chapp's position:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>Again, this is a conclusion in search of an argument. And lurking behind it all is the clear desire to utterly dismantle the theological legacy of Pope John Paul II. People of a certain age simply cannot fully appreciate the depth of antipathy that the Catholic Left had for John Paul II. He was their great white whale and they did everything that they could to undermine his papacy. They loathed and hated him. Why? Because he had almost single-handedly put the brakes on their attempt to utterly Protestantize and secularize the Church. They hated Ratzinger/Benedict XVI for the same reasons. And so now we get the Motu proprio which reads like Tucho Fernandez’s revenge on what he probably views as the “anti-Vatican II” reign of terror of the previous two popes.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>At this point my usual popesplaining critics will roll their eyes and say, “There goes hyperventilating Chapp again unfairly attacking the Pope.” But I would ask all of them to ponder a few simple questions.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>Why was this Motu proprio needed at all? What motivated it? What problems in theological method does it really think are out there and in need of remedy? Exactly what kinds of theology is it really disinviting from the table and which kinds of theology is it inviting to the table? You don’t write Motu proprios without good reason. If this document is just a big “nothing burger” in total continuity with previous pontificates, why was it written at all? If there is “nothing new here so everyone can just keep moving along” then what is its point?</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>And if the popesplainers merely repeat the explanations given in the document, then they too will be guilty of an uncharitable and empirically false caricature of the theological achievements of the past 100 years and of the previous two pontificates in particular.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>This is the Pope’s post-Synodal shot across the bow about what he wants to see happen before the next Synod in 2024. It is blunt and brutal in its own quiet, avuncular way. Kind of like the Pope himself. Tastes like honey. Laced with arsenic.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;">But I think the answer is that Dr. Chapp and Pope Francis are talking past each other, and this is because Pope Francis is actually coming from a completely different cultural context. What I believe Pope Francis is trying to do is to share what he considers to be the genius of the specifically Argentinian theological method -- the People's Theology -- with the entire Church. While Cardinal Fernandez himself is very likely more progressive than Pope Francis, their shared commitment is to the uniquely Argentinian approach of the People's Theology. Once this is understood, it is much easier to explain why this is not in any sense about substantive theology, progressive or not, at all, and it makes much more sense of why Pope Francis himself, while he himself rejects no doctrines, nevertheless insists on this populist methodology that involves essentially no doctrinal discipline.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The best summary I have found of Pope Francis's theological background is a remarkable article by Silvana Martinez and Juan Aguero titled "<a href="https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/pdf/doi/10.4324/9780429438813-39" target="_blank">The Pope Francis' philosophy and the social work values</a>." Relevant excerpts for this discussion include the following:</p><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Pope Francis is recognized as a world leader for his values and social compromise. These values are linked to their life simplicity, their capacity for dialogue and ecumenism, their political perspective on social reality, their option for the poor and popular movements, and their deep compromise with the social justice. These values and convictions come from his life philosophy and his theological formation. <b>The ideas of the theologian Juan Carlos Scannone, one of the founders and ideologues of the Liberation Philosophy and Theology and People’s Theology, exerted an enormous influence on Pope Francis</b>. Liberation Philosophy and Theology developed in the 1960s and 1970s and influenced the whole Latin America. <b>They are based on a profound critique of the structures of domination and oppression of the people and on a critique of the Church for its self-referential gaze and for being away from the suffering of the dominated and oppressed</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>People’s Theology is a genuinely Argentine creation derived from the Liberation Theology. It puts the accent on the people conception, <b>on popular culture, on popular knowledge, on people solidarity, and on popular movements</b>. It has connections with <b>the Justicialism’s philosophy, a political movement created in the 1940s by Juan Domingo Perón</b>. The guiding principles of this movement are <b>social justice, political sovereignty, and economic independence</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>People’s Theology differs from the theology of liberation by taking as central categories not only the people but also the popular culture, moving away from the Marxist conception of popular vanguard that leads the praxis of liberation. For Juan Carlos Scannone (1978), the category "town" is historical-cultural. It is a symbol category that designates all those who share a historical liberation project. It is a cultural category because it aims at the creation, defense, and liberation of a cultural ethos or human style of life. It is a historical category because only historically can be determined in each particular situation, who and to what extent can we truly say people. It is a symbol category for its summoning and significant wealth. This conception of the town of Scannone is also shared by Lucio Gera (1974).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>For these authors, liberation exists in historical and specific cultural molds of the different peoples. Every project of liberation is concretized in the sociopolitical and must bear in mind the history and idiosyncrasy of each town. The theology of the people is totally different at this point not only from the theology of liberation but also from the Marxist conception of socioeconomic class identified with the proletariat or the peasantry.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Pope Francis’ thinking has a strong link with the social work values. His social vision condensed in the ideas of Earth, Roof, and Work expresses the great values supported by social work such as social justice, democracy, human rights, citizenship, sustainable development, wealth distribution, solidarity, freedom, emancipation, among others. The International Federation of Social Workers and International Association of Schools of Social Work (IASSW) included these values in the current Global Statement of Social Work Ethical Principles. This statement was approved in 2018. We next refer to some of these principles. One of them is the <b>recognition of the inherent dignity of the human being</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Another principle is <b>the promotion of the human rights</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>There is also the social work principle of <b>promotion of the social justice</b>.... Social justice implies above all the <b>equitable access of all men to resources</b> and fundamentally <b>the just distribution of wealth</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Another ethical principle supported by the Global Social Work is t<b>he right to self-determination that every human being and every people has</b>.... International Social Work also has an ethical principle <b>the right to participate in decision-making</b> when it affects a social group.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Finally, the principle of <b>the holistic view of the human being as a multidimensional and historical being</b>. Social workers recognize the biological, psychological, social, and spiritual dimensions of people’s lives and understand and treat all people as whole persons.... Faith in God in the thought of Pope Francis is a faith embodied in history and in the nature with which every human being is constituted.</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>Pope Francis and the Church</u></div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Based on the justicialist approach that Francis has in mind, the number one concern he would have is the notion of power being lorded over the people, especially those already suffering under structures of domination and oppression. His view of the Church is not one without doctrine, in the sense of doctrinal truth, but one in which there are no doctrinal enforcers. One can think of this approach as almost Socratic: the student of theology must be allowed to come to the realization himself. But in this case, it is a collective populist approach in which dialogue around the common good will, if domination is excluded, result in agreement around what is good. It is not that there is not any inclination toward sin, but that this populist approach is inherently incompatible with the selfishness that is the root of sin.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Thus, if there is success in forming the Church as a justicialist society, a "town" writ large, then the principle of supernatural charity will naturally flourish. And it is this concept that Francis has in mind for the synodal Church, where each level of Church jurisdiction functions as the "town" and even the Church as a whole follows the pattern. The faith and doctrinal truth in this case serves as a supernatural analogue to nationalism in the justicialist system: a principle of loyalty around which the collective populist action is built, one that is not enforced but rather reinforced by the populist focus on the common good. In some ways, this concept of faith as <i>allegiance</i> is actually more Biblical; see Matthew Bates, <i>Salvation by Allegiance Alone</i>. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">For Francis, then, the purpose of church discipline is solely to prevent this selfishness that leads to domination, not itself to serve as "church discipline" over doctrinal matters, which he himself sees as oppressive. Rather, the role of the leader is to advocate for the essential role of the people, especially the poor and oppressed, in the political process, which is precisely why such leaders are beloved. I say this the following in complete seriousness: it is worth listening to "<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KD_1Z8iUDho" target="_blank">Don't Cry for Me, Argentina</a>" from <i>Evita</i> to get a sense of this connection between the people and their political leaders. An idealized version of <i>peronista</i> politics built on servant leadership, a kind of supernatural Argentina, seems to be the Pope's vision for the synodal Church. Moreover, I believe that this is his understanding of why the Holy Spirit chose a South American, and specifically Argentinian, Pope at the present time and why Pope Francis has in turn selected Cardinal Fernandez as his most preferred adviser.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It seems clear to me that he puts this political vision of the Church far above any specific doctrinal priorities, since his belief is that in such a populist structure, discipline is an outmoded strategy of domination. His attacks on traditionalism are existential; he see traditionalists as a separatist elite that prevents true populism, and he sees bishops who encourage them as operating contrary to the populist unity. It is not an attack on the Latin Mass itself, then, but the elitism and separatism that prevents them from fellowship with other Catholics, and this approach is consistent with the one he has taken with respect to the Syro-Malabar Rite concerning liturgical schisms. He believes that discipline should only be used in defense of his populist vision of unity without separation, which he sees as threatened by traditionalists particularly but also conservatives to a lesser extent by their emphasis on authority and discipline, especially in curial positions. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The conservatives, for their part, seem to be openly challenging Pope Francis <i>in order to provoke a confrontation</i>, one that they seem to believe will show him that some level of discipline and authority will be required. It is axiomatic, at least for those of a more European sensibility, that discipline is a necessary feature of the episcopate. But Francis seems particularly keen not to take the bait, even for those as hostile as Archbishop Vigano, because he wants to show that he will let anyone speak who is not actually exerting power over anyone. It is this openness to everyone, even those with whom he disagrees, that distinctly characterizes his populist vision. The liberals and conservatives are all allowed to have a voice, so long as they do not cultivate separation, exclusion, or elitism.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In my opinion, it is this deeply Argentinian vision of the Church based on the People's Theology that is alien to the European culture of the Church at large. This vision is confused with that of the Western Left, especially given the remote origins of the People's Theology in Marxist liberation theology, but the politics are purely Argentinian. The Pope is a <i>peronista</i>, not a leftist, and his vision of populism is not anything like the class revolution of Marxism. Indeed, it has much in common with the populism of Pope St. John Paul II, which I suspect is why Pope Francis canonized him. (One might note that the Polish Pope was himself criticized for his failure to discipline doctrinal dissent.) It is based on a concrete unity and solidarity, exemplified by the "town," in which all work for the good of everyone. If we consider Pope Francis's view of the "town" in this sense in terms of John Paul II's own use of subsidiarity and solidarity, it might be easier to see the continuity, even though the Peronist political system is not at all familiar to that of Western democracies.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In any case, it is my sense that people are missing something important about Pope Francis in simply lumping him in with European leftists or progressives. I hope that this explanation will help to understand both his <i>intolerance </i>for liturgical separatism and curial authoritarianism but his <i>tolerance</i> for dissenting views of both the progressive and conservative stripes.</div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-53531823102354592472023-10-28T11:22:00.003-04:002023-10-28T11:22:45.306-04:00What infallibility actually means for Catholics<div style="text-align: justify;">The non-technical use of the term "infallibility" in the sense of "when someone cannot err" seems to have become ubiquitous, but when interpreting historical documents like <i>Pastor Aeternus</i> on papal infallibility, it is essential to use the technical term. The technical term refers to situations when we are <i>guaranteed by faith</i> to know that doctrines are true based on the assurance of the God who neither deceives nor is deceived. The term "infallibility" is used to invoke the property of God as revealer who neither deceives nor is deceived; it is a formal assertion that the particular mode of teaching partakes of this assurance.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />"Infallibility" in the non-technical sense is a synonym for "incapable of error." But if that is confused with the technical sense of "infallibility," the reasoning from the concept will be fallacious. Formally, inability to err is a <i>consequence</i> of infallibility in the technical sense. Thus, if <i>P</i> is "is infallible" and <i>Q</i> is "cannot possibly err," then <i>P</i>-><i>Q</i>. But if one were to reason from the lack of infallibility (<i>~P</i>) to infer that one could possibly err (<i>~Q</i>), this would be the fallacy of denying the antecedent. Only in the case that infallibility is used definitionally as "cannot err," so that <i>P=Q</i> (<i>P⇄Q</i>), would this conclusion be logically entailed.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />That is the unfortunate reason that, following <i>Pastor Aeternus</i>, there has been a frequent assertion that only what is infallible is certain not to err. But this is definitely not the case; on the contrary, that assertion has been the most common avenue of dissent in the modern era of the Church by both progressives and traditionalists. Even before the First Vatican Council, Bl. Pio Nono warned against this tendency by the German bishops in his letter <i>Tuas Libenter</i>:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>We address to the members of this Congress well-merited praise, because, rejecting, as We expected they would, this false distinction between the philosopher and the philosophy of which We have spoken in earlier letters, they have recognized and accepted that <b>all Catholics are obliged in conscience in their writings to obey the dogmatic decrees of the Catholic Church, which is infallible</b>. In giving them the praise which is their due for confessing a truth which flows necessarily from the obligation of the Catholic faith, <b>We love to think that they have not intended to restrict this obligation of obedience, which is strictly binding on Catholic professors and writers, solely to the points defined by the infallible judgment of the Church as dogmas of faith which all men must believe</b>. And We are persuaded that they have not intended to declare that this perfect adhesion to revealed truths, which they have recognized to be absolutely necessary to the true progress of science and the refutation of error, could be theirs <b>if faith and obedience were only accorded to dogmas expressly defined by the Church</b>. Even when it is only a question of the submission owed to divine faith, <b>this cannot be limited merely to points defined by the express decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, or of the Roman Pontiffs and of this Apostolic See; this submission must also be extended to all that has been handed down as divinely revealed by the ordinary teaching authority of the entire Church spread over the whole world, and which, for this reason, Catholic theologians, with a universal and constant consent, regard as being of the faith</b>. But, since it is a question of the submission obliging in conscience all those Catholic who are engaged in that study of the speculative sciences so as to procure for the Church new advantages by their writings, the members of the Congress must recognize that <b>it is not sufficient for Catholic savants to accept and respect the dogmas of the Church which We have been speaking about: they must, besides, submit themselves, whether to doctrinal decisions stemming from pontifical congregations, or to points of doctrine which, with common and constant consent, are held in the Church as truths and as theological conclusions so certain that opposing opinions, though they may not be dubbed heretical, nonetheless, merit some other form of theological censure</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is that last category "held in the Church as truths and as theological conclusions so certain that opposing opinions, though they may not be dubbed heretical, nonetheless, merit some other form of theological censure" in which Cardinal Franzelin finds "infallible security," which entails theological certainty that adherence to the opposite proposition will not err. In that case, because submission (obedience) is required of the indefectible universal Church, such submission cannot entail something objectively displeasing to God, such as heresy or other theological error. So both Bl. Pope Pius IX and Cardinal Franzelin, the two minds most clearly behind the declaration of papal infallibility, affirm three following categories that require either the submission of faith or the submission of obedience:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(1) Express decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, or of the Roman Pontiffs and of this Apostolic See, which are infallible (extraordinary Magisterium, infallibly true, submission of faith)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(2) All that has been handed down as divinely revealed by the ordinary teaching authority of the entire Church spread over the whole world, and which, for this reason, Catholic theologians, with a universal and constant consent, regard as being of the faith (ordinary and universal Magisterium, infallibly true, submission of faith).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(3) Doctrines that "are held in the Church as truths and theological conclusions so certain that opposing opinions, though they may not be dubbed heretical, nonetheless, merit some other form of theological censure" (authentic papal Magisterium or "universal ecclesial providence for the security of doctrine," infallibly safe, submission of obedience)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">These correspond to three authoritative modes of exercise of the papal authority:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(1) The Pope can manifest the intention to definitively teach a doctrine <i>ex cathedra</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(2) The Pope can manifest the intention to ratify the ordinary and universal Magisterium without teaching definitively.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">(3) The Pope can manifest in a binding way through discipline that a truth or theological conclusion is so certain that it would be censurable to oppose it. (This also applies to liturgical discipline generally, such as canonization of Saints.)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">What I like about Franzelin is that he restricts the term "religious submission" to what is required by obedience, as Bl. Pius IX does, rather than expanding it to the more general sense of reverence to bishops, which he correctly calls "respect." Unfortunately, Vatican II was not nearly so careful, calling the respect due to bishops "religious submission," which is true only in a much broader sense. Vatican II refers to the religious submission owed under (3) as religious submission "in a special way," but it would have been much clearer just to say that the "special way" just is religious submission and that what is owed to bishops is simply pious respect of superiors, not obedience in this strict sense. This sort of pious respect for the teaching of the Magisterium <i>outside of</i> obedience in the strict sense is what is described in <i>Donum Veritatis</i>. The use of the term "religious submission" to include these two very distinct concepts of obedience is similar to how the term "ordinary Magisterium" was used to encompass two completely different things: the ordinary exercise of authority of individual bishops (including the Pope) and the ordinary and universal Magisterium, the latter of which is an infallible mode of teaching by the bishops dispersed throughout the world in communion with the Pope. In a similar way, the ambiguity in these terms has led to a great deal of confusion regarding Magisterial authority.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">If the Pope manifests none of the intentions in (1)-(3), such as when he renders advice or guidance on a particular subject or prudential matter, then he teaches only as an individual bishop. That is owed pious respect on account of the office but does not require the obedience to doctrine (religious submission properly speaking) commanded under (3), nor does it carry the associated infallible security. For example, Franzelin believed that Pope Honorius did not manifest any binding intent of (1)-(3) in his letters to Sergius, nor did Pope Paul V when he commanded silence on the subject of grace (this would presumably be the case of Vigilius's reversals as well). Franzelin also believed that Honorius's letters were not heretical, but in any case, his letters were the subject neither of infallibility nor or infallible security, since he did not authoritatively command or forbid adherence to any particular doctrine (other than Chalcedon, of course, which was already infallibly binding).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Because applying inerrancy <i>only</i> to infallible teaching has essentially been the preferred path for dissent in the last two hundred years, it is important to turn back to the guidance of Bl. Pio Nono and Cardinal Franzelin. We should not allow their work in <i>Pastor Aeternus</i> to be misused so as to <i>deny</i> the certain theological truth that there is no possibility of error in matters of universal ecclesial providence that demand obedience to the papal office.</div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-79817399843951565152023-10-27T09:03:00.001-04:002024-02-14T06:26:34.326-05:00The infallible security of papal non-definitive teaching<div style="text-align: justify;">The doctrine of the <i>indefectibility</i> <i>of the Church</i> on which the infallibility of the Magisterium is based is poorly understood. The Church's indefectibility is also referred to as <i>passive infallibility</i>, which is that the Church as a whole cannot fail to remain in the faith <i>precisely due to the obedience of the faithful to the Magisterium</i>. In that regard, the infallibility of the Magisterium is not an additional gift on top of the authority of the Magisterium itself; it is an essential organic operation of the Mystical Body of Christ. The indefectibility of the Church is also not a separate source of infallibility distinct from the authority of the Magisterium but rather a protection conferred just by obedience.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">One can think of the Magisterium as performing a similar function to the immune system in the human body. If it fails, there is no way in principle for the body to protect it from disease (heresy, in this analogy). If there were the analogical equivalent of an "autoimmune disease," the immune system turning on the body, there would be no way in principle for the body to protect itself. Just as the immune system's failure would mean a failure in the means by which the body preserves its life, so a failure in the operation of the Magisterium would be a failure in the means by which the Church preserves Her indefectibility. This is why the term "see of pestilence" is aptly used to describe how a failure of papal function would appear.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div>This does not mean that the living Magisterium somehow needs to be constantly functioning in this capacity, but it does need to be constantly <i>able</i> to function for the indefectibility of the Church to persist in the Mystical Body of Christ. Thus, in the case of a papal <i>interregnum</i>, the Church will in due course select a Pope through appropriate means and offer Her peaceful acceptance to his reign, which is itself docility to the office. During this time, the process of papal selection it itself the operation of the indefectibility of the Church, and it is this activity that is the sign of the ongoing Magisterial principle at work, even though there might even be competing claims of antipopes during this process. Perhaps the most dramatic example of such a process to reach peaceful acceptance was the Great Western Schism, which lasted nearly forty years. The aftermath of the Council of Constance, which ended up resolving the matter, shows that the function the Church exercises here is not the Magisterial power itself, only the investment of someone with the power to exercise papal authority.</div><div><br /></div></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This principled view of indefectibility -- that the passive infallibility of the Church always corresponds to infallibility of the Magisterium in its proper function -- can be contrasted with the unprincipled view of William of Ockham, which resulted from his nominalist philosophy. Ockham believed that the indefectibility of the Church was completely accidental to individuals, corresponding to the circumstance of at least one believing Christian in the world holding the true faith by whatever circumstance. He did not believe that the indefectibility of the Church operated by the principle of obedience to the Magisterium (passive infallibility). This unprincipled and nominalist view of indefectibility is the sole basis for the so-called "recognize and resist" approach, which is a philosophical error that, while never (at least to my knowledge) having been explicitly condemned by the Church is still a theological error. That is an implicit denial of the doctrine of the Church's indefectibility, albeit not an explicit one.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Fortunately, we have a test case for the true doctrine of the Church on this point, as there was "a certain candidate for a doctoral degree of theology at the Rhine college in Utrecht" who ran afoul of the Catholic scholar Johann Baptist Cardinal Franzelin, S.J., who is possibly the most authoritative scholar of this history of the Magisterium. The Utrecht candidate made two errors on the indefectibility of the Church: (1) the obedience of the faithful was only required by definitive infallible Magisterial teaching, and (2) the obedience of the faithful was itself a separate source of infallible teaching. Franzelin convincingly rebuts both falsehoods, and the important aspect for our purposes is that he affirms that obedience is required not only for definitive teaching but also for non-definitive teaching. I have included below both of the relevant excerpts from Franzelin's <i>On Divine Tradition</i> (1875) and from an earlier version of his work in the Dublin Review.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Franzelin notes that "the formal cause by which [the bishops] are constituted as the Teaching Church to which has been promised Christ's guardianship and the assistance of the Spirit of truth in teaching, is the visible head of the Church set up by Christ, and the union and agreement of the members with that head." From a philosophical perspective, then, the living Pope himself is the formal cause and principle of the active infallibility that preserves the indefectibility of the Church. It is simply not possible for the Pope or the bishops in communion with him collectively to teach a defection from the faith. Franzelin outlines this intimate connection between the passive infallibility of the faithful and the active infallibility of the Magisterium as follows:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Meanwhile it is certain that Suarez and a great many doctors that acknowledge a consensus of Catholics of this sort, although they do not see infallibility in it, just the same they judge that it so gravely suffices for </i>the security<i> of doctrine as well as for the argument of </i>truth<i> that it would not be lawful to oppose it without a note of temerity, and I say all these doctors held our principle, whereby we assert an infallible authority is not required to oblige a </i>religious assent<i> (that is distinct from the assent of faith immediately or by the medium of the divine) in theological matters, rather "a supreme authority in a human mode," since it is one thing to judge that the authority does not err in a proposed doctrine, and another for the authority to be infallible.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is this religious assent to the "supreme authority in the human mode" that involves a theologically certain judgment that the authority does not err in a proposed doctrine, even though the authority is not infallible in the sense of trust in the God who neither deceives nor is deceived. Rather, it is based on the certain consequence of the divine promise that St. Peter will confirm the brethren and that the gates of Hell will not prevail against his Church. In the generic sense of not committing error, both of these forms of certainty connote "infallibility," in the sense that the proposed doctrine cannot err in some or another respect. But that term is typically reserved for certainty based on the assent of faith to the divine property itself, so that the definitively proposed belief is <i>infallibly true</i>. With respect to religious assent, the certainty is only that the proposed direction is <i>infallibly safe</i>. By "infallibly safe," we mean that obedience to the direction will necessarily not involve denial of doctrine (infallible security of doctrine).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Thus Franzelin says:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Holy Apostolic See, to which the divinely constituted custody of the deposit was consigned, as well as the office and duty of feeding the universal Church for the salvation of souls, can prescribe theological decrees, or insofar as they are bound with theological matters, when they must be followed or to forbid that something be followed, not especially from the intention of infallibly deciding a truth with a definitive judgment, but rather, apart from necessity either simply or for certain circumstances </i>to provide for the security<i> of Catholic doctrine. Although in declarations of this kind there might not be </i>an infallible truth<i> of doctrine because hypothetically there is not an intention of deciding this matter; nevertheless, it is </i>infallible security.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Franzelin quotes the doctors of the Church concerning obedience as follows: "Whatsoever in turn man in place of God commands, <i>so long as it might be certain to not displease God</i>, is to be obeyed as if God commanded it." The certainty of infallible security is then exactly this: certainty not to displease God. One may be certainly secure that nothing commanding religious assent (in the sense Franzelin uses it) will ever be something that would displease God. Franzelin writes "I mean, both objective of the doctrine declared (absolute or relative), and subjective in so far as it is safe for all to embrace it, and <b>unsafe and incompatible with the submission due to the divinely-constituted magisterium to reject it</b>." It is important to note that this is both <i>objective</i> and <i>subjective</i> safety, although, strictly speaking, only subjective safety is required by the dogma of indefectibility in itself, construed as passive infallibility.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div>Franzelin's position that <i>obsequium religiosum</i> is required for non-definitive teaching is reflected likewise in <i>Lumen Gentium </i>25:</div><div><br /></div><span style="text-align: left;"><div style="text-align: justify;"><i style="font-style: italic;">Among the principal duties of bishops the preaching of the Gospel occupies an eminent place. For bishops are preachers of the faith, who lead new disciples to Christ, and they are authentic teachers, that is, teachers endowed with the authority of Christ, who preach to the people committed to them the faith they must believe and put into practice, and by the light of the Holy Spirit illustrate that faith. They bring forth from the treasury of Revelation new things and old, making it bear fruit and vigilantly warding off any errors that threaten their flock. Bishops, teaching in communion with the Roman Pontiff, are to be respected by all as witnesses to divine and Catholic truth. In matters of faith and morals, the bishops speak in the name of Christ and the faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with a religious assent. This religious submission of mind and will must be shown in a special way to the authentic magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not speaking </i>ex cathedra<i style="font-style: italic;">; that is, it must be shown in such a way that his supreme magisterium is acknowledged with reverence, the judgments made by him are sincerely adhered to, according to his manifest mind and will. His mind and will in the matter may be known either from the character of the documents, from his frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or from his manner of speaking.</i></div></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Although Franzelin's position on infallible authority is not explicitly dogmatized here, as noted previously, it would certainly be philosophical error to understand religious assent in any other way. If we understand this teaching in the context of the indefectibility of the Church, the conclusion is unavoidable. Moreover, the "special way" of showing submission "in such a way that his supreme magisterium is acknowledged with reverence" clearly maps to the "supreme authority in the human mode" that Franzelin describes, and this mode is what Franzelin describes with the term religious submission. If the papal Magisterium were not infallibly safe, it could not command religious assent in a way that would not implicitly violate the indefectibility of the Church. It would be only the accidental indefectibility of Ockham, not the essential and principled indefectibility conferred by the divine promise.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Some mistakenly assert that the religious submission given to the Pope's non-definitive teaching is identical to the religious submission given to bishops, since the same term is used. This ignores the reference to the supremacy of the papacy in this regard. It is entirely legitimate to question whether individual bishops are teaching in unity with the Pope, which Franzelin points out as follows: "For the same reason, since the authority of a Bishop is not supreme, even in regard to its proper object, the supreme Magisterium of the Holy See is always at hand where a suspicion rightly arises against the doctrine of one or even of many Bishops." Our religious submission to the supreme authority in the human mode, <i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., the papal Magisterium, is of a different kind than submission to individual bishops outside of their unity with the Pope. The lesser submission owed to individual bishops is subject to the supreme authority of the Pope; the greater submission owed to the Pope cannot be subject to any higher obligation.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">There are at least two distinct ways for the Pope to non-definitively teach doctrine: (A) the exercise of what Franzelin calls the "universal ecclesial providence" and (B) offering a theological opinion as a private theologian (even in a public document). (A) commands obedience to the papal Magisterium in the "special way" of <i>Lumen Gentium</i>; as Franzelin puts it, "the authority is so sacred by the force of the supreme and universal Magisterium, that, although it is not granted the status of <i>ex cathedra</i> for defining doctrine to be held by the Universal Church, but for prescribing <i>from a definition of this kind</i> some doctrine which is or is not to be followed, <i>obedience</i> is due." In contrast, (B) only requires adherence to teachings with religious submission in the sense of prudent deference to the religious authority of the office. (Unlike <i>Lumen Gentium</i>, Franzelin reserves "religious submission" only to case (A) requiring obedience, even though case (B) can also be considered religious submission in a broader sense.) The degree of deference required to the Pope as a private theologian in case (B) is the subject of the more recent document <i>Donum Veritatis</i>, which deals with the obligations of speculative theologians but which fairly can apply to criticism of papal theological opinions even by other bishops.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is case (B) that Franzelin has in mind with the case of Honorius:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>So also there may be and there are public Pontifical documents, in which certain matters connected with faith or morals are the subject of warning, recommendation, or blame, or whose purpose is to forbid the spread of any opinion or error, but whose scope is not to proclaim a definitive sentence binding the whole Church, and which, for that reason, are not pronouncements ex cathedra. "For the Pontiffs often reply to the private questions of this or that bishop, by explaining their own opinion on the matters set forth, not by passing a sentence by which they will the faithful to be bound in believing" (Melch. Canus, 1. vi., c. 8, ad. 7). To this category are justly referred, for instance, the two letters of Honorius I. to Sergius of Constantinople.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It might appear at first glance that Franzelin is lumping every non-definitive statement into either Magisterial or private opinion. But this is not the case; Franzelin is only pointing out that statements that the Pope does not specifically will to bind the faithful cannot possibly be considered <i>ex cathedra</i>. He does not say that only <i>ex cathedra</i> statements are binding to religious assent, which would contradict his later thesis against the Utrecht candidate, and he does not say that private opinions bind people to religious submission in any sense. It suffices to say that what Honorius says was never intended to be binding on the faithful, so the question of infallible safety is irrelevant in this case.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Franzelin thus establishes a threefold structure of papal Magisterial authority:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>1. <u>Extraordinary Papal Magisterium</u>: Ex cathedra teaching, which is both definitive and binding.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>2. <u>Non-definitive Magisterial teaching</u></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(A) <u>Authoritative Papal Magisterium ("authentic" magisterium in the proper sense)</u>: Universal ecclesial providence exercising the supreme Magisterium in the human mode, "theological decrees, or insofar as they are bound with theological matters, when they must be followed or to forbid that something be followed, not especially from the intention of infallibly deciding a truth with a definitive judgment, but rather, apart from necessity either simply or for certain circumstances to provide for the security of Catholic doctrine," requiring religious submission of the intellect and will in a special way, infallibly safe to obey.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(B) <u>Non-authoritative Papal Magisterium</u>: Private opinion expressed in public documents on "certain matters connected with faith or morals are the subject of warning, recommendation, or blame, or whose purpose is to forbid the spread of any opinion or error, but whose scope is not to proclaim a definitive sentence binding the whole Church," requiring "religious submission" only in the sense of deference to authority akin to the deference to individual bishops. This is teaching given publicly in office, but not exercising the authority of that office to require adherence to specific teaching. [N.B., enjoining silence falls into this category because it does not require adherence to anything; "</i><i>[Universal ecclesial providence] is not argued about those decrees, wherein nothing other than silence was enjoined (as, for example, we know Paul V did concerning the doctrine on the assistance of divine grace)." But other disciplinary decrees that implicitly require adherence to teaching do fall in this category.]</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The easiest way to understand what connects (2)(A) to (1) and distinguishes each of them from (2)(B) is the exercise of the authority to bind and loose. (2)(B) does not bind the conscience, although it does require prudent deference to the advice given. If there is no authoritative statement that something must be followed or forbidding that something can be followed, even in the absence of a definitive statement on the point, then whatever opinion is given remains non-authoritative. This distinguishes, for example, the <i>Tomus</i> of St. Leo to Flavian, which was clearly intended to state the doctrine that binds the Christian faithful, from the letters of Honorius, which offered statements of opinion rather than binding theological conclusions.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In that respect, the argument made by Jeremy Holmes and John Joy in <i>Disputed Questions on Papal Infallibility</i> that it is possible for the Pope to exert less than his full Magisterial authority is certainly correct. Holmes notes that "[s]ometimes the father only interposes his paternal office slightly, and the child knows that a slight reason would be enough to justify transgressing his father's request." In case (2)(B), the Pope teaches in public office, but without the authority of the supreme Magisterium, as a private theologian and bishop, which is exactly this case. But Joy errs when he denies that the Pope can exercise his supreme Magisterial authority "in the human mode," less than <i>ex cathedra</i> but nonetheless commanding obedience with theological certain infallible security. Thus Joy maintains "the pope, when he exercises his non-infallible teaching authority, as he typically does in encyclical letters, apostolic exhortations, letters to bishops, etc., <b>does not speak therein with the full authority of the Church (as he does when he speaks <i>ex cathedra</i>), but rather with his own authority as the pope</b>." This was the error of the Utrecht candidate that denies religious submission and infallible security for such teachings, and Franzelin has explained in detail why that position is erroneous. Joy's argument turns on a fallacy, and I will now respond to that argument directly.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>Responding to a traditionalist argument</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It turns out that the view of the Utrecht candidate that religious submission (and the concomitant lack of error) applies only to infallible teaching has made a comeback among traditionalists, despite Franzelin's rebuttal. John Joy, in responding to Franzelin's view of infallible security, makes the inexplicable claim that "[Franzelin] failed to consider the possibility of authoritative papal teaching that would be in conflict with the previous teaching of the Church" (<i>Disputed Questions on Papal Infallibility</i>, p. 21). On the contrary, he rejected it explicitly as a contradiction of the indefectibility of the Church! But Joy's fallacious argument has been adopted relatively widely, so it is important to understand why Joy's response is inadequate. Here, I will consider a version of that argument <a href="https://erickybarra.wordpress.com/2022/09/11/the-strict-conditions-for-papal-infallibility-yield-2-options-recognize-resist-or-safely-adhere-to-papal-errors/">adopted by my friend Erick Ybarra</a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><i>Allow me to state clearly what I think needs to be said in the order of logical sequence:<br /><br />(1) The limiting conditions of the Pope’s infallibility means that not all of his magisterial/teaching acts are infallible.<br />(2) Not being infallible is equivalent to being fallible. [Joy: "For what is not infallible is fallible; and what is fallible is able to fail."]<br />(3) The result of (1) and (2) is that the majority of the Pope’s magisterial teaching is delivered in a fallible mode.</i><div><i>(4) A fallible teaching mode leaves the possibility of teaching errors<br />(5) If the Pope teaches in a fallible teaching mode, then it is possible for the Pope to err in his magisterium<br />(6) In consideration of (4) and (5), it is possible that the faithful of the Church will be faced with a Pope who attempts to teach an erroneous doctrine from his teaching office.</i></div><div><i>(7) There are only two likely consequences (for there are many that we could speculate upon) that would yield from the sequence of thought in (1) to (6):<br />(8) Either it is lawful for the faithful to recognize the Pope’s office (and its limitations) and to also resist assenting to the erroneous doctrine coming from his fallible magisterium<br />(9) Or it is not lawful to do so, and the faithful are obliged to always give the assent of mind and will (religious assent), at least, to anything the Pope teaches that is manifest from his magisterial office, even when this means the faithful will be obliged to give assent to erroneous doctrine that contradicts the gospel and divine revelation.</i></div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Premise (2) is the fallacy of denying the antecedent (P->Q does not imply ~P->~Q). As Franzelin correctly observes, "<span style="text-align: justify;">it is one thing to judge that the authority does not err in a proposed doctrine, and another for the authority to be infallible." What differs in the two cases is the certainty that we have concerning the lack of error. In the case of the extraordinary Magisterium, we have <i>the assent of faith</i> (either divine or ecclesial) that the proposed doctrine is <i>infallibly true</i>. In the case of universal ecclesial providence, we are <i>theologically certain</i> that the doctrine is <i>infallibly safe</i>, that is, that is certain not to displease God. People who deny the latter are bad philosophers, even censurable as temerarious, but not heretics. Lastly, in the case of private opinion that is not made binding by the supreme Magisterium in any sense, we owe only prudent deference. It is the failure to distinguish the second category from the third that is the mistake resulting from the fallacious premise (2). </span>The fallacious premise results in an equivocation between religious submission to bishops <i>simpliciter</i> and religious submission to the supreme papal Magisterium in a special way, even though this distinction is made explicitly in <i>Lumen Gentium</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As I mentioned, I think that people who deny infallible safety in the objective sense are at worst temerarious and not heretical. Since this is the reason for denying the teaching of <i>Lumen Gentium</i> pertaining to the "special way," I likewise do not think that this is a denial of the doctrine of <i>Lumen Gentium</i>, although I do believe that it results in an incorrect interpretation of that document. But there is something disturbing in the new adoption of the Utrecht candidate's argument that only infallible teachings demand religious obedience, an argument that Franzelin took painstaking steps to refute in his later publication of <i>On Divine Tradition</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>Excerpts from Franzelin's writings</u></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div><div><u>Franzelin, Johann Baptist, S.J., <i>On Divine Tradition </i>(1875; trans. Ryan Grant, 2016)</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>Thesis XII: The Consensus of the Faithful, Scholion I, Principium VII, pp. 179 <i>et seq</i>. (non-italicized text is original emphasis; <b>bold</b> is my own)</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Holy Apostolic See, to which the divinely constituted custody of the deposit was consigned, as well as the office and duty of feeding the universal Church for the salvation of souls, can prescribe theological decrees, or insofar as they are bound with theological matters, when they must be followed or to forbid that something be followed, not especially from the intention of infallibly deciding a truth with a definitive judgment, but rather, apart from necessity either simply or for certain circumstances </i>to provide for the security<i> of Catholic doctrine. Although in declarations of this kind there might not be </i>an infallible truth<i> of doctrine because hypothetically there is not an intention of deciding this matter; nevertheless, it is </i>infallible security. <i><b>I say security, both the objective of declared doctrine (either simply or for such certain circumstances), and subjective insofar as it is safe for all to embrace it; it cannot happen that they would refuse to embrace it, because it is not safe and not without a violation of due submission toward the divinely constituted Magisterium</b>. <b>Someone that would deny this distinction within a final and definitive teaching of the Pope speaking </b></i><b>ex cathedra <i>as well as among those doctrinal provisions and prohibitions, let him be compelled to have all edicts of the Holy See pertaining to doctrine in whatever way and in one and the same appraisal of </i>definitions ex cathedra<i>, which is indeed from ecclesiastical history, from the practice of the Holy See, and especially from the most studious declaration </i>of a definition ex cathedra</b><i><b> promulgated by the Vatican Council, and he will manifestly be shown to be wrong</b>. On the other hand, the distinction between </i>infallible truth <i>and between </i>security of doctrine<i> must be dutifully observed, in so much as they must be understood according to that which was placed </i>in principle<i>, which are spoken of in the corollaries that have been drawn out. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>[*N.B., Franzelin writes in a footnote about "a certain candidate for a doctoral degree of theology at the Rhine college in Utrecht," whose dissertation ends up being the foil for Franzelin's argument.]</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollarium 1. The authority of the Magisterium established by Christ in the Church, as far as the matter we are taking up, ought to be considered two-fold: a) just as in individual acts it is under the assistance of the Holy Spirit for an infallible definition of truth, or as it is the </i>authority of infallibility; <i>b) if in terms of the extent, just as the Magisterium does the same thing with the authority to shepherd that was divinely consigned to it, still its whole focus (if one may speak this way) is ultimately not in defining a truth, but insofar as it will have seemed necessary or opportune and sufficient to the security of doctrine, which we can perhaps call </i>the authority of universal ecclesiastical providence<i>, or </i>doctrinal providence<i>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollarium 2. </i>The authority of infallibility <i>can not be communicated by the Pope to others as though to his ministers and those working in his name. Therefore, when a </i>definition of infallibility<i> might be said to be "promulgated" through some holy Roman congregation, this mode of speaking is not proper, as a Congregation, in this hypothesis, merely exists in the mode of consulting; defining on the other hand is for the Pontiff alone. <b>They ought, therefore, to indicate those proofs by which we already said it is necessary to render the intention of the Pope </b></i><b>to define ex cathedra </b><i><b>manifest</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The authority of universal ecclesiastical providence<i>, as we called it above, is not indeed independent but </i>dependent upon the Pontiff<i>; it is communicable and by the Pontiff himself it is communicated to a greater or lesser extent among certain congregations of Cardinals. For that reason, even the decisions of the most holy Congregations may rightly be called and by ecclesiastical use are customarily called </i>decreta sanctae Sedis<i>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>It is clear from the aforesaid, that every </i>definition ex cathedra<i> is at any rate, a definition </i>of the Holy See<i> insofar as by the whole focus of the supreme Magisterium, the agent, "defines a doctrine on faith or morals to be held by the universal Church"; nevertheless, not every decree </i>of the Holy See<i>, even if it pertains to doctrine, is a </i>definition ex cathedra; <i>lastly a </i>definition ex cathedra<i>, which is only of the pope insofar as the divine assistance was promised </i>to him<i> in Blessed Peter, can never be called in its own and genuine sense a decision of a Pontifical Congregation</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollarium 3. <b>It is false, that the authority on account of which one owes the assent of the intellect is only the authority of God the revealer or the Church, or the Pope defining infallibly, since there are many other degrees of religious assent</b>. At present, it must be distinguished between the assent </i>of faith properly and immediately divine<i> on account of the authority of God the revealer, and the assent of faith which we spoke of above that is </i>by the medium of the divine<i>, on account of the authority of infallibly defining a doctrine as true but not as revealed; <b>then the religious assent due on account of the authority of universal ecclesiastical providence in the sense which we have a little early in the exposition of the </b></i><b>principle</b><i>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Evidently, this assent does not treat on that, which we call </i>religious<i>, on doctrine to be held by the force of a decree as </i>infallibly true<i> or to be rejected as </i>infallibly false<i> or to be noted or to be through another censure </i>of infallible authority <i><b>for this would be against the hypothesis</b>. Just the same, the authority is so sacred by the force of the supreme and universal Magisterium, that, although it is not granted the status of </i>ex cathedra for defining <i>doctrine to be held by the Universal Church, but <b>for prescribing from a </b></i><b>definition of this kind <i>some doctrine which is or is not to be followed, </i>obedience <i>is due</i></b>. <i>Our adversaries [quoting the Utrecht candidate] do not deny this </i>obedience<i> is indeed due, but they restrict it merely to the omission of external acts, and consequently, even to </i>reverential silence<i> "lest one who might teach some doctrine, nay more that he may write on some matter or offer his judgment"; but by no means except </i>through an ex cathedra definition <i>can an "observance of mind </i>(obsequium mentis)<i> such that one someone would lay aside his opinion and embrace the contrary with so firm a certitude that he would profess to adhere to it with an oath," be demanded. Yet, whenever a Sacred Congregation where a </i>definition ex cathedra <i>does not yet exist, demands an </i>obsequium mentis<i> of this sort, as in the case of Gallileo, "the Holy Congregation of the Inquisition exceeded the limits of its power." We, on the other hand, believe that in judgments of this sort, even published short </i>of a definition ex cathedra<i>, </i>obedience<i> is demanded and must be furnished, which includes an </i>obsequium of the mind<i>, but certainly that it would be </i>infallibly <i>judged that a doctrine were true or false (to the extent that our adversary seems to have understood our opinion). <b>Rather that it will be judged that a doctrine contained in such a judgment is </b></i><b>secure<i>, and for us this is certainly not </i>from the motive of divine faith<i> (or account of God the revealer or the Church </i>teaching infallibly<i>), but </i>from the motive of sacred authority, <i>whose office is without a doubt to provide for the soundness and security of doctrine, to be embraced with the </i>obsequium mentis</b><i><b> and to reject what is contrary</b>. This is not argued about those decrees, wherein nothing other than silence was enjoined (as, for example, we know Paul V did concerning the doctrine on the assistance of divine grace), but the discussion is on the responses and the decrees, in which some doctrine is ordered to be followed or not to be followed. Therefore, this is proposed to those to which it pertains, not only to be silent but in that sense, in which it is declared, must be taught and defended, and for that reason the obsequium of the mind is included; if not then you would suspect perhaps that hypocrisy and feigning were commanded. Next, since, in theological doctrine its own </i>place<i> and even its own characteristic reasoning, on account of which the assent demanded, is not </i>internally observed, <i>rather, the authority proposing truth, that </i>sacred universal authority of doctrinal providence <i>by the force of its office is the most sufficient motive from which a pious will can and ought command a religious or theological consensus of understanding. I reckon that our opinion rests upon very grave arguments.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>[Corollarium 3, Section (d)(</i>𝛾<i>), p. 196]</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Now, because our opponent asserts that Suarez teaches that such a consensus of Catholics is infallible, it will be worthwhile to describe his doctrine. On the </i>infallibility of church in belief<i>, Suarez teaches three things [De Fide, disp. V, sect. 6]. Firstly, that the Church cannot defect through heresy; secondly it cannot err through ignorance, "in these matters which it believes, as it were, are certain </i>de fide<i>"; thirdly, in these matters which it believes are not, as it were, </i>de fide, <i>but so much that the contrary opinion would merit some censure, it must be held that it does not err, nevertheless on infallibility in all these matters in which a doctrine attains more nearly or remotely to faith, it will be more or less certain that the Church does not err on those points. Concerning what seems to us to be the authority of a consensus of theologians, we will speak more of later on in Thesis XVII. <b>Meanwhile it is certain that Suarez and a great many doctors that acknowledge a consensus of Catholics of this sort, although they do not see infallibility in it, just the same they judge that it so gravely suffices for </b></i><b>the security<i> of doctrine as well as for the argument of </i>truth<i> that it would not be lawful to oppose it without a note of temerity, and I say all these doctors held our principle, whereby we assert an infallible authority is not required to oblige a </i>religious assent</b><i><b> (that is distinct from the assent of faith immediately or by the medium of the divine) in theological matters, rather "a supreme authority in a human mode," since it is one thing to judge that the authority does not err in a proposed doctrine, and another for the authority to be infallible</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>[p. 211]</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollarium 4. The authority </i>of universal ecclesiastical and doctrinal providence<i>, in itself resides firstly in the sole shepherd of the whole Church and in no other individual person. Nevertheless, just as it is said to each Bishop, "feed the flock of God, which is among you," so without a doubt, the authority if </i>particular providence<i> is adequate for the flock subordinated to it in regard to the yoke of sound doctrine, in subordination and in union with the supreme and universal shepherd, the Roman Ponitff. It happens, by necessity of this</i> subordination and unity in doctrine<i>, that the head should merely be reduced to preaching and safeguarding doctrine whether by an explicit definition or a consensus of the Church, or even through the decisions of </i>universal providence <i>that have already been proposed, but not for deciding controversial questions on his own between Catholics. <b>For the same reason, since the authority of a Bishop is not supreme, even in regard to its proper object, the supreme Magisterium of the Holy See is always at hand where a suspicion rightly arises against the doctrine of one or even of many Bishops</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>On the contrary, </i>in the internal forum<i>, as well as the </i>sacred authority<i> in the order for the direction of the spiritual life (by the force of the sacred office established by Christ, since a solely scientific authority is not suitable </i>in its own mode<i> for the director of souls), to the point that the faithful, in doubtful matters that touch upon conscience, could at some time (when other, safe roads are not clear), be held </i>to conform their own practical judgment to the authority of the ministers of God. <i>Without a doubt Jesus Christ, the head, disposes and rules the whole Church and its individual parts in the internal and external life, but not without his visible vicars, through all ranks from the high even to the low, so that the principle of authority and spiritual obedience should pervade the whole body and all the members by different degrees, by forms and modes.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Generally, the evangelical counsel of obedience not only of the will, but also of the intellect, proves most profitably that the infallibility of teaching </i>is not a necessary condition<i> to furnish subjection and obedience of the intellect.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Rather, from the common doctrine of the Saints, such as Suarez among many, and St. Alphonsus describe in summary: "someone under obedience that doubts, whether the matter commanded is lawful or not, </i>is held to lay aside doubt<i>, and thus, can and </i>ought<i> to obey." Sts. Bernard, Bonaventure, Ignatius, Bl. Humbert the Dominican, Dionysius the Carthusian and others teach in one consensus: "Whatsoever in turn man in place of God commands, </i><b>so long as it might be certain to not displease God,</b> <i>is to be obeyed as if God commanded it." Still, every one of these would be altogether false unless one under obedience were held to subject the intellect to an authority in doubtful matters of this sort, not even in speculative opinion but </i>in practical judgment<i> on the honesty of his actions, although this would not be </i>infallible<i> either speculatively or practically. Therefore, this is the doctrine of the saints, which St. Alphonsus calls </i>common and certain<i>, if it is true, then it is false that </i>one could<i> or </i>never ought<i> to subject the intellect to a superior authority unless it is infallible.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>Franzelin, Johann Baptist, S.J., “Tractatus de Divina Traditione et Scriptura.” The Dublin Review. Vol. XVII. July, 1871. pp.258-268.</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><u><br /></u></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><u>F. FRANZELIN ON THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT OF INFALLIBILITY</u></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>WHAT has been so far discussed concerning the magisterial and ministerial means for preserving Tradition, seems to demand a more distinct statement of principles at least, concerning the Subject and Object of the power of infallibly teaching and judging. The full exposition and demonstration, however, of this most important point belongs to its own proper Treatise on the Church and the Roman Pontiff.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Principle I.—Indefectibility in the truth of that Faith which is one in Catholicity, or infallibility in believing has been, by God, promised to and conferred upon the Universal Church, which is "the house of God, the pillar and ground of the truth" (1 Tim. iii. 15), " built upon a rock, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt. xvi. 18). Whatever, therefore, the universal Church believes as of faith, that by Christ's promise and ordaining is evidently infallibly true. Of this infallibility in believing, which is commonly called passive, the Subject is the universal Church herself.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Church is kept in the unfailing truth of one Faith by the Holy Ghost by means of an authentic ministerial and magisterial power, though the Pastors and Doctors whom Christ has given for the building up of the body of Christ (Eph. iv. 11, 12), to teach the Church of God with authority; to which was to be due from all the faithful, as corresponding effect, consent and "obedience of faith." Wherefore to this magisterium instituted, by Himself, Christ promised and upon it He conferred infallibility in teaching all that He himself and the Holy Ghost had taught.*</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>* Because the magisterium, furnished with this charisma of infallibility, by its ministerial action guards, proposes, develops, and protects revealed doctrine, and keeps all the faithful in unity of faith: hence infallibility in teaching is commonly called active, and has for its end indefectibility in believing, which through the " obedience of faith " is the passive infallibility of the whole body of the Church.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Subject then of this infallibility in teaching are all and only those, to whom has been entrusted by God the right and office of teaching with authority the Church Universal.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(a) Thus the Teaching Church.—that is the body of Pastors and Doctors in union, agreement, and subordination towards the visible head of the Church,—is infallible : and that in her universal and consentient preaching of doctrine on faith or morals; in her solemn judgments or definitions of the same doctrine. For to the Teaching Church so constituted has been said : "All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth: go ye therefore and teach all nations; baptizing them .... teaching them to keep all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and behold l am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world" (Matt, xxviii. 18, seq.). "And I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, to abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth. .... He will teach you all things, and will suggest to you all things whatsoever I have told you (a ilirov iftiv[Greek])" (John xiv. 16, 26).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><b>These promises do not appertain to the individual successors of the Apostles, because individually they do not succeed the Apostles in the office of teaching with authority the whole Church ; an office which in the Apostles (excepting only Peter, head of the Church, who was always to continue in his successors) was not ordinary, but extraordinary and personal to themselves: but the promises were made to the body of the Apostolic succession in common, in so far as they are the Teaching Church. But they are not the Teaching Church, except in so far as they remain united, consentient, and subordinated towards the visible head of the whole Church.</b></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Wherefore <b>the efficient cause of the infallibility of the teaching Church, whether in its universal preaching or in its solemn definitions and judgments, is without doubt the promised assistance of the Spirit of truth</b>; but the condition without which the successors of the Apostles are not the Teaching Church, and <b>the formal cause by which they are constituted as the Teaching Church to which has been promised Christ's guardianship and the assistance of the Spirit of truth in teaching, is the visible head of the Church set up by Christ, and the union and agreement of the members with that head ; just as the form of the unity of the visible Church in general is the Church's visible head itself</b>. Hence it is that the ordinary office of infallibly teaching,— that is, the office instituted in the case of the Apostles to be passed on to their Successors,—was explained by Christ our Lord in words which were addressed, never to the individuals, but always to the entire College in union with Peter.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(b.) <b>For the opposite reason, the words of Christ by which the primacy and infallibility of magisterium included in the primacy is promised and granted to Peter, designate him alone not only as expressly distinct from the rest, but also in relation to the rest as who should confirm and shepherd them</b>. "Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jona and I say to thee, thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt, xvi.). "Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not, and do thou turn and (tjriorpti/iac[Greek]) confirm thy brethren" (Luke xxii.). "Jesus says to Simon Peter: Simon, son of John, lovest thou me more than these? He says to him: Feed my lambs feed my sheep" (John xxi.).*</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Thus Peter, as ordinary endowment for himself and for each of his Successors, received from Christ the power and office of feeding and teaching the Universal Church in faith and morals, in such sort that this very power, conferred in the person of Peter upon each of his Successors, demands by divine institution the obedience of faith and consent of the whole Church; and that hence <b>the infallibility of the whole Church in believing cannot stand, except in so far as upon the head of the Church, successor of Peter, together with such right of exacting consent of faith, there has been simultaneously conferred infallibility in teaching</b>; when (that is) he proposes a doctrine on faith or morals, with such a definitive sentence as binds the whole Church to consent. <b>The Subject then of infallibility is Peter's Successor himself; through the divine assistance which has been promised to him per se, as teacher of the Church, and not on condition of the concurrent judgment or consent of the other pastors and doctors who, compared with the Pontiff so teaching the Church, are the most noble part of the Church so built upon this rock that the gates of hell may not prevail against it, are brethren to be confirmed, sheep to be shepherded</b>; although, compared with the faithful they continue pastors and doctors, to propose to the faithful, to teach and to defend with authority the defined doctrine itself.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>"It is a revealed dogma of faith that the Roman Pontiff when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when in discharge of his office as Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, he defines, in virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, is endowed, by the divine assistance promised him in Blessed Peter, with that infallibility with which our Divine Redeemer willed that the Church should be furnished in defining doctrine of faith or morals; and, therefore, that such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves and not in virtue of the consent of the Church " ("Definition of Vatican Council," Constit. I., de Eccl. Christi, cap. 4).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary A.—There is not a twofold adequately distinct Subject of the infallibility promised by Christ to definitions of doctrine on faith or morals; but [the Subject of infallibility] is both the visible head of the Church regarded per se; and the same visible head taken as ordering and informing the body of the teaching Church, which, thus constituted, is itself infallible by the assistance of the Spirit of truth. This inadequate distinction in the Subject of infallibility is pointed out in the Vatican definition itself just before cited.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary B.—Whatever is to be believed with Catholic faith or is to be held with theological certainty, on the objective extent of infallibility [ec extensione quoad objectum] vested in the Church defining or in a general Council, the same, in the same way, is to be believed and held on the infallibility vested in the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra. This is the very point defined by the Vatican Council.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary C.—The antecedent consent of the Church may indeed be the objective means by which the Pontiff arrives at the knowledge of the definability of a doctrine: but it is not of itself and from the nature of the case the sole and necessary means of knowing; for doctrines on faith or morals may be recognized as definable from other sources and by other means as well, and questions hitherto doubtful and controverted even within the borders of the Church may be defined. And by no means is such consent of the Church or Bishops, whether antecedent, concomitant, or subsequent, necessary by way of authentic judgment concurring with the judgment or definition of the Pontiff. The Gallican opinion requiring this consent of the Church as necessary to the infallibility of the Pontiff's definitions,—in such sort that the sole Subject of infallibility should be the body of the teaching Church, namely the Pope with the bishops,—is now a heresy directly and explicitly condemned by the Vatican Council. The subsequent consent of the whole Church, however, is always the effect of the Pontiff's definition.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary D.—According to the declaration of the Vatican Council itself, the Pontiff is said to speak ex cathedra " when in discharge of his office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians he defines, in virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the universal Church." For the Apostolic Chair is nothing else than the supreme authentic magisterium, whose definitive doctrinal sentence binds the universal Church to consent. This intention of defining doctrine, or of teaching with definitive sentence and with authority obliging consent of the universal Church, should be made plain and cognizable by clear signs. No settled form however, to be necessarily used by the Pontiff in making known this his will, is essential. For although there be certain solemn forms which of themselves express a speaking ex cathedra, and which accordingly the Pontiff uses only when speaking ex cathedra,—such as, for example, dogmatic Bulls,—yet this form is not so essential and exclusive, that without it the Pontiff cannot, as Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, define doctrine on faith or morals to be held by the whole Church, condemn in the same way errors opposed to it, and make plain his will to that effect.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary E.—In the documents themselves of Councils and Pontiffs in which it is without doubt proposed to publish definitions of doctrine, there may be, and usually are, contained many things which it is not intended to define: obiter dicta which are usually enunciated indirectly; mostly, also, the arguments brought to prove the definitive sentence itself, &c. Although these things are of weighty authority, yet they are not infallible definitions.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>So also there may be and <b>there are public Pontifical documents, in which certain matters connected with faith or morals are the subject of warning, recommendation, or blame, or whose purpose is to forbid the spread of any opinion or error, but whose scope is not to proclaim a definitive sentence binding the whole Church, and which, for that reason, are not pronouncements ex cathedra</b>. "For the Pontiffs often <b>reply to the private questions of this or that bishop</b>, by explaining their own opinion on the matters set forth, <b>not by passing a sentence by which they will the faithful to be bound in believing</b>" (Melch. Canus, 1. vi., c. 8, ad. 7). <b>To this category are justly referred, for instance, the two letters of Honorius I. to Sergius of Constantinople</b>.*( In the Tract, de Incarnat. we have spoken of the (by no means heretical) sense of these letters.) That doubt may arise as to whether certain Pontifical documents contain a pronouncement ex cathedra and definition of doctrine, we do not deny: but the same thing occurs sometimes in respect of Conciliar documents also; a fact of which we have an example in the diverse opinions which have existed and still exist in some quarters on the Instructions for the Armenians published in the Council of Florence, on the point whether the teaching therein contained, especially on the matter and form of the Sacraments, is to be considered dogmatic or merely as practical instruction. <b>Whenever such doubts occur, theologians properly warn us "that in discriminating these matters the judgment of wise men, and (more especially) the sense and consent of the Church, is of much force"</b> (Tanner de Fide, q. 4, dub. 6, n. 262).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>This will be sufficient for our scope on the Subject of infallibility. Our present treatise is more particularly concerned with the doctrine on the Object of infallibility.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Principle II.—The Deposit of the Christian Faith, strictly understood, embraces all and only those things, which have been explicitly or implicitly revealed to the human race by God to be believed, done, or followed ; in other words, which have been made known by Catholic revelation (as distinct from private divine revelations) for the eternal salvation of mankind.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary A.—In the Deposit of the Faith are contained theoretical doctrines (and among these also truths which, in so far as they are cognizable by reason, are commonly said to appertain to natural religion)—practical laws (and among these also the natural law written in the hearts of men as reasonable beings), as also certain perpetual and fundamental institutions, such as the Church, its power, its form of government, &c. In other words, these are contained in the Deposit), revealed and supernatural dogmatics, ethics, politics.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary B.—Only truths revealed by God, when duly proposed may and ought to be believed with divine faith; because faith is assent on account of the authority of God revealing.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary C.—In the Deposit of Faith may be objectively contained truths, not yet duly proposed, so that all should be bound to believe them as revealed with divine faith.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Principle III.—With truths revealed and duly proposed are connected and related many things, without which those revealed truths themselves either could not, or could not so well, in all their fulness, be guarded, developed, and defended; although these [connected truths] are either not themselves revealed, or are not yet duly proposed to be believed with divine faith.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Such are many theoretical and practical truths in that triple order, dogmatic, moral, and (so to speak) constitutive, which we have pointed out; as truths theologically certain, e.g., on the procession of the Holy Ghost by way of love in connexion with the mystery of the Blessed Trinity; on the sanctification of the humanity of Christ by the created gifts also, on its [enjoyment of ] the Beatific Vision from the first moment of its existence, in connexion with the mystery of the Incarnation, &c.: then again certain circumstances bound up with revealed truths, when these are to be practically applied, e.g., if there is question of the genuine sense of texts in such and such books, in so far as they are agreeable or opposed to the Deposit of Faith; facts again of themselves historical, e.g., the legitimate celebration of a particular Council, &c.; furthermore, certain special dispositions of divine providence pertaining to the better estate and government of the universal Church, e.g., if there is question of the opportuneness or moral necessity of political independence and temporal dominion in the case of the Supreme Pontiff, in order to the [good] government of the Church, &c.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary A.—The Deposit of Faith is violated; not only by direct denial of revealed truths and by heresy, but may also be attacked, and in the mind of the faithful exposed to dangers, by errors contrary to truths, not in themselves revealed, yet connected with revealed truths, and consequently theological or religious.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary B—Although the Deposit of Faith strictly understood comprises revealed truth only, nevertheless the deposit to be guarded in its entirety, with all its outworks and modes of application, is of wider extent: "O Timothy, keep the Deposit, avoiding profane novelties of words" (1 Tim. vi. 20).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Principle IV.—<b>The authority (infallible under the promised assistance of the Holy Ghost) of that authority to which Christ has entrusted the office of infallibly keeping the Deposit, and of guarding it against threatening errors, appertains in the first place to guarding, setting forth, and developing the truths which, in the strict sense, make up the Deposit itself of the Faith; that is to say, revealed truths: and by consequence, to warding off errors directly opposed to them,—in other words, to condemning heresies. This is the fundamental revealed dogma of the Catholic faith; and hence its denial is not a heresy only, but the very root of all heresies.</b></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Herein it is contained and hence it immediately follows, that the infallibility promised for guardianship of the Deposit reaches to the whole extent of the Deposit to be guarded; that is, to truths even in themselves not revealed, in so far as they are in contact with revealed truths, and are needed to the custody, proposition, development, and defence of the latter. This extension of infallibility, by consent of all theologians, is a truth so certain in theology that its denial would be most grave error, or even, according to many, heresy : although up to the present time it has not been explicitly condemned as heresy. (Vide Card, de Lugo de Fide, disp. xx., n. 106, 114; Baiiez, 2, 2, q. 11, a. 2, concl. 2 ; Suarez de Fide, disp. v., sect. 6, n. 4, 5, 8 ; sect. 8, n. 4.)</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary A.—Not only revealed truths, but also truths connected with revealed, in so far as the connexion extends, may be infallibly defined by the infallible magisterium; and similarly, not only heresies may be condemned, but minor censures may be pronounced with infallible authority under the assistance of the Holy Ghost. Because therefore a doctrine is not defined as in itself revealed; or because errors are not one by one condemned with the note of heresy, but are proscribed with no particular censure or with minor censures, or with several censures in globo; for these causes, taken by themselves, it cannot be affirmed without grave error that a definition is not infallible, or is not a pronouncement ex cathedra.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary B.—No Catholic may deny that [the quality of] infallible definitions [belongs to] the dogmatic Constitutions of the Council of Constance ag. inst the articles of Wycliffe and John Hus, confirmed by Martin V.; of Leo X. against Luther (" Exsurge"); of Clement XI. against the Jansenists (" Unigenitus "), &c., in which propositions are condemned under different censures in globo; as also the Constitution of Pius VI. against (the synod of) Pistoja (" Auctorem Fidei"), in which a very large number of propositions are severally proscribed under minor censures. And this Corollary, which is certain on other grounds also, in turn demonstrates the truth of the Principle laid down, because without it the present Corollary itself could not stand.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary C.—A quality which is defined to belong to a proposition, infallibly belongs to it in the sense and way intended in the definition. Hence those who are of opinion, for instance, that a proposition is said to be temerarious which is asserted against strong reasons and weighty authority without due foundation, also affirm that it is this quality, and not per se the falsehood of the proposition, which is defined in the censure of temerity. This same thing, —viz. that the definition does not touch the falsehood of the proposition, but some other quality worthy of condemnation,—they more especially affirm in the case of censures, by which propositions are branded as scandalous, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears. (Vide Card, de Lugo de Fide, disp. xx., n. 114 ; Canum, 1. xii., c. 11, ad finem.) And at all events, when the Council of Vienne considered that an opinion (that about the infusion of grace and the virtues in the case of infants) was to be chosen as the more probable" this per se is not a definition of the truth (of the opinion), but only of its greater probability. (Cf. de Lugo, 1. c. n. 115-129.)</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary D.—<b>The Infallibility of the Church and of the Roman Pontiff is believed with divine faith, on the authority of God revealing; an opinion proposed by the infallible definition of the Church or the Pontiff as true but not as revealed, is believed on the revealed authority of the proponent. Whence we may call mediately divine that faith, which some call ecclesiastical</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Principle V.—If the Church is infallible in guarding the Deposit of Faith at least in the strict sense, and therefore in declaring the true sense of revealed dogmas,—she is, by this very fact, infallible in judging of the true sense, the import and extent (intensione et extensione), of her own authority and infallibility; or, which comes to the same thing, in judging of the conditions and objects on which authority belongs to her by divine right and on which the assistance of the Spirit of truth has been promised her. For this authority and infallibility is undoubtedly a revealed dogma.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary.—It involves a contradiction, to admit the infallibility of the Church in revealed dogmas, and at the same time to deny the authority of a definition admitted actually to exist, on the ground that the point defined is not a dogma of the Faith.*</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>* In order that I may not seem, in a plain matter, to be fighting against shadows, here is a proof of this contradiction, openly published in our own day by schismatical priests (presbyteris sectariis). "The conditions therefore required for the judgment of the Pope to be certainly infallible are two: 1st, that the judgment turns upon matter revealed; 2nd, that it be accompanied by the consent of the Episcopate. Failing this second condition, it is not certain that the judgment is infallible; failing the first, it is certain that it is not infallible However unanimous (which they are not) the Pope and the bishops might be in deciding that the Church has need at this time of the temporal power of the Pope, and in declaring excommunicate all who think otherwise, this decision, as coming not from the teachers of the Church and the custodians of revealed truth but from private doctors, would have no authority to bind consciences.''—Mediatore, August 9,1862.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Principle VI.—As it is certain from the principles of revelation itself, as they are understood and proclaimed by the Church, that truth appertains to her infallible magisterium, and errors are subject to her infallible judgment, for no other end than the custody of the Deposit of the Christian religion, and its protection and advancement among the faithful;—so is it equally certain that in most sciences, as they are, and ought to be, cultivated by mankind on principles purely natural and from sources non-revealed, in philosophy especially, theoretical and practical, in history, geology, ethnography, &c. there are found truths, which are likewise revealed or are connected with revealed truths. The reason is, because revelation contains not only superrational truths, but many cognizable by reason also and from natural sources; in other words, because revelation and natural sciences have in many points a common object-matter. Equally is it evident, that in these sciences, not indeed by right use of reason, but by its abuse and through ignorance, hypotheses may be laid down as principles, and conclusions may be deduced, opposed, directly or indirectly, to truths of revelation, rational or superrational; and consequently (since truth cannot contradict truth) containing errors cognizable and capable of condemnation on revealed principles.*</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(* "As theology (sacra doctrina) is founded on the light of faith, so is philosophy on the natural light of reason. Whence it is impossible that the truths of philosophy should be contrary to the truths of faith And whatever in the sayings of philosophers is found contrary to the Faith, that does not belong to philosophy, but is rather an abuse of philosophy arising from defect of reason."—S. Thom. in Boeth. Trin. Proleg., q. 2, a. 3.)</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Church's magisterium therefore teaches truths of this sort, and may infallibly judge of errors of this sort, not by teaching human sciences on their principles, but by judging of them on hers.* Wherefore the infallible Church never judges, and in virtue of her promised infallibility the Holy Ghost can never even permit her to pass a definitive judgment, on truths or errors, except in order to the custody of the Deposit and in virtue of her divinely-imposed office of guarding the Deposit.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(*"The proper knowledge of this science (theology) is that which comes from revelation, and not that which comes from natural (objective) reason. And hence it does not appertain to it to prove the principles of the other sciences, but only to judge of theln. For whatever in other sciences is found to contradict truths of this science, is wholly condemned as false."—S. Thom,, i. q. 1, a 6, ad 2.)</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary A.—Although philosophy and the other natural sciences rest on their own proper principles, which are known or so far as they are known, not from revelation and the authentic magisterium of the Church, but by reason and from natural sources ;—nevertheless the magisterium of the Church can, and indeed ought, from revealed principles, point out for avoidance errors opposed to the integrity and safety of the Deposit to be guarded. Catholic scientific men, therefore, should keep this standard before their eyes. Reason prescribes this course, lest they fall into error; faith prescribes it, lest they fall into error contrary to the truths thereof.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary B..—Those who profess themselves Catholics and consequently acknowledge the authentic magisterium of the Church, and yet affirm that philosophy, in the mode explained, is not subject to this norm, that the progress of science is impeded by the same, that the Church should let philosophy correct her own mistakes (Syllab. Pontif., propp. x., xi., xii., xiv.),— such men demand liberty to embrace error by an abuse of philosophy, and deny the Church's right and duty of providing for the integrity and soundness of the doctrine of faith.—Vide Con. Vatic. Constit. de Fide, cap. 4, can. 2.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Principle VII.—<b>The Holy Apostolic See, which has had committed to it the custody of the Deposit, the power of shepherding the universal Church for the salvation of souls, may prescribe theological opinions or opinions bearing on theology as to be followed, or proscribe them as to be avoided, not solely with the intention of infallibly deciding the truth by definitive sentence, but also without such intention; from the need and with the intention of looking to the security, absolute or relative, of Catholic doctrine. In such declarations, although there is no infallible truth of the doctrine, because by the supposition there is no intention of deciding such truth; yet there is infallibly security :* security, I mean, both objective of the doctrine declared (absolute or relative), and subjective in so far as it is safe for all to embrace it, and unsafe and incompatible with the submission due to the divinely-constituted magisterium to reject it</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(* <b>That these two things, infallible truth and infallible security, do not coincide, is clear even from the fact that otherwise no probable or more probable doctrine could be called sound and secure.)</b></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary A.—The authority of the magisterium instituted by Christ in the Church is to be regarded, in the present matter, from a twofold point of view :—a, as in individual acts it is aided by the Holy Ghost to define the truth infallibly,—in other words, as it is the infallible authority; , as the same magisterium acts ; with the pastoral authority indeed divinely entrusted to it, but not with all its intensity (if we may say so), nor as defining the truth in the last resort, but so far as shall have seemed needful or opportune and sufficient for security of doctrine; and the magisterium in this point of view we may perhaps call the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary B.—The authority of infallibility cannot be communicated by the Pontiff to others, as his ministers acting in his name. If at any time, therefore, an infallible definition is published by any sacred Congregation at Rome, the Congregation itself merely performs the function of consultor and ministerial promulgator, while the Pontiff alone defines. Here then must be found those tokens which, we have said above, make clear the Pope's intention.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The authority of universal ecclesiastical provision, as we have termed it, not indeed independently but in dependence upon the Pontiff, is communicable, and is by the Pope himself communicated with greater or lesser extension, to certain sacred Congregations of Cardinals.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary C.—<b>It is a mistake (to suppose) that the only authority to which intellectual assent is due, is that of divine revelation or of an infallible definition of the Church or the Pope. There are manifold degrees of religious assent. For our present purpose [it is sufficient to ] distinguish assent of faith properly and immediately divine, on the authority of God revealing ; assent of faith which we called above mediately divine on the authority of him who infallibly defines a doctrine as true, but not as revealed; religious assent, on the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision in the sense explained</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>This very doctrine has been clearly set forth by the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX., in his letter of December 21st, 1863, to the Archbishop of Munich, beginning, "Tuas libenter accepimus." "<b>We wish to believe that [those who attended the literary Congress at Munich] were not desirous of restricting the undoubted obligation of Catholic teachers and writers to those points only which are proposed by the infallible judgment of the Church as dogmas of faith to be believed by all</b> . . . . For, even though the question concerned that submission which is to be yielded in an act of divine faith, yet that would not have to be confined to points defined by express decrees of Ecumenical Councils or of Roman Pontiffs and this Apostolic See, but to be extended to those things also which are handed down as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed throughout the world, and are accordingly held to appertain to the faith by the universal and consistent consent of Catholic theologians. <b>But since the question concerns that submission by which all Catholics are bound in conscience who apply themselves to the speculative sciences with a view to conferring new benefits on the Church by their writings, hence the members of the same Congress should recognize that it is not enough for learned Catholics to receive and revere the aforesaid dogmas, but that they must also submit themselves to the doctrinal decisions put forth by Pontifical Congregations, and to those heads of doctrine held by common and consistent consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions so certain that opinions opposed to those heads of doctrines, though they cannot be called heretical, yet deserve some other theological censure</b>."</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><b>Further, although the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision (as we have called it, resides primarily and directly in no individual except the pastor of the whole Church, yet a particular [power of] provision, subordinated to the Chief Pastor, belongs to each bishop in his own diocese</b>. Nay, in foro interno, and in order to the direction of the spiritual life, it belongs in a way to the directors of souls. And this example (as in general the evangelical counsel of obedience, not only of the will but also of the intellect) is perhaps the easiest way of explaining, how infallibility in him who gives a command is not a necessary condition [for the propriety] of intellectual submission and obedience.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Corollary D.—<b>The infallible authority and supreme magisterium of the Pontiff defining, had never anything whatever to do with the case of Galileo Galilei, and with the Abjuration of opinions enjoined him. For not only did not even a shadow of a Pontifical definition enter into that case, but in the whole of that decree of the Cardinals of the Holy Office, and in the form of Abjuration, the name even of the Pontiff is never found expressed</b>. The documents may be read in full in "John Baptist Riccioli Almagist," Nov., p. 11, 1. ix., sect. 4, c. 40, p. 496, seqq. Nevertheless, in the then state of the question, the matter not having been yet cleared up, since the truth of the astronomical system, at that date by no means proved, supplied no foundation for interpreting the passages of Scripture in any other than the obvious sense, and since the most learned men of that time in physics and astronomy, as Tycho Brahe, Alexander Tasso, Christopher Scheiner, Antonio Delfino, Justus Lipsius (vide Riccioli, 1. c. p. 495), judged Galileo's opinion contrary to Scripture, it was certainly the business of the authority of ecclesiastical provision to take care that the interpretation of Scripture was not injured by conjectures and hypotheses, which seemed by no means likely to most people at the time. No examination of doctrine was instituted preparatory to its definition for the universal Church, for no one thought of such a thing; but a criminal process was held in the year 1633, in which, under these circumstances, no other judgment could be come to, than that which is contained in the final sentence of the judges. "<b>In order that your serious and harmful error and transgression* may not remain altogether unpunished, and that you yourself may become more cautious for the future and be an example to others to abstain from such faults, we decree that the book of the Dialogues of Galileo Galilei be forbidden by public edict, and yourself we condemn to the common (formalem) prison of this Holy Office for a period to be fixed at our will; and as a wholesome penance we command that for the next three years you recite once in the week the seven penitential psalms; reserving to ourselves the power of moderating, changing, or taking away, wholly or in part, the aforesaid pains and penalties." **</b>—Vide "Revue des Sciences Ecclesiastiques," 2C serie, t. iii., pp. 105 seqq. 217 seqq.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(* Galileo had broken the command enjoined him in 1616, which he had promised to obey, to the effect that " for the future <b>he should not be allowed to defend the aforesaid false opinion, or teach it any way by word or writing</b>." —Vide "Riccioli," 1. c. p. 498.)</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(** This is not the place to speak of the falsehoods by which, long after the affair was finished and after Galileo's death, imaginary tales began (to be spread) about threats and tortures used against him. To refute them, it will be enough to read merely the narration of Vincenzo Viviani, Galileo's pupil and friend, in "Opp. Galilei, ed. Ticini," 1744., t. i., p. 64. See also "Marino Marini Galileo e 1' Inquisizione." Roma. 1850. "La Verite" sur lc Proces de Galilee," (" Melanges Scientifiques, etc., de M.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i> Biot." Paris. 1858, tom. iii. pp. 1, seqq.)</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div></div></div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-24218529921621365712023-09-24T10:50:00.001-04:002023-11-18T08:44:06.940-05:00Trinitarian article index<div>This is an index of my articles for the last two years that cover my theological pluralist account of Trinitarian relations to explain the East-West division on the <i>filioque</i>. I've also included earlier articles that anticipate this work on theological pluralism.</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2007/03/what-is-not-individual-is-common.html" target="_blank">What is not individual is common</a> (March 2007)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2007/12/more-on-cappadocian-epistemology.html" target="_blank">More on Cappadocian epistemology</a> (December 2007)</div><div><br /><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/09/the-tri-unity-matrix.html" target="_blank">The Tri-Unity Matrix?</a> (September 2021)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/09/reflexive-relations-in-trinity.html" target="_blank">Reflexive Relations in the Trinity</a> (September 2021)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/09/historical-use-of-reflexive-relations.html" target="_blank">Historical Use of Reflexive Relations in the Trinity</a> (September 2021)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/10/spherical-coordinates-and-trinitarian.html" target="_blank">Spherical Coordinates and Trinitarian Relations</a> (October 2021)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/11/eternal-manifestation-as-efficient.html" target="_blank">Eternal Manifestation as Efficient Sustaining Cause</a> (November 2021)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/12/the-son-as-source-of-spirit-quod.html" target="_blank">The Son as a source of the Spirit "quod essentia"</a> (Dialogue with Fr. Christiaan Kappes) (December 2021)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/12/consubstantiality-as-relative-property.html" target="_blank">Consubstantiality as a relative property</a> (December 2021)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2022/02/catholic-fundamental-theology-part-1.html" target="_blank">Catholic fundamental theology in two metaphysical systems</a> (February 2022)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2022/05/fundamental-theology-vs.html" target="_blank">Fundamental theology vs. presuppositionalism</a> (May 2022)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/the-filioque-impasse-resolved.html" target="_blank">The filioque impasse resolved</a> (Response to the work of Michelle Coetzee) (April 2023)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/05/my-theory-on-blachernae.html" target="_blank">My theory on Blachernae</a> (May 2023)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/05/the-essenceenergies-impasse-resolved.html" target="_blank">The essence/energies impasse resolved?</a> (May 2023)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/06/why-hypostasishyparxis-distinction.html" target="_blank">Why the hypostasis/hyparxis distinction doesn't work</a> (Response to the "origination of hypostasis"/"communication of essence" distinction in the <i>filioque</i>) (June 2023)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/06/when-polemics-become-pointless.html" target="_blank">When polemics become pointless</a> (Response to Craig Truglia's critique of Brian Duong) (June 2023)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/07/when-is-cause-not-cause.html" target="_blank">When is a cause not a cause?</a> (Interacting with Fr. Thomas Crean's <i>Vindicating the Filioque</i>) (July 2023)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/09/debunking-fr-giulio-masperos-account-of.html" target="_blank">Debunking Fr. Giulio Maspero's account of the <i>filioque</i></a> (Interacting with Fr. Maspero's <i>Rethinking the Filioque with the Greek Fathers</i>) (September 2023)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/09/old-nicenes-and-new-nicenes.html" target="_blank">Old Nicenes and New Nicenes</a> (Interacting with Dr. Peter Gilbert's "Not an Anthologist: John Bekkos as a Reader of the Fathers") (September 2023)</div><div><br /></div><div><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/11/did-theodorets-nestorianism-lead-to.html" target="_blank">Did Theodoret's Nestorianism lead to denial of the Filioque?</a> (November 2023)</div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-58307414937996016912023-09-17T16:33:00.002-04:002023-09-24T10:50:06.391-04:00Old Nicenes and New Nicenes<p> My friend Craig Ostrowski raised an interesting point concerning my previous post on Fr. Maspero:</p><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The point I would like to propose for further exploration concerns the common acceptance of Cyril as a New Nicene regarding the immanent trinity (but an Old Nicene regarding the incarnation) and how that may impact his filioquist writings. I confess that I've never seen this issue treated by any scholar. In fact, many scholars who accept Cyril's classification as an old Nicene then go on treat those passages as though he fully bought into the Cappadocian technical terminological distinctions.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This "old Nicene" concept is based on Cyril and the Nicene creed using the terms <i>ousia</i> and <i>hypostasis</i> somewhat interchangeably in the term <i>physis</i>, as contrasted with the "new Nicene" model that distinguishes them as technical terms. Craig also refers to Grillmeier's observation that "Cyril of Alexandria followed this [new] linguistic convention for the <i>theologia</i>," although he did not do so in the <i>oikonomia</i>, which Grillmeier presumably associates with the <i>Logos-sarx</i> Christology of Alexandria. In my opinion, the only reason that Grillmeier makes the former assertion is because of the "Cappadocian victory" narrative, and I think that his entire view of "old" and "new" Nicene theology (and Cyril as a "New Nicene" theologian) must ultimately be discarded as inaccurate. Instead, we must accept that the so-called "old" Nicene view was simply a different theological model, and this diversity reflects pluralism rather than sequential development.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Craig cites Peter Gilbert's article "<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301361819_Not_an_Anthologist_John_Bekkos_as_a_Reader_of_the_Fathers_Communio_362_Summer_2009_pp_259-304" target="_blank">Not an Anthologist: John Bekkos as a Reader of the Fathers</a>" as using the terminology in the way he has in mind, and I think that this is an excellent example of a work that can simply be updated with a theological pluralist outlook:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>When I speak of John Bekkos as an “Old Nicene,” I do not mean that he went around preaching one divine hypostasis. I mean that Bekkos, in his debates with his contemporaries, reopens questions that were already being asked in the fourth and fifth centuries, questions about the relation between ousia and hypostasis, and about whether the Father generates the Son from his substance or from a personhood separated from his substance. Bekkos thought that, while the Creed of Constantinople is a definitive statement of the Church’s faith, it does not abrogate what was said in the Creed of Nicaea of 325; in particular, it does not annul the language of that document, which states that the Son is ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός, from the essence, or substance, of the Father. Bekkos sees this language to be essential for understanding, in Greek terms, what it is that the Latin Church actually believes about the Holy Spirit’s procession. Near the beginning of the book On the Union and Peace of the Churches of Old and New Rome, Bekkos speaks of his intention to “set forth methodically all the written statements in which ancient writers on the doctrine of the Trinity clearly express the view that the Holy Spirit exists from the substance of the Father and the Son, which is what the Church of the Romans acknowledges when it asserts that he proceeds from both.” Now, this way of speaking about a divine person—the person being from the substance—is not often encountered in the Cappadocian fathers and, indeed, in most Greek theological writing after them, just as it does not appear in the Creed of Constantinople of 381, although it was frequent in St. Athanasius, is found in Apollinarius, was kept in use within the party of Paulinus of Antioch, and occurs regularly in the writings of St. Cyril of Alexandria. Indeed, St. Cyril frequently uses the expression “from the substance of the Son” to describe the Holy Spirit, as Bekkos does not hesitate to point out; e.g., at Thesaurus 33, Cyril says:</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>It is necessary . . . to confess the Spirit to exist from the substance that is God the Son’s, possessing the entirety of his power and operation.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>It is not simply that Bekkos is able to cite fathers of the Church who use the expression “from the substance,” however, that constitutes him as what I would call an Old Nicene theologian. It is, rather, his realization that the way these texts were being expounded in his day by those writers who carried on the Photian critique of the Latin Filioque doctrine missed something essential to the meaning of this formulation, that in serving for them simply as synonymous with “consubstantial,” it had become vestigial and had lost something of its original dogmatic function—and furthermore, it is his rediscovery of that function, his recognition and restatement of an inner logic to the formulation ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας. This, I would submit, is what chiefly justifies one’s calling John Bekkos an Old Nicene theologian.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I completely agree that Bekkos has hit on the underlying logic of the Alexandrian position in a way that his contemporaries were incapable of comprehending. But I think calling this position "Old Nicene," as contrasted with the "New Nicene" position, which distinguishes <i>ousia</i> and <i>hypostasis</i> in a technical way, already falls into the "Cappadocian victory" trap. It assumes that the Alexandrian position <i>developed into</i> the Cappadocian position, and I have explained in excruciating detail why I believe this position is radically false. Let us instead take Dr. Gilbert's entirely correct observation that <i>homoousios</i> had "become vestigial" in Photian theology and pursue that observation even further: <i>it had already become vestigial in the Cappadocians</i>!</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">There are at least four different conceptual ways of using the term <i>homoousios</i> that are documented in Barnes's <i>Augustine and Nicene Theology</i>:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">1. <u>Explicitly relational</u>: Barnes points out that Athanasius uses the term <i>homoousios</i> technically as a one-way relation; it is always <i>homoousios</i> to another person. The Son is <i>homoousios</i> to the Father; the Spirit is <i>homoousios</i> to the Son. Conceptually, this technical usage serves the same purpose as the causal relations in Latin one-power theology, in that it shows a relational structure between Persons that accounts for their ability to perform distinctively divine acts like creation, deification, and miracles.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">2. <u>Nominative</u>: In the typical Latin theology (with one notable exception), <i>homoousios</i> is essentially a label used synonymously with "is God" or "has the divine power." Conceptually, this is a restated version of the "one power" theology (what has divine power is God), as opposed to an assertion based on revelation that the relations of divine Persons are revealed as relations of consubstantiality, which would be more typical of Athanasius.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">3. <u>Victorinian</u>: Barnes notes that Victorinus uses the term <i>homoousios</i> in his own idiosyncratic way that is taken from Porphyrian Neoplatonism and that is not the technical way that Athanasius is using it. This eventually provides a starting point for the psychological analogy in Augustine, but Augustine does not really inherit the underlying metaphysical structure at all, instead operating in the nominative model of <i>homoousios</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">4. <u>Neoplatonic</u>: This is the more technical use of <i>ousia</i> from the Middle Platonic/Neoplatonic model, especially concerning the eminence of the divine <i>ousia</i>, that is characteristic especially of Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian theology. This is primarily driven as a response to Eunomius's use of the same concepts.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">What Bekkos found with respect to the inner logic of <i>ek tes ousias</i> did not only relate to the use of that phrase but the very concept of <i>homoousios</i> in Alexandrian theology. Without the <i>ek tes ousias</i> in its correct meaning (i.e., the <i>filioque</i>), the entire argument on which Alexandrian theology is based (viz., that dependencies in divine economic activities in Scripture are meant to reveal consubstantial relations of origin) would simply fail. The structure of the Cappadocian argument is actually reversed. They show consubstantiality by the activity-power-nature argument for each of the Persons, then use that to show that the relations of origin must be relations of consubstantiality. In short, the Alexandrian logic is that relations based on consubstantiality are directly revealed, and the Cappadocian logic is that the consubstantiality of the relations is what must be demonstrated. As I mentioned, the latter is driven to some extent by the exigencies of the conflict with Eunomius, but it is also based on the fact that something is simply missing from the Cappadocian understanding of the Alexandrian theology. They do not see the full theological content of the term <i>homoousios</i>, seeing it primarily as a philosophical assertion of identical nature ("simply as synonymous with 'consubstantial,'" as Dr. Gilbert put it).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">To illustrate what I think the difference between (1) and (4) is, I've put together a couple of diagrams of the different models.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhORPRNdXZaO_OwjlXbB0Gqzr2QZ5aNBG9GKlbeuWpwQQGrzNukrGGT8-Zbs1SvdjtR0HxpXAqlyJrYCnh5GxR_5_jfwgm9mlRoDvvAtPsbrPabpGZwSELgm_Tz9jOtCwprq6CfoaxONwEm0x7itoX_Kq8qEGZF_3vyimj0TUfMWYyXnsheLFPutQ/s1098/Trinity%20diagrams%20Irenaeus%20Cappadocian.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1044" data-original-width="1098" height="304" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhORPRNdXZaO_OwjlXbB0Gqzr2QZ5aNBG9GKlbeuWpwQQGrzNukrGGT8-Zbs1SvdjtR0HxpXAqlyJrYCnh5GxR_5_jfwgm9mlRoDvvAtPsbrPabpGZwSELgm_Tz9jOtCwprq6CfoaxONwEm0x7itoX_Kq8qEGZF_3vyimj0TUfMWYyXnsheLFPutQ/s320/Trinity%20diagrams%20Irenaeus%20Cappadocian.png" width="320" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">My concept for the Irenaean diagram is musical, taking inspiration from Irenaeus's use of the lyre as an image for the harmony of creation. However, it is important to understand that Irenaeus's image is based on the <i>diversity</i> of the notes (created things), so it needs to be modified in this case to focus specifically on the functions that each note is performing. In that respect, I believe that it shows how divine co-activity illustrates the relational structure between the Persons.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">For purposes of the illustration, we will take major and minor chords (root-3rd-5th) and consider how each note functions in defining the chord. The root note provides the context for both of the other notes; this is analogous to the way that the Father is the principle for the entire Trinity. The perfect fifth harmonizes ideally with the root note, essentially following automatically from the defining root. But the root and the fifth alone (the power chord) lacks something. In a chord progression, the power chord might fit within a larger context, but by itself, the chord is incomplete. But the third (major or minor) completes the chord, because it determines how the root and fifth resonate with one another without itself being either the root or the fifth. It is that sort of defining role that I think Irenaeus has in mind in the Incarnation; the structure is based on how the Father and the Spirit relate to one another in the Son, and the relations are both essential and simultaneous. </div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;">The Cappadocian model is built on the concept of instability in the Neoplatonic model, and in that model, instability means descent. The dyad is unstable; it cause things to fall away from the One. What the Cappadocian model does, as far as I can tell, is to have the Spirit hold the Trinity together by providing a simultaneous exaltation of the Son that excludes any possibility of the Son descending. I've illustrated this force, which is associated with the anointing of the Son, that holds the Son at the level of the Father and the Spirit. In that sense, the Spirit is the bond (<i>syndetikon</i>) or middle term (<i>meson</i>) between the Father and the Son that keeps them together. That upward force is what I take St. John Damascene to have in mind when he speaks of the Spirit as the "impulse" of the Trinity, and it is why I suspect he does not consider the bond itself as defining the Spirit (as the <i>filioque</i> would require) but instead being a result of the procession of the Spirit. The relations of Son and Spirit here to the Father complement one another as opposed to the Father-Son relation and the Son-Spirit relation being mutually defining.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Note that both of these models make sense of the economy and Christ's unique role in the Incarnation. Christ's defining mediatorial role in the Irenaean model parallels His defining mediatorial role in the economy, which in turn matches the triadic structure of creation itself. In the Cappadocian model, Christ's dual motions of descent and ascent in the Spirit are naturally suited to drawing humanity up in the Spirit. Both the concepts and the work they do are very different, but they are nonetheless directed at what Scripture and Tradition reveals about the nature of the economy. This is what I have in mind by theological pluralism, and I believe that such pluralism is a better explanation than the "Old Nicene"/"New Nicene" model.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">[Update -- Dr. Gilbert provided the following response:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div class="xdj266r x11i5rnm xat24cr x1mh8g0r x1vvkbs" style="margin: 0px; overflow-wrap: break-word;"><div dir="auto"><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>I would correct one thing: when I stated that "in serving for them simply as synonymous with 'consubstantial,' it had become vestigial," I was referring to the formulation ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, not to the term consubstantial; I didn't mean to imply that the homoousion had become vestigial for the Cappadocians or for the tradition that followed them. And even the Cappadocians themselves, in many texts, show that they are not exclusively wedded to the "first substance, second substance" interpretation that they sometimes give to hypostasis and ousia. But I would agree with you that the interpretation given to the homoousion in later Byzantine tradition, in taking a certain reading of the Cappadocians as normative, tended to ignore something that was present in authors like St. Athanasius and St. Cyril, for whom the theology of ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας was not vestigial at all. I think Bekkos picks up on this difference, and correctly sees it as a root issue in the whole pneumatological debate between East and West.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><i>As for whether Athanasius should be called an "Old Nicene," or rather, whether the term "Old Nicene" is appropriate, I think that is largely an unimportant matter of terminology. The terms "Old Nicene" and "New Nicene" did not come into use until the late 19th century, and their usefulness is still disputed to this day, but I think they in fact designate historical realities, and it is good to have some generally recognized terms to designate these realities and not forever to be inventing new ones. I don't think the expression "New Nicene" was ever intended to imply the superiority of "New Nicene" theology over "Old Nicene" theology—certainly it did not imply this in the thought of those scholars who coined the terms. "New Nicene" simply implies that there was a process in the mid-to-late fourth century, whereby Eastern homoiousians eventually came round to accepting the Nicene homoousion—and, in this process, the Cappadocian fathers played a crucial role. Harnack thought that they did so by changing the meaning of homoousion from numerical unity to generic unity, that, in essence, they transformed the homoousion to a kind of homoiousion. A lot of patristic scholars have criticized Harnack on this: Bethune-Baker, in the early 20th century, denied that the Nicene homoousion originally meant anything like what Harnack said it did. Nevertheless, I do think that, by pushing the Cappadocian theology to extremes and inventing principles which the Cappadocians themselves did not state, later Byzantine writers do absolutize a view of the homoousion as generic unity in a way that makes theologians like Athanasius and Cyril unintelligible; on that, I would agree with you.</i></div><div dir="auto"><i><br /></i></div><div dir="auto">I think we were actually agreeing on this point, in that I saw the <i>ek tes ousias</i> as reflecting specifically how the Alexandrians were using the term <i>homoouosios</i>. I replied as follows:</div><div dir="auto"><br /></div><i>I agree that I wasn’t clear. What I had in mind was not the concept of </i>homoousion<i> itself but the relational use of the term in the sense of </i>ek tes ousias<i>. So we are aligned; it was a particular way of using the term that fell into desuetude almost immediately in the Cappadocian arguments. But they definitely got plenty of mileage out of the concept of natural unity in the more-or-less Platonic sense.</i>]</div></div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-77845862001627085042023-09-09T11:13:00.014-04:002023-09-09T11:45:07.663-04:00Amoris Laetitia and Reconciliation<p style="text-align: justify;">Part of the problem in the response to <i>Amoris Laetitia</i> has been the complete failure of the respondents to make proper distinctions in their responses. This has left them, especially the <i>dubia</i> cardinals, completely outmanned by their progressive counterparts and entirely hapless to address the real problem. And because of this incompetent "defense" of orthodoxy, the progressive narrative has run rampant (not that Pope Francis has lifted a finger to stop it, of course). And the progressive narrative is heresy, the same heresy condemned by <i>Veritatis Splendor</i>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The massive tactical error is to respond to <i>AL</i>'s changes on the doctrine of the <i>public</i> participation in the Eucharist, as opposed to addressing head-on the doctrine of Confession, which <i>AL</i> makes no attempt to change. The so-called "<a href="http://www.correctiofilialis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Correctio-filialis_English_1.pdf" target="_blank">filial correction</a>" charged the Pope with seven errors, none of which <i>AL</i> actually taught:</p><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>1). 'A justified person has not the strength with God’s grace to carry out the objective demands of the divine law, as though any of the commandments of God are impossible for the justified; or as meaning that God’s grace, when it produces justification in an individual, does not invariably and of its nature produce conversion from all serious sin, or is not sufficient for conversion from all serious sin.'</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">2). 'Christians who have obtained a civil divorce from the spouse to whom they are validly married and have contracted a civil marriage with some other person during the lifetime of their spouse, who live more uxorio<i> with their civil partner, and who choose to remain in this state with full knowledge of the nature of their act and full consent of the will to that act, are not necessarily in a state of mortal sin, and can receive sanctifying grace and grow in charity.'</i></div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">3). 'A Christian believer can have full knowledge of a divine law and voluntarily choose to break it in a serious matter, but not be in a state of mortal sin as a result of this action.'</div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">4). ‘A person is able, while he obeys a divine prohibition, to sin against God by that very act of obedience.’</div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">5). 'Conscience can truly and rightly judge that sexual acts between persons who have contracted a civil marriage with each other, although one or both of them is sacramentally married to another person, can sometimes be morally right or requested or even commanded by God.'</div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">6). 'Moral principles and moral truths contained in divine revelation and in the natural law do not include negative prohibitions that absolutely forbid particular kinds of action, inasmuch as these are always gravely unlawful on account of their object.'</div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">7). 'Our Lord Jesus Christ wills that the Church abandon her perennial discipline of refusing the Eucharist to the divorced and remarried and of refusing absolution to the divorced and remarried who do not express contrition for their state of life and a firm purpose of amendment with regard to it.'</div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The problem is that, if the proper distinctions are made, not one of these statements is supportable from <i>AL</i>. In particular, they are not distinguishing between living <i>more uxorio</i>, that is, living together, and sexual acts. There are two different forms of living <i>more uxorio</i>: continently, as brother and sister, and incontinently.<i> </i>If that distinction is not made, then this should actually be a fraternal correction of Pope St. John Paul II rather than Pope Francis. (In fact, I suspect that a number of these people are the same ones who would've said that <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> was wrong all along and are using this occasion as an attempt to reverse what they see as imprudent discipline.) But if the distinction is made, then this idea of "venial incontinence," which is the paranoid fear of the critics, cannot be found anywhere in <i>AL</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">We can see this in the first and third dubia:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>Dubium One</b>: <i>It is asked whether, following the affirmations of “Amoris Laetitia” (nn. 300-305), it has now become possible to grant absolution in the Sacrament of Penance and thus to admit to Holy Communion a person who, while bound by a valid marital bond, lives together with a different person “more uxorio” (in a marital way) without fulfilling the conditions provided for by “Familiaris Consortio” n. 84 and subsequently reaffirmed by “Reconciliatio et Paenitentia” n. 34 and “Sacramentum Caritatis” n. 29. Can the expression “in certain cases” found in note 351 (n. 305) of the exhortation “Amoris Laetitia” be applied to divorced persons who are in a new union and who continue to live “more uxorio”?</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>Dubium Three</b>: <i>After “Amoris Laetitia” (n. 301) is it still possible to affirm that a person who habitually lives in contradiction to a commandment of God’s law, as for instance the one that prohibits adultery (cf. Mt 19:3-9), finds him or herself in an objective situation of grave habitual sin (cf. Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, Declaration, June 24, 2000)?</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-position: 0px 0px; border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Merriweather, serif; font-style: italic; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In both of these questions, the "following the affirmations of <i>Amoris Laetitia</i>" and "After <i>Amoris Laetitia</i>" language serve the "have you stopped beating your wife?" function in the question, because both would have been true under <i>Familiaris Consortio</i>. Note that the first question does not include "without fulfilling the conditions provided for by <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> n. 84," etc. If the answer "yes" is given, it resolves no ambiguity, since that would just be ratification of the prior discipline under <i>Familiaris Consortio</i>, i.e., that they can live <i>more uxorio</i> as long as they do so continently. The third <i>dubium</i> is similar; the couples that are allowed Reconciliation and participation in the Eucharist <i>remoto scandolo</i> are nonetheless in an "objective situation of grave habitual sin." Living as brother and sister does not change the objective situation at all. So <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> has already established that people in an objective situation of grave habitual sin (cohabitation) can nonetheless have access to the Sacraments of Reconciliation and the Eucharist, and this is nowhere changed in <i>Amoris Laetitia</i>!</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is why one can appreciate the position of Josef Seifert, who firmly criticized <i>AL</i> based on the teaching of Pope St. John Paul II in <i>VS</i> but who refused to participate in the "filial correction." That was the principled approach, because the conservatives who wanted to reverse the discipline of <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> would condemn John Paul II and Francis in the same stroke. Consider that without the qualifier "incontinenly," the statement that the couple would "live <i>more uxorio</i>" in alleged error #2 would be exactly what <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> teaches. But even more than that, <i>AL</i> correctly appeals to the fact that the requirements of mortal sin might not be met in some of these cases based on Catholic moral theology, so the focus on "mortal sin" rather than contrition has fallen into the progressive trap. This was a grave error by the conservative opponents of <i>AL</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Likewise, when they do turn to Reconciliation, their approach bungles the argument. <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> very clearly permits Reconciliation for people who do not express a firm purpose of amendment with respect to what <i>AL</i> calls "the obligation to separate," because positive commandments are not broken when done for proportionate reasons. So, once again, the failure to distinguish living <i>more uxorio</i> <b>continently</b> and living <i>more uxorio</i> <b>incontinently</b> is a fatal error. Thus, in the sense that the alleged error #7 charges, <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> would be guilty of the same thing.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But, in fact, every single one of the alleged errors is based on this confusion! It makes the uncharitable assumption that AL is referring to living <i>more uxorio</i> incontinently, contrary to the actual wording of the document, which always refers to the state of life (cohabitating with a non-spouse) and never to sexual acts. There is literally not even one reference that applies to sexual activity within the union; the only reference to living as brother and sister says that it is difficult and that we should not deny absolution to those who fail at it. Nowhere does <i>AL</i> say or even imply that incontinence is not a serious sin that requires Reconciliation before the Eucharist. On the contrary, the strong implication of <i>AL</i> is that the confessors should not jump to conclusions based on the state of life but rather should consider the person's acts, including whether the person is trying to be continent even if not successfully doing so.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Buenos Aires guidelines actually confirm this:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(5) Whenever feasible, and depending on the specific circumstances of a couple, and especially when both partners are Christians walking together on the path of faith, the priest may suggest a decision to live in continence. Amoris Laetitia does not ignore the difficulties arising from this option (cf. footnote 329) and offers the possibility of <b>having access to the Sacrament of Reconciliation if the partners fail in this purpose</b> (cf. footnote 364, recalling the teaching that Saint John Paul II sent to Cardinal W. Baum, dated 22 March, 1996).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Why would you need Reconciliation if incontinence is not a serious sin? There's no qualification here or any suggestion that incontinence would <i>not</i> be a serious sin. There is no suggestion that incontinent partners can proceed directly to the Eucharist without Reconciliation. On the contrary, the possibility being offered is Reconciliation, although that would implicitly be followed by the Eucharist. Apart from the paranoia that <i>AL</i>'s references to the state of sin simply <i>must</i> be referring to sexual incontinence, there would be no reason to think so.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>(6) In other, more complex cases, and when a declaration of nullity has not been obtained, the above mentioned option may not, in fact, be feasible. Nonetheless, a path of discernment is still possible. If it comes to be recognized that, in a specific case, there are limitations that mitigate responsibility and culpability (cf. 301-302), especially when a person believes they would incur a subsequent wrong by harming the children of the new union, Amoris Laetitia offers the possibility of access to the sacraments of Reconciliation and Eucharist (cf. footnotes 336 and 351). These sacraments, in turn, dispose the person to continue maturing and growing with the power of grace.</i></div></i><br /><div>These four sentences have prompted numerous cries of "Katie, bar the door!" Indeed, it is fair to say that this is the sole basis for the paranoia, since the only discussion of sexual activities in <i>AL</i> is quoted in BA #5, and it is clear that incontinence requires Reconciliation in that case. The move from #5 to #6 solely deals with <i>why the proposal is not feasible</i>. In other words, <i>why is this person not agreeing with the new spouse that they should be continent? </i>In those cases, the penitent might not be culpable for failing to do so; it might not indicate a guilty intent to remain incontinent. That person's moral responsibility for the situation should be assessed. On the other hand, if the incontinence itself were not sinful then <i>why is Reconciliation mentioned here at all?</i> If this idea of "venial incontinence" is not contemplated in #5, then why would we conclude that it comes out of nowhere in #6, especially when there is the additional factor of whether the penitent is <i>culpable</i> in the spouse's refusal?</div><div><br /></div><div>To be clear, I am sympathetic to the suspicion of Victor Manuel Fernandez, the likely writer of both <i>AL</i> and the BA guidelines, and I believe that he has <i>explicitly</i> taught heresy concerning the "intimate acts" of a <i>more uxorio</i> cohabitation in his own comments. But he isn't stupid either; he kept that out of both documents and restricted it to his own private speculation so that Pope Francis could avoid being justly charged with any of this. On the contrary, they knew full well that if the conservatives did exactly what they did, which was stupidly and recklessly charge Pope Francis with heresy in a way that would indict even the sainted Pope John Paul II, then it would make Pope Francis appear all the more reasonable. And that gives the progressives a longer leash. The idiotic "have you stopped beating your wife?" <i>dubia</i> and the subsequent filial correction have done exactly that.</div><div><br /></div><div>What they could've done, and what they should've done, is to focus on the requirement of Reconciliation in the case of incontinence, distinguishing the obligation to separate from the moral commandment concerning sexual acts. There is actually a significant amount of text in <i>AL</i> and even the BA guidelines that reaffirms the obligation of continence in <i>FC</i> and the need for Reconciliation in the cases of lapses. They should've focused on the objective role of the priest in the internal forum that balances the subjective considerations of the penitent, <i>contra</i> the extended (and mostly irrelevant) commentary on mitigating factors for moral sin. They should've focused on the objective requirement of firm purpose of amendment, which doesn't allow mitigation or subjective exceptions apart from (usually invincible) ignorance. Instead, they unjustly and falsely charged Pope Francis with heresy and showed themselves thoroughly inept at both clear teaching and Vatican politics.</div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-62689476377271931282023-09-04T15:54:00.005-04:002023-09-17T10:25:28.774-04:00Debunking Fr. Giulio Maspero's account of the filioque<p style="text-align: justify;">I'm not sure I have ever been as disappointed in an eagerly-awaited book as I was in Fr. Giulio Maspero's <i>Rethinking the Filioque with the Greek Fathers</i>. Intellectual history always necessarily includes a systematic element, but the restraint required to genuinely understand what the authors themselves meant, putting oneself aside in charitable empathy for the object of one's inquiry and ruthlessly adhering to one's proper discipline, is particularly challenging for systematic theology. Given Fr. Maspero's background in physics, it reminds me of the tendency of physicists to turn into philosophers of quantum mechanics; a friend once quoted Vadim Kaplunovsky's description as follows: "many have gone down that dark path never to return." It is that "dark path" in historical theology that concerns me, especially with respect to the <i>filioque</i>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I apologize in advance that the format and time constraints limit my ability to provide extensive and specific citations, but I'm hoping I made the bibliography clear and the quotations accurate. I use names like "Nyssen" for Gregory of Nyssa and "Cyprios" for Gregory of Cyprus for brevity. <b>Bold</b> is generally how I add emphasis; I will usually italicize quotes and use standard font for original emphasis. Brackets might be original or my own, but my own changes are formatting and citations, not substantive. In any case, I am trying to integrate a large number of works, and that is necessarily going to fail to capture the entire context. I would highly encourage people to read any works that they find interesting.</p><div style="text-align: left;">I. The "dark path" in historical theology</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br />II. The pluralist road to Constantinople<br /><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">III. Theological pluralism: a case study in Alexandria</div><div style="text-align: left;"><span> </span>A. Antecendents: Irenaeus of Lyons</div><div style="text-align: left;"><span> </span>B. The contemporary: Didymus the Blind</div><div style="text-align: left;"><span> </span>C. Athanasius the Great</div><div style="text-align: left;"><span> D. The successor: Cyril of Alexandria</span><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span>IV. Maspero turns his blind eye to the West</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span>V. The Byzantine model: Nikephoros Blemmydes</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span>VI. An ecumenical reading: recognition of theological pluralism</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span> A. Western pluralism</span><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span> B. Theological pluralism in Byzantium: Gregory of Cyprus</span><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span><span> C. Theological pluralism in Byzantium: Gregory Palamas</span><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span><span><br /></span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span><span>VII. The "Cappadocian victory" model as a cause for Catholic self-flagellation</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span><span><br /></span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span><span>VIII. Drop the anti-filioquism</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span><span><br /></span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;">IX. <i>Apologia pro Vita Sua</i>: an autobiographical note</div><p style="text-align: justify;"><u>I. The "dark path" in historical theology</u></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Let's start with questions of historical methodology. I am approaching this issue primarily from the perspective of metaphysics and systematic theology. But for a very similar critique concerning the plurality of textual and exegetical traditions, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2IxOteF9js" target="_blank">this presentation by Nathaniel McCallum</a> on Erick Ybarra's YouTube channel is absolutely essential. I will point out at various points where McCallum's historical approach complements my own, but the fundamental concern is that a monolithic sense of Christian history motivated by a variety of concerns has more or less obliterated the sense among historians of theological pluralism in the period from Nicaea to Constantinople. In particular, Constantinople was perceived as the coalescence of Christianity around Cappadocian theology (and especially pneumatology), which I call the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm. What follows is an explanation of how Maspero has fallen for this narrative completely and how it has caused him to badly misread numerous Latin and Alexandrian Fathers.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">To begin, we can observe that Maspero seems to have been led down the "dark path" by Sarah Coakley, who wrote the foreword to this book. Maspero admits Coakley's influence, citing especially two of her works: "Beyond the <i>Filioque</i> Disputes? Re-Assessing the Radical Equality of the Spirit through the Ascetic and Mystical Tradition" (previously published in <i>It Is the Spirit Who Gives Life</i>, ed. Radu Bordeianu) and <i>God, Sexuality, and the Self</i>. Maspero and Coakley have both adopted the systematic perspective that the idea of "hierarchy," which they see as a subordinationist tendency built into early Trinitarian thought (especially Origen's), is the <i>bête noire</i> of Christian theology. In particular, it is speculative theology about causal relations in this hierarchical context, most emphatically the "filioquist" speculation, that is the quintessential example of rationalism run awry. In Maspero's and Coakley's view, the cure to this sort of hyper-rationalism is a return to patristic apophaticism and mysticism. But this so-called "apophatic" position is a form of modernist anti-intellectualism that destroys the cataphatic position of those they study. In short, their contemporary, post-Kantian theology has impeded their ability to perceive the coherence of the authors they study and therefore has radically compromised their role as historians. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">This question of the role of historical and systematic theology came up in the critiques of Lewis Ayres's <i>Nicaea and Its Legacy</i> in <i>Harvard Theogical Review</i> 100:2 (Apr. 2007), which Coakley edited. In that collection, Fr. Khaled Anatolios's rejoinder to Ayres provides a auspicious warning: "So my fundamental discomfort has to do precisely with the prioritizing of what I have called the mathematics of tri-unity over the presentation of a holistic vision of Christian life in which a particular reading of Scripture is appropriated and performed." Notably, Ayres's system that Anatolios was critiquing in this case was an even looser systematic account of pro-Nicene theology than what Maspero and Coakley are now offering for the <i>filioque</i>. As will become clear in my own pluralist account, I would likewise dispute Ayres's assertion that "a number of [Athanasius's] key arguments are simply not carried into later tradition (such as some key elements of the manner in which the Spirit is dependent on the Son in the <i>Epistulae ad Serapionem</i>)." Yet Ayres's relatively weak claim in that regard does not come close to the alleged failures with which Maspero will charge Athanasius.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In any case, Anatolios's own historical method provides a stark contrast with the aspirations of a Maspero or a Coakley. Rather than attempting to achieve a doctrinal or metaphysical synthesis that the patristic authors likely did not intend, he sees these authors as providing a <i>coherent account of their own Christian life</i>. In his work on Athanasius, he describes the Alexandrian Doctor as "a systematic theologian in his own right, someone who claims to offer a certain vision of the coherence of the Christian faith," but he also notes elsewhere that "Athanasius is not propounding Christological metaphysics in a systematic manner, but is trying to show the correct way in which to understand Christological statements." Likewise, in describing Anatolios's own systematizing efforts in <i>Retrieving Nicaea</i>, Anatolios says he is "trying to show how the development of trinitarian theology entailed a global interpretation of Christian faith and life as a whole," which means he must "destabilize the division of the tasks of historical and systematic theology."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Anatolios describes his own role as a historical theologian in the conclusion to <i>Retrieving Nicaea</i>:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>The purpose of this concluding chapter is to suggest some elements that can contribute toward a creative retrieval of Nicene trinitarian faith. There is not a single and monolithic path for such retrieval, just as fourth-century theologies that accepted the Nicene </i>homoousios <i>were not utterly uniform. The burden of this book has been to propose that both the construction of Nicene theology and its reappropriation are systematic endeavors in the sense that they aspire to interpret the entirety of Christian experience in light of the oneness of being of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But the exact contours and contents of this project differed from on theologian to another, and rather than trying to homogenize a "Nicene theology," we have chosen to retrieve key insights from three preeminent theologians of that era. This task of retrieval involves both a receptive and an actual constructive posture. <b>The receptive element is composed of reconstructing the logic by which questions pertaining to the divinity of Christ and the Spirit in the fourth century led to a trinitarian reinterpretation of Christian faith</b>. Of course, this work of reconstruction, being an interpretive endeavor, cannot itself be purely receptive. I have exercised selectivity and systematization both in my choice of representatives of the Nicene tradition and of aspects of their work.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Michel René Barnes likewise points out the importance of understanding the author's logic and its coherence for any credible reading in <i>Augustine and Nicene Theology</i>. In his seven steps of historical interpretation, the fifth is a "close reading or exegesis of the text that uncovers the key steps in the author's logic or expression," and the sixth is that the "reading must identify, and show a fluency with, those conceptual idioms that are they key building blocks of the author's logic or expression." It is particular unfortunate that Fr. Maspero's own work comes on the heels of <i>Augustine and Nicene Theology</i>, which provides a survey of patristic Latin theology in its historical context reflecting (and in some cases, collecting) Barnes's lifetime of work in the sources. Maspero performs this task well with Gregory of Nyssa and the various Syriac writers he studies in his book, but completely fails to do so with any Western author, especially the scholastics. The following passage from Barnes might well have been written of Fr. Maspero's handling of Augustine's <i>De Trinitate</i>:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>If one compares the number of Augustinian texts consulted in contemporary accounts of his Trinitarian theology to the number of Augustinian texts consulted in accounts from a hundred years ago, what one finds is that the number has shrunk drastically. Hardly anyone refers to the last Trinitarian writings by Augustine anymore, those against Maximinus. The fact that these texts are not translated from Latin into a modern language means that, practically speaking, they are not being read by systematicians, a limitation that was not in place a hundred years ago. Given that systematic reconstructions of Augustine's Trinitarian theology are now made on the basis of the single text, </i>De Trinitate<i>, or not uncommonly, a canon of selections from this single text, we can conclude that the actual reading of Augustine has been made functionally superfluous. The rhetorical voice of such reconstructive narratives is one of comprehensiveness, but the "historical method" supporting the narrative is in fact reductive. Stories of increasing scope are told on the basis of diminishing experience and evidence.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;">And this is Maspero's great failure and his step down the "dark path." By trying to be so comprehensive in his "reconstructive narrative," he has disregarded the logic of the Western authors (including Alexandrian authors) entirely, substituting his and Coakley's hierarchical narrative where it absolutely does not exist. Note that the sort of historical caution that Anatolios and Barnes have in mind here is not the postmodern timidity that Coakley has in mind when she says the following in the foreword to Maspero's book: "Indeed, while other theologians in the period of postmodernity have tended to recoil, in line with current fashion, from that they see as the modernistic pretensions of any <i>Dogmengeschichte</i> [history of dogma] of an earlier generation, Fr. Maspero has remained refreshingly impenitent about seeking <i>some</i> such metanarrative of doctrinal development, albeit one suitably chastened by the complexity and breadth of the texts he surveys." Anatolios and Barnes clearly have no problem with giving an account of the history of dogma. Rather, the problem is that neither Coakley nor Maspero are "suitably chastened" by the authors they study in their metanarratives. I suspect that Maspero may even know that he has gone too far; he describes his chapter on Augustine in a footnote as "epistemologically bold," which seems to have been a subconscious admission that he doesn't actually know Augustine well enough to form an opinion.</p><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="text-align: justify;">But proper epistemic humility is in this case not only a question of mundane historical method in terms of the logic of the authors. We are also dealing with the most transcendent mystery of Christian faith: the Holy Trinity. So we must not only respect the logic of the authors themselves but also bear in mind a similar humility in the systematic task. </span><span style="text-align: justify;">I have yet to find a better summary of this challenge than that given by Fr. Jean-Hervé Nicolas in </span><i style="text-align: justify;">Catholic Dogmatic Theology: A Synthesis</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> (Book I of Matthew Minerd's translation, p. 26):</span></div><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>This process [of theological reasoning] is oriented to something more than more complete knowledge of a particular truth, aiming also at a </i>doctrinal synthesis <i>in which truths are illuminated by one another, each being interdependent in its intelligibility within the whole. When such a synthesis is concretely realized by a theology or by a "school," we call it a "system." A system cannot coincide exactly with a </i>doctrinal synthesis<i>, which is an ever-sought objective ideal which will never be realized, <b>for its inaccessible model is the transcendent, simple, and total Divine Truth</b>. This means that a system is only an imperfect realization of the ideal synthesis, one ever to be perfected, corrected, and supplemented.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>Each system (at least every system that merits being taken into consideration) sketches out and organizes its synthesis around true principles, and a given system has the merit of placing its central principles in relief, though it sometimes attributes a role to them that other, equally true principles are misunderstood. This is what unbalances its synthesis and is a cause of errors in its conclusions. A theological system is fully valid (even at its own particular level as an ever-developing system) only if it is truly capable of integrating all the truth found in other systems as in capable of eliminating its own errors.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>Nevertheless, they are distinct, and theological pluralism is a fact. Let us only say that through all of its effort, each theological system (as well as each theologian) aims to reduce the pluralism to unity without fully succeeding in this task. This effort at reduction can indeed be expressly renounced by the theologian, and some profess that pluralism as such is good and ought to be maintained. Nonetheless, such an effort represents an inseparable aspect of theological investigation and the affirmations or denials to which it leads. Indeed, it is impossible to theologize without affirming and denying, and whoever simultaneously affirms that one statement is true and another false, affirms at the same time that everything that contradicts what he affirms (and that affirms what he denies) is false. On the other hand, a theological statement </i>(<i>a</i> theologoumenon)<i> is never isolated. It necessarily enters into an organized ensemble from which it receives its justification, meaning, and value. In short, is is part of a system. No theologian truly holds that the system that he adopts and that he constructs (for a system takes on a unique form in each person) is equivalent to every other system and can be indiscriminately replaced by any other whatsoever.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;">As against such pluralism, nothing characterizes the "dark path" of Maspero and Coakley so much as the attempt to find one golden philosophical thread running from the Apostles to present-day philosophy, which appears to be a nigh-irresistible temptation. There is almost-universal consent today that the Neo-Thomist historical scholarship, which tried to fit all of Christian history into the Thomistic synthesis, produced numerous and significant historical errors that often dominated historical discourse. But the cure seems to have been worse than the disease in this regard. One alternative has been to assert a rival totalizing synthesis: the Neo-Palamite view of the East has tried to subsume all of Christian history into the essence-energies distinction (starting with Lossky and followed in David Bradshaw's <i>Arisotle East and West</i>, Aristeides Papadakis's <i>Crisis in Byzantium</i>, and Philip Sherrard's <i>The Greek East and the Latin West</i>). This is essentially just a rival metaphysical system to Thomism, and it produces the same sort of theological blind spots. But in some ways, what Maspero and Coakley are doing is even worse.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The more pernicious school of thought here is that of modern existentialism, primarily because it doesn't hold itself out as a school. This is what I have in mind for the "dark path." Modern existentialism is driven by the Kantian separation of <i>noumena</i> (thought) and <i>phenomena</i> (experience). This is a peculiarly modern problem; in a significant way, pre-modern philosophers had such a clear understanding of the connection between being and intelligibility that they never would have believed something as bizarre about human reason. Unfortunately, this alien (and very contemporary) way of thinking is now pervasive among systematic and moral theologians. (For the implications of this methodology in moral theology, I refer the reader to Matthew Levering's <i>The Abuse of Conscience</i>.) The notable characteristic of this methodology is an emphasis on experience as the "true" or "ontological" reality that logic and reason don't actually reach. In the Trinitarian context, this results in a completely disproportionate focus on categories like "personalism," "relationality," "mysticism," and "love" that are perceived to be associated with this ineffable "real" experience, while the "logical" and the "systematic" can be no more than poor descriptions of the underlying reality.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Probably the worst offenders here are John Zizioulas and John Behr. Zizioulas, of course, introduced the "social Trinity" model, which overemphasizes the category of person. While those such as Maspero and Coakley may not follow that model to its extreme, they retain the disproportionate emphasis on the relational and the personal. For such historians, the assertion that the Cappadocian theology, with its particular emphasis on the category of <i>hypostasis</i>, is simply the definition of Trinitarian theology is an irresistible temptation. And while such post-Kantian historians often claim to reject the de Régnon paradigm of "Latins start from the essence, and Greeks start from the person," they do so because they denigrate the formal science of metaphysics (<i>noumena</i>) to the point that they cannot even imagine even Western Fathers pursuing it. It is not clear how turning the Fathers into proto-existentialists is any better than trying to turn them into proto-Thomists.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Behr's post-Kantian approach goes to an even further extreme, and Ayres's rejoinder to Behr's critique is telling. Behr thinks of Augustine as inaugurating a "modern paradigm," which as Ayres observes as invoking a "fairly standard account of the divisions between Eastern and Western Christianity." Ayres does not explicitly detect the post-Kantian disdain for <i>noumena</i> here, but he does pick up on "the Barthian character of Behr's Orthodoxy." According to Ayres, Behr's approach results in "an overly restrictive notion of the shape of appropriate Christian discourse, one that hampers our reading of the pro-Nicenes," exactly as Maspero's ends up doing. I agree with Ayres that the "central question of interpretation and appropriation" is "to what extent is an engagement with Nicene theology an engagement with a theological culture in many ways deeply alien to that shaped by the modern post-Enlightenment discourses of academic theology?" There are those like Ayres, Barnes, and Anatolios who are sensitive to this question, and there are those like Maspero and Coakley who are all too eager to take for granted the post-Kantian existential approach.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Suffice it to say I do not think the post-Kantian approach is successful as a historical methodology. In many ways, it is even less accurate than the triumphalist approaches of the Neo-Thomists and the later Neo-Palamites, who at least give careful attention to the metaphysical concepts of their own paradigms. In the end, any accurate metanarrative must recognize theological pluralism and conceptual diversity, because that is an undeniable fact of both history and our present experience. That is the lesson that we <i>should</i> learn from modern philosophy: the map is not the territory. In other words, our descriptions of the things are not the things themselves. From that perspective, we can recognize, <i>contra</i> Neo-Thomism and Neo-Palamism, that no formal synthesis can perfectly describe its object, while still not going to the post-Kantian extreme that the entire idea of metaphysics is theologically inferior to existentialist/personalist philosophy.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">We can pursue an alternative to this sort of totalizing discourse about the faith. As prudent Christians, we should take into that systematics will necessarily founder on the mystery of the Trinity, and it is exactly here that the "inaccessible model" that is "the transcendent, simple and total Divine Truth" must prevent a complete doctrinal synthesis. (For that matter, any formal system cannot help but be incomplete according to Gödel, but that limitation is even more acute here.) With respect to affirmations in the context of Trinity, we are necessarily forced to rely on <i>paraconsistent logic</i>, a set of formal affirmations that are <i>subcontrary</i> or, said another way, do not follow Leibniz's law of identity (<i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., that two identical objects are indiscernible). This is simply the case because the assertions that "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God; the Father is not the Son or the Holy Spirit, the Son is not the Father and the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is not the Father and the Son" are contradictory if we interpret them all according to the same rules. If there are no formal limits on the assertions we make in this context, then the concept of a systematic Trinitarian theology would be reduced to nonsense. Yet in turn, whatever formal limits we employ concerning divine transcendence will typically be axioms that cannot be proved, meaning there will be a necessary theological pluralism as Nicolas suggests. If we do not even give the Fathers the same conceptual space that we would allow for ourselves, it is unlikely that we will understand them. But if we do allow them that space, then pluralism is only to be expected.</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">But this still leaves the question: how do these totalizing metanarratives, these "historical tropes" in Lewis Ayres's parlance, become so dominant in the field of history? I would say that the same thing has happened with a "Cappadocian victory" paradigm as happened with the de Régnon paradigm. A couple of influential authors reached a certain conclusion, and that conclusion is uncritically accepted by later historians. No one actually checks to see whether the interpretive grid can be derived from the original texts anymore. Then the alien interpretive grid is used to interpret the author's other texts, so that it becomes a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy of what the author will say. Until someone points out that this reading simply makes no sense in the author's context based on the actual texts, the historical trope continues to dictate the interpretation.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Unfortunately, it does not help that two of the most influential Catholic theologians on the <i>filioque</i>, Fr. Yves Congar and Fr. Jean-Miguel Garrigues, both used exactly this methodology. Fr. Thomas Crean in his book <i>Vindicating the Filioque </i>(p. 197) confesses his perplexity at Congar's claim that "for St. Cyril, the Holy Spirit receives his 'hypostatic existence' from the Father alone, but his 'substantial existence' from the Father and the Son." As Crean points out in a footnote, "Congar does not here quote or cite any texts in support of his claim. Likewise, Jean-Miguel Garrigues claims that there are 'innumerable texts' in which Cyril distinguishes <i>ekporeusis</i> and <i>proienai</i> or <i>hyparchein</i> (to exist), but those he quotes in support of this claim do not in fact draw any such distinction, or even use the word <i>ekporeusis</i>." This is how the "Cappadocian victory" narrative gained traction among Catholic theologians even to the point of dominating the 1995 Clarification -- a couple of renowned theologians took it for granted, and it has influenced the exegesis of Latin and Alexandrian authors ever since.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">As I will argue, the better alternative is to see a necessary pluralism in systematic theology that applies to Constantinople as well. Then we can then turn to the task of intrepreting the Fathers and hearing what they have to say.</div><p style="text-align: justify;"><u>II. The pluralist road to Constantinople</u></p><p style="text-align: justify;">One interpretive challenge is that the Fathers of the Church did not reach the level of systematization that would be called a doctrinal synthesis or a theological school. They were engaged in a much more straightforward task: defending their faith against assertions that it was false or even absurd. That required the use of logic, metaphysics, and epistemology, but the use of those concepts was both practical and Scriptural as opposed to primarily systematic. There is a modern bias against such "polemical" works in a way that privileges the systematic Ivory Tower model of theology, as if the exigencies of conflicts with heretics somehow produced less thoughtful reflections, even though the polemical need was likely the impetus for writing such things at all. It is why works like Augustine's <i>De Trinitate</i> and Gregory of Nyssa's <i>Ad Ablabium</i> are interpreted as supposedly "more reflective" or "mature" and given canonical status over and above their more clearly polemical works, regardless of chronological order. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The fact that the patristic authors had a way of doing theology coherently but not systematically is why, for example, Barnes can bluntly say "Augustine's Trinitarian theology did not survive the Middle Ages" and "when the theology of the 'historical Augustine' is articulated by me or others, there is bafflement about where and how such a theology, or means of doing theology, 'fits.'" It is not so much that there are not Augustinian ideas or that systems built on these ideas cannot be legitimate developments of his thought so much as that those developments are not what Augustine himself had in mind. Barnes describes this process as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>There were, undoubtedly, some years after Augustine's death during which theologians worked with the same intellectual concepts at hand; for approximately two centuries after Augustine's death there were Homoian (Arian) bishops in North Africa; sea lanes to southern Europe remained open; and whoever the Western "emperor" was that held jurisdiction over North Africa, he would claim to be "Roman." Over time, each of these would fall away until none were left. The complete text of </i>De Trinitate<i> was replaced by piecemeal quotation -- which for centuries was the only way the text was known. New philosophies and conceptual idioms dominated reading, and a form of exegesis and commentary designed to "read" fragmented texts developed: scholasticism. Through this hermeneutic, "fragmentation" was lost as the disparate remains of previous books were woven into new unities by the emerging European culture of scholasticism, but the sense that something important might be missing was covered over by the intellectual seams that grew stronger as the independent vigor of post-Roman, neo-Latin cultures grew. Thomas and others developed sophisticated and dense literature based upon individual tropes originally found in the textual fragments. Somewhere in all this benign reception the logic and doctrine of Augustine's Trinitarian theology as expressed in his writings was denatured and reinvented as a hermeneutical bridge connecting islands of Augustinian thought otherwise lost or submerged. It is impressive to note that this "Augustinian Trinitarian theology" -- even though a construct -- as in itself strong enough and profound enough to last half a millennium -- and counting.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;">His footnote goes on:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Trinitarian theology expressed by Augustine in his books (376-429) was received by a theological culture unable to read them intelligently. A coherent body of thought emerged through the isogenesis of brilliant minds in the Middle Ages; but this coherent body did not derive in any substantial way from the patristic texts. The received theology was projected onto the historical texts as they emerged. Difference between what Augustine "said" in 412 and what he was perceived to have "said" in any text existing in 1412 (or 1912) that were accounted for were glossed over ("existent relations"?) by the scholastics. The theology of scholastic Augustine was received by all sides as the theology of the historical Augustine, and still is today. "Scholastic Augustine" who taught, e.g., a Neoplatonic triad of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, etc., became one of the most enduring straw [men] in history, since, e.g., </i>The Testimony of the Twelve Patriarchs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Other than to add that I suspect Boethius was in many ways "the first medieval" and the great synthesizer of Augustine's Latin tradition, analogous to Maximus's role in the Byzantine tradition, I completely agree with Barnes. Even viewed collectively, the orthodox Fathers supporting the doctrine of Nicaea cannot even individually, much less collectively, be thought to define one <i>metaphysical</i> <i>school</i> or even a properly <i>doctrinal synthesis</i>, especially since essentially none of the authors themselves were trying to do so. Further, we still have to bear in mind the caution raised by Nicolas that <i>each individual intrepreter brings a slightly different interpretation to the broader school</i>. At best, one might note common logical structures in the theological and polemical arguments, as Barnes does well in his summary of Latin theology and, for that matter, as Maspero does well with Syriac and Cappadocian theology. Yet even relatively loose categories, such as "pro-Nicene" (Lewis Ayres) or "neo-Nicene" and "pro-Nicene" (Barnes), might be more systematic that the texts permit. For example, as Anatolios pointed out in his critique of Ayres, Ayres's criteria would exclude St. Athanasius.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Anatolios himself seems to have been the most successful at identifying these common logical structures, since he has defined the distinction between Nicenes and Arians based on how each school defines the unity of the persons in <i>Retrieving Nicaea</i>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>The essential distinction, from within the common ground of confession of the Trinity as differentiated unity, was whether the divine Trinity was united according to a unity of being, or by unity of will. To say this is not to prejudge the question of just how that unity was conceived; it does not presume, for example, that numerical oneness or equality is a necessary feature of that unity so conceived.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Within Anatolios's broader taxonomy, distinctions of the kind that Ayres and Barnes draw become more reasonable. In other words, if we take the concept of <i>unity of being</i> as primary, then arguments from the concept of <i>physis,</i> one power-one <i>physis</i>, and inseparable operations can be considered various accounts of that kind of unity, which in turn produce these less-than-systematic philosophical schools. <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/the-filioque-impasse-resolved.html" target="_blank">My own proposal</a> for analyzing the <i>filioque </i>dispute fits into the broader context of orthodoxy that Anatolios defines. In terms of historical support, this approach finds support in Russell Friedman's tracing of two medieval models of Trinitarian relations back to Aristotelian philosophy that would have been known in the post-Nicene period. Specifically, those models are as follows:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"></p><ul><li style="text-align: justify;"><u>Relational</u>: The personal properties of the Trinity are inherently relational, based on the fact that every relational property by its nature logically involves opposition, <i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., relating to something else. This is exemplified by Rome and Alexandria and typified by the logical method of Porphyry.</li><li style="text-align: justify;"><u>Emanational</u>: The modes of production are the reasons for relational properties. This is exemplified by Cappadocian theology and typified by the vertical causality of Neoplatonism.</li></ul><div style="text-align: justify;">In each case, the model is built on an analogy from knowledge of created things, but the ultimate object of description is, in the words of Nicolas, "the transcendent, simple, and total Divine Truth." So this is precisely the kind of area where we would expect different philosophical schools to develop. One of the most obvious considerations in distinguishing them is the concept of relation: there is a sense in which relation is used to express the distinction between two things (relational), and there is a sense in which relation is used to express the natural connection between them, as offspring to parents (emanational). In the medieval context, this corresponds to the dispute between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure on whether the Father is Father because He is distinct (relational) or whether the Father establishes the distinction between the Persons because He is Father (emanational). Neither of those senses is false, but in the application of the concept to the Trinity, the relational model emphasizes distinction, and the emanational model emphasizes natural likeness. And as we expect, there is a constellation of real experiences, including liturgical experiences, around which these schools develop. </div><p></p><p style="text-align: justify;">In that regard, those same emphases can become limitations when each model gives an account of participation in the divine nature -- the relational account is challenged to give an account of likeness in a model built on distinction, and the emanational account is likewise challenged to give an account of distinction in a model based on divine likeness. Both models end up relying on the categories of activity and power <i>vis-à-vis </i>creation, but in fundamentally different ways. The relational model will emphasize <i>immediacy</i> and <i>immanence of activity --</i> that all created being images the activity of the shared power of the divine nature, but to a finite degree in accordance with the respective finite natures being mixed with non-being. Thus, the account of participation is based on the participation of an effect in its cause. The emanational model will emphasize <i>energeiai</i>, characteristic modes of divine activity that are participable by finite natures and united in their distinction within God. Note that, even here, the distinction between the models is one of emphasis, since created activity in likeness to divine activity is common to both the relational and the emanational models. But the relational mode is focused on the act of being itself (<i>esse</i>), while the emanational model is focused on the diverse ways of being. (This prefigures the much-later distinction between Thomist <i>analogia entis</i> and the Scotist formal distinction.)</p><p style="text-align: justify;">This general recognition of theological pluralism in the period between Nicaea and Constantinople, of which my own theory is only one isolated example, is the most profound and productive historiographical achievement of the last fifty years. It rivals St. John Henry Newman's recognition that the "Arian" name covered a large and diverse span of theological and philosophical positions. Numerous similarly pluralist positions have been widely accepted as successful. For example, Grillmeier's <i>Logos-sarx</i> and <i>Logos-anthropos</i> models have held up relatively well under critical scrutiny. Norman Russell's magisterial work on deification shows that the later Alexandrian views of Athanasius and Cyril, which he called Alexandrian Tradition II, are very different from the Cappadocian model. Yet despite this recognition of pluralism in various other areas, on the specific subject of the <i>filioque</i>, the sides remain unrepentantly retrograde. It is unclear how groups with such distinct understandings of Christology and soteriology would somehow converge around a single Trinitarian pneumatology, yet this is the prevailing theory. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is particularly inconvenient for this theory that quarreling over the "right" philosophical position dates back to the post-Nicene/pre-Constantinopolitan era. For example, St. Athanasius was better able to relate to the semi-modalism of Marcellus of Ancyra while St. Basil had more in common with the homoiousians, which was a point of conflict over their respective models. The disagreement on philosophical matters came to a head between Pope Damasus and Basil, as it is described by Barnes:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>In his letters to Basil, Damasus is vehement that a Trinitarian formula of one </i>ousia<i>, three </i>hypostases<i>, is unacceptable to Westerners. It is, however, Damasus' positive statements that are my concern here, although he articulates only two of the basic themes I have been following. The first is his use of power language to identify and describe the basis of unity in the Trinity. Typical of his formulae are, "the Trinity of one power, one majesty, one divinity, and substance so that their power is inseparable" and "[the] Father, Son and Holy Spirit are of one deity, one power, one figure, and one substance." Note the relative lack of emphasis on "one substance" -- that the conclusion of Damasus' first list is a statement that the power among the Three is inseparable. This is not a Trinitarian theology that pivots on the notion of substance.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;">This provides the background of Barnes's summary of Constantinople:</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i>It is said that the letter from the Council in Constantinople in 382 written to Damasus and Western bishops was "intended to be compatible with Western statements" </i>[<i>citing Ayres, </i>Nicaea and Its Legacy]<i>. The doctrinal summary begins with: "according to ... [our] faith there is one Godhead </i>[theotes]<i>, Power</i> [dunamis]<i>, and essence </i>[ousia]<i> of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; the dignity being equal, and the majesty being equal in three perfect </i>hypostases<i>, i.e., three perfect </i>prosopa<i>." Notice that power is mentioned before essence. All Western Nicenes used a Latin word similar in meaning to </i>theotes<i> to speak about the unity of the Trinity </i>(<i>e.g., </i>deitas<i>, </i>divinitas)<i>, but there is little that they could argue from it. Many Western Nicenes used the Latin equivalents of </i>dunamis<i> to speak about the unity of the Trinity and to argue for it, and some used it to argue for the unity of the Trinity. The letter equates </i>hypostases <i>with</i> prosopa, <i>implicitly allowing that either could be used. If the letters of Damasus to Basil and the Eastern bishops are accurate, then that Greek party's refusal to allow any word but </i>hypostasis<i> for the formula "three what?" ended with Basil's death or the council in 381. Damasus and Latin theologies of "one power, three persons" won.</i></p><p style="text-align: justify;">This is not to say that Damasus "won" in the sense that the Latin view became the standard of orthodoxy as against the Greek view. What won is the idea that multiple schools of thought could coexist within the sphere of orthodoxy, a lesson that is repeatedly forgotten and relearned in Christian history. Along those lines, Nathaniel McCallum, at around <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2IxOteF9js&t=1247s" target="_blank">the 21:00 mark</a>, explains that even the Constantinopolitan creed itself at least textually appears to be based on a recension of the creed of Nicaea I made by St. Epiphanius to try to build consensus among the pro-Nicene faction. Specifically, Epiphanius is trying to reconcile Nicaea with St. Cyril of Jerusalem's local creed, the latter of which ends up being the textual basis of Epiphanius's own version. In order to minimize conflict, that version essentially just adds <i>homoousios</i> to the Jerusalem creed, and this irenic overture seems to have been the basis of union in Constantinople. This is perfectly in line with the theological pluralist view, which I believe to be the credible account of the facts as they actually are.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I want to highly several points that McCallum makes that are directly relevant to theological pluralism in the context of the <i>filioque</i>. First, Damasus's own creed, based on the best available textual evidence, included the <i>filioque </i>explicitly as early as 377, so that the pluralism between Damasus and Basil by concerning Constantinople is directly relevant to pluralism on the <i>filioque</i>. Second, as I mentioned before, the final language of the Creed of Constantinople changed the language <i>para tou Patros ekporeuetai</i> (John 15:26) to replace <i>para</i> with <i>ek</i>. The Johannine source of that preposition is Rev. 22:1: <i>ekporeumenon ek tou thronou tou Theou kai tou Arniou</i> (proceeds from (out of) the throne of God and the Lamb). (We will see that the use of <i>ek</i> in the context of the Spirit proceeding from the Son is characteristic of the relational model.) Third, the Cappadocians and the Antiochene theologians more broadly are lukewarm to this Johannine tradition and even the Johannine authorship of Revelation, preferring to rely on Paul's "Spirit of God" and the Old Testament in their own pneumatology. All of this means that the text of Constantinople is much more likely evidence of a compromise <i>between multiple theological traditions</i> than a victory for the Cappadocian paradigm.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">We have arrived at the crossroads of the entire <i>filioque</i> debate, and that crossroads is similar to the one that faced in Barnes's seminal article "De Régnon Reconsidered" (reproduced as a chapter in in <i>Augustine and Nicene Theology</i>). There is, on the one hand, a theory that everyone seems to take for granted but has scant support in the texts of the authors. On the other hand, when the works of these authors are considered holistically and in context, a coherent picture emerges from each that simply does not fit within the broader metanarrative. And just as the West was caricatured as a result of the de Régnon paradigm, the Alexandrian theologians have repeatedly been treated only as less-consistent Cappadocians. Maspero is certainly among those holding that view based on his read of both Athanasius and Cyril, but when the Alexandrian conceptual framework is examined in the texts themselves, an entirely different picture emerges.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><u>III. Theological pluralism: a case study in Alexandria</u></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Perhaps no theological tradition has been abused by the revisionist history of "Cappadocian victory" than that of Alexandria. Even historians more sensitive to historical diversity, such as Lewis Ayres, have not entirely overcome the tendency to see Athanasius as a waystation on the way to later Trinitarian theology, as opposed to the source of a fully-developed pneumatology in its own right. But this underrates the coherence of Athanasius's contribution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Maspero's theory actually dates back to his earlier chapter in <i>Rethinking Trinitarian Theology</i>; he believes that an objection raised by the "Tropici" (a name Athanasius gives to a group denying the divinity of the Holy Spirit) has merit. The Tropici assert that if the Spirit related to the Son in the same way that the Son relates to the Father, a theme that Athanasius often uses in referring to the Spirit as the "image of the Son," it would make the Spirit a grandson. The reason that Maspero thinks that this objection has force is that he situates Athanasius within the Origenist philosophical paradigm of the Cappadocians rather than locating Athanasius's own philosophical paradigm. That error is fatal to the accuracy of his theory, since Athanasius has already dealt with the issue in the context of his own theological system.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">To begin, Maspero follows Simonetti's account of Origen as showing a tension between two models of Trinitarian causality: the vertical (Platonic) and the triangular (Semitic).</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZNPB1XdiBYukQaL1mTt4YP9ttpg4xJztdBY2CrPdp9ROVOCZsQDtdPbaILuYhq0uwr6_8B3ettrId4gDAeusnRm4ljlfn5KOHEoxSwacWI9TvmRxN6ZVhSFFiYcBkcxY2nltSCDqzKZakrGbce1PMM8H_20RZIhoT24DHKFvQYKc9BFb4bF6DiQ/s1096/Maspero%20Trinity.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1096" data-original-width="588" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZNPB1XdiBYukQaL1mTt4YP9ttpg4xJztdBY2CrPdp9ROVOCZsQDtdPbaILuYhq0uwr6_8B3ettrId4gDAeusnRm4ljlfn5KOHEoxSwacWI9TvmRxN6ZVhSFFiYcBkcxY2nltSCDqzKZakrGbce1PMM8H_20RZIhoT24DHKFvQYKc9BFb4bF6DiQ/s320/Maspero%20Trinity.jpeg" width="172" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The vertical model involves Origen's Middle Platonist notion of the hierarchy of being. Maspero believes that Athanasius's notion of <i>physis</i> did important work in separating the divine nature from the Platonic "great chain of being," but it was still based on a vertical model without the balancing "tension" of the triangular model. This allegedly made Athanasius's account vulnerable to the charge of making the Spirit into a grandchild, and it was only the Cappadocians, especially Gregory of Nyssa, who fully incorporated the idea of relation from the triangular model. In particular, according to Maspero, the Cappadocians introduced the concept of relations from the triangular model into the very being (substance) of God and used the hypostatic personal properties to distinguish those relations. It should be easy to see at this point that this account fits well into the emanational model that Friedman describes, and I cannot fault Maspero's description of how the Cappadocians developed that model. Yet Maspero's overemphasis on the post-Kantian categories of "person" and "relation" causes him to disproportionately weight the accomplishments of this model as the very definition of Constantinopolitan pneumatology. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In particular, the application of this model <i>beyond</i> the Cappadocian school is based on Maspero's inexplicable failure to account for two significant facts: (1) the Alexandrian and Latin theologians rejected the idea of vertical causality within the Trinity outright, thus completely avoiding this problematic Origenist dynamic, and (2) the Alexandrian and Latin use of relation (especially the image-prototype relation) was not the Platonic Origenist version. Maspero's view ends up being nothing but the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm at work, and a careful study of the Alexandrian theologians shows the inaccuracy of the narrative.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>A. Antecedents: Irenaeus of Lyons</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">There is a general sense that Athanasius either read Irenaeus or was at least indirectly influenced by his work. In any case, Anatolios has convincingly shown the conceptual similarity between the two, so there is clear evidence of some kind of common tradition with Athanasius even apart from a direct or indirect influence. Especially given Irenaeus's connection to St. John the Theologian and the Johannine corpus, it is unquestionable that Irenaeus was influential for the reception of the Johannine Scriptures, especially along the Roman-Alexandrian axis. So as a matter of historical context, Irenaeus is essential.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Two of Barnes's students wrote dissertations on Irenaeus's Trinitarian theology: Anthony Briggman (published as <i>Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit</i>) and Jackson Lashier (<i><a href="https://epublications.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1108&context=dissertations_mu" target="_blank">The Trinitarian Theology of Irenaeus of Lyons</a> </i>later<i> </i>published as <i>Irenaeus on the Trinity</i>). Both contribute to the most relevant part of the history for our purposes, which is Irenaeus's interaction with Theophilus of Antioch that leads to his "two hands" theology. Briggman makes out the case that Irenaeus likely became acquainted with Theophilus's work during the composition of <i>Adversus Haereses</i>, after he moved away from Asia Minor. Lashier points out that this is plausible given the commerce between Antioch and Lyons.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Ireneaus develops a finely-woven conceptual structure for his pneumatology that includes three key elements:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">1. The Spirit is a co-Creator based on Psalm 33/2:6 and therefore a divine co-actor.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">2. The creation of man by God is "hands on" in a unique way, with the Son and the Spirit (the two hands) providing intimate contact between the divine nature and the human clay (<i>plasma</i>). This is why man is uniquely suited for deification, an extension of this creative act.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">3. The Spirit has a unique role of perfecting or completing creation (sometimes described with "adorning" or similar terms).</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Ireneaus's pneumatology involves a strong identification of the Holy Spirit with <i>Sophia</i> in the Old Testament, in like fashion to the identification of the Son with the <i>Logos</i>. He also used the potter-clay image of creation in Scripture (probably from Justin Martyr, as Briggman argues), but the subsequent use of the "two hands" imagery bringing these concepts together seems to have come from Theophilus, and this is what Irenaeus incorporates into his own anti-Gnostic argument. For Ireneaus, the "two hands" are used in an anti-subordinationist fashion to show unity; the work of the hands is the work of the whole potter (in this case, the whole Trinity acting as one, the one Creator God) in intimate contact with the clay. It is that intimacy and immediacy in the process of material creation that uniquely characterizes humankind as an object of deification and recapitulation; there is no mediation between God and man but only the direct contact of the One God with creation. Any kind of mediation, including any sort of graded hierarchy between the potter and his own hands, would defeat the logical structure of the argument, especially against the Gnostics. This is a God who gets His hands dirty in the work of material creation in a very real sense.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Here we have to think of Irenaeus's anti-Gnostic context. He sees very early on that any mediator between God and creation, whether the Son or the Spirit, is immediately problematic. This is why he is focused on the <i>agency</i> of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in creation, the "let us" of Genesis 1:26, because any hint of passivity will open the door to the Gnostic hierarchy of aeons. For Irenaeus, the Creator requires three co-equal divine agents united in one divine simplicity without gap or separation and dependent on nothing outside of God. This is why, as Briggman describes, Irenaeus identifies the Holy Spirit with the "<i>Sophia</i> of God" in his conflict with the "<i>sapientia</i> of [the Gnostic] Valentinus." Irenaeus makes this identification despite the potential complications with St. Paul (1 Cor. 1:24 -- "Christ the power of God and the <i>wisdom</i> of God") and despite the sharp distinction with the prevailing <i>Logos</i> theology of the time and the resulting Spirit Christology. Among Christian writers, probably due to the influence of the Pauline language, only Theophilus seems to have expressly equated the person of the Spirit with <i>Sophia</i>, likely drawing from a common Jewish <i>Sophia</i> tradition more frequently associated with the Son (see Briggman at p. 128). For Irenaeus's purposes, it is enough to confirm his approach to see Theophilus bringing the potter-clay and Spirit-<i>Sophia </i>concepts together in this image of the two hands, even though Theophilus is not actually using the image in the same way as Irenaeus. That is the conceptual connection that Irenaeus needs to complete his anti-Gnostic argument.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Briggman's summary of that synthesis at p. 146-47 is apt:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The importance of the identification of the Spirit as one of the Hands of God and as Wisdom in Irenaeus' theology of the Spirit cannot be overestimated. Each of these titles entails the creative activity of the Spirit, the divinity of Spirit, and the distinction and equality of the Spirit in relation to the Son. The attribution of creative activity to the Holy Spirit is the most foundational and significant aspect of Irenaeus' pneumatology.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The identification of the Spirit as a Hand and as Wisdom reveals the Jewish character of Irenaeus' pneumatology. It also shows that he adapts and develops the traditions he adopts to his own purposes. In the case of his identification of the Spirit as Wisdom the adaptation of the tradition involves Greek philosophical concepts. The utilization of these traditions by Irenaeus goes far toward showing his theology of the Spirit to be the most complex Jewish-Christian pneumatology of the period.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">We can also see this as a very early example of Christian pluralism in pneumatology. First, we can consider Theophilus's own sources for this Jewish "two hands" image, as reported by Briggman:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Whatever particular source Theophilus depended upon, his location in Antioch also suggests one that came from Asia Minor. Additional support for a tradition in Asia Minor may be found in Robinson's observation that the hands imagery is also found in the </i>Clementine Homilies<i>, whose date is unclear but whose provenance seems to be in the East, perhaps even Syria. Both </i>Sirach<i> and </i>4 Ezra<i>, which contain the Hands motif or similar language, further substantiate the presence and receptivity of the tradition in the East, and their subsequent translation into Syriac shows a continuing presence in Asia Minor. All this being said, the presence of the Hands tradition in Asia Minor does not preclude its existence elsewhere, as is evident from its presence in the </i>First Epistle of Clement 33.4<i>, but neither do I desire to make such an argument. I am content, at this point, to show that the possibility of a source from Asia Minor is not without foundation and that it is also possible that Theophilus' source was Jewish</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">But as Lashier points out, there is a difference in kind between how this Jewish dyad of Son and Spirit, the Semitic triangular model that Maspero has found, is appropriated in Irenaeus. Although there is no subordination <i>between</i> Son and Spirit in the triangular model, as there is in the linear/Middle Platonic model, there is still subordination between the Father and the Son-Spirit dyad. This subordination is reflected in the fact that the Holy Spirit's role with respect to creation ends up being diminished with respect to the Father and the Son, including in Theophilus. Lashier thus describes Irenaeus's conceptual innovation over the Apologists (including Theophilus) as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The Trinitarian formula resulting from the retroactive alteration of the binitarian argument of [Adv.] Haer. 2 is quite advanced from the ontologically subordinate hierarchy witnessed in the Apologists' formulas. Unlike his sources, Irenaeus does not rank the three divine entities in descending order. In fact the argument of [Adv.] Haer. 2 indicts Valentinian theology on just this count for this understanding would render the divine nature compound and therefore comprised of gradated and spatially separated divine beings. Rather, in Irenaeus' formula, the Logos/Son and Sophia/Spirit exist in a reciprocally immanent relationship with the Father and with one another, such that the same divine nature encompasses all three entities. The one divinity, or the one spiritual nature that comprises all three entities, makes Father, Son, and Spirit one.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Irenaeus' emphasis on the equality of divinity of the Father, Son, and Spirit explains, in part, his reluctance to address the respective generations of the Second and Third Persons from God. For the Apologists, the generation of the Second and Third Persons served as the basis for their lesser, subordinate divine natures insofar as their generations displayed a temporal beginning to their personal existences. Therefore, in the Apologists' understanding, only the Father was eternally personal and equated with the God of Israel.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>For Irenaeus, the Logos/Son and the Sophia/Spirit are included in the uncreated nature of God/Father because they are eternal. While Irenaeus also believes that the Son and Spirit are generated from the Father, his removal of the time element from this generation allows him to maintain the Son and Spirit's eternal natures. Therefore, Irenaeus remains a monotheist insofar as all three entities are equally God and share one divine, spiritual nature. As Barnes has observed, Irenaeus does not have a category by which to identify the separate existence of the Son and Spirit. Irenaeus believes Father, Son, and Spirit are distinguished, as indicated by the differing roles they play in the economy, but he is much more interested in their unity, such that he fails to develop a separate category approximating "person."</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Lashier further explains Irenaeus's understanding of divine production as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Although he says little directly regarding the generations because of Scripture's silence on the matter, his polemical argument against the Valentinian theory of emanation reveals his understanding of generation as dictated by the spiritual and eternal unity he envisions among God/Father, Logos/Son, and Sophia/Spirit. First, he removes any time element in the process. Although Logos/Son and Sophia/Spirit are generated from God/Father, this generation does not result in a beginning point to their existence. As Logos and as Spirit, they are always with God in a spiritual unity and in agreement with a simple divine nature. Second, he removes any spatial connotations in the process. Although Logos/Son and Sophia/Spirit are generated from God/Father, they do not separate from him or come out of him. They remain in a spiritual and interpenetrating unity with God at all times, even when the Son is incarnate upon earth.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Irenaeus's Logos-Sophia Triadology, with its the "interpenetrating unity" that Lashier calls "reciprocal immanence," already provides the logical structure of the relational model. This conceptual structure is present even though Irenaeus does not articulate a metaphysics of relation or the aetiology of the Persons (or even <i>that</i> they are Persons) in a systematic way. The model centers around three distinct divine agents performing uniquely divine acts (creation, deification) in a reciprocally immanent way that shows their unity as One God. This reciprocal immanence in the economy corresponds to an eternal relational structure in God, who is ontologically distinct from creation. Irenaeus has rejected the emanational model as inherently subordinationist; there is simply no way that Irenaeus can be reconciled with that model. Lashier describes Irenaeus's model of economic action as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Irenaeus further argues for the eternal distinction of God/Father, Logos/Son, and Sophia/Spirit by their distinctive economic functions. <b>Only God/Father is the source of the work</b>; only Logos/Son establishes or brings the work into existence; only Sophia/Spirit arranges or forms that work. ... <b>The result is a functional hierarchy -- God/Father is the source of the work and the two agents perform that work -- that assumes a prior spiritual or ontological unity</b>. To put this understanding in modern Trinitarian terms, for Irenaeus, the economic manifestation of the Trinity depends on the reality of an immanent Trinity, which exists from eternity regardless of the presence of creation.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Irenaeus' theology thus may be considered Trinitarian in the full sense of the word. He believes in the existence of three divine and eternally distinct beings, named God/Father, logos/Son, and Sophia/Spirit. He accounts for both their eternal unity through a common possession of one spiritual nature and their eternal distinction through the generation of the Son and Spirit from the Father and through their different functions in the economy. In Irenaeus' understanding, the two agents' equal divinity with the Father allows them to perform these economic functions.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Irenaeus's Trinitarian theology thus anticipates both the logical structure of relational model and the model's incompatibility with the emanational model, rejecting any kind of realist analogy to production. Moreover, his use of "source" here as the source of the Persons having spirit/power is exactly how the monarchy of the Father appears in the relational model, which is compatible with the throne as the "source" of the river in Rev. 22:1 that proceeds from the throne and the Lamb. This can be contrasted with the emanational model's view of the Father as the source of productions of Persons. Irenaeus here has in mind a source of "spirit," which instead connotes divine power and substance, although it is also the reason for the Persons' existence. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Unfortunately, Irenaeus's explicit Trinitarian model was lost to history within only a generation, contributing to later confusion. Briggman (p. 205) says the following:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>By the time he finished writing, then, Irenaeus had constructed the most complex Jewish-Christian pneumatology of the early Church. The difference that we have seen between his account of the Spirit and the one offered by Justin is an example of the first pneumatological transition that occurred in Christian theology during the second and third centuries. A rudimentary account of the Spirit gave way to a sophisticated pneumatology. The second transition that occurred during this period is marked by the loss of several Jewish traditions that were constituent and critical elements of Irenaeus' theology of the Spirit. The sophisticated pneumatology of Irenaeus gave way to a more rudimentary account of the Spirit. How and why this regression occurred merits further investigation. I will finish this study with a few brief comments which I hope will be a slight contribution to further explorations along these lines.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Theologians of the third and early-fourth centuries no longer identified the Holy Spirit as Wisdom, as one of the Hands of God, or as the Creator. The absence of these themes in Irenaeus' successors should be seen as contributing to the frequent devaluation of the Spirit in their writings, for they no longer had recourse to significant ways of ascribing distinction, equality, eternality, and divinity to the Holy Spirit. The writings of Origen and Tertullian, one generation after Irenaeus, and the works of Novatian, two generations later, illustrate the pneumatological changes that occurred during this period.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Given the relevance to Maspero's use of Origen, we should carefully attend to Briggman's observations (pp. 207-08) about Origen: </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>[The] restriction of the work of the Holy Spirit to the Church alone, in contrast to the activity of the Father and the Son toward all creation, corresponds to the subordination of the Spirit to the Father and the Son. ... The limitation of the Holy Spirit's activity relative to that of the Father and that of the Son is based upon the lower status of the Spirit's being relative to that of the Father and that of the Son. As a result, the fact that Origen withholds creative activity from the Spirit reveals the inferiority of the Spirit relative to the Father and the Son. Indeed, Origen's refusal to ascribe creative activity to the Spirit clears the way for him to regard the Holy Spirit to be the first among the creatures created by the Word. </i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Origen's use of the Semitic triangular model thus uses the older subordinationist understanding exemplified by Theophilus and shows no signs of Irenaeus's anti-subordinationist developments. Much of the subsequent explanatory work for the emanational account was directed to finding an alternative solution to the problem that Irenaeus had already solved in his own way. We will even see St. Basil employ the concept of Spirit as "perfecting cause" in the Origenist sense, despite recognizing the personhood and (lesser) divinity of the Spirit. Maspero has correctly identified the work that Gregory of Nyssa did to try to compensate for this subordinationist tendency. But Maspero is also, at least by all appearances, oblivious to the fact that Irenaeus had already created his own alternative paradigm.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In any case, no one after Irenaeus used the combination of Word-Sophia and "two hands" imagery to establish a Trinitarian theology. The loss of this theory had significant consequences for the following centuries. The ignorance of Irenaeus's warning about subordinationism contributed (<i>via</i> Origen) to the development of a new subordinationism: Arianism. Following that development, there was a need to answer a more sophisticated account of the Demiurge and the polemical use of 1 Cor. 1:24 to show the inferiority of Christ, so it became important to identify the Son (rather than the Spirit) with the divine Wisdom. Moreover, because Arianism affirmed the <i>Logos</i> as Demiurge, merely showing the power of creation, which was the primary purpose of Irenaeus's model, was no longer sufficient to show the full divinity of the divine Persons. For these reasons, the model of Irenaeus would no longer have been suitable in its original form.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">But it was not a complete loss. There were still elements of Irenaean theology that ended up contributing to later syntheses. For example, Barnes notes the following about a possible stude nt of Irenaeus, Hippolytus of Rome:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>"By means of the works," Tertullian says, "the Father will be in the Son and the Son in the Father ... and thus by means of the works </i>[opera] <i>we understand that the Father and the Son are one ... [thus] we should believe that there are two [Persons], but in one power." I think that the anti-monarchian polemical exegesis of John 14:9-10 by Tertullian and Hippolytus is the first time in which a </i>common power, common works<i> theology is articulated in Christian Trinitarian theology</i>, ever.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In <i>The Power of God</i>, Barnes also quotes Hippolytus as saying that "in terms of the economy the display [of the Power] is triple." One could not more succinctly summarize what Lashier calls "reciprocal immanence" in Irenaeus; the "triple" power fits with the functional hierarchy that Irenaeus describes. Hippolytus likewise reasons from economic exercise of divine power to eternal immanent relations in the one divine power (the One God), and the reasoning is in this case fully Trinitarian. So even though Hippolytus lacks any detailed explanation of the Spirit, the Trinitarian structure is there, and it certainly could have come from Irenaeus. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This coordinate exegesis of John 14:9-11 and John 10:30, 37-38 ends up being a mainstay of Latin Trinitarian theology, with the preposition "in" becoming a synonym for this reciprocal immanence. Even though the expressly <i>pneumatological</i> aspects of Irenaeus's model have been pushed to the side in the face of the need to establish the divinity and personhood of the Son, the logical structure is still there to recreate it. In fact, when the need for such a pneumatology arises, that is exactly what happens with St. Nicetas, whom Barnes credits with "first articulat[ing] a Latin theology of the Holy Spirit that fully redresses the limitations of pneumatology since Tertullian" (~370s). From Briggman (p. 215):</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The theology of the Holy Spirit remained weak until the Church once again found a way to define and affirm key features once present in the pneumatology of Irenaeus but subsequently absent in those of the third and early fourth centuries. One way was the reaffirmation of creative activity to the Spirit. Toward the end of the fourth century Nicetas of Remesiana preached a sermon on the Holy Spirit <b>that could almost have been taken from Irenaeus</b>:</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>"We may now turn to the other powers and works of the Holy Spirit. These will help us to realize His nature and greatness. It is only by their works that we know the Father and the Son -- 'believe the works' [John 10:38], said the Lord. In the same way, we shall not fully know the nature of the Holy Spirit unless we know how wonderful are His works... What kind of faith would it be to believe that man's sanctification and redemption depended on the Holy Spirit, but that his formation did not? ... Remember what the Prophet David said of our creation: 'By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth' [Ps. 33:6]. By the 'word' we must here understand the Son, through whom, as St. John declares, 'all things were made' [John 1:3]. And what is 'the spirit of his mouth' if not the Spirit whom we believe to be Holy? Thus, in one text, you have the Lord, the Word of the Lord and the Holy Spirit making the full mystery of the Trinity.... [I]t adds to the glory of the Father to refer the creation of all things to a Word of which He is the Father or to a Spirit of which He is the source. The fact remains that when His Word and Spirit create, it is He who creates all things. The Trinity, then, creates."</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">I believe the Alexandrians (Athanasius, Didymus, and Cyril, not Origen and Clement) were even more faithful to Irenaeus's model than the Latins were, adding to it the later concepts of nature and person. Specifically, they preserved the focus on the special account of the creation of man and its obverse, deification/recapitulation, as opposed to the more general "works" of John 10 and 14, and the divine activity is viewed explicitly in terms of reciprocal immanence. They also retain Irenaeus's strong version of the Creator/creature divide and the resulting anti-subordinationist understanding of the Father's monarchy. This Irenaean legacy also distinguishes the later Alexandrian model from the older triangular model associated with Origen. And as the Latins did, the Alexandrians will fill in the missing concept of "person" (in place of "agent") and "nature" (in place of "spirit") in Irenaeus's model, while preserving the fundamental relational structure.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>B. The contemporary: Didymus the Blind</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In considering Maspero's position, we turn first to Athanasius's contemporary Didymus. Especially with the Irenaean context, Didymus demonstrates that Alexandrian theology did not use Origen's Platonic understanding of participation (metaxy) between the Trinitarian Persons, at least not without significant modification. Kellen Plaxco, another student of Barnes, wrote a dissertation <i><a href="https://epublications.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1634&context=dissertations_mu" target="_blank">Didymus the Blind, Origen, and the Trinity</a></i> that traces the radical break in Alexandrian theology between Origen and Didymus, exemplifying the view which proved enormously influential for both Alexandrian and Roman theology. This Alexandrian-Roman school is precisely where I attribute the origin of the relational model. In providing the background for his exposition of Didymus, Plaxco includes a warning that could have been written word-for-word about Maspero's use of the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>As I have mentioned, features attributed to "pro-Nicene" theologians are all evident in writings that date from the 370s and later. Their appearance in </i>On the Holy Spirit <i>has enabled the presumption that Didymus did not compose </i>On the Holy Spirit<i> earlier than the eve of the triumph of pro-Nicene theology ensconced in the Creed of Constantinople, 381. However, that presumption rests on another, namely, that the "Cappadocians" possessed unprecedented genius. But the Cappadocians did not develop their own theological positions in a vacuum, and the premise that any theology resembling theirs must have derived from theirs, is not sound methodologically. Such working assumptions have resulted in Didymus' </i>a priori <i>exclusion from influential treatments of doctrinal development in the fourth century</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">As Plaxco points out, the influence was likely from Didymus to the Cappadocians, not <i>vice versa</i>, especially since St. Gregory Nazianzen may well have met Didymus in person before giving his orations. With respect to the other Cappadocians, Mark DelCogliano's 2010 article "Basil of Caesarea, Didymus the Blind, and the Anti-Pneumatomachian Exegesis of Amos 4:13 and John 1:3" points out that Basil's anti-Pneutmatomachian exegesis of Amos 4:13 follows Didymus's approach in <i>On the Holy Spirit </i>rather than that of Athanasius's <i>Ad Serapion</i>, which has historically been misattributed as the source of both works. More likely is that <i>Ad Serapion</i> and <i>On the Holy Spirit</i> were both written contemporaneously around 360 in response to the same challenge of the "Tropici" that Maspero describes above. This missing link between Didymus and later theology, resulting significantly from the destruction of his Greek works due to his unjust condemnation as a Origenist, has contributed to the blind spot of historians with respect to the Alexandrian-Roman school.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Plaxco's conclusion effectively responds to Maspero's assertions concerning the alleged Origenist background of Alexandrian theology:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>In this study I have argued two points. The first regards the consequences of "participation" for Origen's theology and pneumatology; the second concerns the nature of Didymus's "correction" of such dynamics for a new period in Christian theological development. These two points, taken together, trace a shift from Origen to Didymus. With Origen, it is possible to believe that the Holy Spirit "participates in" the Son, and that the Son "participates in" the Father. With Didymus, no member of the Trinity "participates in" any other; instead, all created beings "participate in" the Trinity as a unified divine cause.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">As Plaxco makes out in detail, one of those rejections is Didymus's rejection of Origen's "graded hierarchy" (Maspero's linear model), and in particular, the rejection of Origen's notion of "image" taken from the Platonist Numenius. Numenius calls the Demiurge an "image" of the "First God" (essentially see as Aristotle's first mover, self-thinking thought), which the Second God images by "imitation" in terms of actualizing what the First God is thinking. The Second God receives the divine nature as a torch passing a flame, being a kind of divine being, but the operations of the First and Second God with this divine nature are distinct. In addition to locating Numenius as the source of Origen's understanding, Plaxco notes the use of the same concept in the anti-monarchian works of Novatian and Clement. The major transition from these anti-monarchian antecedents to later Trinitarian orthodoxy is the shift from <i>imitating the activities of the Father</i> to <i>having the very same power as the Father</i>, where that divine power serves as the delineation between divinity and creation. That corresponds to Anatolios's distinction between unity of will and unity of being, so the transition that Didymus is a broadly Nicene move (following a similar trajectory in Irenaeus). By contrast, the various Arian sects were actually the "conservative" inheritors of Origen's theory, although what they actually inherited was the inherent tension between this Hellenic model and the loving Creator of the New Testament.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This tension with the Greek philiosophy was an important impetus for the Trinitarian development; Christians all realized that, to some degree or another, a choice needed to be made between Athens (the graded hierarchy of vertical causality) and Jerusalem in order to save both. But in that development of an alternative philosophical account to Hellenism, theological pluralism arose almost immediately between the Western and Eastern halves of the Empire. The East of the Cappadocians was more strongly influenced by the Origenist solution (through Gregory Thaumaturgus) harmonized with the Syriac liturgical traditions, while the West was more eclectic both in philosophy and liturgy with a generally Roman background, primarily Stoic, Ciceronian, and Porphyrian. And behind those divisions was an underlying pluralism in the reception of the Jewish tradition with Irenaeus in the West and Theophilus in the East.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Maspero misses this pluralism completely, as far as I can tell, but it is fascinating that he very nearly hits it in his discussion of Origen's exegesis. Specifically, Origen was taking an allegorical interpretation of the two olive trees of Zechariah 4:3 as explicitly teaching the triangular model. The following is Maspero's only mention of Didymus in his entire book, and he says more than he knows here:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>In his commentary on [the two olive trees of] Zechariah, Didymus reveals his awareness of this exegesis of Origen but interprets it in terms of theological "notions of the son and of the Spirit" </i>(oi peri Yiou kai hagiou Pneumatos eisin logoi). <i>For this he cites the authority of the church of Alexandria, probably referring to Athanasius. The semantic shift is evident as is Didymus's intention to avoid any possible misunderstanding regarding the divine nature of the Son and the Spirit by moving from the level of being to that of language.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"> </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Maspero presumably sees this as an example of how the Alexandrians missed the balancing effect of the (Semitic) triangular model, but quite the opposite is the case. Origen is following Theophilus's interpretation of the Son-Spirit dyad, which is subordinationist, and Didymus is following the anti-subordinationist approach (probably from Irenaeus). Didymus's exegesis is also grounded in the Johannine and Hebrew use of apocalyptic to express divine things symbolically but as they actually are (my thanks to Nathaniel McCallum for pointing this out). This is also a mature work of Didymus, one written years after the Council of Constantinople that cites the authority of Athanasius, and it is clear evidence of how Didymus and Athanasius have broken from Origen in favor of the Irenaean and Johannine theology. This unambiguously demonstrates theological pluralism.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This holds for Athanasius as well. Plaxco notes that Athanasius had already interpreted Zechariah 4:5 in his pneumatological work <i>Ad Serapion</i>. While Didymus does not interpret that passage identically, there is no doubt that Didymus has his own similar views in mind when offering a counter-exegesis to Origen here, since both of them take a more abstract and less "realistic" interpretation. Maspero's assertion that Didymus is "moving from the level of being to that of language" is based on the Kantian dichotomy between <i>phenomena </i>and <i>noumena</i>, not anything that can be found in Didymus. Didymus's move is conceptual; he is taking the anti-subordinationist reading of the passage.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In remarking on this passage from Zechariah, Maspero has completely missed that this reflects two <i>Scriptural traditions on Zechariah</i>. As Nathaniel McCallum pointed out in his discussion on the <i>filioque</i>, there is an intimate connection between Revelation and Zechariah as apocalyptic literature that was extremely influential in the Johannine tradition. Maspero recognizes the <i>Syriac</i> reception of Zechariah as part of an overall dyad tradition, which fits well with the Cappadocian model, but ignores the <i>Johannine </i>tradition connecting Zechariah to Revelation. This is yet another example of simply ignoring the theological pluralism that went into Constantinople in service of the "Cappadocian victory" interpretation.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">At the conceptual level, Didymus shows a conscious rejection of the philosophical model on which Origen's exegesis is based, which shows the distinctive Alexandrian-Nicene theology in its full development. It is not a question of moving from the level of being to <i>language</i> but rather a move between two <i>conceptual models</i>, mirroring the conceptual shift on the Son-Spirit dyad from Theophilus to Irenaeus. Note that, based on Didymus's counter-exegesis of Zechariah, Origen's triangular model was considered just as subordinationist in Didymus's eyes as the so-called "linear" model. For Didymus, this subordinationism would break the immanent relational structure and the creature-Creator distinction on which his argument for consubstantiality is based. Theredore, the problem Didymus has with Origen was not the conflict of linear versus triangular, but rather Origen's subordinationist interpretation of the Father's monarchy in both models. The Alexandrian-Roman and Cappadocian schools oriented themselves around two very different ways to address the problem of subordinationism. Unlike the Cappacodian model, Didymus is following his Irenaean and Johannine tradition on this point, having in mind an immanent relational structure for the Trinity like Rev. 22:1 and using that relational structure to interpret Zechariah.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Referring back to my previous article on causality, the conceptual distinction Didymus is raising here corresponds to the metaphysically thin and metaphysically thick accounts of the relational and emanational models. Origen is reading these kinds of images as strong affirmations of the Father's uniqueness (the lampstand as compared to the olive trees), taking the created analogies more literally. This is similar to how the emanational model takes the analogy to creaturely production more literally. Didymus's response is more abstract relative to the created analogy; it is at the level of <i>logoi</i>, concepts. There is no way (or need) for Didymus to integrate the linear and triangular models in his own logical model, because his model is already built on a concept of relations that do not involve subordination.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The difference in principles from a philosophical perspective can be traced to the radical divine transcendence around which the relational account is built. The metaphysically thin analogy reflects that the inner-Trinitarian relations are on the other side of the Creator-creature divide, so that we can glean only very basic logical connections from the divine activities in creation, which are "causal" only by remote analogy. We are operating in the heavenly realm of the apocalyptic: the things that we can say only with symbols. By contrast, the metaphysically thick account of the emanational model presumes more qualitative knowledge based on the Scriptural terms used, much like Origen's use of the Semitic models. Maspero misses the difference between these theological models entirely.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In terms of distinguishing Didymus's use of relations from the modernist thinking of Maspero and Coakley, which sees "hierarchy" everywhere, one of the key hierarchy-breaking features that Didymus uses is the concept of <i>servility</i>. Much of the subordination in Origen's model is not only vertical causality but also the idea that the prior levels in the hierarchy <i>dictate</i> the obedience of the lower levels, which is the origin of the Arian "unity of will" approach. Coakley's feminist rereading of the <i>fiilioque</i> casts the relational model as entailing "hierarchy" in the Trinity, while Maspero sees in the (medieval) <i>filioque</i> the <i>residuum</i> of vertical causality, both of which implicitly assume the Arian account of relations. But the relational model was actually used by Didymus to show <i>equality</i> of power; it was explicitly non-hierarchical in divine being and based on "reciprocal immanence" in the manner used by Irenaeus. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In Didymus's version of the relational model, which by this time explicitly includes inseparable operations, the Son and the Spirit doing the same thing as the Father did not make them servants of the Father bur rather showed them to be God themselves, eliminating any suggestion of hierarchy between the Persons. Plaxco gives an excellent explanation of how Didymus denies servility of the Spirit, distinguishing himself from Origen's hierarchical account. I say confidently that this is the relational model in action because the conceptual move to show identity of divine power is identical to the one made by both Irenaeus and Latin theologians, the latter of whom likely had Didymus as an influence. Didymus uses <i>inner-Trinitarian relations manifested in the economy</i> to show <i>identity of divine power</i> -- a clear sign of the relational model.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>C. Athanasius the Great</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">If we turn then to Athanasius, we find that he makes that same departure from Origen that Didymus does in terms of affirming the gap between divine and created participation and clearly distinguishing the participation relation in the Trinity from any creaturely analogues, which excludes any sort of subordinationism. From Anatolios's <i>Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought</i>:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Aside from the central datum of the priority of the Father-Son relation and its containment of the God-world relation, Athanasius relies heavily on Origen in his pervasive use of the category of participation. That was the fundamental category by which Origen distinguished and related God and world. While Origen could also speak of participation within the Trinity, he distinguishes the participation of creatures in God as accidental and not essential. Moreover, Origen also uses the terminology of "externality" to contrast the creation-Creator type of participation from that within the Trinity, a strategy that Athanasius would fully exploit. Also characteristic of Origen's conception is an emphasis on the fragility of human participation in the divine, both because this participation is accidental and not essential and because humanity's orientation is alterable. Alterability is thus conceived as a quintessentially creaturely problem in Origen and perhaps even more so in Athanasius. On the other hand, Athanasius respectfully corrected his illustrious predecessor on such issues as the conception of a graded hierarchy within the Trinity and the notion that the world is an eternally necessary correlative to God's almightiness. But what most distinguishes Origen and Athanasius with reference to the relation between God and creation is precisely Athanasius's continuing of the Irenaean emphasis on the immediacy between God and creation. Origen would not deny such immediacy, but his conception of the universe is much more one of a graded hierarchy; it is a universe constituted by mediations. While stressing divine providence and re-echoing Irenaeus's insistence that there is no God beyond the Creator, Origen is just not as emphatic about the immediacy of the relation between God and creation as Irenaeus was or Athanasius would be. The convergence between divine transcendence and immanence -- or, to put it another way, the conception of divine transcendence in terms of immanence and immediate presence -- is simply not as much of a consciously employed theological </i>topos<i> in Origen. Athanasius's logic, however, following Irenaeus, is uniformly focused on the immediate relation between God and creation, to the point of consistently de-emphasizing created mediations.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This provides the context for Athanasius's pneumatology described in <i>Retrieving Nicaea</i>:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Athanasius consistently concludes his characterizations of the interrelationship of the three with a reprise of the co-relation of Son and Spirit. This strategy can be partly attributed to the fact that he is arguing against those who accept the full divinity of the Son but deny the same status to the Spirit, but it also represents the perspective of an Irenaean "two hands" theology in which the Son and Spirit are conceived as coordinate mediums between the Father and creation.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>To sum up the relations among the three according Athanasius's presentation of the biblical patterns, we could say that in each case <b>the Father is source, the Son is outgoing manifestation and imaged content of the source, and the Spirit is the outward actualization of that content in and toward creation</b>. Moreover, to repeat Athanasius's typical reprise, <b>the actualization is precisely the actualization of the content that is Christ</b>. The characterization of the Spirit as the actualization of the dynamism of divine life extends beyond these examples and is present throughout the </i>Letters to Serapion.<i> A striking demonstration of this conception is the fact that the same term </i>(energeia) <i>is used by Athanasius to depict both the outward activity of the Trinity as a whole and the specific role of the Spirit in relation to Father and Son. Thus, in the first instance, Athanasius can say that the Trinity is "identical and indivisible in nature, and its activity </i>(energeia) <i>is one;" here </i>energeia<i> denotes the outward activity of the Trinity. But, according to the second pattern, he typically identifies the Spirit as the "living energy" of the Son: "For where the light is, there is the radiance, and where the radiance is, there is its active energy </i>(energeia) <i>and luminous grace"; the Spirit "activates </i>(energoun) <i>everything that is worked by the Father through the Son."</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The use of the "image" in the Trinity is built around this logical structure in which relations are on a single ontological plane, not Origen's subordinationist structure but Irenaeus's anti-subordinationist model. The logical structure of the bolded phrase is also identical to Irenaeus's "functional hierarchy," where the Trinitarian <i>taxis</i> corresponds to the economic order in the exercise of divine power, of which the "source" (in the Irenaean sense of the term) is the Father. Thus, when Maspero asserts that Athanasius's "'proportional' concept of the intra-Trinitarian relations at the basis of which the Spirit is the image of the Son just as the Son is the image of the Father" somehow "lays him bare to the criticism of the Tropici that the Father was the grandfather of the Spirit," he is clearly mistaken. Athanasius and Didymus both maintain that relations are all on the same ontological plane, excluding any subordinationism but allowing a functional hierarchy that defines the inner-Trinitarian relations.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In terms of formulating the <i>functional</i> distinction between the Persons, both Athanasius and Didymus rely on the Spirit's characteristic designation as "seal" to show that the Spirit as image has a special active role. As seal, the Spirit imprints the image it reproduces (in this case, Christ, who is himself the image of the Father) on the souls of men, giving the Spirit a distinct characteristic in the common divine act. This is not remotely the use of "image" as a mode of production; on the contrary, the Spirit relates back to the Son <i>qua</i> image of the Father, presupposing the relationship between the Father and the Son. It is the absolute crucial relationship between the Son and the Spirit that establishes both their unity (consubstantiality) with one another and with the Father. If we avoid Maspero's attempt to saddle Athanasius with an ill-fitting Origenist metaphysics, Athanasius's notion of the "image of the Son" as <i>an immanent relation that presupposes a prior immanent relation</i> is extraordinarily clear, and it also clearly matches Irenaeus.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">It is characteristic of trying to fit Athanasius into such mismatched models that one will tend to accuse Athanasius's model of being incomplete or inadequate as a Trinitarian theology. Consider Maspero and Fr. Thomas Weinandy ("The Filioque: Beyond Athanasius and Thomas Aquinas: An Ecumenical Proposal" in <i>Ecumenical Perspectives on the Filioque for the 21st Century</i>), who make essentially identical critiques of Athanasius when trying to fit him into their respective theological models:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><i>Athanasius succeeds in distinguishing the two processions numerically but is not yet able to explore what it is that characterizes each one and therefore their distinction. </i>[Maspero]</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><i>The Spirit's procession from the Father and the Son must be such that it not only accounts for his full divinity, but also positively establishes what differentiates the Spirit from the Son, that is, his singular personal identity. This, it seems to me, is what Athanasius ultimately wanted to do, but his use of the concept of 'image' does not allow him adequately to do so. </i>[Weinandy]</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">But in the relational model, <i>the fact that a person is distinguished relationally as against the other persons suffices</i>. In other words, Maspero and Weinandy are both expecting Athanasius to solve a problem that does not even arise in his theological model; both are trying to hybridize the incommensurable Alexandrian and Cappadocian models. What they should have instead seen is that <i>the deficiency of the emanational model in describing relations</i> makes it peculiarly difficult for the Cappadocians to derive the relation between the Son and the Spirit, especially because they need to navigate around protecting the monarchy of the Father as emanator. That is why they would have a need to provide such explanations. From the relational perspective, Athanasius has already done the conceptual work necessary to distinguish the Son from the Spirit, and there is no need for him to go further, nor would his apophaticism likely permit him to do so. In that respect, <i>pace</i> Ayres, the conceptual structure for the relational model and its attendant pneumatology is already fully developed in Athanasius. This is not to say that he provides a complete metaphysical explanation, but the conceptual structure, now further developed from Irenaeus's foundational concepts, is there.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">In terms of the specific Alexandrian version of the relational model, another fact that is often overlooked in Athanasian thought is that <i>the term "homoousios"</i> <i>is itself relational</i>. This is actually a unique feature of the Alexandrian version of the relational model; the Latin version of the model developed the concept of causal relations based on one <i>power</i> but did not use consubstantiality of <i>nature</i> as a relation in the way that Athanasius does. This is documented by Barnes:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><i>It is true that Latins speak of the Holy Spirit as being "one in substance" with the Father and the Son before Greeks do. Potamius of Lisbon says (c. 360) that "the substance of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is one" </i>(De subst. 10). <i>One cannot find a Greek who says in 360 (or any time in that decade) that the Holy Spirit is </i>homoousios<i> with the Father and the Son -- because, at least in significant part, of the particular understanding Greeks have of </i>homoousios<i> that has no parallel in the West. The advantage Latin theology has from its "ignorance" of Greek Nicene theology (as exemplified by, e.g., Athanasius) is that it was free to make statements about a one or single substance that would not have been possible with an Athanasian understanding of </i>homoousios.<i> For Athanasius and the Greeks he influenced, </i><b>homoousios</b><i><b> was a unique and one-way predicate statement</b>: one could and should says "the Son is </i>homoousios <i>with the Father" but one could not meaningfully or piously say "the Father is </i>homoousios<i> with the Son." Ignorant of this technicality, Latins were free to say that the Father and the Son -- and the Holy Spirit -- were of one, single substance.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">That one-way predication of <i>homooousios</i>, which matches Athanasius's use of the image relation, serves the same purpose that the causal relations serve in Latin theology: it relates Persons back to the Father, through the Son in the Spirit's case. In other words, unlike the looser use of the term in Latin theology, consubstantiality statements specifically serve a relational function in the Alexandrian model. This methdology may well be what Maximus had in mind in the <i>Letter to Marinus </i>when he said the Latins "have manifested the procession through him and have thus shown the unity and the identity of the essence." A critical statement in Alexandrian pneumatology, therefore, is that the Spirit is <i>homoousios with the Son</i>. This consubstantiality defines a relation with both the Son <i>and </i>the Father, which mirrors the "from both" relation in the <i>filioque</i>. The fact that "from" language is used in Alexandrian theology to show "the consubstantiality of the Spirit with the Father and the Son" does not exclude that the Alexandrians are talking about relations of origin. Because "consubstantiality" in this context is relational, it means that they are using the concept to establish causal relations between two distinct Persons. Anatolios notes the following in <i>Athanasius</i>:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><i>In this way, the biblical message that Jesus is Savior translates directly for Athanasius into the inference that Jesus is God. By the same logic, the Holy Spirit is also fully divine, for if we are united to the Son through the Spirit, it cannot have been by a creature that the Son "linked us to himself and to the Father." We can see that intrinsic to this kind of logic is a conception of salvation not in terms of a kind of immanent well-being, nor even principally in transactional terms as a kind of exchange between human merits and divine remittance of punishment, but rather primarily in terms of union and communion. Salvation is primarily and ultimately, for Athanasius, a matter of being "joined" to God. So once against we see that a fundamental issue is that of mediation, understood precisely in terms of this "joining"; and the operative principle is that a creature cannot properly be said to join another creature to God, for only God can join creation to himself.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">This is Irenaeus's understanding of deification, now augmented by Athanasius with concepts of nature, person, and relation (in the form of "image" and "consubstantiality"). By contrast, consubstantiality is not used relationally in the Cappadocian model; it is a <i>conclusion to be demonstrated</i> based on the modes of production. When Athanasius is interpreted according to the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm, the interpretation fails to grasp Athanasius's conceptual structure, which should rightly be considered a further development of Irenaean theology. It would even be fair to say that Athanasius and Didymus have developed a full Irenaean Trinitarian theology updated for the needs of the Arian conflict.</div></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">And as might be expected from his treatment of Athanasius, Maspero's handling of St. Cyril of Alexandria is not accurate. Because Maspero is relying here on an interpretation of Cyril that has become unfortunately prevalent in the scholarship, it is necessary at this point to provide a more extensive explanation.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>D. The successor: Cyril of Alexandria</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">With Cyril, we can put the point against the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm even more strongly. Most importantly, let us consider Cyril's context and theological background, including the following observations that correspond with Nathaniel McCallum's presentation:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">(1) Alexandria was more strongly influenced by the Johannine theology of Irenaeus than the speculative works of Clement and Origen.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">(2) Alexandria strongly affirmed the canonicity of Revelation, <i>even when its authorship by St. John was doubted.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">(3) Rev. 22:1 used <i>ekporeusthai</i> with the preposition <i>ek</i> in a context that was understood to refer to the immanent procession of the Spirit by Irenaeus.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">(4) By contrast, the context of the Cappadocian model generally avoided Johannine passages in pneumatology, doubted the canonicity of Revelation, and preferentially followed Origenist exegesis on Trinitarian relations.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">(5) Cyril was personally involved in the deposition of the prominent Constantinopolitan patriarch St. John Chrysostom, <i>who was from Antioch</i>, and engaged in numerous conflicts with Antiochene theologians throughout his life.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">First, leaving aside Cyril's own theology, what reason could there possibly be for viewing the Cappadocian writings as normative for <i>Cyril's interpretation of Constantinople</i>? Further, it is questionable whether Cyril would've even considered Constantinople itself normative in many of the years in which his theology developed. Rome didn't even know about the Council, and Alexandria saw it as Constantinople using the Emperor to take its historic priority and therefore of questionable authority. Apart from the "Cappadocian victory" hypothesis, we would never make the assumption that the Cappadocians were the normative guide for interpreting Cyril. Yet this is exactly the assumption on which this interpretation of Cyril's <i>Commentary on John</i> is based.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">[Update -- My friend Craig Ostrowski pointed out to me that it is questionable whether Cyril even knew the creed of Constantinople. From Norman Russell's book on Cyril (endnote 92, pp. 213-14):</div><i>Whether Cyril knew of the conciliar definition of the Holy Spirit made at Constantinople in 381 is difficult to determine. The Creed read out at the Council of Ephesus (431) was that of Nicaea, which ends simply: 'And in the Holy Spirit'. The Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, which expands the clause on the Spirit... was acknowledged as the creed of an ecumenical council for the first time only in 451, when it was read out at Chalcedon. Cyril never refers to it explicitly, although his treatment of the clause on the Spirit in his letter on the creed (Ep. 55) bears some resemblance to it: 'For He is consubstantial with them, and is poured forth, or rather, proceeds from God the Father as if from a source, and is bestowed on creation through the Son' (ACO I,1, 4, p. 60.21-4). Boulnois thinks Cyril may have been aware of the conciliar definition (Boulnois [1994], 509), but this seems to me unlikely. His phraseology is of a piece with his other writings; cf. Dial. Trin. 6, 1009B, 1012C.</i>]</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">In discussing the frequent citation of Cyril's <i>Commentary on John</i> in support of the <i>filioque</i>, Maspero makes the following claim for his "Cappadocian victory" narrative:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><i>The pneumatology is an excellent test for the proposed narrative. In fact, Cyril's authority has always been mentioned in the </i>Filioque<i> dispute. But if his texts are examined in light of the path illustrated here, it becomes clear that his concern is not to distinguish the procession of the Spirit from the generation of the Son. It is a more Nicene that Constantinopolitan pneumatology. And this is not because Cyril's Trinitarian theology is not developed, but because his concern is essentially christological and soteriological. The same role of the ninth of his </i>anathematismata <i>in the third letter to Nestorius of September 430 demonstrates this: Cyril's focus is to avoid that the Holy Spirit could be understood as a power extraneous to Christ, hence the emphasis on the correspondence between economy and immanence. The essential issue if that the substance of the Father passes from the Son and from the Son to the Spirit, so that the Third Person is immanent to the Second and not external to Him.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;">But no light at all emerges from Maspero's "dark path." Maspero's assertions that Cyril is "more Nicene that Constantinopolitan" are based on Maspero's equation of "Constantinopolitan" theology with the Cappadocian model. Otherwise, the "christological and soteriological" concerns of Cyril would not in any way suggest that his concerns are not Trinitarian; they must be, just as they were for Irenaeus. These assertions by Maspero only reflect Maspero's embrace of the "Cappadocian victory" narrative. Once those revisionist interpretations are discarded and Cyril is instead allowed to speak with his own Alexandrian voice, it becomes clear that Cyril's own view is exactly the "filioquist" view. But because of the revisionist account, Cyril's voice in this debate has been entirely suppressed.</div></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In the revisionist view, the circular argument goes as follows: (1) assume the doctrinal source of Constantinople is Cappadocian, (2) take Cyril's acceptance of Constantinople as an acceptance of the Cappadocian theology, and (3) use that assumption to interpret Cyril's theology. This argument should be familiar; it was exactly the same circular argument used to misdate Didymus's <i>On the Holy Spirit</i> of Nicetas of Remesiana's work: (1) assume that the doctrinal source of Constantinople is Cappadocian, (2) assume that Didymus and Nicetas must have received their own doctrine from the Cappadocian source, and (3) use that assumption to date the work. The methodology is not correct in those cases, and it is not correct here.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Let's first look at Thomas Crean's analysis of Cyril (pp. 202-03), which is based on a comprehensive survey of the relevant texts and which interprets Cyril's theology holistically:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>St. Cyril's own words are so explicit that there is little need to draw any further conclusion from them. He teaches in many places and in many ways that the Holy Spirit is eternally from the Son as well as from the Father. Although he does not in any extant text use the particular phrase </i>ekporeuetai ex Yiou<i>, his teaching is identical to that of the Catholic Church, that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son as from one principle.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Responding to Sergei Bulgakov's assertion that "it is impossible to unite [Cyril's] texts into a harmonious whole and to extract a coherent theological theory," Crean replies:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>To this one can reply that while it is no doubt true, as Bulgakov remarks, that St. Cyril's main concern in the passages that I have considered was to uphold the divinity of the Holy Spirit and to combat Nestorianism, there is nonetheless in these passages a perfectly coherent account of the procession of the third divine person; and it was accepted both by the Council of Ephesus and also, a thousand years later, by the Council of Florence</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Crean's close reading of the texts is exactly right, of course; it takes an extraordinarily desperate effort to deny that Cyril taught the <i>filioque</i>. But the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm simply can't accept this. Constantinople means just what the Cappadocians said, so what Cyril is saying must be what they said. The result is that at least the Antiochene monopatrist position must have been before the later-developed <i>filioque</i>, just as Didymus and Nicetas must have followed the Cappadocians rather than preceding them. And if Cyril seems to be saying something different than the Cappadocians, he must not have been thinking about the issue; otherwise, he would have followed their solution.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Indeed, <i>the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm is used to define the </i>filioque <i>issue</i>. There is a repeated assertion that unless an author explicitly deals with "the relationship between the first and second processions" or "the role of the Son in the procession of the Spirit" (<i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., in terms of productions), his Trinitarian reasoning must not address the <i>filioque</i>. We can see this in Maspero's source Fr. Brian Daley ("The Fullness of the Saving God" in <i>The Theology of Cyril of Alexandria: A Critical Appreciation</i>), who himself follows Marie-Odile Boulnois's groundbreaking scholarship:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>As Boulnois observes, Cyril is <b>not primarily interested in developing a precise theological description of the personal or hypostatic origin of the Spirit, let alone of the mutual relations of the hypostases in the Trinity</b>; he is, instead, concerned to insist, against Arians and Antiochenes, that the Spirit truly comes from, and shares, the divine substance which Father and Son possess as their own, and that the Spirit therefore properly 'belongs to' the Son, even in his incarnate state, and so is both received and sent forth by Jesus as 'his own'. Because his concerns are at once more soteriological and more christological than they are 'Trinitarian' in an isolated sense, Cyril can sound vague and even can appear contradict himself, when speaking of relations within the Trinity; Boulnois speaks of the 'fluid', even 'ambiguous' character of Cyril's language about the origin of the Spirit, despite the fact that he discusses the role and status of the Spirit perhaps more extensively, and with greater attention to Scriptural detail, than any other of the Greek Fathers.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><b>While not being a 'filioquist', then, in the precise sense of later controversies,</b> Cyril does show a tendency, unusual in the Greek theological tradition, to stress the Son's role, alongside that of the Father, in being genuinely the source of the Holy Spirit. The reason for this role of the Son, Cyril often repeats, is his unity of substance with the Father, a fully divine status which the Son has himself received in being begotten. Nor is it helpful to apply to Cyril's thought on the Spirit a distinction often found in Greek theology since Photius: that the Spirit can rightly be said to come 'from the Son' with regard to his mission in sacred history, even though within God he proceeds 'from the Father alone'. As we have seen repeatedly here, Cyril avoids and even rejects any way of thinking or speaking about God that might appear to drive a wedge between God's being in itself and God's action in history, through Christ and the Spirit, to create, to save, and to sanctify. The rhetorical force of his argument, both against Arian views and against the more overtly orthodox conceptions of his Antiochene opponents, is rather to emphasize that the single, divine, transcendent being is one with his historical manifestation in the person of Jesus and the Mysteries of the Church -- that God acts in history as God is. For this reason, as Mme Boulnois observes, 'it is impossible that the missions of the Son and the Spirit in the divine economy should not reveal, at least partially, their own proper mode of being'.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">I submit that the reason Cyril seems "vague" and self-contradictory to Boulnois and Daley is that people have failed to interpret him according to the relational model and are instead trying to force him into the categories of the Cappadocian emanational model. And note that "filioquist" supposedly refers to "later controversies," even though Cyril's pneumatology likely came from Didymus (who was definitely a source of the Latin <i>filioque</i>) and Athanasius, whose conceptual structure exactly matches the <i>filioque</i>. Indeed, the repeated assertion of a so-called "patristic <i>filioque</i>" or "<i>filioque </i>of the Greek Fathers" is based on the assumption that Latin and Alexandrian theologians <i>could not have developed their own pneumatology</i>! Is it any wonder that Cyril seems confused when interpreted according to a view he almost certainly did not hold?</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">As might be expected, Daley's enthusiastic support of the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm also has its roots in the "dark path" of modern existentialism. As an example, Daley gave a speech in the same Duquesne series on the Holy Spirit in which Coakley spoke, which is also published in <i>It Is the Spirit Who Gives Life</i>. It falls right in line with Maspero and Coakley in terms of denigrating excessive logic (read: <i>noumena</i>):</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Lossky's underlying critique of much of Western pneumatology seems, in one respect, at least, well-taken: In attempting to express how the unknowable God of Israel, and Jesus the Lord, and the Spirit sent forth by Jesus on the Church, are all a single divine substance, differentiated by geometrically conceived "relations of opposition" that alone allow them to define each other in reciprocal terms, Latin scholastic theology ran the risk of transforming our awareness of the Holy Trinity into a logical conundrum about unity and multiplicity</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">On the most charitable interpretation I could give here of this sentence taken in isolation, Daley would be raising the same concern by calling relations of opposition "geometrically conceived" as Anatolios was when he spoke of "the mathematics of tri-unity." That is to say, if we <i>reduce</i> theology of the Trinity to formal logic, it misses the position that the Fathers were trying to defend, which is not solely that belief in the Trinity is (para)consistent but that it is belief in something real. But what is actually happening with Daley is instead the same post-Kantian tendency to favor the <i>phenomenal</i> over the <i>noumenal</i>, favoring what he sees as "existential" theological methods over "logical" ones. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Obviously, this misinterpretation is not limited to Western theologians. Eastern theologians use it polemically to attack the West. For example, Mikonja Knešević takes a similar approach to Daley for his own Palamite interpretation of Cyril in "<i>Ex Amphoin</i>. Cyril of Alexandria and Polemics over <i>filioque</i> of Gregory Palamas." Knešević is more motivated to defend Palamas's later interpretation, but he is clearly relying on the same "Cappadocian victory" model when he speaks about Cyril's use of <i>ekporeusthai</i>. The problem is that both he and Daley are showing cracks in their attempts to do so. In "The Fullness of Saving Grace," Daley says the following of Cyril's use of <i>ekporeuesthai</i> to describe the <i>Son's </i>procession from the Father:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Cyril seems to be deliberately using the now-canonical terminology for the Spirit's origin to denote the Son's origin, as well, and so to identify both in terms of unity of substance and equality of status within the divine Mystery. In doing so, he shows concern about the negative implications of what would be called a 'monopatrist' position on the origin of the Spirit: in the terms of the debate he was engaged, it could be taken to suggest that Son and Spirit participate in different degrees in the one saving Mystery of God, which flows from the Father</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Knešević says the following in a footnote on Cyril's use of <i>ekporeuesthai</i> in the alleged "technical" sense of the Cappadocians:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Despite the indubitable fact that Cyril never considers the question of personal procession of the Holy Spirit extensively or in isolation, nor does he directly search for the personal and ontological role that the Son plays in all of this, it is still evident that he is predominantly careful in terms of restricting the use of the word </i>ekporeuesthai <i>for the Spirit's ultimate origin in the Father, who is the "source of divinity" ... that is, he never uses it in the sense that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, or even from the Father and the Son. ... <b>Whilst Daley and Boulnois think that Cyril is along the lines of the synodical definition in this terminological choice, that is, Cappadocians and John 15:26, [Norman] Russell finds such a view problematic</b>.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">[Update -- Craig Ostrowski found what appears to be the source in Russell's <i>Cyril of Alexandria</i>, endnote 87, p. 213: <i>Cyril says that the Son sends Him 'who is from Him and is His own' (to ex autou te kai idion autou) (Orat. ad Theod., ACO I, 1, p. 66.24) cf. Boulnois (1994), 510</i>.]</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">I characterize these as "cracks" because they show problems with trying to fit Cyril into the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm, as if Cyril were simply using the term <i>ekporeuesthai </i>in the same technical way that the Cappadocians did. But Cyril is not playing by the rules; he is using the term "wrongly," despite Daley's effort to explain his way around it. Knešević relies on Daley and Boulnois to support the "Cappadocian victory" interpretation of Cyril, but even he must admit that Norman Russell, who carefully studied the Alexandrian texts in his work on deification, is unpersuaded. Here, we turn back to Crean's observation: <i>there simply is no evidence in the texts that Cyril is using this term in the technical sense that the Cappadocians do</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Let's consider Daley's argument in more detail. According to Daley, passages that clearly pertain to inner-Trinitarian relations are relegated to "driv[ing] home ... the substantial unity of the divine Persons and their constant dynamic interaction in the work of salvation, as a way of resisting any Arian or subordinationist theological schemes." This is clearly based on the assumption that these concepts of consubstantiality and relationality can be distinguished, as they are in the Cappadocian model, as opposed to being inextricably entwined, as they are in the relational model. Interpreted in the Irenaean model, for example, this would clearly be a demonstration of immanent relations, not "mere" consubstantiality.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">That leads us to Cyril's own logic, which Daley's interpretation would render entirely incoherent. Unquestionably, the most reliable interpretation is that Cyril is following Athanasius. If we discard the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm, which casts Athanasius as a proto-Cappadocian, and instead understand him on his own terms, Athanasius presents a version of the relational model using consubstantiality (the <i>homoousios</i> relation) and image as fundamental concepts. The key feature of that model is that the Spirit relates back to the Father <i>through</i> the Son in the same way that the Son Himself relates to the Father.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">It then becomes simple to explain Cyril's use of <i>ekporeuesthai</i> with respect to the Son. From Cyril's perspective, the relation of the Spirit to the Father (through the Son) in John 15:26 images the relation of the Son to the Father Himself. Daley points out that the use of <i>ekporeuesthai</i> for the Son is a "unique usage" of the passage by Cyril, but it is an entirely routine application of the Athanasian model. Far from "using the now-canonical terminology for the Spirit's origin to denote the Son's origin," Cyril is simply using the fact that the Son-Spirit relation images the Father-Son relation to apply the Scriptural language from one to the other.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Moreover, as even Daley seems to admit, <i>Cyril is defending his theology against the Antiochene interpretation</i>. The quoted passage is as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>For if the Son bestows </i>(choregei) <i>the Spirit completely from </i>(para) <i>the Father, and is considered to be in the position of some subordinate [in doing so], how can we escape confessing that the Spirit is completely foreign to his [= the Son's] substance, perhaps even superior to him and much more powerful, if that is the way things are, according to your ignorance? For if the Son does not, in your view, proceed </i>(ekporeuetai) <i>from the Father -- that is, from His substance -- how could the Spirit not be reckoned to be superior in comparison with the Son? What then shall we say, when we hear him [= the Son] saying of him [= the Spirit], 'He will glorify me, because he will take of what is mine and will proclaim it to you' [John 16:14].</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">On its own terms, <i>this is an express rejection of the "technical" use of </i>ekporeuesthai! What Cyril is actually saying is that if <i>ekporeuesthai</i> were intended to suggest that the procession of the Spirit were <i>independent of</i> the procession of the Son from the Father as opposed to <i>dependent on</i> the Son's procession from the Father, this would actually put the Spirit in a superior relation to the Father. This alone would suffice to show that Cyril is defending the relational model as against the emanational model, which uses the technical sense of <i>ekporeuesthia</i> to distinguish between modes of production as opposed to a univocal form of relation. In addition to Cyril's contrary use of <i>ekporeuesthai</i>, which is exactly the same sense in which the Latins use <i>processio</i>, Cyril also cites John 16 for eternal relations in exactly the same way that the Latins do and in a way that maps directly onto his description of the Spirit's procession "from the essence of the Son." Notably, this is the same "from the <i>ousia</i> of the Father" phrase that the original Nicene Creed (likely authored by Athanasius) uses to describe the causal relation between the Father and the Son. Cyril also uses both John 14:26 and 1 Cor 2 in the psychological analogy and elsewhere uses the insufflation of John 22 to show the eternal relation between the Son and the Spirit, exactly in the way that Augustine and other Latins do. While Boulnois and Daley both notice all of these anomalies to the "Cappadocian victory" model, they simply cannot get their heads around the idea that the Greek-speaking Alexandrians might share a conceptual model with the Latins rather than the Cappadocians. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Cyril is just as uncooperative with respect to the use of the preposition <i>ek</i> as he is with the verb <i>ekporeuesthai</i>. In the Cappadocian model, the modes of divine production must be distinguished from one another, but they must also be distinguished from creaturely production to ensure that the Persons are divine. This leads to a technical use of the preposition <i>ek</i> to show production, which is why it was acceptable (and in some ways preferable) to use the preposition <i>ek</i> in the Creed of Constantinople, even though the Scriptural language from John 15 was <i>para</i> not <i>ek</i>. But for the argument that those using the Cappadocian model will often make, <i>ek</i> can never be applied to procession from <i>the Son</i>, which would (in their view) question the monarchy of the Father. St. John Damascene says it this way, referring to the Pauline language: "Neither do we say that the Spirit is from (<i>ek) </i>the Son, but we call Him Spirit of (<i>de</i>) the Son." But Cyril's usage corresponds to the Johannine <i>ek</i> and the Irenaean conceptual model, not the Cappadocian model. For Cyril, "of" (in the sense of "belonging to") actually does mean "from."</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Here I will refer to Boulnois's "The Mystery of the Trinity according to Cyril of Alexandria: The Deployment of the Triad and Its Recapitulation into the Unity of Divinity" in <i>The Theology of Cyril of Alexandria</i>, which describes Cyril's use of "from" (<i>ek</i>) and "in" (<i>en</i>):</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>In reading Cyril's work we are struck by the recurrence of formulae which characterisze the relationships between the persons, formulae based on two prepositions: 'from' </i>(ek) <i>and 'in' </i>(in)<i>. The Son and the Spirit are 'from' and 'in' the Father:</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>"The Son who is in him and issues from him by nature [is] both distinct and of the same nature, by virtue of a natural union. He is distinct, on the one hand, because he is conceived as having his own exisetnce -- the Son is Son and not Father. On the other hand, he is of the same nature, because the one who comes from the Father by nature accompanies in every way the existence of the One by whom he is begotten" [17:3, citations from Commentary on John]</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>What will later become the perichoresis (or circumincession) undergoes here a phase of elaboration. How to understand this mutual immance? First we should set aside erroneous interpretations. We are not at all dealing with material containment: the Son is not contained inside the Father as one utensil would be within another, as asserted in a heretical book which Cyril once happened to have in his hands. This immanence is not limited either to a purely moral linking, as would be any unity existing in a human context, nor is it an indwelling by grace as occurs in the union of God with men, for in that case the relationship is extrinsic rather than substantial. When we read that the Son is 'in the bosom of the Father' (John 1:18) we should not therefore believe the heretical exegesis, based on Luke 16:22 (Lazarus received in the bosom of Abraham), which seeks to resudce the meaning of the expression merely to the assertion that the Son is in the Father's love. In other words, this immanence is not only a moral unity. <b>It enables us to understand how three hypostases become distinct in the phase of expansion without however withdrawing into their own individuality</b>. To say that the Son is in the Father or the Father is in the Son supposes that they are totally united both in identity of substance and that they are persons distinct in number, for a thing cannot be placed inside itself. <b>'To be in' implies therefore both distinction and conjunction</b>. Therefore <b>it is both because of consubstantiality and relationships of origin that the persons subsist mutually in one another</b>.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Nevertheless, the terms are not interchangeable, for the Son is in the Father as in his source, while the Father is in the Son as in his perfect expression. This reciprocal immanence has, therefore, a structure which is rooted in a relationship of origin. Their being numbered together is in obedience to an immutable order described by Cyril as the relationship which joins an image to its model. 'The Son is in the Father and issues from the Father both in an inseparable and distinct way, being in him on the one hand, in that he is an imprint of him, and being conceived in his own existence as an image is in relation to its archetype.' Thus we can compare the relationship of the Father to the Son to that of a king to his portrait. This analogy emphasizes not only continuity and resemblance, but also knowledge of the kind, which can be obtained through the portrait. Similarly, the Father and the Son are one 'to the extent that one can be seen in the other without any difference' [6:27].</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The relationships of co-immanence and of image must be understood in a dynamic way, as movements of mutual giving: the Son and the Spirit receive everything from the one of whom they are the image and in return glorify their archetype. 'The Father is glorified in the Son as in the image or likeness of his own form. In fact, the beauty of a model always appears in its imprint' [10:28-30]. We are far from a situation where the act of receiving implies inferiority in the Son or the Spirit, as was taught by the Arians, for, if they receive </i>everything<i>, that means they are totally equal. If the Son's glory is necessary to the Father (John 17:1), that proves their consubstantiality. The double movement of giving between the archetype who gives everything to the image, and the image which manifests its model, consists, finally, in an exchange of glorification. The Father is glorified by the Son and the Son by the Father because they reveal in their very selves the greatness of the other. 'Just as the pride and glory of the Son consists in his natural possession of such a begetter, so, in my view, the Father's glory equally consists in his own begotten Son being just what he is' [8:54].</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">If Boulnois situated this explanation in its full pneumatological context, instead of the cursory mention of the Spirit that she gives here, this would simply be the Trinitarian model of Irenaeus and Athanasius. (I doubt that Lashier's use of Boulnois's term "reciprocal immanence" for Irenaeus is a coincidence.) The mutual glorification of the Father and Son in John 17 is mirrored for the Spirit in John 16:14-15. The double image (Son is image of the Father, Spirit is image of the Son) aligns with the same usage in Athanasius and Didymus. The fact that Boulnois doesn't even see this in Cyril's exegesis of John 16 can only be attributed to the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm; she is absolutely convinced that the relational model cannot be in Cyril. She writes:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>This common possession of the Spirit appears thus as a particular case of the general rule by which everything that belongs to the Father also belongs to the Son:</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>"Thus since the Son is the fruit and the imprint of of the hypostasis of the one who begot him, he possesses by its nature everything which belongs to the begetter. That is why he says, 'Everything the Father has is mine; that is why I said to you that he will take what is mine to make it known to you' (John 16:15). He is obviously speaking of the Spirit who exists through him and in him" [Commentary on John 16:15].</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The assimilation of the Spirit with the properties common to the Father and the Son enables us to understand why Cyril presents the relationship of the Spirit to the Father and to the Son as that of a singleton belonging jointly to a dyad. This approach, however, carries two risks: on the one hand, that of considering the existence of the Holy Spirit in the Father as coming before the begetting of the Son (through which begetting the Son receives the Spirit); and on the other, that of reducing the Holy Spirit to the status of being simply a property of substance without a subsistence of His own. This is why Cyril completes this first approach by showing that the Holy Spirit is in equal measure proper to the Son, because he depends on him and receives all that he has from him, as stated in John 16:14. The Trinitarian relations no longer appear, then, to be like the belonging of a common element to a dyad, but more like the articulation of two dyads. The Father gives everything to the Son and the latter gives everything to the Spirit. Thus, the Son is the image of the Father and the Spirit is the perfect likeness of the Son. This model too, however, presents difficulties. The dyad Son-Spirit is not strictly symmetrical vis-à-vis the dyad Father-Son, in the sense that the dependence of the Spirit in relation to the Son does not exclude the original link which unites the Spirit to the Father. In consequence, even if the Spirit is proper to the Son as he is proper to the Father, the relationship of the Spirit to the Son is not the same as that of the Spirit to the Father</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Boulnois's explanation here is simply incoherent. First, the general rule if that everything the Father <i>does</i>, the Son also <i>does</i>, which in this case refers to being (with the Father) the source of the Spirit's action in the same way that the Father is the source of the Son's action. This is exactly why belonging (of) implies origin (from) in Cyril's logic. It is also untrue that there is a risk of the Spirit "coming before the begetting of the Son." By the exact same rationale that Boulnois gave for mutual glorification in John 17 (i.e., reciprocal immanence), the Spirit would be mutually glorifying the Son in John 16:14-15. The Spirit would therefore no more need to be prior to the Son to glorify Him than the Son would need to be prior to the Father. Likewise, the Spirit has no more risk of "being simply a property of substance" than the Son Himself does; since the Spirit is shown as a distinct divine agent in the divine action, His personhood is established. Perhaps nothing illustrates the absurdity so much as this: <i>if Boulnois had applied her own explanation of "from-in" based on reciprocal immanence, she would've gotten Cyril's pneumatology right!</i> Instead she see problems that aren't there, simply because the Trinitarian structure of functional hierarchy (the same as that of Irenaeus, Athanasius, and the relational model generally) completely escapes her.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Perhaps more importantly, though, this identifies the exegetical conflict between the Alexandrian-Roman model and the Cappadocian model on John 16:14-15. Cyril, like his predecessors, sees "from-through-in" (<i>ek-dia-en</i>) in terms of the functional hierarchy. So when St. John speaks of the Spirit taking "from what is mine," Cyril's logic <i>demands</i> that the Spirit is from the Son, and because economic relations show immanent relations, the Spirit is from the Son <i>in eternity</i> according to the functional hierarchy. The Cappadocian model demands with equal fervor that "what is mine" refers <i>only </i>to the Father's nature and that it <i>cannot possibly mean</i> that the Spirit is from the Son. The coordinate exegesis with John 15:26 is identical; Cyril thinks that it <i>cannot</i> exclude the Spirit being from the Son, and the Cappadocian model requires that it <i>must</i> exclude the Spirit being from the Son. Either we accept theological pluralism here, or we have to choose between which Fathers and Doctors of the Church are normative. The "Cappadocian victory" model in which we pretend they are saying the same thing is chimerical.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Moreover, the <i>en</i> here brings in the exegesis of other Johannine passages showing reciprocal immanence: John 14:9-11 and John 10:30, 37-38. The "in" in these passages is used to establish the eternal causal relation between the Father and the Son in the functional hierarchy, and it functions identically in the Latin "one power" exegesis. It would be entirely inconsistent with Cyril's "from-in" structure to exclude the Spirit from this reasoning. And once again, the Cappadocian model's interpretation is opposite; the "in" here results from common nature, consistent with consubstantiality being a result of productions. The Cappadocian model excludes "in" from defining the eternal relationships, while Cyril's model requires it. There is no middle ground; the Alexandrian-Roman model and the Cappadocian model are opposed to one another.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Now consider what happens with Boulnois if we instead situate Cyril's conceptual model with Athanasius and Didymus. If we then apply that methodology consistently, Boulnois's argument here directly contradicts Maspero's assertion that "image" is used identically in "image of the Father" and "image of the Son," which Maspero alleged to be a weakness in Athanasius's model. Contrary to Maspero's assertion, Cyril here is saying nothing different than what Athanasius and Didymus said with respect to the Spirit as the image (and seal) of the Son. And the two-dyad structure she describes is nothing but the logical structure of the relational model (and the <i>filioque</i>), as contrasted with the Cappadocian model.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">We can even apply this to Boulnois's entire methodology in "The Mystery of the Trinity..." to show that her approach is self-contradictory on pneumatology. Boulnois first observes that Cyril dedicated three works to the Trinity (<i>Thesaurus</i>, <i>Dialogues on the Trinity</i>, <i>Commentary on John</i>). With respect to the <i>Commentary on John</i>, Cyril describes his exegesis as "dogmatic," choosing chapter headings relevant to Trinitarian questions and directing his prologue to how St. John foresaw the two heresies of Sabellianism and Arianism. Absent the artificial constraint that Cyril must fall within the boundaries of the Cappadocian model, there would be no reason whatsoever to think that he would not be address the inner-Trinitarian relations, including the relation of the Spirit to the Son. In any case, there is no sign at all suggesting that Cyril would be vague, ambiguous, or self-contradictory in his work, especially if his aim was to show the intellectual force of Christianity to pagans, as Boulnois thinks his motive to have been.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Boulnois here makes an interesting observation about Cyril's view of divine unity:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Cyril's insistence on speaking of the Trinity as such or of the three persons as being indissolubly linked to one [an]other comes from his idea that the Trinity is fundamentally one unity, so that it is impossible to speak of one of the three without also speaking of the others. Because of this faultless unity, man has been created in the image of the Trinity as a whole and not just in the image of the Son, as maintained by his Alexandrian predecessors, Origen and Athanasius. 'For the marks of the whole consubstantial Trinity shine in him (the man), in so far as the Divinity by nature which is in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is unique.'</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This is all true but misleading about the antecedents in Athanasius. Didymus certainly did view man in the image of the entire Trinity; this is documented by Plaxco. But even Athanasius's use of the image was not like Origen's, nor was it incompatible with Cyril's or Didymus's.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">As Anatolios has shown, both Athanasius and Origen agreed that humanity was made "according to the image of God" (the Father) through the Word in analogy to the way that the Word was the perfect image of God (the Father). But Athanasius's image is neither subordinationist (as Origen's is) or static (as the Neoplatonic vertical hierarchy is); his entire theology is based on the dynamic return to the Father (the subject of an excellent book by Peter Widdicombe). But what Athanasius seems to have in mind with this dynamic return seems to be exactly Irenaeus's view of recapitulation, as Lashier describes in a lengthy footnote:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Some scholars assert the opposite, namely, that the Spirit and Son bring humanity to the Father, the ultimate source of their redemption. ... The passages cited in favor of this position feature Irenaeus describing the orderly progression of humanity's sanctification and growth. For example, Irenaeus writes in one place that humans "ascend through the Spirit to the Son, and through the Son to the Father, and that in due time the Son will yield up his work to the Father" [Adv. Haer. 5.36.2]. Nonetheless, the interpretation results from a failure to grasp Irenaeus' understanding of the immanent Trinity apart from the economy, for the assumption that the end goal is unity with the Father </i>alone<i> misses Irenaeus' inclusion of the Son and the Spirit with the Father as, by nature, uncreated. As such, in uniting with the uncreated one, humans are uniting with the divine nature encompassed by Father, Son, and Spirit. Accordingly, he writes "[M]an, who is a created and organized being, is made according to the image and likeness of the uncreated God, of the Father who plans and commands, of the Son who assists and accomplishes, and of the Spirit who nourishes and completes, but with the man making progress every say and ascending towards the perfect, becoming nearer to the uncreated one" [Adv. Haer. 4.38.3]. The passages which describe humanity's progress from Spirit to Son to Father are significant in that they underscore Irenaeus' understanding of salvation as a process of growth from immature child to Godlike adult. The passages indicate nothing about the nature of the Triune God other than that Father, Son, and Spirit have different functions in the economy. Accordingly, Irenaeus understands that humanity first sees the Spirit, through whom they see the Son, through whom they see the Father. He writes, "For God is powerful in all things, having been seen at that time indeed, prophetically through the Spirit, and seen, too, adoptively through the Son; and He shall be seen paternally in the kingdom of heaven, the Spirit truly preparing man in the Son of God, and the Son leading him to the Father, while the Father, too, confers [upon him] incorruption for eternal life, which comes to everyone from the fact of his seeing God" [Adv. Haer. 4.20.5]. (The significance of the paternal vision of God in this passage, as I suggested in chapter two, is not that the Father is the ultimate source of redemption, but that salvation entails adoption, that is, seeing God and knowing him as Father -- but insofar as this vision is the effect of redemption, it presupposes the work of Father, Son, and Spirit.) Nevertheless, the reciprocally immanent Godhead assures that in seeing one divine person, humans see all three, whether or not they realize this. Irenaeus writes," [W]ithout the Spirit it is not [possible] to see the Word of God, and without the Son one is not able to approach the Father; for the knowledge of the Father [is] the Son, and knowledge of the Son of God is through the Holy Spirit..." [Epid. 7].</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">As against Origen, this seems to be exactly the sort of path Athanasius has in mind. Anatolios in <i>Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought </i>notes this dynamic quality of Athanasius's thought as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>One very striking point, which has not been noted sufficiently by previous interpreters, is that, despite his use of the terminology of governance </i>(hegemonia)<i> to describe God's activity in relation to creation as a whole, Athanasius nowhere, to my knowledge, uses this terminology to describe God's activity in relation to humanity. This fact in itself indicates that passivity or receptivity of humanity to the beneficient and sustaining power of the Word is of a different order than that of the rest of creation. The crucial difference is that humanity is ordained not only to receive and manifest this power, and not only to receive and manifest it consciously, but, most crucially, it is ordained to receive it actively. That is, humanity is charged with the responsibility and the fundamental vocation of persevering in its receptivity to divine grace by an active striving. Athanasius describes humanity as not only protected and maintained by the Word, but also as charged with the task of consciously assenting and clinging to this protection and maintenance. Thus, the "added grace" bestowed upon humanity comes with the condition that humanity itself maintains its accessibility to this grace. Its "likeness" to God is sumtaneous with the vocation to strive to retain that likeness: "so that as long as it preserved </i>(sozon)<i> this likeness it would never depart from its conception of God or abandon the company of the holy ones, but holding on to</i> (echon) <i>the grace of the Giver, and also the proper power of the Father's Word, it might rejoice and converse with God, living a life free from harm, truly blessed and immortal." </i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This is how Athanasius ties human nature to the capacity for deification in the Trinitarian life; the Trinitarian relations form the basis of our creation according to the image, which links those Trinitarian relations to our capacity for deification by grace. Christological and soteriological issues are therefore absolutely inseparable from the inner-Trinitarian relations. It is critical at this point to understand that Athanasius's logic is based on the Son <i>as the eternal giver of the Spirit</i>, which is the causal relation that Athanasius sees in John 16:14. The Son being the image of the Father cannot suffice to give grace to creation unless His sonship also makes him the giver of the Spirit. The significance of the Incarnation, then, is that Jesus becomes not only <i>giver</i> but <i>receiver </i>of the Spirit according to His humanity, thus restoring the original purpose of creation. Anatolios explains Athanasius's use of the concept in <i>Contra Arianos</i> as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>I do not think that Athanasius here wants us to understand literally that before the incarnation, there was absolutely no communication of grace and reception of the Spirit. But he does want to emphasize that our reception of the Spirit is to be ascribed in a most eminent way to the incarnation. This is because it is in the incarnation that the Word himself received grace humanly on our behalf, and thus granted us the definitive ability to "remain" in grace, which, as </i>De Incarnatione<i> demonstrated, had been the block in human-divine communion. The great consequence of the incarnation is that henceforth grace was to be united to the flesh in a way that is analogous to, derivative from, and yest still also distinct from Jesus Christ's natural reception of grace. For, in the incarnation, the Word assumed as his own a human body that was yet a natural recipient of divine grace </i>(to physin echon tou dechesthai ten charis)<i>. Thus it is precisely in the incarnation, through Christ's human receptivity on our behalf, that our reception of the grace of the Spirit finally becomes securely united with our own flesh.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Cyril's use of "image" here is therefore inseparably tied to Athanasius's understanding of the inner-Trinitarian relations. The sense in which man is the image of the Trinity is this active and relational sense of the Son actively imaging the Father, giving the Spirit, and incorporating our souls by grace into the Trinitarian life. We are the image of God precisely in this capacity to actively image not the Person of the Father so much as the Trinitarian life oriented to Him. The similarities between this Alexandrian model and Augustine are unmistakable here, especially the use of the psychological analogy and referring to the Trinity in the singular (something that supposedly indicates the "Western" view). These are signs that Cyril's theology is closely following the Latin and Alexandrian view as contrasted with the Cappadocian view.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Boulnois goes on to describe Cyril's logical structure as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The fundamental movement to be found in this approach to the mystery of the Trinity follows three phases which correspond to three refutations of three errors: (1) the affirmation of monotheism (against polytheism); (2) the real and not purely aspectual deployment </i>(diastelletai)<i> of the one sole Divinity in three hypostases (against Sabellianism); (3) and the recapitulation </i>(anakephalaioutai) <i>of the three Persons in one sole divine nature (against Arianism).</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This structure is entirely from the relational model; it does not even mention the distinction between productions that is the defining feature of the emanational model. And it wasn't a case of Cyril being unfamiliar with the linear model of Platonism. According to Boulnois, Cyril's <i>Contra Julianum</i> specifically appeals to the vertical Neoplatonic hierarchy to show that even the best pagan philosophers recognized something like the Trinity with only one major fault: "Nothing would be lacking in their understanding of the subject if only they were willing to attribute to the three hypostases the concept of consubstantiality, which aids the conception of one sole divine nature without this tripling which leads to a change in the nature of each and to an inferiority in one of the hypostases in relation to others." Cyril knew of the Platonic model, but he instead follows Athanasius's use of consubstantiality as a relation and both Athanasius's and Didymus's rejection of any sense of hierarchy in the relational structure. In other words, based on how Boulnois describes Cyril's argument, he is clearly operating in the relational model.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This is further confirmed by Boulnois when she describes Cyril's use of the Trinitarian names as relations:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Another characteristic of these names is that they belong to the category of relative nouns </i>(ta pros ti pos echonta), <i>which strongly supports the affirmation of their eternal coexistence: in order to be a Father from all eternity he must have begotten from all eternity. 'We cannot conceive that he is truly Father if he does not possess the Son as the fruit of his own nature. In fact, in accordance with the main feature of relative things, we cannot have a son without assuming the existence of a father; just as we cannot imagine a father without a son.' Father and Son cannot, therefore, be deprived of convergence </i>(syndrome)<i>. Cyril uses a more technical vocabulary </i>(ta pros ti, ta pros ti pros echonta, schesis, anaphora)<i> than do his predecessors Athanasius or Didymus, and brings to bear the grammatical and philosophical origins of relative nouns, such as those of Porphyry who takes Father and Son as examples of relatives who are simultaneous in being.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Like the Western adherents of the relational model, Cyril has in mind the <i>logical</i> use of Porphyry, the metaphysically thin version of relation, rather than the metaphysically thick analogy to the mode of production. His concept is to show logical simultaneity, eternal coexistence, rather than consubstantiality resulting from modes of productions. And as seen previously, Cyril sees the relations themselves as showing consubstantiality, which is the hallmark of the relational model in Alexandria. It simply does not do justice to Cyril's thought to ignore the conceptual structure that is clearly present.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Moreover, without the <i>filioque</i>, Cyril's entire model of recapitulation becomes senseless. The diastolic motion (deployment) of the Trinity corresponds to the processions of the Persons. If the Holy Spirit does not immanently proceed from the Father <i>and </i>the Son, being the image of the Son as the Son is the image of the Father, then the Spirit could not be the path of the systolic flow (recapitulation). In the same way that Athanasius's concept of grace requires the Son to be the eternal giver in relation to the Spirit, the relational structure is essential to Cyril's view. For that matter, the logical structure of recapitulation comes from the Johannine theology of Irenaeus, which was developed further by Athanasius and completed here by Cyril. Note that the monarchy of the Father is automatically preserved in this structure since the Father serves as the "source" in the functional hierarchy, as Irenaeus and Athanasius both affirmed. But because Cyril has rejected subordination and vertical causality in the hierarchy, there is no hint of the Neoplatonic <i>exitus-reditus</i> in Cyril's concept. It is in this way that the operation of the Holy Spirit in man mimics the Trinitarian life, as Boulnois describes:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>It is [the Spirit] who, according to Cyril's exegesis is breathed over creation in Genesis 2:7 and sent again in John 20:22, to refashion man according to his original beauty. And the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is the means by which man is put in contact with the Son and through the Son with the Father. The Spirit's real mission is therefore to lead man to perfection, <b>a mission which corresponds to his place in God</b>, where he 'completes' the Trinity. Cyril calls Him 'the completion' </i>(synpleroma) <i>of the Trinity and the 'quality' </i>(poiotes)<i> of the divinity. In order to describe this fine point of the divinity, Cyril has recourse to several comparisons which appeal to the senses of taser, smell, and touch. The sweetness of honey, the heat of fire, the scent of a flower, all play a part in putting us in touch with the basic quality of what they emanate from and of which they express the essence. In so far as the Spirit is the 'completion' of the Trinity, he sums up in himself the quintessence of the divine nature.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">There could not be a better way to illustrate the use of relations to show consubstantiality than this; the relation of the Spirit as <i>synpleroma</i> leads back to the unity (<i>pleroma</i>) of the Trinity (which is, incidentally, contrasted with the <i>pleroma</i> of creation in Irenaeus). While this bears some resemblance to the Cappadocian use of relations, such as Nazianzen's <i>meson</i> or Nyssen's <i>syndetikon</i>, Cyril's model does not concern itself at all with distinguishing the modes of production in order to avoid a vertical hierarchy, the problem that necessitated the conceptual development in the Cappadocians. On the contrary, Cyril here is making the same kind of arguments about causal relations from John 20:22 that the Latin theologians (including Augustine) do, albeit in the Alexandrian idiom of consubstantiality. If Cyril were following the Cappadocian approach, he would need to make a much sharper distinction between the economy and the immanent Trinity to avoid inadvertently pointing back to a vertical hierarchy. But because Cyril (like Athanasius and Didymus) has already rejected the vertical hierarchy as a premise, his logical structure takes an entirely different form, one that matches what was originally developed by Irenaeus.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Cyril even explicitly draws the conclusion from Athanasius's relational use of consubstantiality that the whole Trinity can be described as consubstantial. Boulnois relates that "Cyril inherits from Athanasius and from the Council of Nicaea the term 'consubstantial', which had been applied to the Son, but he goes further in applying it to the Trinity in its entirety." This is the Alexandrian relational model in full and explicit development: the <i>relation</i> of consubstantiality shows the <i>unity of being in Trinity</i>. As Boulnois notes "[i]n saying identity of substance we also mean unity of operation and of will, which allows Cyril to reject all of the Arian objections based on a distinction between the different operations within the Trinity, made by them in order to prove the inferiority of the Son or of the Holy Spirit." To be sure, this is the same <i>end</i> as the Cappadocian model and pro-Nicene theology generally, but it reaches the end by an entirely different path.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Indeed, I think that Cyril <i>rejected</i> the emanational model, just as he did with monopatrism, because it was unworkable within his own theological model. In particular, he is resistant to the use of <i>henad</i>, which would've been the Neoplatonic term, to express divine unity, as Boulnois explains:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Wanting to refute Sabellian teaching which stated that the distinction in the Trinity was purely nominal rather than real, Cyril warns against the confusion of three persons in a henad. The use of the plural </i>(plethuntiko arithmo)<i> as in Genesis 1:26, 'Let us make man in our own image', confirms that 'the numbering of the Trinity goes beyond the henad.' Cyril invokes several texts from Scripture which use a grammatical plural or suppose a distinction between two beings. This statement by Cyril on the number is not aimed only at the Sabellians, <b>but also at the Eunomians who maintained that consubstantiality is a confusion of Father and Son</b>. If the Trinity is contracted into a henad, everything is confused from then on and the persons have no further existence of their own. However, a comparison with human consubstantiality clearly shows that (1) the identity of nature between Adam and his son does not, consequently, entail a confusion, and that (2) each one keeps his own individuality. Otherwise, we would end with the absurd, not to say sacrilegious, situation of mixing the sacred and the profane (ezek. 22:26) in not distinguishing between Peter or Paul and Judas. 'Since the concept of the divine nature goes to the number three, it is obvious to all that each of the numbered persons is in his own hypostasis, and that it is not at the expense of a change in nature that each one ascends to the one sole divinity and merits the same adoration' [Commentary on John 1:1]. Paradoxically, the unity of divine nature does not mean that Father and Son are one in number. In other words, if we want to maintain, against Arianism, unity and common adoration, we should not, even so, lapse completely into the opposite excess of mixing. <b>We need to be able to give the paradoxical affirmation of union without confusion, which is why the term henad is completely proscribed, being too precise in its negation of plurality, unlike the term unity</b> </i>(henosis)<i>.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The Cappadocian model was essentially in the same conceptual space of Neoplatonic henads (which is not to say that it was Eunomian, of course). But the Cappadocians did have to answer the problem that Cyril raises: how to articulate unity in a way that does not collapse the Persons into one another. That is what we would expect; the relational model is based on using relations to distinguish, while the emanational model is based on likeness, which creates this risk of collapse. Gregory of Nyssa ends up giving a fairly complicated account, which I understand it to say that the division in nature is actually due to the <i>imperfection</i> of finite natures to completely realize the nature. There really would be one humanity if we could exemplify our division in the way that God is divine. But it is a very different solution of the problem than Cyril's, since Cyril's logic excludes it.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In summary, we have reviewed all three of these Alexandrian theologians from the theological pluralist perspective, and there is not even a hint of the emanational model of the Cappadocians or any other evidence for the "Cappadocian victory" narrative. On the contrary, every single one of them shows clear evidence of viewing the inner-Trinitarian relations in exactly the same way as the relational model (and Irenaeus, for that matter). And while Maspero's read on them was mistaken, that still does not approach the degree to which he errs on the Western authors.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>IV. Maspero turns his blind eye to the West</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Maspero's chapter on Augustine, irenically subtitled "Western Metaphysical Poverty," is a "epistemologically bold" monument to failed <i>hubris</i>. I am not as much disappointed that Maspero, as a Catholic clergyman, is so dismissive of Latin theology; that is almost <i>de rigeur</i> for today's self-flagellating Catholic <i>intelligentsia</i>, especially when it comes to the <i>filioque</i>. (Crean's <i>Vindicating the Filioque</i> is the rare exception that tests the rule.) What really exasperates me is that Maspero cursorily cites two of the best books on Western Trinitarian theology that I have ever read -- Paul Thom's <i>The Logic of the Trinity</i> and Russell Friedman's <i>Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham</i> -- without demonstrating any evidence that he understood the theological pluralism that they entail. Indeed, given what he wrote in his chapter on Augustine, I was left seriously questioning whether Maspero had read them at all. The only "Western metaphysical poverty" Maspero actually demonstrates is in his own understanding of pre-modern philosophy.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Let us see what Maspero is thinking (or not, as the case may be). Given Maspero's favorable citation of his student Chungman Lee, who makes out a case for theological compatibility between Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa, the problem does not seem to be that Augustine has endorsed any heresy in his pneumatology. (For those on a budget, I recommend downloading Lee's dissertation, which is essentially the same as the published book for purposes of this discussion.) In terms of my own assessment of Lee, my only criticisms are that he is probably too charitable with some of the positions that various modern authors have taken, many of which are historically implausible, and that he does not make any real recommendations for how to take his own conclusions forward. But on the whole, his general conclusion that there is no real theological difference between Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa and that we ought to take note of that harmony in attempting to address the <i>filioque</i> seems right to me. So to the extent Maspero finds a deficiency in Augustine, it must be solely in his metaphysical explanation; he is not accusing Augustine's theology of being deficient (unlike, I suppose, the ever-reviled "medieval <i>filioque</i>").</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">So what is this alleged metaphysical deficiency? Well, it's clear that Maspero's account has already gone off the rails in that regard from his introduction to the book. Here is his account of Pope Leo III on the <i>Filioque</i>:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The position of Pope Leo II seems very interesting not only for the fact that it is politically balanced but also from a theological and a pastoral perspective. The key point is his acceptance that the patristic doctrine presents a tradition that is favorable to the </i>Filioque<i> without contradicting the Eastern position, which is focused on the defense of the paternal monarchy. He dropped and kept the expression simultaneously, distinguishing the level of form from that of content.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>This observation is fundamental to the present study in which the term </i>Filioque<i> with the theological discussions it inspires, is not understood in the medieval or contemporary sense, but in the patristic sense as:</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>1. affirmation of an active role of the Son in the immanent procession of the Spirit</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>2. without this role being causal, thereby overshadowing the monarchy of the first divine Person</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>This double definition marks a clear difference with respect to the medieval proposals, which in a context already distant from apophatic epistemology conceived the relationship between the Father and the Son as closed, so that the Second Person could be indicated as the cause of the Third Person. Anselm's theology, with its logicalizing defense of the </i>Filioque<i>, goes in this direction, which can be dubbed Filioquism. At the same time, the issue analysed here in the context of Greek patristics relates directly to immanence and not only economy, where the role of the Son in the coming of the Spirit is obvious because the gospel indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Spirit is given </i>per Christum<i>, as sent by the Father but also by the incarnate Word. The question examined in the present research is whether this </i>per Christum <i>is an expression of a </i>per Filium<i>, which is the immanent root of the economic origin of the Spirit.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Recall what I wrote earlier about the Trinity requiring a <i>paraconsistent logic</i>. Human reason will founder on the shores of the divine mystery, and this will be a reason for legitimate theological pluralism, especially in this case. In that respect, theology is <i>apophatic</i>, in that it always involves limits on what we can say, but it likewise never ceases to be <i>cataphatic</i>, on pain of not being theology at all. As Fr. Nicolas said, "it is impossible to theologize without affirming and denying." This is the <i>conceptual</i> level at which theological pluralism takes place. It is not a question of whether such conceptual models are <i>existential</i> versus <i>logical</i>, as the theological turn of phenomenology would suggest, but whether they coherently unite the cataphatic and the apophatic.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Viewed that way, Maspero makes so many fundamental mistakes in his assertions here that he plunges to the level of "not even wrong." His assertion of the theological content of the <i>filioque</i> is wrong as a matter of historical fact; the doctrine that Pope Leo was affirming was the same doctrine the Franks taught, not some "active but not causal" role but both the Father and the Son as cause of the Spirit. It was the same theological tradition that Barnes has to carefully documented: the economic exercise of power shows causal relations, and in this case, that the Spirit originates from both the Father and the Son. Contrary to Maspero's assertion, in making this affirmation that the doctrine of the <i>filioque</i> was correct and not incompatible with the East, Pope Leo, like his predecessor Pope Hadrian, recognized the theological pluralism between Byzantine and Frankish schools. And as a theological pluralist, he was urging that we not create a conflict over this legitimate diversity. Yes, it is therefore true that Leo makes a distinction between "form" and "content," but that distinction is not a distinction between words and theology. Rather, it is a distinction between the conceptual ways that we articulate theology and the object of theology, God Himself. But Maspero falsely maps Leo's reasoning onto the post-Kantian dichotomy between content (<i>phenomena</i>) and logical form (<i>noumena</i>). The resulting slander against the great St. Anselm's "logicalizing" matches the tone of Maspero's reckless accusations against St. Athanasius, and the accusation against Anselm is no less wrong.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">But Maspero's distinctive howler here, one that is repeated over and over in the book, is the "active but not causal" role of the Son. From the perspective of the Latin (and Alexandrian) doctrine of the <i>filioque</i>, this is entirely chimerical; Maspero might as well say that the Trinity is a "square circle." This is because Maspero's interpretation would deny R-causality between the Son and the Spirit, which would render the relational model (and the entire Alexandrian and Latin patristic models of causal relations) nonsensical. It is one thing to say, as I have, that the Byzantine tradition has a different account of causality in mind, one that is analogous to the distinction between originating and sustaining causes, even though this distinction is inadmissible in Western metaphysical systems. That would at least be respecting the Eastern school in its integrity recognizing legitimate theological pluralism. It is another thing to do what Maspero does: to deny theological pluralism and to demand that everyone join the same school, by asserting a logical impossibility as an ecumenical proposal. In the entire Latin tradition, whatever role the Father has in spiration must be identical to the role the Son has in spiration, on pain of making the Father and the Son into two principles. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Maspero's error falls into the same class of mistakes that the Orthodox scholar Jean-Claude Larchet, makes concerning Augustine. In Chungman Lee's published book (p. 59), Lee documents Larchet's interpretation of Augustine's <i>principaliter</i>/<i>communiter</i> distinction. In Larchet's mind, following "certain western theologians," what Augustine is trying to say is that only the Spirit's <i>hypostasis</i> originates from the Father, but the Spirit's <i>ousia</i> comes from both the Father and the Son. Larchet says that, in any case, this would not be adequate to support the Orthodox view on monarchy of the Father, which requires that the Father is the only source of both. But Lee later points out at p. 225 that this distinction between origin of <i>hypostasis</i> and origin of <i>ousia</i> cannot be supported from Augustine either: "Given Augustine's notion of divine simplicity, the approach of some contemporary western theologians cannot find support in Augustine. He argued that the Holy Spirit comes to exist from the Father and receives everything from him without distinction." For the same reason, Maspero's assertion would likewise be self-contradictory if situated within Augustine's logical structure. Just as the Spirit's single spiration cannot coherently be divided between <i>ousia</i> and <i>hypostasis</i>, it likewise cannot be divided between <i>active/causal</i> and <i>active/non-causal</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Maspero's error about Augustine comes from the incompetence of his metaphysical assessment in the section of Chapter 8 titled "Relation: The Philosophical Background." Here, it is not so much in the background of the concepts that Maspero errs but rather his analysis of <i>Augustine's use</i> of those concepts. This is a terrible turn in Maspero's thought, because Maspero begins with a really excellent observation that there is an etymological distinction in the Latin and Greek concepts of <i>relation,</i> similar to the way the verbs <i>processio</i> and <i>ekporeuesthai</i> (in the Cappadocian sense) have slightly different conceptual connotations:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The root of the Greek </i>schesis<i> is linked to the verb "to have" </i>(echein), <i>while in Latin </i>relatio <i>is linked to </i>referre<i>, as in "to refer" or "to report." This implies that the gnoseological dimension may have a greater presence in the Latin sense, while the Greek approach is more ontological</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The terminological distinction here reflects a real conceptual distinction; in fact, it is exactly the conceptual distinction between the metaphysically thin and metaphysically thick analogies of causality that distinguish the relational and emanational models. But rather than seeing a path to theological pluralism here, Maspero immediately falls into the post-Kantian dichotomy of "gnoseological" (<i>noumenal</i>) and "ontological" (<i>phenomenal</i>), dismissing the former. For Maspero, the Cappadocian model is "real," and the Western model is "logical" or "linguistic."</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This is at the heart of why Maspero bungles his analysis of Augustine as compared to Gregory of Nyssa:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Here a clear difference emerges, as [Gregory] reshaped both the metaphysical understanding of substance and relation, while the Bishop of Hippo simply juxtaposed the two, resemantizing relation (which could no longer be considered an accident) without radically changing the concept of substance. The cause of this is to be found in the poverty of the metaphysical tools with which the Bishop of Hippo worked, since the tradition of commentary on Aristotle's </i>Categories <i>in Western Neoplatonism was situated within the dialectic, therefore more focused on the linguistic level and less powerful on the ontological level.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">There is so much wrong that a book could be written solely on the errors in these two statements. I see them as the sum of what is wrong in everything that Maspero is trying to do. It would be as foolish to try to say that the description of an electron as a particle is more "ontological" when trying to account for the results of a two-slit diffraction experiment, where the wave description may be the more natural way to describe the reality. Gregory's metaphysical understanding is not <i>superior</i> to Augustine's; it is merely <i>different</i>, with its own advantages and disadvantages depending on what one is considering. The following is Maspero's application of the Kantian dichotomy to demonstrate the alleged superiority of Gregory of Nyssa's "ontology" in <i>Ad Ablabium</i>:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>This is a fundamental and inescapable crossroads in thought because the alternative was to consider the notions of person, nature, and relation equivocal and <b>merely metaphorical</b> in the two ontologies, (i.e., in the Trinity and in the world). On the other hand, the <b>same ontological force</b> attributed to the relation in God makes it possible to reinterpret relations at the level of creation.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>In this was in the </i>Ad Ablabium<i> Gregory provides the answer to the question of why we are not talking about three gods but about three men, starting from what we have seen about the intra-Trinitarian relations as the principle of personal distinction in the one divine nature and through a rereading, again from a relational perspective, of the one nature of the human being. In fact, the Bishop of Nyssa identifies a dual aspect in the human </i>physis: <i>an intensive one and an extensive one. Man is not only any individual of the human species. Neither humanity is the mere sum of individuals, but human nature is simultaneously the communion of all men of all times and the individual man. It is a synthesis of the first Aristotelian substance and the second one, which are unified into a single concept to express the revealed novelty.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Unfortunately for Maspero, he has not responded to any of Richard Cross's arguments comparing Gregory and Augustine on divine simplicity, found in "Divine Simplicity and the Doctrine of the Trinity: Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine," <i>Philosophical Theology and the Christian Tradition: Russian and Western Perspectives</i>. Cross outlines the following of Gregory's use of relations:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Basically, it seems to me that Gregory explicitly defends what Radde-Gallwitz labels the nominalist </i>[which Cross notes is more accurately "conceptualist"]<i> account of the </i>epinoiai<i>, and hence of divine </i>propria<i>. And it should be clear enough from what I have already said that this nominalist account would be a close cousin – perhaps even a sibling or twin – of Augustine’s account of the divine attributes. In fact, Gregory’s account is clearer than Augustine’s own account, because he makes it clear – in a manner later made clear by Thomas Aquinas – that the various </i>epinoiai<i> are not synonymous, as we shall see.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Gregory insists nevertheless that <b>the various concepts – the meanings of the various words we use of God – are different from each other</b>. He makes the point by means of his main anti-Eunomian argument that if we believe unbegottenness to be the same concept as other concepts indicating the divine essence, then the only true claim to be made of God is that he is unbegotten. Equivalently, as Gregory puts it, if unbegottenness is something extramental, then so too must other divine attributes be: and this compromises divine simplicity.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><b>But the relation is not some real constituent of the Father distinct from the divine essence</b>: there is no difference in terms of simplicity, and our utterances about God do not require any real distinction between divine properties, be they shared by the persons or proper to just one person. So it will turn out that <b>what makes it true that the Father is unbegotten is simply the divine essence</b>: there is, we might say, <b>no entity other than the divine essence to do the relevant explanatory semantic work</b>.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><i>...</i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><i>Gregory’s account of divine simplicity is, then, more assured than Augustine’s, but Augustine – and for that matter much of the Western tradition after him – is recognizably in the tradition of Gregory, <b>both on the question of the simplicity of the divine essence and on the question of the simplicity of each divine person</b>. This is all directly relevant to the old de Régnon paradigm. If each person is as simple as the divine essence, then clearly Modalist problems seem to arise; if, contrariwise, each person includes something real not included by the divine essence, then it will be hard to resist the view that the persons are distinct from each other in the way that created substances are distinct from the essence that they instantiate, and (by analogy) problems about Tritheism need to be confronted. Of course, underlying an account such as de Régnon’s are worries about analogies such as those chosen by Gregory, and explicitly rejected by Augustine, according to which the Trinity of persons is comparable to the relation between human nature and a plurality of human persons – hence worries, understandable but wholly misguided, about Tritheism. I have argued elsewhere that we misunderstand Gregory – and the ways in which Augustine differs from him – if we take these analogies too seriously, and I am not the only person to have made this suggestion. If my reading is correct, the problem for both thinkers is to find a convincing riposte to Modalist challenges. But my main point is that the account of divine simplicity found in the two traditions, represented by Gregory (in Contra Eunomium 2) and Augustine, is equally strong. And this, I argue, provides further evidence that the old Western analysis of the history of the doctrine is profoundly mistaken, and that the time for serious consideration of some kind of </i>rapprochement<i> is overdue on both sides of the Ecumenical divide.</i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><i>This is all independent of the question of the </i>filioque<i>: one could accept a strong account of divine simplicity, like that advocated by Gregory and Augustine, and yet be neutral on the question of the </i>filioque<i>; and the same seems to be true if the strong account of divine simplicity is rejected in favour of a weaker one. One reason for this is that part of the issue with the </i>filioque<i> lies in securing the distinction of the Spirit from the Son. For example, Richard Swinburne has argued that the </i>filioque<i> is necessary for the distinction between Son and Spirit on the grounds that difference between spiration and generation – and thus the difference between the Spirit and the Son — consists ‘simply in dependence on two co-causes as opposed to dependence on one cause’. But powerful voices in both the East and the West reject this line of argument: generation and spiration might just be fundamentally distinct kinds of relation irrespective of the number of causes involved: being a Son of ___, and being passively spirated by ___, could simply be distinct kinds of relation (think of being a Son of ___, and being a daughter of ___), and in this case Son and Spirit are distinct irrespective of any causal relation between the two. This point seems to me to be accepted implicitly by Gregory, who seems simply to assume an irreducible distinction between generation and procession; and later in the Latin Middle Ages Duns Scotus explicitly makes the point in the context of a rejection of the standard Western defence of the </i>filioque<i>. And this line of thought rejects the view that the </i>filioque<i> – the Spirit’s dependence on the Son – is necessary for the distinction between Spirit and Son.</i></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;">The Cappadocian school is therefore no more "ontological" for its metaphysical thickness than the Alexandrian-Roman school, nor is the Alexandrian-Roman school "merely metaphorical" because it is relatively metaphysically thin. Rather than the sort of name-calling that Maspero, Coakley, and Daley all do against so-called "filioquism," we could instead work for <i>rapprochement</i> around the idea that Cross outlines here: there can be multiple metaphysical schools even when the concept of "relation" is doing similar theological work. If we accept that everyone is operating at a <i>conceptual</i> level with due respect for divine transcendence and that this produces a natural theological pluralism, then we can start to understand what makes up the theological schools. </p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;">In this conceptual space, a picture is worth a thousand words, so it is easiest to illustrate these conceptual structures to show where Maspero's description is wrong. Once we leave aside the metaphysical baggage and consider the conceptual structure, then we can compare Maspero's own description to the conceptual models of those authors to see if even one of his purported "objections" holds water.</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;">Here is Maspero's illustration of what he takes to be as the Cappadocian model of the Spirit as <i>meson</i> between the Father and the Son:</p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjdLtQbu_Dmvl4rjstX7qCDZYSyrAoz3ejjKXUNZ8CXd_8YO_moXN2nn7PXLhidyimbbPcbvodg_4eSyUE4U7WzUGeoHQCXZmqpfBHeGX8juLyE6nnxO5eihmGIHMOHYmuPJ2nQFu4--Tkz1y5qP1ukViwXPTsnoAm-EJBV2Br0_n3F-0-44ZJ_Sw/s860/Maspero%20Trinity%20meson.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="330" data-original-width="860" height="123" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjdLtQbu_Dmvl4rjstX7qCDZYSyrAoz3ejjKXUNZ8CXd_8YO_moXN2nn7PXLhidyimbbPcbvodg_4eSyUE4U7WzUGeoHQCXZmqpfBHeGX8juLyE6nnxO5eihmGIHMOHYmuPJ2nQFu4--Tkz1y5qP1ukViwXPTsnoAm-EJBV2Br0_n3F-0-44ZJ_Sw/s320/Maspero%20Trinity%20meson.jpeg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in;"><br /></p></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Here is Friedman's relational model, which is nearly identical:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2KI71-uyX449KCF7WNNgL7OpuanDLYmsnGds_RHhSDDbTXBpxGVN2o5GPTk5Ea3Mx-jPiWtsePeZlMNXK-8ARFysNZk4SmctXcSDpsTsFX3OA2_2G2D2iBFVkrwUzf5hLXFlGJThljzFN4KgqYT93HCJxmudqH8XDxQ4G6XVcqToZnaIkEdlwdA/s738/Friedman%20Trinity%20relational.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="337" data-original-width="738" height="146" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg2KI71-uyX449KCF7WNNgL7OpuanDLYmsnGds_RHhSDDbTXBpxGVN2o5GPTk5Ea3Mx-jPiWtsePeZlMNXK-8ARFysNZk4SmctXcSDpsTsFX3OA2_2G2D2iBFVkrwUzf5hLXFlGJThljzFN4KgqYT93HCJxmudqH8XDxQ4G6XVcqToZnaIkEdlwdA/s320/Friedman%20Trinity%20relational.jpeg" width="320" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">But perhaps it is the overlap of passive spiration with the relation of the Holy Spirit back to the Father and the Son that Maspero finds so troublesome. In that case, we can turn to the Franciscan emanational model. Friedman illustrates it as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPwUEOwsTwnpycO24Lqu3yNRVBYAhIpRDYrBT3pS0L7Bs8Bezi6XJ2rb1xZ4FWXlLilaHrsAi_CdHYTlR_BqFOT1rstoD5jZVoxPwkkPCOtkMkdnAjWii57EuDeo--8w5HdAOg3uugFpq83wrUW_froEP4P5aWHPh6YoMA60fzenACDT7zHqXHag/s916/Friedman%20Trinity%20emanational.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="180" data-original-width="916" height="102" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPwUEOwsTwnpycO24Lqu3yNRVBYAhIpRDYrBT3pS0L7Bs8Bezi6XJ2rb1xZ4FWXlLilaHrsAi_CdHYTlR_BqFOT1rstoD5jZVoxPwkkPCOtkMkdnAjWii57EuDeo--8w5HdAOg3uugFpq83wrUW_froEP4P5aWHPh6YoMA60fzenACDT7zHqXHag/w519-h102/Friedman%20Trinity%20emanational.jpeg" width="519" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The arrow in this design is the same as Maspero's; the brace shows the <i>meson</i> in exactly the way that the dashed arrow does in Maspero's illustration. These drawings are simply the same. But perhaps Maspero thinks that these later Western models were somehow successfully cobbled from Augustine's broken model, as opposed to being what Augustine himself taught. Maspero seems to take this position when he asserts that, in Augustine's original concept of relations, "the danger of what will be later called Filioquism[*] resides here, as the relation between the Father and the Son, at least in this formulation, seems to be perfect in itself without any reference to the Spirit, because from the linguistic perspective the Son refers to the Father and not to the Third Person." Maspero seems to be asserting that these later authors may have somehow overcomes the flaws of Augustine's own theology, from which Augustine himself was only saved by a blessed inconsistency.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">[*I must query "called by whom?" Those who espouse the post-Kantian philosophy of Maspero, Coakley, and Daley, presumably.]</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This description of Augustine is just as flawed as the rest of Maspero's analysis. In applying the tools of modern group theory to Augustine's logical structure, Thomas Ryba ("Augustine's Trinitology and the Theory of Groups," <i>Augustine: Presbyter Factus Sum</i>) illustrates Augustine's conceptual structure as follows:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEijPthG7-fyikgodfUyTKS38AWQk11hm_x8uJOe_J5_qw-a0eCeci-u-rn908fZNI3PnWSri7YjGN-P8lFbMtrlOixpB6b-BniAd5VdsmmTsD_ZHhpspjkb8Y_TpJjkUoTVInplLow3quiqns53GsIqeTgXAvMj6WZxa-mQ4NRrfMma2uBFdVaL9w/s4032/Ryba%20Trinity.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3024" data-original-width="4032" height="308" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEijPthG7-fyikgodfUyTKS38AWQk11hm_x8uJOe_J5_qw-a0eCeci-u-rn908fZNI3PnWSri7YjGN-P8lFbMtrlOixpB6b-BniAd5VdsmmTsD_ZHhpspjkb8Y_TpJjkUoTVInplLow3quiqns53GsIqeTgXAvMj6WZxa-mQ4NRrfMma2uBFdVaL9w/w410-h308/Ryba%20Trinity.jpeg" width="410" /></a></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Of course, Ryba cautions that he is not "suggesting that Augustine consciously anticipated the modern notions of relations, mappings, or groups in his formulation of the Trinity, but, rather, that the notions he described are susceptible to an interpretation under these formal descriptions." It is very clear that the Father-Son relationship is in no way closed off in Ryba's depiction and that the categories of substance and relation are <i>both</i> incorporated in the new model.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Yet Maspero somehow still asserts that the "metaphysical tools at [Augustine's] disposal are, however, inferior to what happens in the East" and that the "misunderstandings on the side of the Orthodox tradition can instead be traced to the metaphysical <i>deficit</i> of the theological tools developed by Augustine, which do not reach the perfection of those found in Greek Trinitarian theology." Ryba's assessment of Augustine's use of Aristotle's <i>Categories </i>(including the use of substance in this model) says exactly the opposite:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>[A. C.] Lloyd [a critic of Augustine's ontology] is mistaken in arguing that Augustine is forced to maintain a "non-symmetric theory of identity." He is mistaken because a singular lack of imagination does not allow him to see a way out of the dichotomy between tritheism or modalism. But there is a way out, and Augustine has found it by revising the categories of classical ontology to allow relations to operate reflexively upon substances to define necessary new properties.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This is why Maspero's assertions that "[i]t is clear [in Augustine] that the introduction of the relation in the divine substance is not envisaged here, as a substance relative in itself -- rather than <i>ad se</i> -- is not admissible from this metaphysical perspective" and that Augustine "recovers the relational dimension of the Spirit, not on a formally metaphysical level but on that of communion and love" are completely unsupportable. Maspero has read (or, at least, should have read) an entire book about how the identity of the relations with the divine substance can be explained metaphysically: Paul Thom's <i>The Logic of the Trinity</i>. The fact that Augustine doesn't provide a <i>fully developed explanation </i>in no way implies the lack either of a <i>conceptual structure </i>or of <i>conceptual modifications to fit that structure</i>. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Let's look at Thom's picture of that structure:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjywzJ61tEDfgk6r28Kv3tzgmE-SJqPVLJaWL2XxVnKMKY69NSFkRlOJyLmqafjevlymG4h8cLXm8cji4M8a1XIdof2y7zJ80dP40zCguJeLZhOV62ToCbJypY4S2R72Q3eiizvWtUC_fAI6LZfnDnodv-Ldg38ZQKijy4og1ubQn9PfLzLc8tIjg/s4032/Thom%20Augustine%20Trinity.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3024" data-original-width="4032" height="345" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjywzJ61tEDfgk6r28Kv3tzgmE-SJqPVLJaWL2XxVnKMKY69NSFkRlOJyLmqafjevlymG4h8cLXm8cji4M8a1XIdof2y7zJ80dP40zCguJeLZhOV62ToCbJypY4S2R72Q3eiizvWtUC_fAI6LZfnDnodv-Ldg38ZQKijy4og1ubQn9PfLzLc8tIjg/w459-h345/Thom%20Augustine%20Trinity.jpeg" width="459" /></a></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Thom (pp. 39-41) summarizes Augustine's accomplishment as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Three questions must be asked about the Augustinian structure. Does it actually model the four propositions that make up Augustine's view of the Trinity (the unicity and simplicity of God, the relative distinction of the Persons, and their substantial identity with God)? Is it consistent with the ontology of the </i>Categories<i>? And is the model internally consistent?</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>According to the structure shown in Figure 2.11, there is one and only one God; so it asserts divine unicity. According to the structure, the divine perfections are God; and in that sense the model affirms divine simplicity. The model also shows the substantial identity of the Persons with God. What it does not show is the relative distinction of the Persons. This, indeed, was already clear in our semantic matrix for the Persons, which does not give a representation of the relationality of the Persons; and the ontological structure, while it shows the Persons as interrelated, does not give a representation of what these interrelations are. Consequently, it does now show what it is about the Persons that makes them distinct from one another. So, the model does not finish the task Augustine set himself. It is inconsistent with Arianism, but it does not ground its anti-Arianism in anything more basic.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>In order for the structure displayed in Figure 2.11 to be realized, some of the principles governing the </i>Categories<i> ontology must be dropped. Because a substance in this structure stands in the relationship </i>ab<i> to something, we have to drop Definition 1.3 ("a substance is a nonaccident that is not from anything"). This can be replaced by a new definition of substance [Definition 2.1].</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>This definition states that a substance is a nonaccident that is not from anything <b>other than itself</b>.... So, part of what is going on in Augustine's revision of the </i>Categories <i>ontology is that <b>he is generalizing to cover cases that the </b></i><b>Categories </b><i><b>did not envisage</b>.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Thus, the ontology implicit in Augustine's structure differs from the ontology of the </i>Categories <i>in two respects. The definition of substance must be altered from Definition 1.3 to Definition 2.1; and Rule 1.3 must be replaced by Rule 2.1 </i>[N.B., the latter change opens the possibility that God's essence can be in relation to Godself without being an accident to Godself]. <i><b>There is no obvious internal inconsistency in this ontology</b>.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">And although Augustine himself did not give an account of relational distinction, <i>the modifications that he made to the </i>Categories <i>ontology did</i>. Thom (p. 116-17) explains this as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>So while the </i>Categories <i>ontology does not allow that a relation can be a substance, a modified ontology that substitutes Rule 2.1 for Rule 1.3 allows for this possibility. S<b>ince that substitution is made in the ontologies of Augustine and Boethius, the possibility already existed in earlier ontologies that a relation can be a substance, even if it was not explicitly recognized there</b>. In any event, this possibility plays a crucial role in the thought of Bonaventure, Albert, and Thomas.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Thus, Ryba's and Thom's conclusion is that Augustine's conceptual framework is a paraconsistent logic using modified classical categories that is open to the understanding of Persons as relations. Nor is the Father-Son relation formally closed in this structure, as Maspero and Coakley each claimed:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>[T]he relation between the Father and the Son, at least in [Augustine's] formulation, seems to be perfect in itself without any reference to the Spirit, because from the linguistic perspective the Son refers to the Father and not to the Third Person. </i>[Maspero]</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Even to say '</i>filioque<i>' is to presume that a privileged dyad of Father and the Son is already established, and that the Spirit then somehow has to be fitted in thereafter. </i>[Coakley, <i>God, Sexuality, and the Self</i>]</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The fact that formal closure is instead <i>achieved</i> by the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son was formally demonstrated in the systematizing efforts of Boethius, who was himself a clear and direct influence on Aquinas. That is a particular damning conclusion, because Maspero claims (contra Thom but without explanation) that Aquinas overcame Augustine's limitations by his concept of subsistent relations. It is not clear what uniquely "linguistic" limitations Augustine faced; the fact that Holy Spirit is not naturally read as a relational term is something that all Trinitarian theologies must confront. Regardless, if Maspero thinks that Aquinas somehow "solved" this problem for Augustine, he was clearly anticipated in that solution by Boethius's formalization of Augustine, which Paul Thom clearly demonstrated (and Maspero should have known about). As Alexey Fokin put it in his chapter "Models of the Trinity in Patristic Philosophy" in <i>Philosophical Theology and the Christian Tradition: Russian and Western Perspectives</i>, "This [logical] scheme was first briefly sketched by St. Augustine, but it was Boethius who gave it its full rational form. Although the method used by Boethius, like that of the Cappadocian Fathers, was based on Aristotelian logic, Boethius did not go beyond this logic."</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This explicit comparison of the logical (and ontological) structures of Boethius and the Cappadocians is the subject of the 2014 article "Relations in the Trinitarian Reality: Two Approaches" by Pavel Butakov. Butakov outlines the comparison as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>In this paper I will analyze two Trinitarian theories which contain the earliest examples of full-fledged "social" and "anti-social" models of the Trinity. The "social" model belongs to Gregory of Nazianzus (329-390), once an archbishop of Constantinople; it is presented in his </i>Theological Orations <i>(Ors. 27-31) and became paradigmatic for Eastern theology ever since. The author of the "anti-social" model is Bethius (475-525), the first medieval thinker; his model is developed in the treatise </i>On the Trinity<i>, and it became the mainstream theoretical approach to theology of the Trinity in the West. What is common for both models is that they rely on the Aristotelian category of relation to be able to introduce difference in God</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Here, "social" and "anti-social" refer to the distinctions between the use of relations in the emanational and relational models that I described previously, <i>viz.</i>, that the emanational model uses the relation to establish unity of nature in distinction and the relational model uses relational opposition to establish difference within unity. This corresponds exactly to Friedman's mapping of the relational and emanational models to Aristotle's definitions of relations in the <i>Categories</i> and the <i>Metaphysics</i> respectively<i>.</i> Boethius in particular relies on the one-way property of relative distinction (relating-to) as the basis of his own logical model. Butakov illustrates the model as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiez24OU9rjsWw-0olYyjEhA42_olZtJzaxDdVcZNcSBOvJRcYGDo5KrFl8o_Fs4gCv0es3yC1D41fxIIcXORDMC5q0ibBoNWqKePeK83DGb8nsPDq-QxiyfGHxq_Q2peO6Yx2p5ZMW6uqHFpHSZk8qgwEULzPe0_zQ9HJTr0wcMKcADJjSlS7nbw/s260/Butakov%20Trinity%20Boethian.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="179" data-original-width="260" height="179" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiez24OU9rjsWw-0olYyjEhA42_olZtJzaxDdVcZNcSBOvJRcYGDo5KrFl8o_Fs4gCv0es3yC1D41fxIIcXORDMC5q0ibBoNWqKePeK83DGb8nsPDq-QxiyfGHxq_Q2peO6Yx2p5ZMW6uqHFpHSZk8qgwEULzPe0_zQ9HJTr0wcMKcADJjSlS7nbw/s1600/Butakov%20Trinity%20Boethian.jpeg" width="260" /></a></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In articulating the difference between the Boethian and Cappadocian models, Butakov notes that the Boethian model is "closed" in the following formal sense:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>A model should be considered complementable ("open") if it can accept new same-type elements without a change in the other elements, or in their relations, or of the adequacy of the model. If addition of a new same-type element affects the other elements of the model, or their relations, or makes the model inadequate, such a model should be considered non-complementable ("closed"). A complementable model is similar to a key ring: adding another key to it affects neither any of the previous keys, nor their attachment to the ring, and the key ring remains what it was and does what it was doing. A non-complementable model could be compared to a pair of scissions which by its definition consists of two blades and a fulcrum. It is impossible to add another blade or a fulcrum without it ceasing to be a pair of scissors. In the Trinitarian context a complementable model would allow adding another person or a relation, while a non-complementable model would not.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>In the model of Boethius each person of the Trinity is constituted by unidirectional relations in such a way that the number of possible options is exhausted by three: the Father is the one who the relation is from; the Son is the one who the relation is to and from; the Holy Spirit is the one who the relation is to. A person with no relation can not be a fourth option, since for Boethius a divine person is a subsisting relation to other divine persons. An attempt to introduce a fourth relational person to the Boethian model will have severe consequences for the members of the Trinity</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Butakov notes that Gregory the Theologian's model (illustrated below), which is built on the distinction between procession and generation, lacks this property of formal closure.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiTI96BOAdeq4dPNuEsPoof_Ya7fKmgHsvUcw7GJHRhK_VCY8VDEGayJzatUzB_WknDBBO-nZvxfYnBqSaFJUYkFXQ6WUMuRjM3umYTsClcdsTjDjYVax56xyeroM84X0vJNIo5ud1t7jtXudjmQqAtofy-tuMMkyXsiJMRL2OVZh89TK9wPpt4aw/s256/Butakov%20Trinity%20Cappadocian.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="180" data-original-width="256" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiTI96BOAdeq4dPNuEsPoof_Ya7fKmgHsvUcw7GJHRhK_VCY8VDEGayJzatUzB_WknDBBO-nZvxfYnBqSaFJUYkFXQ6WUMuRjM3umYTsClcdsTjDjYVax56xyeroM84X0vJNIo5ud1t7jtXudjmQqAtofy-tuMMkyXsiJMRL2OVZh89TK9wPpt4aw/s1600/Butakov%20Trinity%20Cappadocian.jpeg" width="256" /></a></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Instead, it depends on a metaphysically thick analogy for relations and productions, as the emanational model does. As Butakov describes, this Cappadocian model "requires a position of extreme realism concerning the status of the relations; otherwise they could not function as individual elements of the model, and the objective difference between the two relations would not be justified. In other words, Gregory treats generation and procession as subsisting realities that are different from the persons." But there is no internal principle for formal closure. Butakov notes that "Gregory himself does not provide any theoretical ground for number three except for a Pythagorean discourse on the greater stability of a triad and of a monad or a dyad."</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Maspero's lost opportunity due to his failure to perceive theological pluralism is devastating. In point of fact, <i>he has identified a legitimate development of the emanational paradigm in Gregory of Nyssa</i>. The way that Gregory develops the relations of the Holy Spirit, reconciling the linear and triangular models, is by no means illegitimate, <i>but it takes place within that specific theological school</i>. Specifically, it is dealing with the problem of formal closure, one that is avoided by design in the relational model. One could point to Cyril's use of the Neoplatonic concept <i>synpleroma </i>(completion) to show that the relational model reaches the same dogmatic conclusion as the emanational, albeit by a different route. But it does no good to simply say that they are the same.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">What emerges in these "bilingual" historical figures like Cyril, Maximus the Confessor, and the Frankish-era Popes Hadrian and Leo is that they are <i>tolerant of theological pluralism</i>. They are charitably disposed to the idea that <i>dogma can be expressed in different ways</i>. And this is not mere political expedience on their part, trying to court allies, but rather a legitimate ability to recognize what is authentic theological pluralism and what instead denies the revealed truth. It is not coincidental that the Franks and Photios were each thoroughly incapable of seeing outside of their own conceptual models and that this intolerance for theological pluralism produced the Great Schism.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Indeed, if Fr. Thomas Crean's close reading of Maximus's <i>Letter to Marinus</i> is correct, then there is even evidence that Maximus <i>explicitly</i> taught theological pluralism. Fr. Crean notes that the phrase <i>en alle lexei te kai phone</i>, is often interpreted as "in their mother tongue," so Maximus is often taken to be asserting that the <i>filioque</i> results from inherent deficiencies in the ability of Latin to express concepts. If we instead interpret this instead in terms of the Latins' <i>characteristic and accustomed way of speaking</i>, then what Maximus is likely pointing out here is the difference in theological schools, rather than a linguistic deficiency. Note that Maspero takes a similar "linguistic deficiency" approach with Syriac as he does with the Latins, but unlike his analysis of Augustine, he also has evidence of cultural exchange that shows the Syriac and Cappadocians coalescing around <i>a common conceptual framework apart from linguistic differences</i>. If we factor in those cultural connections, then it is far more likely that the Cappadocian-Antiochene-Syriac axis and the Rome-Alexandria axis were developing their respective theologies independently and in parallel. In other words, <i>Rome and Alexandria coalesced around a common conceptual framework, despite linguistic differences, in the same way Cappadocian and Syriac theologians did</i>. Maximus, a man uniquely immersed in both East and West, was in a perfect position to perceive the sanctity of both systems.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In that regard, Butakov's work is a shining example of the right way to accept theological pluralism. He admits that each model has its advantages and its challenges. Unlike Maspero, he does not denigrate one as deficient or impoverished as compared to the other's alleged perfection. He does not prejudice the work of one model simply because another exists. Had Maspero followed that irenic approach to theological pluralism, he could have recognized the Cappadocian metaphysical development as <i>paradigm-specific</i> to its own Origenist inheritance, as opposed to simply defining the dogma itself in the "Cappadocian victory" narrative. He could have brought Syriac theology in, not as a hostile witness to outvote the West, but as yet another school within theological pluralism. Instead of peaceful coexistence, though, Maspero chose war.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>V. The Byzantine model: Nikephoros Blemmydes</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Maspero attempts to enlist Nikephoros Blemmydes, a famously irenic figure, into his campaign for Cappadocian victory. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>To confirm the importance of the proposed conclusions we can cite the pneumatology of Nikephoros Blemmydes who, in the middle of the thirteenth century, read the patristic data precisely in the line of an active but not causal role of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit, expressing the connection between the economy and immanence in relational terms</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">But what if we instead look at Blemmydes in terms of irenic theological pluralism, as we did with Maximus?</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Unquestionably, Blemmydes is in the Cappadocian school, so this gives us an incredibly powerful opportunity to look into the mind of a master of the Cappadocian synthesis to see its logic. Fortunately, we have as a guide the excellent work of Basil Lourié in "Nicephorus Blemmydes on the Holy Trinity and the Paraconsistent Notion of Numbers: A Logical Analysis of a Byzantine Approach to the <i>Filioque</i>." Like Ryba with Augustine, Lourié applies the group-theoretical approach to explain Blemmydes's logic in a way that (following Gregory Nazianzus's Pythagorean argument) excludes dialetical pairing. And also like Ryba, he concedes that Blemmydes "was not a theoretician" of this logic, but his "merit consists in making some first steps in its direction when it became semi-forgotten by his contemporaries," thus showing "an imperfect but unusual, for his epoch, sensitivity" to "a powerful flow of patristic logical thought" from the Cappadocians.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This formal analysis of Blemmydes results in a numbering set for the Trinity that is "pseudo-natural"; it looks like normal counting, but it always skips from one to three. The logical operation associated with this structure is the "ternary exclusive or" (3XOR) operation. One very interesting feature of Lourié's analysis is that it would produce a <i>Qǝbat</i>, a kind of reverse-<i>filioque</i> in which the Spirit is Mother from the Syriac tradition, to balance the <i>filioque</i>. This is Blemmydes's famous "through one another" formulation. In other words, it explains the inherent compatibility that Maspero correctly identifies between the Syriac and Cappadocian traditions.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In this formalism, the monarchy of the Father and the resulting causal relations are used to pick out the non-causal Trinitarian relations between the Father and the Son, which Lourié summarizes as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Let us notice that these paraconsistent relations in the Holy Trinity are not causal. In their respective causal relations, both Son and Spirit are completely distinct without forming any paraconsistent relations. However, this consistent and "classical" reasoning in Triadology is placed within a non-classical concept (our pseudo-natural numbers), exactly according to Niels Bohr's Correspondence Principle.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>However, in non-causal relations, the Father is not necessarily the first in the Holy Trinity. Many Byzantine authors, whereas not Blemmydes, dedicated detailed explanations to why there is no "physical order" among the hypostases of the Holy Trinity, that is, why any hypostasis could be counted as the first one. Thus, theoretically, there is not only one choice of the first element (discussed by Blemmydes) but all the three, and the resulting number of the pseudo-ordered pairs in the paraconsistent conjunction is equal to the number of permutations (ordered combinations) of the two elements from </i>n [= n!/(n-2)!].</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>In the Holy Trinity, where </i>n = 3, <i>this results in 6. If one element from three is already chosen, we have to replace </i>n<i> in the above formula with </i>n-1<i>, which results in 2: the two paraconsistent non-causal conjunctions covered by the symmetric formula</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Thus, Maspero's "causal" and "non-causal" relations can fit within this Cappadocian logical model (E-causality). But they are incompatible with the use of relations in the Boethian model, which is like the Irenaean model in requiring all of the relations to be in a causal structure (R-causality). This Cappadocian logic does not die with Blemmydes; it influences Gregory of Cyprus in the anti-unionist response to Lyons, and it becomes directly relevant to Florence through the Palamite theologian Joseph Bryennios, the teacher of Mark Eugenikos. In terms of that later inheritance, Lourié has written three articles on the use of this paraconsistent logic by Bryennios: "A Logical Scheme and Paraconsistent Topological Separation in Byzantium: Inter-Trinitarian Relations according to Hieromonk Hierotheos and Joseph Bryennios," "What Means 'Tri-' in Trinity? An Eastern Patristic Approach to the 'Quasi-Ordinals'," and "The Trinity from Six Groups: A Logical Explanation of Byzantine Triadology by Joseph Bryennios" (unpublished). </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Lourié located eighteenth-century reproductions of Byrennios's illustrations of these logical relations, depicted below:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh8GwvCPXBGzQLL_3MVY8236HyXCdJe5P50op6iQKD60dJ6w1mOkMCEvsGimJMppXhC9Qof0xp6MI4mi70rEpa3Im-P8WcnpfR3doonj6nM48qwyipXnPwWVxvF4ddWNWhkS7rukY6Yy0qoKxkA6bnnCZLTROJKSHqlfPKFbgC_wih6P-ZWBACecA/s1298/Image%20from%20The_Trinity_from_Six_Groups_a_Logical_Ex,%20page%203.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="768" data-original-width="1298" height="269" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh8GwvCPXBGzQLL_3MVY8236HyXCdJe5P50op6iQKD60dJ6w1mOkMCEvsGimJMppXhC9Qof0xp6MI4mi70rEpa3Im-P8WcnpfR3doonj6nM48qwyipXnPwWVxvF4ddWNWhkS7rukY6Yy0qoKxkA6bnnCZLTROJKSHqlfPKFbgC_wih6P-ZWBACecA/w455-h269/Image%20from%20The_Trinity_from_Six_Groups_a_Logical_Ex,%20page%203.png" width="455" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhkj0R49DXVzd-ktP5ONHaxfydA81lUjkxhcMSIDgK22v9rnGweEcgHiOP5reNsktS8FzxnVmrSDwx183fcZS71_wDvDglzXCCr_q_-xa1VfkJ5wQxl39fvMh5USMZ-eJLPtPRhTOE2iVOzo9s5PizHqmx5M2RRd5rFlMyP3319OKDLMoefcBUutw/s1074/Image%20from%20What%20Means%20Tri.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="734" data-original-width="1074" height="287" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhkj0R49DXVzd-ktP5ONHaxfydA81lUjkxhcMSIDgK22v9rnGweEcgHiOP5reNsktS8FzxnVmrSDwx183fcZS71_wDvDglzXCCr_q_-xa1VfkJ5wQxl39fvMh5USMZ-eJLPtPRhTOE2iVOzo9s5PizHqmx5M2RRd5rFlMyP3319OKDLMoefcBUutw/w419-h287/Image%20from%20What%20Means%20Tri.png" width="419" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The first compares Bryennios's own logical conception, as three interlocking circles (sets) at the vertices of a triangle (<i>Sch</i>. A) with how he understands the Latin model based on pairwise (dialectical) relations (<i>Sch</i>. B). Note that Bryennios sees the Latin structure in terms of vertical causality, even though this is not actually the logical structure of the Boethian model. This is perhaps the best evidence of misunderstood theological pluralism; the East has failed to understand the Western model, but not because of "the metaphysical <i>deficit</i> of the theological tools developed by Augustine, which do not reach the perfection of those found in Greek Trinitarian theology," as Maspero claims. Rather, Bryennios is trying to understand the Western view in his own conceptual model, and due to theological pluralism and the incompatibility of the models, it simply cannot fit. The second illustration shows the logical structure that Lourié outlines of a sixfold set of relations that can then be oriented around causal and non-causal based on the monarchy of the Father. It is difficult to imagine a clearer image of (1) the internal logical structure of the fully-developed Cappadocian model from Gregory Nazianzus and (2) the difficulties that theological pluralism presented for mutual understanding. Both East and West had a very clear understanding of their own logical model, yet they could not recognize that the other side was conceptualizing the same object in a different way.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">So rather than taking Maspero's monolithic approach, let us instead take what we have learned about these models, including the difficulties in cross-paradigm discussions, and try to understand the history of the <i>filioque</i> in these terms. In that, we will see two magisterial figures, Thomas Aquinas in the West and Gregory Palamas in the East, each struggle to explain pluralism in terms of their respective paradigms. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>VI. An ecumenical reading: recognition of medieval theological pluralism</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>A. Western pluralism</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Butakov remarks on the subsequent development of the Boethian and Cappadocian models as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>So we have examined the two Trinitarian theories which were the first in church history to provide exhaustive and functionally complete theoretical models for the "social" [emanational] and "anti-social" [relational] approaches. Their functionalist is exhaustive since both are able to support the consubstantiality of the divine persons and their numerosity, and to identify each of the persons. Both models are simple and elegant, and both are Trinitarian, i.e. their structure is tied not to any number of persons but exactly three. In both theories these goals are achieved by an application of the Aristotelian category of relation, although the ways in which the category is applied and the functions of the relations in the models are different. </i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><b><i>The two models became two separate paradigms for the later Eastern and Western theological traditions until St. Thomas made an attempt to unite both of them into one system in his </i>Summa Theologiae</b><i>. Aquinas allows for both interpretations of the Trinitarian relations. On the one hand, he speaks of the "relations of origin" in God (S.T. 1.28.4), which function in the same way as relations in the Gregorian model that bond the persons in pairs. On the other hand, he also uses the Boethian approach to relations and insists that each person is a "subsisting relation" (S.T. 1.29.4). The combined model is cumbersome and less effective; moreover, it does not work without yet another distinction between opposite and non-opposite relations of origin (S.T. 1.30.2). It lacks the elegance and simplicity of the paradigmatic models of Gregory and Boethius, and does not allow achieving more than each of them already does. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Aquinas' theory; nevertheless, <b>his desire to use both models speaks for their value, and his trouble to combine them reaffirms their incompatibility</b></i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">We see that Aquinas shows the monolithic understanding of patristic authority, but he has difficulty seeing how the category of relations as used in the Cappadocian model can fit into the Boethian model that was a dominant influence on his own theological thinking. St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, following primarily St. John Damascene, takes the opposite approach. Bonaventure starts from the understanding of relations in the Cappadocian model, primarily St. John Damascene, and then attempts to reconcile that model with Augustine's understanding of divine simplicity and relations. As Barnes points out, this scholastic reading is based an "inverted Augustine"; like Athanasius, Augustine himself was much more concerned with the "extra-Trinitarian" Christology, the Christian life <i>relative to</i> the Trinity as proclaimed doxologically, than providing a systematic metaphysical explanation.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">But what is more interesting for our purposes is that Augustine is amenable to being systematized in different ways, much like Christian doctrine itself. Certainly, if the question of the priority of relations versus productions is the defining issue, we would not expect the concepts of the other model to be completely excluded; the logical structure of the relational model must account for the productions, and the emanational model must account for the logical structure of the relations. In addition, the Fathers, like Augustine, were defending dogmatic affirmations, not themselves providing a fully systematic account. The most we can generally say about the Fathers in the context of this pluralism is that their individual conceptual structures are more exemplary of one model or the other, but there will generally be elements of their thought that can be systematized in either paradigm.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Even the "logicalizing" Anselm, for example, who articulated the fundamental metaphysical principle at the heart of the relational model -- "The unity should never lose its consequences except when a relational opposition stands in the way, nor should the relations lose what belongs to them except when the indivisible unity stands in the way" -- is cited by Friedman as a source of the emanational model. That is because Anselm likewise provides an explanation of the productions as emanations that could be a starting point for the emanational account. But as a general rule, someone who starts with a more logical, numerical, or abstract approach that is "metaphysically thin," like Athanasius, Augustine, Boethius, or Anselm, will naturally prioritize the relational logic, while someone with a "metaphysically thick" analogical method (especially those grounded in Neoplatonism) will more naturally start from the concept of productions themselves. The fact that there is a need to do additional conceptual work to fit in concepts from the other model is often <i>mistakenly used</i> to conclude that a Father's work is inchoate, underdeveloped, or unconsidered relative to someone else's work. We saw exactly this tendency with the interpretation of the Alexandrian theologians.<br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The <i>filioque</i> is probably the best example. In the relational model, the <i>filioque</i> emerges as a logical consequence from how relations are defined in terms of distinction. But explaining how that relational distinction translates into personhood is a metaphysically complex task, even if the relational logic itself is not. In the emanational model, the relationship between the Son and the Spirit is something that is much more difficult to explain, because the productions themselves don't explain it, particularly given the importance of the monarchy of the Father in defining the productions. Gregory of Nyssa, Bonaventure, and Scotus show that it can be done, and, given the importance of defining the Trinitarian names as relational in Christian theology, that task cannot be avoided. But, once again, it is by no means a light philosophical task.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">So why has theological pluralism been relatively successful within the West? It is because there is a common dogmatic object that the models are trying to explain. And what is the common dogmatic object that the <i>filioque</i> affirms? The common dogmatic assertions of the fully-developed pro-Nicene theology are the following:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">1. There are three irreducibly distinct divine Persons.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">2. Those persons are united in being, not will or activity. (Anatolios's Nicene principle)</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">3. The distinctions between the Persons in this one being are based on relations among the Persons.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">At point 3 develops a bewildering variety of potential explanations. Bonaventure and Aquinas both agree <i>that relations distinguish persons relative to divine simplicity</i> but they do not agree on <i>the underlying metaphysical connection between person and relation </i>-- Bonaventure adopts the Cappadocian (emanational) model and Aquinas adopts the Boethian (relational) model. So they can agree on the <i>filioque</i> despite having adopted essentially incompatible metaphysical structures, both based on the principle that persons are defined in relation to one another but without agreement on what those relations are in the metaphysical sense. In short, they agree <i>that</i> the Persons are distinguished relationally, but they do not agree <i>how</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">More importantly, this theological pluralism follows the antecedents in Rome, Alexandria, and Cappadocia, both before and after the First Council of Constantinople. And even those parallel developments follow even earlier Johannine/Irenaean and Syriac theological trajectories, which had led to irreducible theological pluralism. Yet even if we restrict ourselves to the Byzantine anti-filioquist response, there was theological pluralism.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>B. Theological pluralism in Byzantium: Gregory of Cyprus</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">First, we have to address the fact that the <i>filioque</i> to which the East was responding was not what the West (including Alexandria) actually mean by the <i>filioque</i>, <i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., the assertion that the Holy Spirit is distinguished by relation to both the Father and the Son. In responding to the union proposals of Lyons, the East sees what Photios saw and what the Cappadocian model immediately leans to when it hears the <i>filioque</i>: the vertical causality of Origen. That much is clearly seen in the drawing of the Latin model from Bryennios labeled as <i>Sch. B</i> above. As I hope I have shown, that is a complete caricature of the relational model, but owing to the loss of awareness on the Eastern side, that is clearly how it was perceived. On that much, all the anti-unionists agreed.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The alternative Byzantine models all fell broadly within the underlying Cappadocian (emanational) school, in which the basis for personal distinction and relations was the distinction between begetting and proceeding from the (alone) uncaused Father. The logical structure of these generally triangular structures was the Blemmydes model, in which there was a logical relation of mutual implication between the modes of origin so that there must be exactly two such modes. But that created yet another question about the conceptual interpretation of the model's symmetry. Were the Persons really then "through one another" in their relationship, as Blemmydes himself thought? Or was there an additional symmetry-breaking principle beyond causation (monarchy) that could further define the relationship between the modes of origin, such as "manifestation"? If so, was such a symmetry-breaking principle <i>only economic and merely verbal when applied in eternity</i>, so that the eternal "reality" was the triangular model? Or was "manifestation" like causality itself, a <i>conceptual description</i> of a real eternal object that was conditioned to our intellectual limitations? </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This produces a continuum in the emanational model concerning the relation between begetting and proceeding. One extreme can be called the <i>purely triangular</i> or <i>Photian</i> model; it held that any such relation could only be economic and that speaking of this at the immanent level would be going beyond what was revealed. This was represented by the Arsenites at the time of Cyprios. At the other extreme is the <i>real</i> model, which held that the mutual implication was a conceptual description of begetting and proceeding as processes that take place through one another (which seems to have been Blemmydes's own position). Neither the Photian nor the real model was a prevailing position in the East; the latter was rejected because more or less everyone agreed that something need to be said about immanent relations and why there were exactly two caused Persons, and the former was rejected because Blemmydes was pro-union, which was politically impossible in the late thirteenth century. So the more meaningful pluralism was in the middle.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Between the extremes, then, there grew to be two main schools in the East: the Cypriot school and the Palamite school. First, Gregory Cyprios accepted Blemmydes's notion that begetting and proceeding were mutually implicative but introduced "manifestation" as a symmetry-breaking principle between the Son and the Spirit, similar to the way that monarchy breaks the sixfold symmetry in Bryennios's diagram. (That Cyprios is relying on the Blemmydes model is confirmed by Vivier-Muresan, who notes that the controversial "through the Son" language is used by Cyprios despite resistance at the time.) But rather than trying to ground this symmetry-breaking principle in the underlying Person of the Father, Gregory attempts to derive the manifestation relation from the distinction between begetting and proceeding, effectively creating two levels of distinction. The productions thus create not only two distinct Persons (<i>termini</i>) but an implicit conceptual relation between the resulting Persons. As I explain below, it is at this level of "produced distinction" where Maspero's "active but not causal" role for the Son would actually make sense, and I think this is very likely what Gregory of Nyssa (and likely Gregory Thaumaturgus before him) had in mind for his own concept of "manifestation."</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In developing an explanation, Cyprios has a problem. There are only two levels in God: nature and person. As St. Basil says (speaking for the emanational model, of course), "what is not individual is common." But there is some precedent in Gregory Nyssen to view the relational structure among the persons as being a distinct but not separate level, and this is particularly relevant to the problem Cyprios has. Unfortunately, Nyssen suffers from the same problem that Augustine did; he asserts relational properties but does not actually explain what they are in the model (which is, of course, why Maspero could force his own views of "relation" into the formulation). Cyprios takes on the monumental task of filling this gap and explaining what the relations in the Blemmydes model actually are from a metaphysical standpoint.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Cyprios starts with the concept of causality and relation in the emanational model: the causal productions by the monarch produce distinct persons. Therefore, he needs to formulate the non-causal relations, whatever they are in terms of the persons <i>having been produced.</i> Otherwise, he will entangle this distinction with the causal relations and the monarchy of the Father. This is why, although he does use the phrase "having existence through" characteristic of the Blemmydes model, he does not interpret it in the real sense that Blemmydes does. Cyprios's solution to the problem of what the non-causal relations are is both ingenious and, in my opinion, underrated as a contribution to the Cappadocian model. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">As I understand it, Cyprios has in mind a kind of self-sustaining reaction that is initiated by the Father in His act of emanation, like a fire that is kindled or a sun that is ignited. Of course, this is both eternal and simultaneous (the Father is constantly igniting and the Trinity is constantly sustaining), but this is how Cyprios identifies an activity for the Son within the Trinity and a reciprocating activity of the Spirit within the overall structure of relations that Blemmydes lays out. This is what I believe that Cyprios has in mind for his version of the distinction between "receiving existence from" (from the Father alone) and "having existence through" (defined by the reciprocal and relational activity of the Persons relative to one another). Thus, he follows the rule that what is not individual is common, but he sees relation as two types of reciprocal and eternal interaction: causal and non-causal. Here, then, is Maspero's "active but not causal role" for the Son: in the Cypriot model's reciprocating and self-sustaining reaction among the Persons. But they are not "real" in the sense that Maspero (or Blemmydes) though.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">There is a question here as to whether the distinction I have outlined corresponds to the essence/energies distinction, so that this self-sustaining reaction corresponds to an "eternal energetic procession" in the uncreated energy, rather than hypostatic properties. This is the position famously taken by Aristeides Papadakis in <i>Crisis in Byzantium</i>, the magisterial work on Gregory of Cyprus. As good as this work is, I believe Papadakis's position on this theological issue has been convincingly rebutted by Anne-Sophie Vivier-Muresan in "The eternal manifestation of the Spirit through the Son: a hypostatic or energetic reality?" Vivier-Muresan convincingly argues that Cyprios does not speak about eternal manifestation in the way that he speaks about the energies or the divine glory. Rather, I believe that he is putting relations between the persons of the level of <i>nature</i> because they are the <i>result of the natural productions</i>. That would mean manifestation actually corresponds to <i>power </i>(<i>dynamis</i>) rather than <i>activity</i> (<i>energeia</i>); the productions establish the modes of possession of both the <i>nature</i> and the corresponding <i>divine power</i>. It is the way that the Son and the Spirit <i>each</i> possess the divine power as a result of their eternal production that establishes the manifestation relation. This is why manifestation can establish a hypostatic characteristic for the Spirit, as Dumitru Staniloae argues from Gregory of Nyssa's texts and which matches Maspero's interpretation of Nyssen. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Regardless of exactly how manifestation is described, though, we can address is whether this Cypriot model is reconcilable with the relational model, and the answer is that it clearly is not. This concept of relations, with a two-tier distinction between causal and non-causal relations found in the Blemmydes model, is entirely incompatible with the concept of relations in the relational model. This is because having formally-closed relations on a single logical level is essential, since the relations themselves fundamentally define the logical structure. Moreover, the Cypriot model is not even compatible with the Bonaventuran version of the emanational model (Thom's illustration of the fully-developed Franciscan model is at p. 159; it suffices for our purposes to say that they do not match). But if we are theological pluralists, then we should turn back to the point at which theological diversity arose in the West: "The distinctions between the Persons in this one being are based on relations among the Persons." Is what Cyprios articulates here an acceptable account in that regard?</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">I think that if we are committed to authentic theological pluralism, we must consider the Cypriot model acceptable. It is more or less a systematized version of what Gregory of Nyssa teaches, mediated through the authoritative developments of Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor, and John Damascene. This same pluralism could be tolerated by Constantinople, could be tolerated by St. Maximus, and could be tolerated by the Popes at the time of the Photian Schism. It seems very difficult to conclude that the <i>filioque</i> doctrine, which has a creedal usage dating back to Pope Damasus, was specifically intended to exclude this model. Especially based on how Bryennios later illustrated the Latin view, I think it is likewise entirely fair to say that what the Cypriot had in mind conceptually was not what the Latins had in mind. In terms of what was actually condemned at Blachernae, what the people who condemned John Bekkos seem to have had in mind was the "real" version of the Blemmydes model, which did not match any of the Latin models (and it is questionable whether Bekkos himself held that view). In any case, we have had indications from the ecumenical bodies on both sides that the condemnations of Lyons and Blachernae no longer apply. We only need to affirm the following principles: (1) the <i>filioque</i> only requires affirmation of a real relational distinction of the Spirit relative to the Father and the Son, for which the Latins use the term "principle" but which is open to multiple metaphysical accounts, and (2) the East condemns a specific causal account of the <i>filioque</i> (probably the "real" version of the Blemmydes mode) that was never part of any Latin tradition. But in order to accept this pluralism, we must discard the "Cappadocian victory" narrative, which has silenced many voices among the Fathers, and recognize the various theological schools in the tradition.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">We have therefore addressed the reason that Lyons did not achieve union: a mutual failure to recognize acceptable theological pluralism. We now also have to consider Florence, and this is where the Palamite model enters the discussion.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>C. Theological pluralism in Byzantium: Gregory Palamas</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The Byzantine model from Blemmydes seems to have highly influenced Gregory Palamas's own "through (<i>dia</i>) the Son = with (<i>meta</i>) the Son" interpretation of the Spirit's procession. This "through=with" formulation has been found in Palamas by Anne-Sophie Vivier-Muresan (in "The eternal manifestation...") and Mikonja Knežević (in "<i>Ex Amphoin</i>..."<i> </i>and "<i>'Ek</i>' and '<i>Dia</i>' in <i>Apodictic Treatises on the Procession of the Holy Spirit</i> of Gregory Palamas"). In interpreting Blemmydes, Palamas has in mind for the term "through" not the instrumental concept "by means of," which would be causal, but rather the physical concept of the Spirit being "throughout" the Son, completely interpenetrating and "resting on" the Son. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Thus, to the extent there is an order between the Son and the Spirit, Palamas does not follow Cyprios in trying to derive the relation from the non-causal relations, which would be too much like vertical causality for Palamas. In Palamas's mind, the causal distinction based on monarchy establishes that generation and procession are mutually implicative, which would require a conceptual <i>spirituque</i> to balance the conceptual <i>filioque </i>(the "real" Blemmydes model)<i>.</i> Rejecting both the "real" option and the Cypriot option, Palamas interprets the mutual implication of Blemmydes to mean a <i>conceptual</i> simultaneity that leaves no room for conceptual distinction; once the persons are produced, there can really be no further order between them.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Following this logic, Palamas says that the <i>order</i> is solely due to the words used in revelation and the fact that we cannot but think in sequential order as creatures; "Father" immediately leads to "Son," so that "Holy Spirit" comes next in our thinking, even though begetting and proceeding are technically simultaneous and mutually implicative. From Knežević's "'<i>Ek</i>' and '<i>Dia..."</i><i>:</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The middle position of the Son here is not, by any means, conditioned by some substantial reasons, which is something that Palamas clearly pointed out during his explanation of the importance concerning the order </i>(taxis) <i>of the persons of the Holy Trinity. Namely, saying that the Spirit is "throught" </i>(dia) <i>the Son "from" </i>(ek) <i>the Father does not imply any causality from the Son's side, neither in this context represents some kind of strictly fixed order inside divine being, but is sue to the nature of the names of divine persons and to the fact that the Father can be called Father only "through" </i>(dia) <i>the Son.... The Spirit is, according to Palamas, also directly from the Father, just like the Son is, but due to the semantics of the name "Father" (i.e., due to the fact that "the Son is the Son of the Father, introducing in the thought the Father, even before He Himself is spoken"); this existential immediacy of the Spirit's procession from the Father is not that transparent, as it is the case with the Son's begetting from the Father; first of all, due to the limitations of the categorial apparatus, which we use to express the mode of divine existence, i.e., because"we cannot pronounce in the terms of our language simultaneously both the Son and the Spirit, as they came forth from the Father".</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Therefore, when it is said for the Spirit that he is "through" </i>(dia) <i>the Son, this does not have a function of pointing to the causality, as the Latins thought, but quite the opposite: it has a function to emphasize, as strong as possible, the factual, but, on the conceptual content, insufficiently transparent relationship of the Spirit with </i>the Father<i> Himself. Since the Son conceptually precedes </i>(protheoreisthai)<i> the Holy Spirit, emphasizing that the Spirit is "through" the Son serves further to underline the </i>direct<i> derivation of the Spirit from the Father, and also to suspend the interpretation, which would indicate some sort of distance between the Father and the Spirit, as a result of this "theoretical" preceding of the Son. In other words, the precedence of the Son to the Holy Spirit and, consequently, calling upon the Spirit "through" the Son, is here reduced by Palamas to the precedence "in thought"; interpreting the words of <b>Gregory of Nyssa</b>, Palamas says that it is of great importance that he, speaking of the Son's precedence on the conceptual level, said that this precedence is "not <b>simply</b> in thought" </i>(oud aples epinoia), <i>"but [that is is] <b>only</b> in thought" </i>(all'epinoia monon), <i><b>which actually excludes the logical or ontological "primacy" of the Son with regard to the Spirit</b></i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Palamas's <i>Apodictic Treatises on the Procession of the Holy Spirit</i> is unquestionably the source of contemporary Orthodox theology and is considered authoritative in his response to the <i>filioque</i> for Orthodoxy, so we cannot disregard his interpretation. Palamas <i>expressly contradicts</i> Maspero's interpretation of Gregory of Nyssa; he says that the relational order of the Son and the Spirit is not only not <i>real</i> (i.e., ontological in Maspero's sense of mind-independent reality) but <i>not even conceptual</i>, in the sense of our ways of thinking about metaphysical objects (e.g., the Thomist virtual distinction, the Scotist formal distinction). It is instead "<i>only</i> in thought," by which Palamas means <i>merely </i>verbal or linguistic. When applied in <i>eternity</i> as opposed to the <i>economy</i> (where there is obviously a real order), the order between the Son and the Spirit becomes merely our limited way of expressing these concepts in words, because there is no corresponding logical structure between the two. Here, Scripture has given us terms like "Father" and "Son," not for their conceptual content but for the expression of mysterious concepts that have no creaturely analogues whatsoever.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Therefore, in Palamas's view, one can appeal to the symmetrical "with" relation as a concept, since this reasonably relates to the Father's modes of production being oriented toward producing the Persons "with" one another, so that the Spirit is "to" the Son and "rests on" the Son. One can even then <i>speak</i> about a certain order in the "with" relation, as long as it is absolutely clear that the relationship itself is symmetrical. This appears to be how Palamas is interpreting Augustine's use of <i>eros</i> and other similar analogies and descriptions of relationships in the Fathers, as well as his own image of the Spirit as being at the "use" of the Son. These analogies do not connote any real asymmetry but, to the extent they are asymmetrical, are simply our limited ways of speaking about the symmetrical "with" relationship. The "order" in these relations remains merely verbal, even if, as Nyssen suggests, it should not be inverted. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Palamas seems to have in mind that the manifestation of these relations in the economy is God's deliberately giving us conceptual tools for speaking about him, even though these do not, strictly speaking, correspond to anything in God. As Vivier-Muresan says, it "is because the Spirit, in his hypostasis, rests eternally on the Son and abides in him that, in the economy, the divine energies are sent in the Spirit from the Father through the Son." In other words, the eternal relationship cannot be equated with the <i>energeia</i>; it instead is the natural relationship in which the divine power is possessed. This would likewise account for a "quite awkward phrase" that Vivier-Muresan points out: the Son is said by Palamas to have <i>the power to bestow</i> (<i>auto to chorgein echein echei</i>) as opposed to actually <i>bestowing</i> the Spirit, which seems to be Palamas's way to keep the eternal relationship on the level of nature and power. So, <i>contra</i> Papadakis, neither Cyprios nor Palamas teaches an eternal energetic procession, each one keeping his respective relational structure at the level of <i>power</i>, but Palamas backs off of any suggestion of a real symmetry-breaking relationship in eternity. Thus, Vivier-Muresan says:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Therefore, the triadology of Palamas appears to be distinct from the Cypriot’s view. More precisely, Palamas seems to step back since he assumes a position that the latter claimed to move beyond. As he refuses to take into account the literal sense of the preposition “by/through” </i>(dia)<i>, considered as only synonymous with the prepositions </i>syn<i> and </i>meta <i>meaning “with”, he aligns with a theology that the patriarch explicitly rejected as being insufficiently faithful to the tradition of the Fathers.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Likewise, Papadakis in <i>Crisis in Byzantium</i> notes that Palamas followed a proposal from Cyprios's secretary that was shot down at Blachernae:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>[Moschabar's] interpretation did not identify "through" with the eternal manifestation, as did Gregory's, or with "from," as did the unionists, but with the preposition </i>syn<i>, </i>meta<i> (with the genitive), or </i>ama<i>, which were translated as "with" or "together." True, it was an interpretation which later Palamite theologians and Mark of Ephesus at Florence would find useful. However great its subsequent popularity it could not convince Gregory or the unionists.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">So here is the point of pluralism in Byzantium: both Cyprios and Palamas accept the Blemmydes model, but they differ on how to interpret "exists through" from a metaphysical perspective (though both agree that it can only be conceptual). Cyprios thinks that the way the Son and the Spirit exhibit the exercise of divine power in the economy maps onto distinct modes of possession of that power in eternity. Palamas, on the other hand, thinks that we only speak thus by way of condescension and that there can be no real ordering between the Son and Spirit in eternity. (We cannot normally <i>speak</i> in a way that violates the Trinitarian order, but that does not correspond to how we should <i>think</i> about the Trinity.)</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Naturally, part of Palamas's theological project is to interpret the patristic tradition according to his own theological model. And much like Aquinas with John Damascene, Palamas comes across certain Fathers who do not speak in the way they should if they are adherents to the model. Cyril is particularly problematic for Palamas because Cyril uses the preposition <i>ek</i>, which simply has no symmetrical interpretation. Palamas's solution is to ascribe the use of <i>ek</i> to the economy wherever he can, and where he can't, to maintain that <i>ek</i> is solely being used to show consubstantiality, which Palamas views as being symmetrical. Of course, the reason Palamas is having such a problem with Cyril is exactly the same reason that Aquinas has a problem with John Damascene: unrecognized theological pluralism. Cyril's relational use of consubstantiality would be exactly what the Latins mean by the <i>filioque</i>, which Palamas cannot allow, so Palamas instead reads his own theory over Cyril. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Knešević's favorable assessment of Palamas's exegesis, based primarily on Boulnois and Daley, is accordingly unconvincing. Although he correctly admits that "Palamas incorporates cyrillian 'filioquistic' passages into his own prevalent interpretative matrix," the following conclusions are entirely typical of the denial of theological pluralism:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Firstly, it can easily be discerned that the Archbishop of Salonica, unlike many of today's western researchers, addressed the "filioquistic" passages in Cyril's opus </i>contextually<i>, which means that he interprets them within the </i>historic <i>and </i>conceptual <i>framework in which the Archbishop of Alexandria expounded his ideas and, above all, in the context of discussions of which he partook actively. Following that methodological principle, Palamas, as we have seen, interprets the cyrillian passages in the context of proving the </i>consubstantiality<i> of the Spirit with the Father and the Son. In other words, all of the cyrillian passages that Palamas takes into consideration regarding the rebuttal of the Latin reading are either of economic character, thus suggesting the temporal bestowing of grace or energy of the Spirit which occurs </i>through<i> or </i>from <i>the Son, or aim at displaying the co-equal divinity and consubstantiality of the three persons of the Holy Trinity. That was exactly the primary undertaking of Cyril and it was a priority on his theological agenda, something that Palamas himself suggests when he claims that Cyril directed the aforementioned formulations at "those who opposed consubstantiality" </i>(epei kai pros tous antilegontas to homoousio ta toiauta gegraphen).</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Thus, Palamas, whilst interpreting Cyril in the context of tradition to which he belonged and in the context of historic controversies of his age, effectively eludes the trap of </i>anachronism <i>into which the authors, who are prone to see Cyril as an advocate of the </i>filioque<i> on the eastern side, undeniably fall. Precisely speaking, Palamas provides here adequate instructions for avoiding one </i>post factum<i> reading, in the sense that an idea, which was already accepted once, is interpreted as if it originated much earlier in time than what it acutally is. Hence, Cyril's texts, instead of having ideas of the later period projected upon them, ought to be read in the context of this author's prevalent motives, which were mainly of christological and soteriological character. The later conflict over </i>filioque<i> was completely alien and unknown to Cyril. So, the appropriate line of reasoning is the one which indicates that, without later pneumatological disputes between the East and the West, the critique which -- starting with Theodoret of Cyrus -- was directed at Cyril regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit "and from the Son", would actually be thrust aside.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Therefore, if all of these and similar attitudes of Gregory Palamas are taken into consideration, an inescapable conclusion that is to be reached is that the Archbishop of Salonica is right along the lines of the Archbishop of Alexandria not only in terms of establishing a more firm relationship between the Son and the Spirit in the domain of divine existence per se, but also – only far more emphasized – in terms of strict renunciation of any hypostatic causality on the Son’s part. Following the abundance of formulations and further elaborations, it can be said that Palamas – which was natural went even further in this respect than Cyril himself.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Knešević doth protest too much, methinks! First, Cyril can't even be read accurately in the Cappadocian model at all, much less in Palamas's speculative extension to that model. Second, Cyril's historical opponents were Antiochenes, not "those who opposed consubstantiality," and much of what Cyril wrote was probably opposing the same monopatrism that Palamas endorses. Third, consubstantiality is used as a relational term by Athanasius, so the use of consubstantiality by Cyril would actually <i>show</i> eternal relations, unlike the way Palamas is using that consubstantiality in his model. Fourth, the Blemmydes model Palamas is employing contradicts the logical structure of the relational model, since it distinguishes causal and non-causal relations. Reading Cyril as teaching the <i>filioque</i> is therefore actually <i>less</i> anachronistic and <i>more</i> sensitive to the original context, contrary to the tendency of modern historical theologians (including Boulnois and Daley) to collapse all of the Greek-speakers into the Cappadocian model. I have no doubt that Palamas <i>believed</i> he was interpreting Cyril correctly, just as Aquinas <i>believed</i> he was interpreting John Damascene correctly, but their respective opponents clearly had the better of them in terms of historical accuracy.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">I raise this to point out that if modern-day Palamites are going to condemn the West for heresy, then they have already condemned Cyril, because the facts do not allow another alternative. People can point out the supposed opinion that Cyril was not a "filioquist," but this is only to succumb to the same sort of academic groupthink that led to pervasive errors in interpretation. Perhaps in the not-too-distant future, the anti-filioquist reading of Cyril will suffer a similar fate as other discredited hypotheses. Regardless, this idea that Cyril was operating in the Cappadocian model, as opposed to the relational model, is unsustainable if Athanasius and Didymus are taken seriously. And it is certainly unsustainable for the entire Latin West, including all of its Saints revered by the East, to avoid condemnation.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">On the other hand, I think that interpreting the <i>filioque</i> to condemn either the Cypriot model or the Palamite model suffers from similar problems. It would likely involve condemning Gregory of Nyssa's own account, which clearly could not have been rejected by Constantinople, and would definitely condemn the Neoplatonic accounts of Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus, and John Damascene. I find it hard to believe that the <i>filioque</i> doctrine has developed dogmatically in such detail. Pluralism was fine in the patristic era; it is likely fine now. Even though there may be a verbal denial of the <i>filioque</i> in the East, I have seen essentially no evidence in this study that there is a conceptual denial. Both the Cypriot model and the Palamite model have an account of relations that should be adequate to meet the dogmatic requirements, whatever labels we decide to put on them.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">With this survey behind us, let us now summarize the problems with Maspero's proposal.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>VII. The "Cappadocian victory" model as a cause for Catholic self-flagellation</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">I mentioned earlier that the influence of the "Cappadocian victory" model through Congar and Garrigues has been baleful for ecumenical relations, since it actually reinforces the suppression of pluralism that is the root cause of division. But it's been even worse than that on the Catholic side, because instead of offering an <i>apologetic</i> for the <i>filioque</i>, based on the historical evidence for the tradition, an unfortunate number of Catholics (Maspero included) are instead offering an <i>apology</i> for the <i>filioque</i>. This is based on the entirely mistaken understanding that the <i>later</i> Greek understanding of "Father alone" was what the Creed of Constantinople <i>really meant</i>, even though there is essentially no evidence for that proposition. There likely was no such consensus meaning among the pro-Nicenes, although the textual background of the creed in Epiphanius indicates that there was at least compromise with (if not outright endorsement of) the Johannine tradition. In any case, if we did have to decide between the two, then it is just as likely (and maybe even more likely) that the <i>filioque</i> as taught in Rev. 22:1 was the intended meaning. But I suspect that appending <i>either</i> "and the Son" or "alone" to "proceeds from the Father" was not considered to deny the underlying doctrine by the other side, because they referred to two entirely different analogical concepts. That failure to endorse one side or the other does not appear to have satisfied either side, a division that continues all the way through Chalcedon and produces further splits after. But the historical fact that Constantinople <i>was</i> a compromise seems undeniable.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">On the other hand, there is no way to accept the "Cappadocian victory" narrative <i>without</i> erasing the Alexandrian-Roman tradition. It renders all of the Latin and Alexandrian Fathers to some or another degree incoherent with primitive or simplistic views that must be corrected by the glorious Cappadocian model. We must apologize for these well-meaning-but-bumbling Saints of the Church who just didn't realize exactly how appalling their claims of patristic support were. We must grovel, abase ourselves before the Orthodox polemicists, put on our sackcloth and ashes, and proceed to display exactly how sorry we were for failing to be aware of the Cappadocians' singular brilliance. And this is done to the point of excluding and in some cases entirely misreading our own Latin tradition. Other than Maspero himself, I have two other relatively recent examples of the same phenomenon that show the same problems.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">First is <a href="https://catholicbridge.com/downloads/response-on-the-filioque.pdf" target="_blank">Catholic apologist Mark Bonocore,</a> who writes the following:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT; font-size: 12pt;"><br /></span></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>For, in the original Greek text of the Constantinopolitan Creed of 381, the term “proceeds” (ekporeusis) had a specific and all-important meaning. It meant to originate from a single Source, Principal, or Cause (Aitia). And the single Source, Principal, or Cause of the Holy Spirit is of course the Father, and the Father alone. As St. Gregory of Nazianzus says ...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>"The Spirit is truly the Spirit proceeding (proion) from the Father, not by filiation, for It is not by generation, but by ekporeusis" (Discourse 39. 12).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Indeed, it was this very theology of the Cappadocian fathers (i.e., Sts. Gregory Nazianzus, Basil the Great, and Gregory of Nyssa) that the bishops at Constantinople I (381) intended to promote when they authored the Creed to say “The Holy Spirit ...Who proceeds from the Father.” –a reference to the Father’s Monarchy as the sole Source, Principal, or Cause of the Spirit. And the bishops at Constantinople I did this to counter the heresy of the Macedonian Arians, who, at the time, were claiming that the Spirit is merely a “creation” of the Son. ‘No,’ say the Council fathers, ‘the Spirit is Divine and has His Source, like the Son, with the Father. It is from the Father that the Spirit proceeds.’</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>So, to someone coming from this Eastern heritage –indeed, for any Greek-speaker who knows what the term “ekporeusis” implies (i.e., procession from a single source, principal, or cause), the addition of the Latin clause “Filioque” (“and the Son”) seriously challenges, if not totally destroys, the originally-intended meaning of this Creedal statement. And we Roman Catholics fully agree and admit this. The introduction of the Filioque is clearly a departure from the original intention and design of the A.D. 381 version of the Constantinopolitan Creed. However, it is not a departure from Apostolic orthodoxy. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In this misguided desire to somehow reconcile this mistaken model with the actual history of Western dogma, Bonocore ends up producing a nonsensical explanation that ends up violating both Catholic and Orthodox dogma:</div></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: TimesNewRomanPSMT; font-size: 12pt; text-align: start;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Rather, the Western Church teaches, and has always taught, that the Father, and the Father alone, is the Source, Principal, and Cause (“Aition”) of the Holy Spirit –that is, the formal proclamation of Constantinople I. Indeed, even St. Augustine, who is often made into an intellectual scapegoat among some Eastern Orthodox (their argument being that Filioque is based totally on Augustine’s supposedly flawed theology) clearly taught that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father “principaliter” --that is, “as Principle” (De Trinitate XV, 25, 47, PL 42, 1094-1095). So, there is clearly no contradiction between Augustine and the Cappadocians or the Constantinopolitan fathers on this issue. Both Greek East and Latin West confess, and always have confessed, that the Father alone is the Cause (Aition) or Principle (Principium) of both the Son and the Spirit.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Ergo, the Catholic Church does not deny the Constantinopolitan Creed as originally written. This is why our Byzantine Catholic Churches recite the Creed without the Filioque, and why even we Romans are able to recite the Creed without the Filioque when participating in Byzantine Catholic or Eastern Orthodox Liturgies. This is also why we reject the clause “...kai tou Uiou ...” (“...and the Son”) being added to the Creedal expression “ek tou Patros ekporeuomenon” in Greek, even when used by Latin Rite Catholics in Greek-speaking communities. If the Greek word “ekporeusis” is to be used or intended, then it is incorrect and heretical to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father “and the Son.” Neither East nor West believes that the Spirit proceeds “from the Father and the Son” as a common source or principal (aitia). Rather, that one Source and Principal (Aition) is the Father, and the Father alone.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>But, if the Western Church agrees with the East that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, then what does it mean by “Filioque” –that the Spirit proceeds “from the Father and the Son”? Very simply, and keeping in mind the West’s isolation from the original Greek-language intention of the Constantinopolitan Creed, what the West means to express is a truth that is equally valid, but distinct and parallel to, the original Greek- language intention. For, when the West speaks of the Spirit “proceeding” from the Father and the Son, it is referring to something all-together different than “procession” as from a single source (aitia). It is not advocating two sources or principals for the Spirit, or some kind of “double spiration,” as is all-too-commonly (wrongly) assumed by many Eastern Orthodox. Rather, it is using the term “proceeds” in an all-together different sense. And the best way to illustrate the two different senses or uses of the term “proceeds” (Greek vs. Latin) is though the following analogy:</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>If a human father and son go into their back yard to play a game of catch, it is the father who initiates the game of catch by throwing the ball to his son. In this sense, one can say that the game of catch “proceeds” from this human father (an “aition”); and this is the original, Greek sense of the Constantinopolitan Creed’s use of the term “proceeds” (“ekporeusis”). However, taking this very same scenario, one can also justly say that the game of catch “proceeds” from both the father and his son. And this is because the son has to be there for the game of catch to exist. For, unless the son is there, then the father would have no one to throw the ball to; and so there would be no game of catch. And, it is in this sense (one might say a “collective” sense) that the West uses the term “proceeds” (“procedit”) in the Filioque. Just as acknowledging the necessity of the human son’s presence in order for the game of catch to exist does not, in any way, challenge or threaten the human father’s role as the source or initiator (aition) of the game of catch, so the Filioque does not deny the Father’s singular role as the Cause (Aition) of the Spirit; but merely acknowledges the Son’s necessary Presence (i.e., participation) for the Spirit’s eternal procession from the Father to Someone else – namely, to the eternal Son. Father and Son are thus collectively identified as accounting for the Spirit’s procession. This is all that the Filioque was ever intended to address; and it was included in the Creed by the Western fathers at Toledo in order to counter the claims of the 6th Century Spanish (Germanic) Arians. These Arians were of course denying this essential and orthodox truth –that is, the Son’s eternal participation in the Spirit’s procession –an issue which was never challenged or comprehensively addressed in the Byzantine experience, aside from the fact that there does exist throughout the writings of the Eastern fathers the profession that the Spirit proceeds from the Father “through [or ‘by way of’] the Son.” –an expression equivalent to the Filioque.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The "game of catch" analogy here is inept in the same way as Richard of St. Victor's "love" analogy; it would create an active and passive principle, which are two principles, rather than a procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son <i>as from one principle</i>. So Bonocore has expressly denied the doctrine of Lyons and Florence exactly because what he is trying to do is impossible. Leaving that aside, interpreting Augustine's "<i>principaliter</i>" in a way that denies that the Spirit proceeds from the Father <i>and </i>the Son <i>communiter</i>, as from one principle, contradicts Augustine's own view in addition to the later dogma. This incompetent historical (and theological) interpretation results directly from the adoption of the "Cappadocian victory" narrative.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Bonocore is a lay apologist who has probably been misled by the 1995 "Clarification" (which really did almost nothing to clarify, since it pushed the "Cappadocian victory" narrative that Garrigues endorsed). Because of the Clarification, this is how he understands the Catholic position he needs to defend, even if it actually contradicts all of the Latin Fathers and all of the background of Lyons and Florence. But the fact that patristics scholar Jim Papandrea makes a very similar mistake shows how the "Cappadocian victory" narrative has coopted the scholarship as well.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Papandrea's book <i>Reading the Church Fathers</i> includes the following explanations of the <i>filioque</i> at various points in the book, which might as well serve as a definition of the "Cappacodian victory" paradigm:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Together, the Cappadocians clarified that the Holy Spirit is of the same divine substance (consubstantial) with the Father and the Son and is therefore divine and is worthy of worship. Thus, the Holy Spirit cannot be a created being, or reduced to the personification of divine activity. Variations of these orthodox and Nicene clarifications had been affirmed in the West since Tertullian, and in the East at least since Athanasius, <b>however, the Cappadocians are credited with effectively ending the debate over the divinity of the Spirit and bringing the East around to an acceptance of the Greek technical terms to be used to described the Trinity. Their work led to a revision of the creed at the Council of Constantinople in AD 381 that expanded the paragraph on the Holy Spirit to what it is today</b> (with the exception of the western addition of </i>filioque<i>, "and the Son"; see below).</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Theologically, Ambrose is less of an innovator and more of a collator and summarizer. He was influenced by all of the important western theologians, especially Tertullian and Novatian (vila Hilary of Poitiers). But he had also traveled to the East, he could read Greek, and so he was able to integrate the influences of Athanasius and <b>especially the Cappadocians</b> into his work. Consequently, his document </i>On the Holy Spirit <i>(written in AD 381, the same year as the Council) is a more succinct and accessible treatise on pneumatology <b>than one would get from trying to glean the information from all of the Cappadocian documents directly</b>. Ambrose does take one step that goes beyond his predecessors. <b>Whereas the Cappadocians had said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father </b></i><b>through the Son<i>, Ambrose, in his attempt to emphasize the equality of the Father and the Son against Arianism, wrote that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father </i>and </b><i><b>the Son</b> (in Latin, </i>and the son<i> is one word, </i>filioque)<i>. For him, the doctrine of inseparable operations applies even to the procession of the Spirit, so that the Spirit must proceed from both Father and Son (just as the Son is sent by both the Father and the Spirit). This will influence Augustine's writing on the Trinity, which in turn will lead to the addition of the </i>filioque<i> clause into the creed in the West (see chapter 13, below).</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Eastern Christians think of the procession of the Spirit as parallel to the generation of the Son. Just as the Son is eternally generated from the Father, so the Spirit is eternally proceeding from the Father. ... But here's the rub: just as we would never say that the Son is eternally generated from the Father "and the Spirit" (which would paganize God, turning the Spirit into something like the mother of the Son, making the Son also the Son of the Spirit) -- so t<b>he eastern Christian will correctly affirm that we cannot say that the Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father "and the Son" since the eternal existence of the Spirit is dependent on the Father alone</b>.* So to the extent that procession of the Spirit is analogous to eternal genenration of the Son, the procession of the Spirit must be from the Father alone, or at most, from the Father through the Son.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">* <i>Augustine did actually say this. <b>In his </b></i><b>On the Trinity, <i>he did say that the procession of the Spirit from the Father </i>and the Son</b><i><b> applies to both eternal procession and temporal procession. However, in this he went too far</b>. In a situation like that of the Pelagian controversy, here Augustine allowed the argument to push him to an extreme that he would later have to nuance. See the response to this question by the [1995 Clarification].</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Western Christians, on the other hand, tend to think of the procession of the Spirit as more of a parallel to the Incarnation of the Son, that is, the giving of the Spirit to humanity is like the giving of the Son to humanity. And in this, western Christians are correct to point to all the Scripture passages which make the Spirit the gift of both the Father and the Son. The heart of the problem is that the same word, </i>procession<i>, actually describes two distinct doctrines. The first is eternal procession, the eternal existence of the Holy Spirit and the Spirit's place in the Trinity, and this is what the easterners are thinking of when they insist that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. The second is temporal procession, the gift of the Spirit to humanity and to the Church, and this is what westerners are thinking of when they insist that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. Thus, the </i>filioque<i> itself (double procession) technically only applies to temporal procession</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">If we need any further evidence that the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm and its use in the 1995 Clarification has devastated the understanding of the Latin and Alexandrian tradition, we need go no farther than a Catholic scholar reciting essentially word for word the hardline Photian position because of it. This is insanity: Papandrea is interpreting the 1995 Clarification to say that Photius was right all along, and he does so precisely because that is how senseless it is to try to read Latin and Alexandrian Fathers in the Cappadocian model. Consider that he is reading Ambrose, a "collator and summarizer," as nonetheless <i>going beyond</i> and <i>creatively synthesizing </i>Cappadocian works, many of which he almost certainly hadn't read, as opposed to simply reproducing what others wrote (including Didymus, as Jerome less than politely suggested). It is certainly beyond question that Ambrose would not have come up with the pneumatological use of Revelation 22:1 on his own, which is a clear reflection of the Johannine tradition he was following. I do not believe it is a coincidence that Papandrea wrote a largely negative review of Lashier's work of Irenaeus that suggested to me that Papandrea was instead unable to think outside of the cognitive box in which the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm had placed him.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Thus we reach Maspero. Maspero at least doesn't assert the logically contradictory position of both Bonocore and Papandrea that the <i>filioque</i> was purely economic. But his alternative proposal for a "patristic <i>filioque</i>" based on a realist version of relations within the substance is no better. Now that we have seen Palamas's move to an even more apophatic view than his predecessors, it becomes immediately apparent that Maspero's assertion of an <i>ontological </i>"active but non-causal" role for the Son in the procession of the Spirit goes in exactly the wrong direction for the East. It suffers from the same flaws as the "real" version of the Blemmydes model that was rejected by both Cyprios and Palamas. And as Cross pointed out, <i>any</i> relational distinction between the Son and the Spirit can be at most conceptual (i.e., related to our manner of thinking about real things as opposed to the thing itself), and that goes for Augustine and Nyssen equally. Divine simplicity thus entails a hard apophatic limit on how literally any conceptual structures can be read onto the Trinity for both East and West; this is what necessitates paraconsistent logic. So this idea that Nyssen's concept of relation is somehow "real" or "ontological" <i>within</i> the concept of "substance" is only an expression of Maspero's Kantian ontology that privileges categories like person and relation; it cannot be found in any of the sources and does nothing to bring the models closer together. At most, Maspero's view might be adapted to fit into the <i>conceptual</i> structure of the Cypriot model, <i>if</i> the relations are not taken to be "real" in the sense that Blemmydes appears to do. But even then, it would be characteristic of the Cypriot model, not a general dogmatic principle that could be applied universally.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">And Maspero's reliance on post-Kantian existentialism in apparent in his use of the psychological analogy:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The usual scheme that identifies the <b>reinterpretation of human interiority in the light of the relationships of the three Persons in the divine immanence</b> as a hallmark of Latin tradition is challenge. In fact, a similar trend can be found in the Greek Fathers based on the <b>new relational ontology introduced by the Cappadocians </b>in view of the Council of Constantinople. This suggests the need to radically rethink the relationship between the </i>Filioque<i> and the psychological analogy, excluding the route that the former be caused by the latter. On the contrary, this happened the other way around, as the theology which led to the distinction between the two immanent processions had as a natural consequence <b>the rereading of the human being's internal faculties without any undue projection from the bottom up</b>.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The bolded text about "reinterpretation of human interiority," "relational ontology," and "rereading of the human being's internal faculties" is purely contemporary. These are modern philosophical terms used in a way that has no basis in the authors Maspero purports to be interpreting. And to put icing on this Kantian cake, Maspero's single citation of Friedman in the entire book is to charge those developing the emanational model with "the loss of moderation preserved in patristic times by apophaticism" based on their strong version of the psychological analogy. The reason I bring up Maspero's passing footnote here is that it illustrates Maspero's fundamental misunderstanding of pluralism <i>even in his own Latin tradition</i>, which a careful reading of Friedman certainly should have prevented. These errors are as follows:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">(1) Maspero's own description of the internal psychology and particularly the "reinterpretation of human interiority" is a much more literal use of the psychological analogy than any medieval short of Henry of Ghent (and maybe not even him) might have employed. Maspero's concepts are so far beyond the borders of apophaticism that the Scholastics set that for Maspero to make this charge, which Friedman himself certainly does not make, borders on the ridiculous. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">(2) One of the people who makes a relatively strong use of the psychological analogy that Maspero chastises is Bl. John Duns Scotus, relying on the formal distinction. Scotus's theology clearly draws from Bonaventure, the Doctor who literally wrote the book on Christian mysticism and apophaticism (<i>The Journey of the Mind to God</i>). Although Bonaventure himself did not make the psychological analogy a major part of his theology, the formal distinction on which Scotus's use of the psychological analogy is based definitely draws on Bonaventure's own theology. The fact that the resulting Franciscan model is closer to the East both theologically, as an emanational model, and metaphysically, as being closer to the essence-energies distinction, makes Scotism particularly suitable for ecumenical efforts. And such use even has historical precedents: as Fr. Christiaan Kappes describes in "A Latin Defense of Mark of Ephesus at the Council of Ferrara-Florence," Mark of Ephesus himself relies on Scotus's work as against the Dominicans at the Council. Maspero's monolithic view has not only led him to suppress pluralism generally but to denigrate a particularly helpful thread of Latin tradition for his ecumenical cause.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">(3) The problem for ecumenism on the <i>filioque</i> has not been use of the psychological analogy, especially the Biblical term <i>Logos</i>, but taking the "love" in "God is love" too literally, the exact same error committed when "love" and "relation" are recast in terms of modern existentialism. The author in the West who used "love" quite literally was Richard of St. Victor, who analogized the Holy Spirit to Abel being born of the love of Adam and Eve. Fr. Kappes in "The <i>Filioque, Thomas de Aquino Byzantinus</i>, and Ps.-Basil's <i>Contra Eunomium</i>" describes this as a "primitive but popular metaphor." Kappes further relates that, despite the authority of Richard, St. Thomas carefully considers this metaphor and rejects it, saying "this example of a material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession of the divine persons" (<i>ST </i>I, p. 36, a. 3 <i>ad </i>1). In particular, it clearly violates the concept of "one principle" endorsed at Lyons, since Adam and Eve would be an active and passive (material) principle for Abel. Given that the metaphor is unlikely to be interpreted in a sufficiently apophatic way, it is therefore inept. Unfortunately, as Kappes also points out, Western missionaries from the East frequently relied on this popular metaphor, which was scandalous to Eastern theologians who viewed it as proof that the West was really teaching two principles, exactly as Photios had claimed centuries ago in the <i>Mystagogy</i>. So Maspero has not only misdiagnosed the problem, which was excessive literalism about the love relation, but doubled down on the same error with his highly literalist account of relations. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">This misbegotten view of his own tradition extends through the very end of the book, where Maspero lays out his idea of apophaticism. As outlined above, apophaticism serves a specific formal function in patristic and post-patristic theological schools; especially with respect to the doctrine of divine simplicity, it specifies the limits of our conceptual apparatus around the Trinity. It is intended to prevent exactly what Maspero does, which is taking terms like "relation" and "person" from our experience too literally. By contrast, in post-Kantian existentialism, the "relational" experience is what is real, while our rigorous conceptual thinking at the <i>noumenal</i> level must be subject to <i>apophasis</i> to prevent us from thinking that our concepts are the reality. Referring to Gregory the Theologian's alleged view of apophaticism, Maspero says:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The extraordinary definition of the true theologian presented by Gregory of Nazianzus seems to lead us in the direction:</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>"But by getting some idea of what concerns Him [God] </i>(ta kat'auton)<i> from the realities surrounding Him </i>(ek ton peri auton)<i>, we piece together </i>(syllegomen)<i> a dark and uncertain image from different things </i>(allon ap'allou)<i>. And so, in our opinion, the best theologian is not the one who has understood the whole, because the limited does not contain the whole, but rather the one who has been able to imagine </i>(phantasthe)<i> more than others and to better unite in his mind </i>(synagoge) <i>the mental image of the truth or a shadow of it or whatever we would like to call it." [Or. 30.17.9-14]</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>The true theologian knows very well that our thought is limited, as the most blessed Trinity is eternal and infinite, that is, always beyond our capabilities. At the same time, the possibility for the knowledge and worship of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is always open, <b>at the relational level</b>. In fact, the correspondence of the verbs </i>syllego<i> and </i>synago<i> in the quoted text recalls precisely the drawing of the connection between the different moments and signs of God's giving of Himself in history, in imitation of the </i>symballo <i>that according to Luke 2:19 characterizes the meditation of the Heart of Mary</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">If we refer back to J.-H. Nicolas's summary of the theological task, there could not be a better correspondence between the Thomist Nicolas and Gregory the Theologian. There can never be any systematic vision (understanding the whole) that fully contains the Divine Truth (<i>apophasis</i>), but we cannot cease from using what reason we have in terms of the law of non-contradiction, affirming and denying, to express that doctrinal synthesis in a coherent way (<i>cataphasis</i>). That is precisely the speculative (imaginative) task to which theologians put themselves. But for Nicolas, this leads to <i>authentic theological pluralism</i>. Maspero, by contrast, reads apophaticism in post-Kantian terms, even purporting to find his existentialist account of "relation" in <i>Scripture</i>. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The true path forward is likewise laid out by Nicolas, who humbly recognized the limitations even of his own Thomist school. It is not some fruitless gladiatorial combat to decide the "best" among those the many wise theologians who each are able to "imagine more than others" and "better unite in [their] mind the mental image." It is not to make the Cappadocian-Syriac school the "winner" over the Alexandrian-Roman school. It is to recognize what many irenically-minded authors in the first millennium did: that there is a such thing as legitimate theological pluralism. As we saw, the "Cappadocian victory" paradigm was three times a failure in accounting for the Latin tradition and for Catholic dogma.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Maspero's concept of "apophaticism," moored in Kantian ontology, is the battleground. Here is what I dispute:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>So, following Gregory of Nyssa's warning, we must avoid turning concepts into idols through a common effort to recover the sense of Christian mystery. The conflict over the </i>Filioque<i> can in fact be traced to the weakening in the theological epistemology of the essential role of apophaticism, understood as affirmation of the fact that the revealed reality exceeds our ability to formulate it. This epistemological loss characterizes the turn from the patristic era, which coincides with that of the first seven Ecumenical Councils, to the medieval and Byzantine era. This seems to suggest the need to study the development of thought in the first eight centuries of the Christian era in search of a common theological grammar</i>.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Would that Maspero had actually done such a study! He might have realized that his ascription of the <i>filioque </i>conflict to "the weakening in the theological epistemology of the essential role of apophaticism" is comically false. What actually characterizes the turn from the patristic era to the medieval and Byzantine era is a <i>loss of the sense of theological pluralism</i>. This was not driven by linguistic considerations, since productive theological exchanges continued between Rome and Alexandria through the fourth century and all the way to Chalcedon. Rather, it was the point at which Greek-speaking Alexandria was lost to the Miaphysites that Rome was separated from Constantinople, and the old Alexandrian-Roman model and the Cappadocian model gradually lost the sense of one another's existence as "Latin" and "Greek" theologies continued to develop. That sense of mutual awareness was hanging on by a thread at the time of the Seventh Ecumenical Council and the subsequent Photian Schism, and the thread was broken in the eleventh century. Apart from a single irenic dialogue between Anselm of Haverberg and Nicetas of Nicomedia in 1136, which is summarized by Ed Siecienski in <i>The Filioque</i> at pp. 122-24, this mutual awareness has never again been achieved.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">It is this largely mythical view of a monolithic theological consensus in the Fathers and the resulting denial of theological pluralism, driven almost entirely by mutual ignorance resulting from the post-Chalcedonian theological splintering of the Roman Empire, that is responsible for the <i>filioque</i> conflict. Even <i>after</i> the Photian Schism, mutual tolerance of theological pluralism continued to operate as it had between East and West, going all the way back to the reception of Jewish traditions by Theophilus and Irenaeus. That pluralism only became a Church-dividing issue in the second millennium, and since then, each side has been polemically insistent that only schools within its own broader theological model can be orthodox. Maspero's attempt to pick a "winner" in the Cappadocian school over and against the Alexandrian-Roman school is only throwing gasoline onto this raging fire.</div></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>VIII. Drop the anti-filioquism</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Maspero begins his book with an anecdote about a young man who carried a sign made from a pizza box during a 2010 papal visit to London that read "Drop the <i>Filioque</i>." Maspero seems to have been under the mistaken impression that the <i>Filioque</i> is "a theological issue that seems to be of interest only to experts in ecumenical dialogue or historians of the Church." He is apparently oblivious to the fact that by 2010, there was a robust theological community of polemics and apologetics between Catholics and Orthodox. One of the chief polemical arguments of the Orthodox against the Catholics during this time has been this assertion of the so-called "patristic <i>filioque</i>" as contrasted with the "medieval <i>filioque."</i> This is frequently asserted by Orthodox who do not recognize Catholics as a true church, some of whom even advocate rebaptism of Catholics who enter communion with Orthodox churches. So Maspero's suggestion to "Drop the medieval <i>filioque</i> and let's keep that of the (Greek) Fathers" is repeating, and seemingly endorsing, an anti-Catholic trope that has been used relentlessly by Orthodox polemicists. That is simply a fact.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Why a scholar of Maspero's standing thought that this would help ecumenism or why he was oblivious to the polemical context of his own writings cannot be explained. But he deserves to be chastised for it, because it was both reckless and avoidable. Had he not been so careless and sloppy in his study of the Latin and Alexandrian traditions (or had he even thought through the arguments of his own sources like Thom and Friedman), this wouldn't have happened. As it is, he should be ashamed for what he has done. Other historians, who are likely equally unaware of the Orthodox polemicists and who view these opinions as nothing but ordinary historical speculation, have endorsed Maspero's work. Having been working at the ground level of East-West ecumenism for almost twenty years, I cannot make such an endorsement; Maspero's "ecumenical" thesis is a disaster, and it does not even have the virtue of being correct. Maspero falls into every trap that has sabotaged East-West dialogue for centuries, and the lesson of history is that all of those traps result from a denial of theological pluralism.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">In terms of how we would actually respond to Toby Guise, the young man with the pizza box, we can consider what Guise actually said about his experience:</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>I went to the Mall primarily out of historical and cultural interest rather than with any clearly defined spiritual expectations. The atmosphere there was certainly one of his expectation, even though many like me were essentially sight-seeing. But when the Pope appeared there was a definite shift in the atmosphere. It was not immediate but a sense of elation infused the crowd, which began to move down the Mall in a kind of joyful mass jog. I was personally overwhelmed by love for Pope Benedict and the desire to communicate this to him. I raised my palm towards him and shouted greetings of welcome and of blessing. His face absolutely radiated peace and love.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i>Coming to the end of the Mall, I was concerned at the possibility of a crush but the dynamic of the crowd prevented this. As it dispersed, people were highly energised and sharing their excitement with each other. It was an important encounter as even while I continue to reject many of the historical claims and canons of the Catholic Church, I do now accept it as a real and functioning spiritual hierarchy and highly value to Pope's presence as the most significant Christian voice in Europe.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">At a personal level, Guise saw something that he didn't expect to see about the Catholic Church. That is no less true for the <i>filioque</i> itself; the problem has been that there is a whole Alexandrian-Roman tradition that people haven't seen. Maspero had a real opportunity here to do on the historical level what Pope Benedict XVI's visit did on the personal level: <i>to show pluralism that hadn't been seen</i>. Bringing the Syriac voice as yet another theological school could have helped to illuminate the pluralism in the orthodox Christian tradition that persists even today. But Fr. Maspero did not rise to that opportunity; instead, he preferred to lend his voice to anti-Catholic polemics that have only contributed to further division.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">I am sorry to say of Fr. Maspero that it would've been better he had stuck to history and restrained his ambition in systematic theology and ecumenism.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u>IX. <i>Apologia pro Vita Sua</i>: An autobiographical note</u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><u><i><br /></i></u></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">I have been very hard on Fr. Maspero. Given that this is the Internet, it is very easy to dismiss my opinion as an overheated polemical exercise (as actually happened with my work on Calvinism). That is especially the case since Fr. Maspero is a scholar in this field, while I am not. For that reason, I find it necessary to give an account of what motivates me to write in this area generally and what motivated me to write what I have written about Fr. Maspero. My hope is that this will at least take any personal criticism out of the equation, so that the work can be judged on its own merit.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">My first serious study of the Catholic faith began when I was in law school in Cambridge, Massachusetts (hence, the name of the blog). In the very first session of a series at St. Paul's Church called "Basic Beliefs," Fr. Jim Savage gave a presentation on the doctrine of the Trinity, and that was the first time I encountered the concept of <i>perichoresis</i>. I can only describe seeing that idea for the first time as a conversion experience. There was no doubt in my mind that what I had seen, was the truth. I had a sense of awe that I previously associated with looking up at the stars and contemplating the vastness of space -- here was a reality that no mind could fully grasp. And it has been so for me ever since.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Following that intuition, the study of the Most Holy Trinity, especially in the Church Fathers, has been a singular focus. Perhaps none was more influential for me than Cyril of Alexandria. I have always seen Cyril's vision as inspiring; he could see beyond himself to the heavenly horizons. He recognized when he needed to fight to preserve the faith, but he could also be extraordinarily open-minded and creative when communicating these ideas to others. I put this blog under Cyril's and Bonaventure's patronage in an effort to emulate their capacious theological vision. I hope that this article has done something to highlight the importance of Cyril's Alexandrian theology in history, which has been largely neglected.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">That brings me to my present purpose. In the past couple of years, I have turned more to writing than reading. That is because I believe that the corrosive effects of Church division have left Christianity seriously hindered in its ability to witness to modern society. I believe there is an incredible intellectual legacy in the Christian faith that has been put under the proverbial bushel basket (Matt. 5:15-16), and that is largely because East and West cannot proclaim it with one voice, so as to let it shine to the world. The "bushel basket", as I see it, is this unproductive attempt of both sides to suppress the theological pluralism of the past, of which the revision of Alexandrian theology out of history is only a symptom.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">Fr. Maspero's book <i>Trinity and Man</i> is an excellent book, and it is special exactly for <i>not</i> doing this. He lets Gregory of Nyssa speak for himself, rather than trying to fit him into rigid Eastern and Western categories. In that regard, it is in the same spirit as Barnes's <i>Power of God</i>, Ayres's <i>Nicaea and Its Legacy</i>, and Anatolios's <i>Retrieving Nicaea</i>, also very good books. <i>Trinity and Man</i> differs greatly from the work of Coakley, Daley, Weinandy, and innumerable others who seem far more determined to solve the ecumenical problem than to hear what any of these Saints have to say about it. It was a sad day to see Maspero join them.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">I offer against those monolithic "solutions" a pluralist alternative. That pluralist alternative would instead recognize that the Cappadocians directly contradicted Cyril and the Latins on pneumatology, especially in the exegesis of John 15 and 16, yet they all somehow managed to live in one faith. That would be a path forward, not back into the mud. The best way I think to let them speak would be to affirm that the Latin version of the Creed is the <i>Latin and Alexandrian</i> version, while the Greek version of the Creed is the <i>Cappadocian and Syriac</i> version, but <i>both are theologically acceptable based on Constantinople</i>. </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The reason that I think it is necessary to affirm the Alexandrian aspect is that two points need to be clear: (1) the "original" Constantinopolitan <i>intentionally</i> allowed both interpretations in local creeds, so the West never changed anything, and (2) this has nothing to do with the Creed being in Greek or Latin. The West affirms the same thing that the Latin and Alexandrian theologians always affirmed, and the East affirms the same thing that the Cappadocian, Antiochene, and Syriac theologians always affirmed. Since the Alexandrian heritage has been subsequently assimilated into the Cappadocian model, it seems simpler to say that the Greek language "stands for" that model, and Latin "stands for" the Western model. That is not because <i>ekporeuesthai</i> is a magic word in Greek or that it had any particular technical meaning after Constantinople but simply because the Byzantine synthesis was built exclusively on a particular version of the emanational model as a historical matter.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The only real alternative to pluralism is to keep the faith traditions for the Holy Spirit under a bushel basket. It seems that a millennium or so of past experience should be long enough to reasonably conclude that this path leads nowhere.</div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-15660776187441264832023-07-04T10:24:00.007-04:002023-09-09T11:25:52.663-04:00Does Amoris Laetitia dogmatize progressive moral theology?<p style="text-align: justify;">Obviously, my answer is "no." If it were otherwise, I have no idea why anyone would stay Catholic, because that would be just as absurd (from my view) as changing the meaning of the Eucharist. When the Anglicans did that, we said their orders were no longer valid. If the Pope likewise changed the meaning of the Sacrament of Penance, we would be in the same situation.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Council of Trent, <a href="https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/decree-concerning-justification--decree-concerning-reform-1496" target="_blank">speaking on justification</a>, says the following concerning the commandments (my emphasis in <b>bold</b>):</p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;">THE OBSERVANCE OF THE COMMANDMENTS AND THE NECESSITY AND POSSIBILITY THEREOF</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">But no one, however much justified, should consider himself exempt from the observance of the commandments; no one should use that rash statement, once forbidden by the Fathers under anathema, that <b>the observance of the commandments of God is impossible for one that is justified</b>.</div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;"><b>For God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes thee to do what thou canst and to pray for what thou canst not, and aids thee that thou mayest be able</b>.</div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">His commandments are not heavy, and his yoke is sweet and burden light.</div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">For they who are the sons of God love Christ, but they who love Him, keep His commandments, as He Himself testifies; which, indeed, with the divine help they can do.</div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">For though during this mortal life, men, however holy and just, fall at times into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial, they do not on that account cease to be just, for that petition of the just, forgive us our trespasses, is both humble and true; for which reason the just ought to feel themselves the more obliged to walk in the way of justice, for being now freed from sin and made servants of God, they are able, living soberly, justly and godly, to proceed onward through Jesus Christ, by whom they have access unto this grace.</div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><b>For God does not forsake those who have been once justified by His grace, unless He be first forsaken by them</b>.</div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;">...</div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>Canon 3.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>If anyone says that without the predisposing inspiration of the Holy Ghost and without His help, man can believe, hope, love or <b>be repentant</b> as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be bestowed upon him, let him be anathema.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>Canon 18.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>If anyone says that <b>the commandments of God are</b>, even for one that is justified and constituted in grace, <b>impossible to observe</b>, let him be anathema.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;">...</div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>Canon 22.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>If anyone says that the one justified either can without the special help of God persevere in the justice received, <b>or that with that help he cannot</b>, let him be anathema.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Trent follows the <a href="https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/orange.txt" target="_blank">Second Council of Orange</a> on these matters:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>CANON 6. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>If anyone says that God has mercy upon us when, apart from his grace, we believe, will, desire, strive, labor, pray, watch, study, seek, ask, or knock, but does not confess that it is <b>by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit within us that we have the faith, the will, or the strength to do all these things as we ought</b>; or if anyone makes the assistance of grace depend on the humility or obedience of man and does not agree that it is a gift of grace itself that we are obedient and humble, he contradicts the Apostle who says, "What have you that you did not receive?" (1 Cor. 4:7), and, "But by the grace of God I am what I am" (1 Cor. 15:10).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>CANON 7. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>If anyone affirms that we can <b>form any right opinion or make any right choice which relates to the salvation of eternal life</b>, as is expedient for us, or that we can be saved, that is, assent to the preaching of the gospel through our natural powers <b>without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who makes all men gladly assent to and believe in the truth</b>, he is led astray by a heretical spirit, and does not understand the voice of God who says in the Gospel, "For apart from me you can do nothing" (John 15:5), and the word of the Apostle, "Not that we are competent of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our competence is from God" (2 Cor. 3:5).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Likewise the conclusion states:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>According to the catholic faith we also believe that after grace has been received through baptism, all <b>baptized persons have the ability and responsibility, if they desire to labor faithfully, to perform with the aid and cooperation of Christ what is of essential importance in regard to the salvation of their soul</b>. We not only do not believe that any are foreordained to evil by the power of God, but even state with utter abhorrence that if there are those who want to believe so evil a thing, they are anathema. We also believe and confess to our benefit that in every good work it is not we who take the initiative and are then assisted through the mercy of God, but God himself first inspires in us both faith in him and love for him without any previous good works of our own that deserve reward, so that we may both faithfully seek the sacrament of baptism, and <b>after baptism be able by his help to do what is pleasing to him</b>. We must therefore most evidently believe that the praiseworthy faith of the thief whom the Lord called to his home in paradise, and of Cornelius the centurion, to whom the angel of the Lord was sent, and of Zacchaeus, who was worthy to receive the Lord himself, was not a natural endowment but a gift of God's kindness.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Both councils use the objective language of "the commandments of God," "to do things as we ought," and the like. In this immediate context of the loss of salvation, it pertains specifically to two things (which <i>Veritatis Splendor</i> will later call the "lower limit" of the objective commandment) : (1) violating any negative commandment in a way that would objectively break the commandment, or (2) violating any positive commandment in a way that would objectively not be excused by another positive commandment. This not does pertain to culpability; it is not saying that the baptized are able, with the help of God's grace, to remain inculpable for mortal sins. Rather, it is saying that they are capable, with God's grace and the illumination of the Holy Spirit dwelling within them, to avoid objectively breaking the commandments. This is why Pope St. John Paul II in <i>Reconcilatio et Paenitentia</i> would say "Considering sin from the point of view of its matter, the ideas of death, of radical rupture with God, the supreme good, of deviation from the path that leads to God or interruption of the journey toward him (which are all ways of defining mortal sin) are linked with the idea of the gravity of sin's objective content. Hence, in the church's doctrine and pastoral action, <b>grave sin is in practice identified with mortal sin</b>." This is so even though "there can occur situations which are very complex and obscure from a psychological viewpoint and which have an influence on the sinner's subjective culpability."</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Pope St. John Paul II summarizes the constant teaching of the Church on hope in <i>Veritatis Splendor </i>103 (my emphasis in <b>bold</b>):</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Man always has before him the spiritual horizon of hope, thanks to the </i>help of divine grace<i> and with the </i>cooperation of human freedom<i>.</i></div></i><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">It is in the saving Cross of Jesus, in the gift of the Holy Spirit, in the Sacraments which flow forth from the pierced side of the Redeemer (cf. Jn 19:34), that believers find the grace and the strength always to keep God's holy law, even amid the gravest of hardships. As Saint Andrew of Crete observes, the law itself "was enlivened by grace and made to serve it in a harmonious and fruitful combination. Each element preserved its characteristics without change or confusion. In a divine manner, he turned what could be burdensome and tyrannical into what is easy to bear and a source of freedom".</div></span><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i style="font-style: italic;">Only in the mystery of Christ's Redemption do we discover the "concrete" possibilities of man. "It would be a very serious error to conclude... that the Church's teaching is essentially only an "ideal" which must then be adapted, proportioned, graduated to the so-called concrete possibilities of man, according to a "balancing of the goods in question". But what are the "concrete possibilities of man" ? And of </i>which<i style="font-style: italic;"> man are we speaking? Of man </i>dominated<i style="font-style: italic;"> by lust or of man </i>redeemed by Christ<i style="font-style: italic;">? This is what is at stake: the </i>reality<i style="font-style: italic;"> of Christ's redemption. </i>Christ has redeemed us<i style="font-style: italic;">! This means that he has given us the possibility of realizing the entire truth of our being; he has set our freedom free from the </i>domination<i style="font-style: italic;"> of concupiscence. And if redeemed man still sins, this is not due to an imperfection of Christ's redemptive act, but to man's will not to avail himself of the grace which flows from that act. <b>God's command is of course proportioned to man's capabilities; but to the capabilities of the man to whom the Holy Spirit has been given; of the man who, though he has fallen into sin, can always obtain pardon and enjoy the presence of the Holy Spirit</b>". </i></div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;">It is within this context, that the ability to confess one's sins is itself a result of grace, in which the teaching of Trent on the <a href="https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/fourteenth-session-of-the-council-of-trent-1480" target="_blank">Sacrament of Penance</a> must be understood.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">First, Trent defines the element of contrition as follows:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;">Contrition, which holds the first place among the aforesaid acts of the penitent, is a sorrow of mind and a detestation for sin committed with the purpose of not sinning in the future. This feeling of contrition was at all times necessary for obtaining the forgiveness of sins and thus indeed it prepares one who has fallen after baptism for the remission of sins, if it is united with confidence in the divine mercy and with the desire to perform the other things that are required to receive this sacrament in the proper manner. </span><b style="font-style: italic;">The holy council declares therefore, that this contrition implies not only an abstention from sin and the resolution and beginning of a new life, but also a hatred of the old</b><span style="font-style: italic;">, according to the statement: <Cast away from you all your transgressions by which you have transgressed, and make to yourselves a new heart and a new spirit.> And certainly he who has pondered those lamentations of the saints: <To thee only have I sinned, and have done evil before thee; have labored in my groanings, every night I will wash my bed; I will recount to thee all my years in the bitterness of my soul,> and others of this kind, will easily understand that they issued from an overwhelming hatred of their past life and from a profound detestation of sins.</span></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">All of this is objective; the "purpose of not sinning in the future" is exactly the the promise "to do things as we ought" made by the grace of the Holy Spirit. This is, by inner grace, the profession of hope that one will thereafter be able "to do things as we ought," <i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., in objective conformity with the commandments. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>From which it is clear that all mortal sins of which they have knowledge after a diligent self-examination, must be enumerated by the penitents in confession, even though they are most secret and have been committed only against the two last precepts of the Decalogue; which sins sometimes injure the soul more grievously and are more dangerous than those that are committed openly. Venial sins, on the other hand, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God and into which we fall more frequently, though they may be rightly and profitably and without any presumption declared in confession, as the practice of pious people evinces, may, nevertheless, be omitted without guilt and can be expiated by many other remedies. But since all mortal sins, even those of thought, make men <children of wrath> and enemies of God, it is necessary to seek pardon of all of them from God by an open and humble confession. While therefore the faithful of Christ strive to confess all sins that come to their memory, they no doubt lay all of them before the divine mercy for forgiveness; while those who do otherwise and knowingly conceal certain ones, lay nothing before the divine goodness to be forgiven through the priest; for if one sick be ashamed to make known his wound to the physician, the latter does not remedy what he does not know. I<b>t is evident furthermore, that those circumstances that change the species of the sin are also to be explained in confession, for without them the sins themselves are neither integrally set forth by the penitent nor are they known to the judges, and it would be impossible for them to estimate rightly the grievousness of the crimes and to impose the punishment due to the penitents on account of them</b>. Hence it is unreasonable to teach that these circumstances have been devised by idle men, or that one circumstance only is to be confessed, namely, to have sinned against another. It is also malicious to say that confession, commanded to be made in this manner, is impossible, or to call it a torture of consciences; for it is known that in the Church nothing else is required of penitents than that each one, after he has diligently examined himself and searched all the folds and corners of his conscience, confess those sins by which he remembers to have mortally offended his Lord and God; while the other sins of which he has after diligent thought no recollection, are understood to be in a general way included in the same confession; for which sins we confidently say with the Prophet: <From my secret sins cleanse me, O Lord.> But the difficulty of such a confession and the shame of disclosing the sins might indeed appear a burdensome matter, if it were not lightened by so many and so great advantages and consolations, which are most certainly bestowed by absolution upon <b>all who approach this sacrament worthily</b>.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is sometimes noted here that Trent is using the older sense of venial and moral sins in terms of objective conduct without regard to later developments concerning subjective culpability and the requirements of full knowledge and consent for guilt of mortal sin. That is true, but in the older language of Trent, it is referred to as "those circumstances that change the species of the sin," meaning in this context from subjectively mortal to subjectively venial. Note that this has nothing to do with the ability either to refrain from sin in the future or, through divine grace, to form the firm purpose of amendment required for integral contrition. Rather, this statement requires that if the penitent is appealing to circumstances concerning what is now called <i>imputability of guilt</i>, then those sins cannot be confessed integrally without a description of such circumstances. Even if those sins are determined by the priest-confessor to be only venially culpable (as may be the case), considerations of mitigated imputability are to be submitted to the judge in the internal forum, not judged on one's own. This is part of the examination that Trent requires to partake of the Eucharist: "Now, ecclesiastical usage declares that such an examination is necessary in order that no one <b>conscious to himself of mortal sin, however contrite he may feel</b>, ought to receive the Sacred Eucharist without previous sacramental confession.""Mortal sin" in this context is objective conduct; if there are exculpatory factors concerning imputability of guilty, they should be explained, not simply relied upon.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Granted, this is still subject to knowledge of the commandments themselves and the recollection that one's conduct objectively violated it, matters on which the priest-confessor is entitled to leave the penitent in "good faith." But with respect to matters of which the person did have knowledge of the commandment at the time, imputability due to lack of full consent would be an exculpatory factor that could "change the species of the sin" that must be subject to the judgment of the priest-confessor to be confessed integrally. Those who do not approach the Sacrament with the intent to make such an integral confession are not approaching it worthily.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The full moral teaching of the Church with respect to this moral teaching concerning objective morality may be found in <i>Veritatis Splendor</i> by Pope St. John Paul II. By articulating morality from the perspective of the acting person, it does not change one iota of the teaching of Orange or Trent concerning objective morality. The commandments may always in principle be kept <i>objectively</i>, in the sense of the objective "lower limit," not merely exculpation due to lack of full knowledge or consent. From <i>VS</i> 52:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>On the other hand, the fact that only the negative commandments oblige always and under all circumstances does not mean that in the moral life prohibitions are more important than the obligation to do good indicated by the positive commandments. The reason is this: the commandment of love of God and neighbour does not have in its dynamic any higher limit, but it does have a lower limit, beneath which the commandment is broken. Furthermore, what must be done in any given situation depends on the circumstances, not all of which can be foreseen; on the other hand there are kinds of behaviour which can never, in any situation, be a proper response — a response which is in conformity with the dignity of the person. <b>Finally, it is always possible that man, as the result of coercion or other circumstances, can be hindered from doing certain good actions; but he can never be hindered from not doing certain actions, especially if he is prepared to die rather than to do evil</b>.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Church has always taught that one may never choose kinds of behaviour prohibited by the moral commandments expressed in negative form in the Old and New Testaments. As we have seen, Jesus himself reaffirms that these prohibitions allow no exceptions: "If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments... You shall not murder, You shall not commit adultery, You shall not steal, You shall not bear false witness" (Mt 19:17-18).</i></div></i><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The point of this teaching is to <i>cultivate hope</i> not to <i>cause despair</i>. This is why the teaching concerning the ability to follow the commandments by God's grace, at least in terms of remaining above the objective lower limit, is <i>prospective</i> and not <i>retrospective</i>. The fact that one has fallen does not mean that God has forsaken that person entirely or that the person is beyond the hope of grace. Indeed, in many circumstances, one might not be culpable for the lapse, even though it might have been avoided entirely. But we must recognize that the retrospective and subjective judgment concerning culpability is not then misused to modify the prospective and objective resolution to sin no more. As <i>VS</i> 63 says:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>In any event, it is always from the truth that the dignity of conscience derives. In the case of the correct conscience, it is a question of the </i>objective truth<i> received by man; in the case of the erroneous conscience, it is a question of what man, mistakenly, </i>subjectively<i> considers to be true. It is never acceptable to confuse a "subjective" error about moral good with the "objective" truth rationally proposed to man in virtue of his end, or to make the moral value of an act performed with a true and correct conscience equivalent to the moral value of an act performed by following the judgment of an erroneous conscience. It is possible that the evil done as the result of invincible ignorance or a non-culpable error of judgment may not be imputable to the agent; but even in this case it does not cease to be an evil, a disorder in relation to the truth about the good. Furthermore, a good act which is not recognized as such does not contribute to the moral growth of the person who performs it; it does not perfect him and it does not help to dispose him for the supreme good. Thus, before feeling easily justified in the name of our conscience, we should reflect on the words of the Psalm: "Who can discern his errors? Clear me from hidden faults" (Ps 19:12). There are faults which we fail to see but which nevertheless remain faults, because we have refused to walk towards the light (cf. Jn 9:39-41).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is doubtless no coincidence that the sainted Pope cites the same Scriptural passage as Trent does. This is why Trent teaches that "those circumstances that change the species of sin are also to be explained in confession" -- to avoid "feeling easily justified in the name of our conscience." There is no suggestion here either that one ever ought to rely on lack of full consent as exculpatory based on one's own judgment and far less to rely on lack of full consent <i>prospectively</i>. This would deny the dogmatic teaching that "God ... by commanding admonishes thee to do what thou canst and to pray for what thou canst not, <b>and aids thee that thou mayest be able.</b>" Again, this is not taught to put the blame on the person who falls so as to cause despair but to encourage hope in the grace of God.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Similarly, the <i>objective</i> teaching that one is always capable in principle of refraining from breaching a negative commandment has been of extraordinary service toward the patience of the martyrs, especially in times of persecution. It is difficult to conceive of greater duress than the threat that one's family will be tortured and killed if one does not offer a pinch of incense. In the earliest days of the Church, it was nonetheless understood that this was a grave sin, albeit one from which a person could repent. The extraordinary penance required was a testament to the hope in God's grace not to do this thing, even under the most extreme duress one could suffer. This is not to say that it was strictly impossible that someone could be subjectively inculpable for this objective violation, but the direct denial of God and the teaching that one could always choose not to breach a negative commandment was so clear that it was essentially impossible for this claim to be made in good faith. Likewise, the possibility that one could return into God's mercy was not denied, but the penance was made appropriate for the severity of the violation.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Pope St. John Paul II thus teaches in <i>RP</i>:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>In a text of his First Letter, St. John speaks of a sin which leads to death (</i>pros thanaton<i>), as opposed to a sin which does not lead to death (</i>me pros thanaton<i>). Obviously, the concept of death here is a spiritual death. It is a question of the loss of the true life or "eternal life," which for John is knowledge of the Father and the Son, and communion and intimacy with them. In that passage the sin that leads to death seems to be the denial of the Son or the worship of false gods. At any rate, by this distinction of concepts John seems to wish to emphasize the incalculable seriousness of what constitutes the very essence of sin, namely the rejection of God. This is manifested above all in apostasy and idolatry: repudiating faith in revealed truth and making certain created realities equal to God, raising them to the status of idols or false gods. But in this passage the apostle's intention is also to underline the certainty that comes to the Christian from the fact of having been "born of God" through the coming of the Son: The Christian possesses a power that preserves him from falling into sin; God protects him, and "the evil one does not touch him." If he should sin through weakness or ignorance, he has confidence in being forgiven, also because he is supported by the joint prayer of the community.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;">With the whole tradition of the church, we call mortal sin the act by which man freely and consciously rejects God, his law, the covenant of love that God offers, preferring to turn in on himself or to some created and finite reality, something contrary to the divine will (</span>conversio ad creaturam<span style="font-style: italic;">). This can occur in a direct and formal way in the sins of idolatry, apostasy and atheism; or in an equivalent way as in every act of disobedience to God's commandments in a grave matter. Man perceives that this disobedience to God destroys the bond that unites him with his life principle: It is a mortal sin, that is, an act which gravely offends God and ends in turning against man himself with a dark and powerful force of destruction.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Again, this does not put an excessive burden on the sinner, as if falling into weakness or ignorance somehow made the sinner being irredeemable and beyond God's grace. The community still prays for the forgiveness of the lapsed, and they will not turn away or exclude those who seek such forgiveness. But one cannot deny either that it is objectively required that the seek forgiveness. Speaking of this "weakness," <i>VS</i> 104 says: </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>In this context, appropriate allowance is made both for </i>God's mercy<i> towards the sin of the man who experiences conversion and for the </i>understanding of human weakness<i>. Such understanding never means compromising and falsifying the standard of good and evil in order to adapt it to particular circumstances. It is quite human for the sinner to acknowledge his weakness and to ask mercy for his failings; what is unacceptable is the attitude of one who makes his own weakness the criterion of truth about the good, so that he can feel self-justified, without even the need to have recourse to God and his mercy. An attitude of this sort corrupts the morality of society as a whole, since it encourages doubt about the objectivity of the moral law in general and a rejection of the absoluteness of moral prohibitions regarding specific human acts, and it ends up by confusing all judgments about values.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is reiterated in Pope Pius XII's exhortation against situational ethics given in his remarks on April 18, 1952 (my emphasis in <b>bold</b>):</div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>We oppose with three considerations or maxims against situation ethics. The first is We concede that God wants above all and always, an upright intention; but this is not enough. He wants also good action. The second is that a bad action is not permissible in order for good to come from it (Rom. 3:8). The third is that there can be given circumstances, in which a man, especially a Christian, must remember that <b>it is necessary to sacrifice everything, even his life, in order to save his soul</b>. All the countless martyrs even in our time, remind us of this. But would the mother of the Maccabees and her children, Saints Perpetua and Felicitas without regard for their babies, Maria Goretti and thousands of other men and women, venerated by the Church, against the circumstances, have faced in vain and even wrongly a sanguinary death? Certainly not; and they remain, with their blood, the most eloquent witnesses to the truth, against the new morality.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>Recent attacks against the teaching of the Pope St. John Paul II</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><br /></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It should be apparent that at no time every was John Paul II's accommodation to human weakness every intended to suggest even remotely, and contrary to the teaching of the Church, that subjective lack of culpability was ever intended to be <i>prospective</i>. The prospective view is based on "the capabilities of the man to whom the Holy Spirit has been given" and likewise in view of the objective teaching that it is always possible to refrain from acts that break the negative commandments, to the point that it may be necessary for the Christian "to sacrifice everything, even his life, in order to save his soul." This affirms the constant teaching that every Christian, with the help of God, can keep the commandments (<i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., never to fall below the objective lower limit of the positive or negative commandments). </div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Yet progressives have taken to not only brazenly denying the sainted Pope's adherence to this traditional teaching but also pretending that his teaching on subjective culpability <i>actually denies it</i>. Pope Francis has recently appointed one such progressive wolf, Archbishop Victor Manuel Fernandez as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Fernandez was notoriously the likely ghostwriter of <i>Amoris Laetitia</i>, and while the document itself was orthodox, Fernandez himself was using it as a Trojan horse for his own progressivism (though, thank God, none of that was made binding). </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Part of this progressive abuse relates to John Paul II's comments on the "law of gradualness" for contraception in <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> 34:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>But man, who has been called to live God's wise and loving design in a responsible manner, is an historical being who day by day builds himself up through his many free decisions; and so he knows, loves and accomplishes moral good by stages of growth.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Married people too are called upon to progress unceasing<i>ly in their moral life with the support of a sincere and active desire to gain ever better knowledge of the values enshrined in and fostered by the law of God. They must also be supported by an upright and generous willingness to embody these values in their concrete decisions. They cannot, however, look on the law as merely an ideal to be achieved in the future: they must consider it as a command of Christ the Lord to overcome difficulties with constancy. And so what is known as 'the law of gradualness' or step-by-step advance cannot be identified with 'gradualness of the law', as if there were different degrees or forms of precept in God's law for different individuals and situations.</i></i></div></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The "gradualness of the law" is what John Paul II describes in <i>VS</i> 104 as "compromising and falsifying the standard of good and evil in order to adapt it to particular circumstances" and making the sinner's "own weakness the criterion of truth about the good, so that he can feel self-justified, without even the need to have recourse to God and his mercy." By contrast, the law of gradualness is described in <i>VS</i> 64:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The words of Jesus just quoted also represent a call to </i>form our conscience<i>, to make it the object of a continuous conversion to what is true and to what is good. In the same vein, Saint Paul exhorts us not to be conformed to the mentality of this world, but to be transformed by the renewal of our mind (cf. Rom 12:2). It is the "heart" converted to the Lord and to the love of what is good which is really the source of true judgments of conscience. Indeed, in order to "prove what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect" (Rom 12:2), knowledge of God's law in general is certainly necessary, but it is not sufficient: what is essential is a sort of </i>"connaturality" between man and the true good<i>. Such a connaturality is rooted in and develops through the virtuous attitudes of the individual himself: prudence and the other cardinal virtues, and even before these the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. This is the meaning of Jesus' saying: "He who does what is true comes to the light" (Jn 3:21).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">These are the "stages of growth" that John Paul II has in mind: development of virtues and the resulting connatural performance of the good and avoidance of evil. This is not remotely to suggest that the "law of gradualness" is some sort of adaptation of the negative commandments for circumstances, which is exactly the assertion of "different degrees or forms of precept in God's law for different individuals and situations." The law of gradualness simply acknowledges that the novice in the practice of virtues will likely fail more often than the veteran of spiritual combat, so it does not judge failures due to weakness as an indication that the person has abandoned the path of spiritual growth or lacks purpose of amendment. The objective law is in the person's knowledge but not yet connatural to the person, which will come through practice and greater conversion of the heart. But this does not mean that the person must not firmly intend to abjure sin. As the <a href="https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/documents/rc_pc_family_doc_12021997_vademecum_en.html" target="_blank"><i>Vadamecum</i> issued after <i>Familiaris Consortio</i></a> clearly states, "[t]he pastoral 'law of gradualness', not to be confused with the 'gradualness of the law' which would tend to diminish the demands it places on us, consists of requiring a <i>decisive break</i> with sin together with a <i>progressive path</i> towards total union with the will of God and with his loving demands." The progressive interpretation would not require the decisive break with sin characterized by the hope that God only commands what can be done.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Fernandez contradicts this explicitly in <a href="https://rorate-caeli.blogspot.com/2017/08/full-text-pope-francis-ghostwriter-of.html?m=1" target="_blank">his own explanation of <i>Amoris Laetitia</i></a>:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The absolute norm in itself does not admit exceptions, but that does not imply that its succinct formulation must be applied in every sense and without nuances in all situations. "Thou shalt not kill" does not admit exceptions. However, it raises this question: should taking life in self-defense be included within the term "killing" prohibited by the norm? Should taking food from others to feed a hungry child be included within the term "stealing" prohibited by the norm? No one would doubt that it is legitimate to ask whether these concrete cases are actually included within the narrow formulations of the negative precepts "Thou shalt not kill" or "Thou shalt not steal."</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>For this reason, it is also licit to ask if the acts of a more uxorio cohabitation should always fall, in its integral meaning, within the negative precept of “fornication”. I say, “in its integral meaning,” because it is not possible to hold that those acts in each and every case are gravely immoral in a subjective sense. In the complexity of particular situations is where, according to St. Thomas, ‘uncertainty increases.’ Indeed, it is not easy to describe as an ‘adulteress’ a woman who has been beaten and treated with contempt by her Catholic husband, and who received shelter, economic and psychological help from another man who helped her raise the children of the previous union, and with whom she had new children and cohabitates for many years. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>But [Pope Francis's] emphasis is rather on the question of the possible diminution of responsibility and culpability. Forms of conditioning can attenuate or nullify responsibility and culpability against any norm, even against negative precepts and absolute moral norms. This makes it possible not always to lose the life of sanctifying grace in a “more uxorio”cohabitation.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The key distinction here is the use of the term "acts" of a more uxorio cohabitation (which Fernandez also refers to as "intimate acts"). Amoris Laetitia never once uses this term and never once refers specifically to such acts. The only time a similar expression is used is the out-of-context citation of Gaudium et Spes in FN 329, which says "[i]n such situations, many people, knowing and accepting the possibility of living 'as brothers and sisters' which the Church offers them, point out that if certain expressions of intimacy are lacking, 'it often happens that faithfulness is endangered and the good of the children suffers'." Therefore, at no time ever does AL endorse this view of Fernandez; it is strictly his own characterization of what he (and allegedly Pope Francis) had in mind, but that intention is not objectively manifested.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Fernandez has conflated (probably deliberately) two separate species of adulterous acts, remarriage itself and adulterous sex, and misclassified both sins under the heading of "fornication," which neither is. Adulterous sex, as contrasted with fornication, is a sin against marriage on account of the sexual faculty having been consecrated to one's spouse. Contracting a second marriage and remaining in it through cohabitation is, in and of itself, another sin against marriage, regardless of whether any kind of sexual activity is taking place. So within the one <i>absolute moral norm -- </i>do not commit adultery -- there are still different species of violation (for example, if one has <i>already</i> remarried, then the commandment is positive to rectify the situation, as opposed to a purely negative precept). There is certainly relevant knowledge of the absolute moral norm here; there must have been a previous valid marriage, and if someone is morally certain that the person never validly married before (despite perhaps being unable to prove this), then that person would be ignorant of the conduct being objectively sinful. We might call this <i>objective ignorance of the rule</i>, which is covered by the traditional "good faith" pastoral exception. But we are talking specifically about the case where "more is involved here than mere ignorance of the rule," by Fernandez's own admission, and he likewise says "[f]orms of conditioning can attentuate or nullify responsibility and culpability against any norm." So we are dealing here with exactly the case of mitigated culpability due to lack of full consent.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In those cases, John Paul II's Magisterial guidance governs: "Hence, in the church's doctrine and pastoral action, grave sin is in practice identified with mortal sin." But this does not deny in any way that "there can occur situations which are very complex and obscure from a psychological viewpoint and which have an influence on the sinner's subjective culpability." In that respect, we can agree with Fernandez (and, objectively, Pope Francis in saying the following:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: "times new roman", serif; font-size: 16px; text-align: left;"><i>In any event, the specific and principal proposal of Francis, in line with the Synod, is not concerning the considerations on the formulation of the norm. Why then is this question part of his proposal? Because he calls for much attention to the language that is used to describe weak persons. For him, offensive expressions such as "adulterer" or "fornicator" should not necessarily be deduced from the general norms when referring to concrete persons.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is the basis for the change in discipline concerning public reception of the Eucharist. Because it is far less likely in many places that we will know whether someone culpably entered the marriage and because there are inculpable reasons for remaining in the marriage, it may be inappropriate to judge that the person is culpable <i>merely by virtue of cohabitating</i>. This is the matter left to the judgment of the bishops (viz. whether cohabitation in and of itself gives scandal in the reception of the Eucharist in the particular diocese). It can, obviously, lead to some unusual situations of inconsistency between dioceses, but there were already such unusual situations with the <i>remoto scandolo</i> exception for continent couples under <i>FC</i>. On the whole, this pastoral accommodation is reasonable.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But if we apply it to <i>the obligation to remain continent itself</i>, then we squarely contradict the moral teaching of John Paul II, which says that "in the church's doctrine and pastoral action," the distinction between grave and mortal sin is practically irrelevant. This is precisely because firm purpose of amendment does not depend at all on this consideration of subjective culpability. With respect to the public action of remaining unmarried, we can licitly draw the distinction based on (1) whether the person is culpable for the person's state of being remarried and (2) whether there are proportionate reasons for not following the positive commandment to rectify one's marital state. If those conditions are met (and we can charitably assume they are) and if the societal conditions are such in the diocese that these conditions are well-known so as to avoid scandal, then Fernandez's point is apt. But the obligation to remain continent is not like culpability for being remarried in the first place; it is a prospective moral obligation. With respect to those prospective moral obligations, "grave sin is in practice identified with mortal sin." And there is a very simple reason for this to be the case: for purpose of the "decisive break" from sin, retrospective considerations of culpability are simply irrelevance. The Church says what Jesus says: "Neither do I condemn you; go, and from now on sin no more" (John 8:11).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is precisely why the conservative bishops at the Synod were willing to accept AL only when this concept was omitted. This is why the document itself never says that there is any exception to the obligation to remain continent, only that the teaching may be difficult to follow (which is exactly what FC says about contraception, while still affirming the exceptionless moral norm). This is why subjective culpability is only applied to the state of remarriage itself in AL and never to acts of <i>more uxorio</i> union. Fernandez is trying to sneak in through interviews and footnotes what never would've been accepted by the Synod, and the truly despicable thing about this knavish behavior is that it is working. There are now so-called conservative Catholics, including "frenemies" like Rocco Buttiglione, who are willing to toss the philosophical brilliance of Karol Wojtyla into the garbage. But the late Pope's Magisterial pronouncements in RP, FC, and VS are not so easily discarded.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">When Fernandez treats <i>the obligation to remain continent</i> as subject to gradualism in its personal demands, an absolute moral obligation that cannot be excused and that it is "necessary [for the Christian] to sacrifice everything" up to and including life itself to avoid breaking the commandment, he distinguishes grave sin from mortal sin in exactly the same way that John Paul II says that the doctrine and practice of the Church cannot do. Given his equivocation between the state of more uxorio and the acts of more uxorio, this makes his claim that "[t]his makes it possible not always to lose the life of sanctifying grace in a 'more uxorio' cohabitation" materially heretical, because he means this prospectively and specifically with respect to intimate acts. It draws a pastoral distinction in "discernment" between grave and mortal sin, which is condemned by the dogmatic moral teaching of John Paul II. When Fernandez asserts that "it is also licit to ask if the acts of a more uxorio cohabitation should always fall, in its integral meaning, within the negative precept," it is most emphatically not, and to assert that there is such a possibility is to impermissibly distinguish between grave and mortal sin.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In this respect, the claim of Rocco Buttiglione that Fernandez favorably cites completely misrepresents that moral teaching:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>John Paul II, however, does not want at all to nullify the role of the subjective conscience. The objective aspect of the act determines the goodness and the seriousness of the act. The subjective aspect of the action determines the level of responsibility of the agent ... Pope Francis sets himself on the ground, not of the justification of the act, but of the subjective attenuating circumstances that diminish the agent's responsibility. This is precisely the balance of Catholic ethics and distinguishes the realistic ethics of St. John Paul II from the objectivistic ethics of some of Pope Francis's opponents. ... Familiaris Consortio, moreover, when it formulates the rule, does not tell us that it does not tolerate exceptions for a proportionate reason. The rule that no one who is not in grace God ought to receive Eucharist by its very nature does not tolerate exceptions. Whoever receives the Body and the Blood of Christ unworthily eats and drinks his own condemnation. The rule according to which persons in God's grace are excluded from communion as the canonical penalty for the counter-witness which they have given, however, may be subject to exceptions, and this is exactly what Amoris Laetitia tells us.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This completely disregards the fact that John Paul II said that, according to his "realistic ethics," "in the church's doctrine and pastoral action, grave sin is in practice identified with mortal sin." Buttiglione and Fernandez both insist on this confusion between the <i>state</i> of <i>more uxorio</i> and the <i>acts</i> of <i>more uxorio</i>. The <i>state</i> might be excused for lack of culpability, but the <i>acts</i> can never be for purposes of Sacramental discipline without violating John Paul II's repeated injunctions to the contrary (which were themselves based on the objective moral teaching of Second Orange and Trent). This is a direct attack on the fundamental moral theology of the Catholic Church in itself, not merely some disciplinary issue on which the practice might change (contrary to Fernandez's assertion).</div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">What we have seen is that even when Fernandez's conclusions are <i>right</i>; they are right for the <i>wrong</i> <i>reasons</i>. It is <i>right</i> to say that we should not judge culpability for the <i>state</i> of <i>more uxorio</i> if there are reasons that the person might not be culpable. It is <i>right</i> to say that the general awareness of those mitigating circumstances may mitigate the public scandal of such a state. But it is <i>wrong</i> to introduce a distinction between grave sin and moral sin in the pastoral practice and discipline of the Church. It is <i>wrong</i> to apply a gradualness of the law that would excuse the resolution not to commit <i>grave</i> sin (because, for these purposes, grave and mortal sin are identical).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">That Fernandez comes to right conclusions for wrong reasons is based on his own citation of the Buenos Aires guidelines on <i>AL</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>After discussing the possibility that the divorced in a new union live in continence, they say that "in other, more complex circumstances, and when it is not possible to obtain a declaration of nullity, the aforementioned option may not, in fact, be feasible." They then add that "</i><i>nonetheless, it is equally possible to undertake a journey of discernment. If one arrives at the recognition that, in a particular case, there are limitations that diminish responsibility and culpability (cf. AL 301-302), particularly when a person judges that he would fall into a subsequent fault by damaging the children of the new union, Amoris Laetitia opens up the possibility of access to the sacraments of Reconciliation and the Eucharist (cf. footnotes 336 and 351)." (<a href="https://www.lifesitenews.com/images/pdfs/Basic_Criteria_for_the_Application_of_Chapter_VIII_of_Amoris_Laetitia__September_5__2016.pdf">Bishops of the Pastoral Region of Buenos Aires, "Criterios básicos para la aplicación del capítulo VIII de Amoris laetitia" [Basic criteria for the application of chapter VIII of Amoris Laetitia</a>], Buenos Aires, September 5, 2016, 6)) </i></div><br /> <div>In discussing the practicality of asking one's spouse to remain continent, which is the feasibility consideration cited above, Fernandez says:</div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>This becomes particularly complex, for example, when the man is not a practicing Catholic. The woman is not in a position to oblige someone to live in perfect continence who does not share all her Catholic convictions. In that case, it is not easy for an honest and devout woman to make the decision to abandon the man she loves, who protected her from a violent husband and who freed her from falling into prostitution or suicide. The "serious reasons" mentioned by Pope John Paul II, or the "objective circumstances" indicated by Benedict XVI are amplified. But most important of all is the fact that, by abandoning this man, she would leave the small children of the new union without a father and without a family environment. There is no doubt that, in this case, the decision-making power with respect to sexual continence, at least for now, has serious forms of conditioning that diminish guilt and imputability.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Fernandez is exactly right here; with respect to <i>acts</i> of sexual continence, this person may either be subject unwillingly to intimate acts (being a so-called "martyr for love" who suffers what she would not herself will for the sake of her children) or may have compromised decision-making and moral weakness. Yet ending the cohabitation itself ("abandoning this man"), the <i>state</i> of <i>more uxorio</i>, would not be morally feasible either. But for purposes of the resolution "from now on sin no more," she cannot make her own weakness the standard of the commandment against the intimate <i>acts</i> and thus apply gradualness of the law, nor can the priest-confessor in his pastoral guidance distinguish between <i>grave</i> and <i>mortal</i> sin based on diminished culpability. They must both affirm, in hope, that she will be able to remain through grace pure in this intent, even if a fall is foreseeable or if she will suffer through what she does not will.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Pope Francis, whatever he may have had in mind in private conversations, has therefore never actually collapsed this distinction between the <i>state</i> of <i>more uxorio</i> and the <i>acts</i> of <i>more uxorio</i> as Fernandez has. Why the Pope tolerates people who make that mistake, despite never actually giving it any official endorsement, seems to be the same Hegelian approach that he takes with the Church more broadly. What he seems to think is that by allowing both the progressive and conservative position (even those he considers erroneous) to be vented that the absolute chaos between completely irreconcilable positions will somehow resolve into a practical synthesis. But when conservatives aren't willing to play this game, as with the <i>dubia </i>or the Liturgy Wars, the Pope chastises them severely. That being said, the way that this game is played is to claim the authority of your own faction (such as the conservative bishops at the Synod) and point out that this is what the document should be interpreted to say (<i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., to claim your interpretation as what the document authoritatively means for tradition). And from my perspective, no matter how many progressive voices the Pope brings to the table, his authoritative voice as the Vicar of Christ has never said what any of them said.</div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-17260644753828691622023-07-01T15:53:00.003-04:002023-07-11T07:53:50.723-04:00When is a cause not a cause?<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is an extension of thoughts I had about <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/11/eternal-manifestation-as-efficient.html" target="_blank">what Blachernae meant by the term "cause"</a> in its opposition to Florence. I suggested there that Blachernae had in mind a distinction between originating and sustaining cause and that thinking about causality in this way might prove fruitful as a method of "talking across" the Eastern and Western theological divide. Of course, a number of people much more intimately familiar with the Scholastic teaching pointed out that the Latin view of causality certainly could <i>not</i> be expressed in this way, a conclusion with which I actually agreed. But I did not have in mind finding a common language between the views; rather, I had in mind using this distinction as a way of mapping how concepts were serving in the respective metaphysical explanations. That is what I hope to do here.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">I. Cause in the Trinity</span></u></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The unique problem with the idea of "cause" in the Trinitarian context is that it can't possibly be real. The Trinity is an eternal, unchanging reality, and literally everything that we know of causality involves change. But Scripture uses the terms "Father" and "Son" in a way that clearly licenses something like what we understand as causal relations, specifically begetting of offspring. If we try to purify the concept of all of its material attachments and connections to the changeable world to the extent that we can, we would likely be left with the notion of a <i>relation</i> and specifically an <i>asymmetric relation</i> between two things. Modern philosophy includes things like <i>grounding relations</i> and <i>contingency relations</i> that are asymmetrical in this sense without necessarily being causal, so the idea that "causal" relations might signify a broader logical concept is not inconceivable.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Historically, there appear to be two main approaches to how these Trinitarian relations are viewed: the relational model and the emanational model. I believe that Russell Friedman has correctly identified them in a way that applies far beyond the immediate medieval context of his work <i>Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham</i>. Each of these models is based on a different use of the term "relation" by Aristotle. One is relation as it is defined in the <i>Categories</i>, sometimes called a "relative" or "relative property," and the other is relation as used in the <i>Metaphysics</i>, specifically in this case concerning how a son (offspring) is "related" to a father who begat him. The major difference between these two approaches is that the latter is much more tied to <i>nature</i>, while the former essentially only involves <i>relata </i>that are not necessarily in any specific natural relationship to one another.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The distinctive feature of Latin anti-Homoian theology is that it was highly focused on power applied to causal relations and irreducibility and less concerned with matters of nature (essence). The notion that "Latin theology begins with the essence" is based on de Regnon's assumption that nature and operations were so intimately connected that theology focused on powers must necessarily be "essence-based." But the better term for it would be "relations-based" in the sense that the intersubjective causal relations within the Trinity were the real focus. This is covered well by Michel René Barnes in <i>Augustine and Nicene Theology</i><i>,</i> and Barnes's conclusions follow Friedman and Paul Thom (<i>The Logic of the Trinity</i>) in finding the core concept of Latin theology to be these causal relations between irreducibly distinct Persons, as opposed to concepts about the essence like divine simplicity.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In contrast, it is fair to say that Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic cosmology, which was already focused intently on the reason for emanations, drove a much more intense interest in the <i>ousia</i> side of relations. The causal relations in Neoplatonism were responsible for the hierarchy of being emanating from the One, so as a philosophical matter, the nature of the One was of significantly more interest. Consequently, Origen and Origen-influenced theologians, such as the Cappadocian Fathers, naturally gravitated more to thinking about the nature of emanation in their understanding of <i>hypostasis</i>. By contrast, the less Origen-inclined Fathers, which included essentially the entire Latin West and the Alexandrian bishops (despite their proximity to Origen), tended not to concern themselves much with nature as opposed to the revealed divine works themselves. (Indeed, Cyril's use of terminology in this regard reflected a freer use of terms like <i>ousia</i> and <i>physis</i>, which eventually led to the miaphysite view, yet another historical misunderstanding over terminology.) Barnes speaks to the difference between West (power-based) and East (nature-based) theology as follows:</span></p><p style="orphans: auto; text-align: justify; widows: auto;"><span style="font-family: inherit; orphans: 2; widows: 2;"><i>It is John 14:10 that becomes the basis for subsequent Latin arguments for the unity of power and the common operation between the Father and Son (and eventually, the Holy Spirit), and it is unity of power that becomes the dominant way of describing the unity between the Father and the Son among Latins with sympathy for Nicaea or with animus for anti-Nicenes. The language of unity of substance is dominant for Ossius of Cordova, Potamius of Lisbon, and Marius Victorinus. It is not dominant in the theologies of Phoebadius of Agen, Zeno of Verona, Faustinus, Niceta of Remesiana, Damasus of Rome and all the letters associated with him, and Ps.-Rufinus of Syria, which thus takes us from 359 to approximately 405. All these Latins lead with the concept of divine power rather than the concept of divine substance: Phoebadius, for example, understands the Sirmium (357) prohibition on essence language as meaning that he would not be allowed to preach the "one power." Hilary's exilic work and Ambrose of Milan's major writings are difficult to categorize because they represent *Latin* theologies confused with and by *Greek*.</i></span></p><p style="orphans: auto; text-align: justify; widows: auto;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This "almost common-sense" understanding of power in Latin theology, derived more from Cicero than any Greek philosopher, can be distinguished from the technical use of the term "power" in relation to nature in response to Eunomianism, an approach that Barnes documents in <i>The Power of God: </i>Dunamis <i>in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology</i>. Eunomian theology, which was a practical non-event in the West according to Barnes in <i>ANT</i>, became a central focus for the Cappadocians exactly because of its focus on what a nature is and how it was known. The Cappadocians famously distinguished the knowability of natures from knowledge of their powers and energies, which made complete sense in the context of the absurd Eunomian rationalism. But what makes this dynamic specifically interesting is that it situates Cappadocian theology very clearly on the emanational side of the divide, which was already true of their use of Origen's term <i>hypostasis</i>. (It is telling that Basil, who clearly fell on the Origenist side, famously disputed Athanasius for his flexibility with respect to Marcellus of Ancyra, who came out of the Latin tradition.) Notably, St. Gregory the Theologian in his Theological Orations used the Father-Son relation in the biological sense as paradigmatic. For example, in the Third Theological Oration, he says:</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">But they say, The Unbegotten and the Begotten are not the same; and if this is so, neither is the Son the same as the Father. It is clear, without saying so, that this line of argument manifestly excludes either the Son or the Father from the Godhead. For if to be Unbegotten is the Essence of God, to be begotten is not that Essence; if the opposite is the case, the Unbegotten is excluded. What argument can contradict this? Choose then whichever blasphemy you prefer, my good inventor of a new theology, if indeed you are anxious at all costs to embrace a blasphemy. In the next place, in what sense do you assert that the Unbegotten and the Begotten are not the same? If you mean that the Uncreated and the created are not the same, I agree with you; for certainly the Unoriginate and the created are not of the same nature. But if you say that He That begot and That which is begotten are not the same, the statement is inaccurate. For it is in fact a necessary truth that they are the same. For the nature of the relation of Father to Child is this, that the offspring is of the same nature with the parent. Or we may argue thus again. What do you mean by Unbegotten and Begotten, for if you mean the simple fact of being unbegotten or begotten, these are not the same; but if you mean Those to Whom these terms apply, how are They not the same? For example, Wisdom and Unwisdom are not the same in themselves, but yet both are attributes of man, who is the same; and they mark not a difference of essence, but one external to the essence. Are immortality and innocence and immutability also the essence of God? If so God has many essences and not one; or Deity is a compound of these. For He cannot be all these without composition, if they be essences.</span></i></div><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">...</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>How shall we pass over the following point, which is no less amazing than the rest? Father, they say, is a name either of an essence or of an Action, thinking to bind us down on both sides. If we say that it is a name of an essence, they will say that we agree with them that the Son is of another Essence, since there is but one Essence of God, and this, according to them, is preoccupied by the Father. On the other hand, if we say that it is the name of an Action, we shall be supposed to acknowledge plainly that the Son is created and not begotten. For where there is an Agent there must also be an Effect. And they will say they wonder how that which is made can be identical with That which made it. I should myself have been frightened with your distinction, if it had been necessary to accept one or other of the alternatives, and not rather put both aside, and state a third and truer one, namely, that Father is not a name either of an essence or of an action, most clever sirs. But it is the name of the Relation in which the Father stands to the Son, and the Son to the Father. For as with us these names make known a genuine and intimate relation, so, in the case before us too, they denote an identity of nature between Him That is begotten and Him That begets. But let us concede to you that Father is a name of essence, it will still bring in the idea of Son, and will not make it of a different nature, according to common ideas and the force of these names. Let it be, if it so please you, the name of an action; you will not defeat us in this way either. The </i>Homoousion<i> would be indeed the result of this action, or otherwise the conception of an action in this matter would be absurd. You see then how, even though you try to fight unfairly, we avoid your sophistries. But now, since we have ascertained how invincible you are in your arguments and sophistries, let us look at your strength in the Oracles of God</i><i>, if perchance you may choose to persuade us out of them.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is the textbook illustration of the action-passion relation in the <i>Metaphysics</i>, so it's a clear use of "relation" in the emanational sense. St. Gregory is therefore showing consubstantiality (<i>homoousion</i>) based on the begetter/begotten relation, as opposed to showing it directly from common power. This represents a different metaphysical approach from Augustine, who used relation in the sense of the <i>Categories</i>, following the Latin trajectory of power-to-relation. Likewise, the begetter/begotten context of emanation (going out of) situates the analogy squarely within the Neoplatonic tradition, while Augustine's psychological analogies are focused on causal production that <i>does not</i> exit the mind. So even before Constantinople, we are at a point where the causal relation is being differently understood along relational/emanational lines.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Another way to think about the relative emphasis of nature was the focus of Neo-Arianism in the East on <i>agen(n)etos</i>, the Father as "unoriginate" and "unbegotten." Eunomius was focused on the concept of the Father being unorginate as defining His unique nature, and this was not a view that ever appeared in the West. Thus, the Cappadocians deployed the concept of relation from the <i>Metaphysics</i> in response to Eunomius's philosophical error, but there is no indication that this was intended to exclude or replace the Latin view. Rather, it was intended to exclude the attempt by Eunomius to <i>define the nature</i> based on its activities.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is the immediate patristic context for the <i>ekporeusis</i> of the Spirit, which can have a different technical meaning depending on how it is used. In the emanational context, <i>ekporeusis</i> has a stronger context of "coming out" or "going away." In the relational context, <i>ekporeusis</i> is more neutral, similar to the Latin <i>processio</i>. And once again, Cyril here has a freer use of the term indicative of the relational background of his theology. In terms of this linguistic difference, I found Wesley Scott Biddy's explanation in his dissertation titled "Creator Spirit, Spirit of Grace" to be enormously helpful. He reports the findings of Juan Miguel Garrigues, probably the most significant influence on the 1995 Clarification on the <i>Filioque</i>. I agree with Thomas Crean's argument in <i>Vindicating the Filioque</i> that Garrigues's firm distinction is overblown, but the summary Biddy gives below is nonetheless useful:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>[I]n one of the most helpful sections of his paper, Garrigues discusses the differences between the words use for the Spirit's procession in the Greek and Latin versions of the Creed. The Greek </i>ekporeusis<i> denotes a passage out of an origin that distinguishes what goes forth from that in which it originates. The Latin </i>procedere<i> "has the inverse connotation," i.e., it means "to go forward giving place to that from which one moves away and to which by that very fact remains connected." Thomas Aquinas gives examples of </i>processio<i> that convey a "progression starting from the origin of what moves forward while maintaining with [the origin] a homogeneous link of communion: it is the same stroke which proceeds from [a] point into [a] line [drawn from a point], the same light which proceeds from the sun in [a] ray, the same water which proceeds from the spring into the stream." In each of these examples, "[t]he origin is not apprehended first of all as the principle from which a distinction issues," as in the Greek verb </i>ekporeuomai, <i>"but as the starting-point of a continuous process."</i> </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">To apply this to causality, we can compare what I will call the "metaphysically thick" analogy of the emanational model to the "metaphysically thin" analogy of the relational model. In the thick analogy, what is being considered is the reason in the nature that causes the emanation, the end to which the emanator emanates. In that respect, Barnes in <i>PG</i> (p. 83) describes Aristotle's view as follows: "One important use of <i>dunamis</i> by Aristotle is in his argument for teleological causes in biological processes, primarily in the teleological nature of reproduction. Aristotle compares the formation of a fetus to the building of a house, for in both 'the process is for the sake of the actual thing [<i>ousia</i>], the thing is not for the sake of the process' [quoting <i>Parts of Animals</i>]." In the thick metaphysical analogy, therefore, it is absolutely necessary to maintain the <i>monarchy</i> of the Father as the single principle <i>for the sake of which</i> the emanations take place. There can only be one reason for the emanation of the other Persons, and this natural mode of existence cannot be shared on pain of creating multiple principles (<i>arche</i>) of the Godhead. In later Scholastic theology, this corresponds to St. Bonaventure's doctrine of the Father's <i>primacy</i>, and to the disagreement between St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas on whether the Father is Father because He generates (relational) or whether He generates because He is Father (emanational).</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">[Update -- My friend Nathaniel McCallum pointed out to me that citation from Arisotle here is inapt because the passage from Aristotle actually refers to the house existing for its own sake, not the sake of the artisan. That's true, and to clarify, I had in mind a "translation" of the concept to the Trinitarian context, in the same way that the "power" of begetting is "translated" into Trinitarian terms. In other words, just as the power of "begetting" takes on a different sense here, the power of "building" would likewise <i>mutatis mutandis</i> take on a different sense. Here, what I had in mind was the fact that the <i>ousia</i> to which the activity is ordered is the plan that the artisan has in mind (the formal cause), which is done for the sake of reasons (the final cause) (ST I, q. 36, a. 3, ans.) in an analogous way to the fact that begetting is ordered to reproducing an instance of the begetter's own <i>ousia</i>. But unlike the case of either begetting or building in the creaturely context, the <i>ousia</i> just is the incomposite being of God Himself, so this reference back to the begetter or builder (relation) is one of identity of substance, not merely likeness in some way. But it is a fair point that I did not actually take that concept itself from Aristotle; I instead believe it was the background for the use of the analogy in the Trinitarian concept of causality.]</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The thin analogy abstracts causal relations from the nature entirely, basically reducing the notion of "origin" to a logical concept similar to the mathematical use of the term: that to which something else relates. Indeed, there is so little connection to the concept of cause that Latin theology does not use the term <i>causa</i> but instead <i>principium</i> (beginning) along with the weaker verb <i>procedere</i>. This fits perfectly with the mathematical example of the point as the beginning of the line, the principle from which the line proceeds. Indeed, one clear example of the Trinity along those lines is that the point is the principle of the line, the point and the line are together the principle of the plane, and the point remains the principle <i>for the sake of which</i> both line and plane are drawn. (I have previously offered the <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/10/spherical-coordinates-and-trinitarian.html" target="_blank">spherical coordinate system</a> as a similar example of logical dependence.)</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The reason I have found the notion of "image" (or more specifically "perfect image") so useful is that it is a concept that works in both the thick and the thin analogy. In the thin analogy, "image" relates back to the prototype, and in the case of perfect image, this is a relation of image and prototype in their respective wholeness. Thus, a "perfect image" is a relation in the metaphysical sense of the relation model. In the thick analogy, the vertical causality in emanationism means that lower beings in the hiearchy of being will be in some sense the image of what is above them, but only a perfect image will reproduce identically the prototype. This is the reason that St. Basil, for example, was able to say with the <i>homoiousians</i> that if the Son was <i>perfectly like in nature</i> to the Father, this would be the same doctrine taught by <i>homoousios</i>. It would only be differences, image in a less-than-perfect sense, that would put the Son on the level of creation, as something other than the "natural image" or offspring that is identical in nature. It is in this sense that "perfect image," whether it is labeled with the word "causal" or not (i.e., whether it is used to ground the natural reason for emanation in the emanational paradigm or whether it is a causal relation in the relational paradigm), ends up serving the same conceptual purpose in both paradigms.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">II. Causality in Cappadocian pneumatology</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The development of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit during the pro-Nicene period and through Constantinople took place largely after this distinction between the relational and the emanational model had already take place. Specifically, the background of the Cappadocian theology traces back to St. Gregory of Neocaesarea (the Wonderworker), who was a pupil of Origen and who was responsible for a mass conversion of people in his region from paganism to Christianity.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The longer version of Gregory's Creed is as follows:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">There is one God, the Father of the living Word, who is His subsistent Wisdom and Power and Eternal Image: perfect Begetter of the perfect Begotten, Father of the only-begotten Son. </span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">There is one Lord, Only of the Only, God of God, Image and Likeness of Deity, Efficient Word, Wisdom comprehensive of the constitution of all things, and Power formative of the whole creation, true Son of true Father, Invisible of Invisible, and Incorruptible of Incorruptible, and Immortal of Immortal and Eternal of Eternal. </span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">And there is One Holy Spirit, having His subsistence from God, and being made manifest by the Son, [to wit to men]: Image of the Son, Perfect Image of the Perfect; Life, the Cause of the living; Holy Fount; Sanctity, the Supplier, or Leader, of Sanctification; in whom is manifested God the Father, who is above all and in all, and God the Son, who is through all. </span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">There is a perfect Trinity, in glory and eternity and sovereignty, neither divided nor estranged. Wherefore there is nothing either created or in servitude in the Trinity; nor anything superinduced, as if at some former period it was non-existent, and at some later period it was introduced. And thus neither was the Son ever wanting to the Father, nor the Spirit to the Son; but without variation and without change, the same Trinity abides ever.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The shorter version of this text on the Holy Spirit is recounted by St. Gregory of Nyssa in his biography of Thaumaturgus as follows:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Ἑν πνεῦμα ἅγιον, ἐκ θεοῦ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχον, καὶ διὰ υἱοῦ πεφηνὸς, εἰκὼν τοῦ υἱοῦ τελείου τελεία, ζωὴ ζώντων αἰτία, ἀγιότης ἀγιασμοῦ χορηγός, ἐν ᾧ φανεροῦται θεὸς ὁ πατήρ, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ θεὸς ὁ υἱός, ὁ διὰ πάντων.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">One Holy Spirit, having substantial existence from God, manifested through the Son, perfect image of the perfect Son, living cause of living things, sanctity and provider of sanctification, by whom God the Father is manifested, who is over all and in all, and God the Son, who is through all.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Let's ignore the "to wit to men" part, which is a later interpolation and which does not appear in Gregory Nyssen's version of the creed. If we take this as representative of the (Origenist) emanational view, then there is a distinction drawn here between having existence (<i>hyparxis</i>) from (<i>ek</i>) and being "manifested" (<i>pephenos</i>) by (<i>dia</i>) the Son. Another synonym for "manifested" -- <i>phaneroutai</i> -- is used at the end, and this use of synonyms for manifestation is typical. It corresponds to the relatively narrow use of <i>ekporeuesthai</i> as compared to other verbs for procession, such as <i>proienai</i>. Those familiar with Eastern theology will therefore certainly recognize these distinctions over and over: <i>ekporeuesthai/proienai</i>, <i>from/through</i>, having existence from/manifested by. As I will discuss in greater detail later, the connection of these distinctions to the economy/theology distinction or the essence/energies distinction is much weaker; I am persuaded that the arguments for such an "energetic procession" are entirely unconvincing. But this distinction between <i>from</i> and <i>through</i> pertaining to origin definitely exists.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">If we turn back to the thick analogy for begetting, this makes sense. The Father is that <i>for the sake of which</i> emanations take place, in like matter to a natural father being that for the sake of which begetting takes place in Aristotle. This, therefore, is <i>cause</i> or <i>arche </i>in the sense of the reason for emanations, in like manner to the cause of begetting being the father and not the offspring. <i>In that specific sense</i>, the Father is the only cause of the Trinity. (For convenience in distinguishing the terms, I will sometimes refer to this sense as "E-cause," referring to its use in the emanational model.) It is not intended to explain <i>how</i> emanations take place, which is essentially incomprehensible and therefore not the proper subject of a thick analogy to natural begetting, but rather <i>why</i> they take place. That distinction is critical, and it should not be forgotten, because it pertains directly to how God transcends human understanding <i>contra</i> the Eunomians and <i>contra</i> any subordinationist tendencies lingering from Origen. This concept <i>that for the sake of which</i> is how the thick analogy to natural begetting serves to establish both the monarchy of the Father by nature and the Son's identical nature with the Father without breaching the divine transcendence.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is all well and good with respect to the Son, Who is begotten, but it becomes somewhat complicated in the case of <i>procession</i> (<i>ekporeusis</i>), a mode of emanation that has no natural analogy but is only revealed. Here, it is unquestionable that the Father must remain the E-cause, since the Father must be the reason for all emanations to avoid Origenist subordinationism. But there is also a <i>defining relationship</i> between the Son and the Spirit that excludes the Spirit simply being another Son based on how each relates to the Father. In E-cause terminology, this defining relationship is non-causal (since there is only one E-cause), but it is nonetheless real in the sense of being an eternal relationship in the Trinity. As long as we do not take this sense of E-causality too literally, in terms of cause and effect, there is no essential contradiction between the Father being the sole reason <i>for the sake of which</i> the other Persons exist and there being an asymmetric dependency in the defining relationship between the other Persons. In the emanational model, that relationship could even be a symmetric relationship of mutual contingency; this is the assertion of a <i>spirituque</i> to balance the <i>filioque</i>. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In any case, the introduction of this concept of <i>defining relationship</i> that is <i>non-causal</i> in the sense of E-causality seems to be the purpose of the distinction of "manifestation" in Gregory's creed. Likewise, when the creed mentions "having <i>hyparxis</i> from," this seems to refer to the reason for emanation rather than a cruder analogy to material causality. Otherwise, the metaphysical analogy to natural begetting would've become too thick to apply in the divine context; it would be explaining <i>how</i> emanations take place as opposed to <i>why</i>.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">By contrast, this crude analogy to natural begetting as production (rather than emanation) seems to be exactly what the creed attributed to Theodore of Mopsuestia is contemplating. Based on Thomas Crean's translation (p. 207), the section on the Holy Spirit reads (with my emphasis in <b>bold</b>):</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>We believe in the Holy Spirit, who is from the substance of God, who is not a Son, who is God by substance, being of the substance of which is God the Father, from whom according to substance he is. "For we have not," he says, "received the spirit of the world but the Spirit who is from God," separating him from all creation and joining Him to God, from whom he is in a proper manner beyong that of all creation; we consider creation to be from God not according to substance but by a creative cause; and we neither consider him a Son, </i><b><i>nor as taking His being from the Son </i>[oute dia Yiou ten hyparxis eilephos].</b></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This uses very similar language as Thaumaturgus's creed (<i>ek theou</i> <i>ten hyparxis echon</i>) but there is a critical conceptual distinction here. While Gregory speaks of the Spirit having (<i>echon</i>) existence out of God (<i>ek theou</i>), which has the emanational context of Origen, Theodore here seems to have production by which existence is received (<i>eilephos</i>), which seems to confuse existence (<i>hyparxis</i>) with <i>ousia</i>. My sense is that this confusion is the same confusion that left the later Nestorian theology would be incapable of distinguishing <i>ousia</i> from <i>hypostasis</i> due to the Syriac concept of <i>qnoma</i> (expressed nature) being unable to pick out the nature from its instantiation. Notably, it rules out the reception by the Holy Spirit (<i>lempsetai</i>) in John 16:14 from being a reception of nature from the Son, even though this will end up being the standard interpretation in the West. As a result, Theodore seems to interpret the Spirit's having existence from the Father in a much more materialistic sense, viz., that which produces another thing, as opposed to the reason for emanations that characterizes Origenist and Cappadocian theology. For that reason, I would not consider this Antiochene tradition representative of the emanational model that is employed in Cappadocian theology. It needs to be converted from its own metaphysical idiom in order to avoid conflict with the Cappadocian tradition, much as as similar conversion was required to avoid the Nestorian implications.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Returning then to Cappaodican theology, this brings me to a significant disagreement Fr. Crean. I must first comment that this is an excellent text that I consider (along with Erick Ybarra's <i>The Filioque</i>) to have essentially reset the scholarship on this subject from where it has more or less rested since Ed Siecienski's <i>The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy</i>. Fr. Crean has made many critical observations that ought to have been made of the 1995 Clarification on the <i>Filioque</i> long ago. But I do believe that he has missed this distinction between relational and emanational models, which can help to explain differences between the Florentine view and the Cappadocian view.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In characterizing the Cappadocian view, Fr. Crean says (p. 122) "for St. Gregory, as for St. Basil, the words <i>aitia</i> or <i>aition</i> as used of the Father do not mean simply cause or principle, but rather 'first cause' or 'principle without principle.'" As far as I can tell, he is exactly correct; this is what I mean by E-cause. But Fr. Crean does not probe into <i>why</i> they make this distinction or how it was used. He makes two cursory references to the use of the phrase "image of the Son" by Gregory Thaumaturgus, an important point to be sure, but does not discuss the distinction between "having existence from" and "manifested by/through" that is the context in which it is raised. This leaves Fr. Crean (at p. 129-30) by his own admission without any real explanation for why St. Gregory Nazianzus writes as he does:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">So striking, in fact, is the way in which the saint implies the hypostatic procession from the Son without ever stating it that I am inclined to think he acted thus by deliberate choice. Why he might have done so has already been suggested, when we considered Oration 31: a reluctance to give a new means of attack to his opponents or a new cause of perplexity to those wavering between Eunomianism and orthodoxy. More generally it seems that he had in mind the principle that he formulated when explaining why the New Testament had not explicitly spoken of the Holy Spirit as God: "You see lights breaking upon us, gradually; and the order of Theology, which it is better for us to keep, neither proclaiming things too suddenly, nor yet keeping them hidden to the end" (Oration 31, no. 37).</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But this is not really an explanation of why making such a distinction is at all related to giving "a new means of attack to his opponents or a new cause of perplexity." That explanation is supplied by the thick analogy to natural begetting in the emanational model, which considers <i>that for the sake of which</i> natural begetting takes place. It is this analogy to natural production, applied to Neoplatonic emanation, that makes the need to establish the Father as the sole <i>arche</i>, as the sole reason for emanation, paramount to avoid Origenist subordination. So while Fr. Crean accurately discerns <i>what</i> the Cappadocians are saying about <i>aitia</i>, he does not hit correctly on <i>why they are saying it</i>, that is, <i>the differences in metaphysical explanation that lead to it</i>. In that respect, as we find with St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, those underlying differences in metaphysical explanation are likely dispositive for the different ways in which they exposit the doctrine.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">III. Causality in Latin theology</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">We move now to the relational model. The Latin model, as summarized by Barnes, operates by three principles: (1) unity of works and power, (2) causal relations, and (3) irreducibility of Persons (subjects). With respect to "causal relations," Barnes has in mind the context of power; it is the causal explanation that the Person has the power to do divine works. In that respect, passages about what a Person "hears" or "receives" from another Person in terms of things like knowledge therefore directly map on to the eternal causal relations between those Persons. This relies on a thin metaphysical analogy for begetting with essentially no connection to biology; the preferred Latin analogy is the internal activities of the mind which "produce" ideas, not biological offspring. In application of these principles, the works of the Son in John 14:10, for example, illustrate that the Son receives His power from the Father and is therefore in the Father. This mutual indwelling is how the Son can say "I and the Father are One" with respect to divinity. So causality in this context refers to <i>any derivative or dependent relation of power</i>, which I will call "R-cause" (relational cause) to distinguish it from "E-cause."</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Barnes has identified St. Niceta of Remesciana as probably the first systematic application of this Latin theology to the Holy Spirit. But even then, the Alexandrian saint Didymus the Blind (translated into Latin by St. Jerome) has notably already made a similar application to John 16, illustrating the common background for Roman and Alexandrian theology. Barnes sets the work of Niceta in context as follows:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">The first Latin descriptions of the Holy Spirit in terms of the interior life of the Trinity occur in the writings of Marius Victorinus and Hilary of Poitiers, both of whom contribute significantly to Augustine's mature pneumatology. It is Hilary who offers a description of the Holy Spirit as interior or inner-Trinitarian 'Gift.' Ambrose of Milan is often treated as the first Latin theologian to articulate a theology of the full divinity of the Holy Spirit, and certainly his _On the Holy Spirit_ is the first lengthy Latin treatise on the Third Person. In fact, however, Ambrose's pneumatology follows in the foosteps of the earlier accomplishments of the Latin theologian, Niceta of Remesciana (as well as owing heavily to the Alexandrian, Didymus the Blind). It is Niceta who first articulates a Latin theology of the Holy Spirit that fully redresses the limitations of pneumatology since Tertullian.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Niceta describes in detail the power and operations of the Holy Spirit: he says explicitly that it is only by the causal trail of power and operations that we know the Father and the Son are divine, and the same hermeneutic holds in the case of the Holy Spirit. We cannot fully know the nature of the Holy Spirit unless we know his works. Niceta then argues strongly that the Holy Spirit creates in common with the Father and Son: he cites both Psalms 33 and 104 as authorities for this judgment, restoring them as testimonies to the Holy Spirit's creative activity (and not only to the Son's). In short, like the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit creates, lives like, foreknows, fills all things, judges all, and is good. These activities are works that the Holy Spirit performs in common with the Father and the Son, exhibiting the one power that they all share in common, and which is the sign of their common divinity.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Barnes notes that in the second half of the fourth century, when Niceta was writing, there were some Latins and Greeks who would "press the point that either the Holy Spirit is a creature or he is not; and if not, then he is either unbegotten or a Son." In response to this assertion, Niceta gives his own account as follows:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Niceta replies by saying that the Holy Spirit is not a creature -- as his works and power reveal -- and we cannot limit the causal options in God to unbegotten or begotten. Scripture gives us a causality other than generation; namely, procession (John 15:26). This type of causality is not obvious to unaided reason, but once revealed by Scripture a meaningful and coherent account (logic) of God's natural productiveness can be developed. With this perspective, an exegetical pattern emerges from Scripture: "spirit" passages associated with God's "breathing" or "exhaling" are images of the Third Person's origin from the Father through "procession."</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But while he has established the foundation for later Latin theologians to infer causal relations between the Son and the Spirit, such as from John 20:22, Niceta himself does not draw such inferences. Barnes notes that "the weakness of Niceta's pneumatology that results in the historical occlusion of his contribution to late-Nicene doctrines of the Holy Spirit is that it lacks any account of the internal (inner Trinitarian) relationship of the Spirit to the Father and the Son. In this regard Niceta offers less than Victorinus and Hilary, and thus it is with the aid of these latter two authors that Augustine develops his doctrine of the Holy Spirit's procession from the Father and the Son." Nonetheless, Niceta has connected causality and exegesis in a new way in the context of the Spirit, and that approach will be influential on St. Ambrose of Milan's later treatise (which depended on concepts from St. Niceta, St. Didymus, and St. Basil).</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Ultimately, St. Augustine is the one who takes all of these ideas to fruition in what Barnes calls his "last pneumatology" in Tractate 99 on John and his works against Maximinus. There St. Augustine finally deploys the Latin theology in a fully causal and power-based account of the Spirit's origin. Specifically, Augustine connects the Spirit's work both in creation and in the economy of salvation together with the Latin theological rules of R-causality to provide a full causal account of the <i>filioque</i> that he initiated in <i>de Trinitate</i>. Barnes cites as an example of his conceptual development that Augustine uniquely relies on the Power going out of the Son as described in multiple Lukan passages to illustrate the causal relation between the Son and the Spirit. This is an argument that had not been used in Latin theology before, but it fits perfectly with the rules of inference that Latin theology uses.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">IV. E-causality and R-causality</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">To recap, we have arrived at two distinct accounts of causality in the Trinity associated with the emanational and relational models.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><u>E-causality</u>: That for the sake of which emanation of the Persons takes place, in analogy to the sense in which natural begetting is "for the sake of" the father who begets. This account is associated with Origen, St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, and the Cappadocian Fathers.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><u>R-causality</u>: That with respect to which something is defined, in analogy to the point as the generator of a line and the line as the generator of a plane. It is also analogized to the interior productions of the mind. This account is associated with the Alexandrian and Latin Fathers.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The doctrine of the Holy Spirit was developed during the pro-Nicene period, so the separation between the Latin-Alexandrian view and the Cappadocian view was already in play. In "<a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/the-filioque-impasse-resolved.html" target="_blank">The filioque impasse resolved</a>," I argued that this separation was due to the rejection of the vertical causality of the Neoplatonic model used in Origen, which (as per Khaled Anatolios) was rejected explicitly by Athanasius. I have since come across <a href="https://epublications.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1634&context=dissertations_mu" target="_blank">a dissertation by Barnes's student Kellen Plaxco</a> titled "Didymus the Blind, Origen, and the Trinity," which convincingly makes the argument that Didymus likewise rejected this aspect of Origenism. (Plaxco's explanation of Origen's use of "perfect image" is likewise instructive for the use of "perfect image" in St. Gregory Thaumaturgus's creed.) Meanwhile, in the West, the Intelligible Triad used by Origen to model the Trinity was not influential at all based on Barnes's survey of Latin theologians. The mistaken belief that the Neoplatonic Intelligible Triad was influential in Latin theology appears to trace to Olivier du Roy's assertions about Augustine, which had been blindly followed by numerous scholars in both East and West until the recent critical work of Barnes and Lewis Ayres. In contrast, the Cappadocians, while clearly rejecting any of Origen's subordinationism, nevertheless showed greater affinity for the emanational model purified of those implications.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The difference in the approaches manifests itself in the clearest passage concerning the cause of the Holy Spirit: John 16:12-16.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">“I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth, for he will not speak on his own authority, but whatever he hears he will speak, and he will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, for he will take what is mine and declare it to you. All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The E-causal account is concerned to affirm that the Father is the only cause for emanations. In the context of causality here, the emanational model will emphasize that what the Holy Spirit receives is what the Father has, downplaying or denying that the Son actually gives anything. The R-causal account, on the contrary, reads "what is mine" as establishing a defining relationship between the Son and the Spirit, so that what the Spirit receives is defined relative to the Son as well as the Father.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As an example of R-causality, the work <i><a href="https://erickybarra.wordpress.com/2017/07/01/didymus-the-blind-on-filioque-a-d-313-398/" target="_blank">On the Holy Spirit</a></i>, a Latin translation by St. Jerome of Didymus's work, reads as follows:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Here again, to ‘take’ is to be understood, so as to be in harmony with the Divine Nature. For as the Son, when He gives, is not deprived of those things which He gives, nor, with loss to Himself, imparts to others, so also the Spirit does not receive what what He had not before. For if He receive what before He had not, when the gift is transferred to another, the Giver is emptied, ceasing to have what He gives. As then above, when disputing of incorporeal natures, we understood, so now too we must know, that the Holy Spirit receives from the Son that which had been of His own nature, and that this signifies, not a giver and a receiver, but one substance. Inasmuch as the Son is said to receive of the Father that, wherein He himself subsists. For neither is the Son ought besides what is given to Him from the Father, nor is the substance of the Holy Spirit other, besides what is given Him by the Son.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Even if we don't accept that this work was authored by Didymus, although that is highly likely, the Latin redaction shows exactly what we would expect in the Latin view and what we see in numerous Latin authors. To deny R-causality in this passage would simply be to deny the entire Latin theology of the Trinity.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">We can take St. John Damascene as an example of the E-causal account. In <i>On the Holy Trinity </i>(trans. Nicholas Roumas), he uses language from St. Gregory Thaumaturgus's creed with the interpolation "that is, to men" in the following description of the Spirit: </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>one holy Spirit, having its existence from God, and sprouting </i>[manifesting/pephynos] <i>through the Son, that is, to men. Perfect image of the Son, life, cause of life, holy source of holiness, bestower of sanctification, in whom is manifested God the Father, who is upon all and in all, and God the Son, who is through all</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In <i>The Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith </i>1.8, John explicitly invokes the analogy to natural generation:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">For He could not have received the name Father apart from the Son: for if He were without the Son , He could not be the Father: and if He thereafter had the Son, thereafter He became the Father, not having been the Father prior to this, and He was changed from that which was not the Father and became the Father. This is the worst form of blasphemy. For we may not speak of God as destitute of natural generative power: and generative power means, the power of producing from one's self, that is to say, from one's own proper essence, that which is like in nature to one's self.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Like the Cappadocians, then, he will have the concerns to make the Father the exclusive E-cause. This provides the context for what nearly appears to be a self-contradiction in John's work. First, there is this statement in 1.8, which is similar to <i>On the Holy Trinity</i>:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>And we speak likewise of the Holy Spirit as from the Father, and call Him the Spirit of the Father. And we do not speak of the Spirit as from the Son: but yet we call Him the Spirit of the Son. For if any one has not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His, says the divine apostle </i>[Rom. 8:9]<i>. And we confess that He is manifested and imparted to us through the Son. For He breathed upon His Disciples, says he, and said, Receive the Holy Spirit </i>[John 20:29].</span><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Then these are in 1.12:<br /></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>And the </i><i>Holy Spirit</i><i> is the power of the Father revealing the hidden mysteries of His Divinity, proceeding from the Father through the Son </i>(ek Patros di Yiou ekporeumenon)<i> in a manner known to Himself, but different from that of generation.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">...</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">But the Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Father but the Spirit of the Father as proceeding from the Father. For there is no impulse without Spirit. And we speak also of the Spirit of the Son, not as through proceeding from Him, but as proceeding through Him from the Father. For the Father alone is cause.</span></i></div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As might be expected, I must again disagree with Fr. Crean's assessment of St. John Damascene, for exactly the reason I have above: I believe Fr. Crean has missed this distinction between the emanational and relational models. (That being said, I agree with his general conclusion that St. John did not actually oppose the <i>filioque</i>.) </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Fr. Crean says the following:</span></div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Since we have argued above that Damascene has in mind an active role for the Son in the procession, it would follow here that he intends [by saying the Father alone is cause] to simply affirm that the Father alone is principle without principle, and hence that he is not really denying the </i>Filioque<i>. According to [José] Grégoire, St. John has no polemical intent in his Trinitarian writings except against Arians and Manichees. At the same time, he apparently lacks the concept of the Father and Son as a single principle of the procession, as well as Augustine's explanation of what it means for the Holy Spirit to proceed </i>principaliter<i> from the Father. For this reason, Damascene is not able to produce a fully satisfactory synthesis of his thought, a sign of which fact is the absence of any explanation in his work of the "rest" of the Holy Spirit in the Son. One may say that while the deeper tendency of his thought is in favor of the </i>Filioque<i>, a habit of language has grown up that obstructs the expression of the doctrine.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">There is a much simpler explanation; what St. John is denying is that any other Person is <i>that for the sake of which</i> the Persons are emanated (the E-cause). He is not denying the R-causality of the Son and, on the contrary, he says many things that affirm it at least implicitly. As Fr. Crean observes "to be 'between' the Father and the Son, while it is not explained by either Nazianzen or Damascene implies that a relation to both the Father and the Son is intrinsic to the person of the Holy Spirit." In particular, Fr. Crean critiques Damascene's use of the image of the Spirit "resting on/in" the Son, but this is surely nothing other than the description of the Spirit as the eternal anointing/Kingdom of the Son used by St. Gregory of Nyssa and others. This is definitely R-causality -- that the Spirit is defined relative to the Father and the Son -- albeit with due care not to compromise the E-causality (monarchy) of the Father. Certainly, the "habit of language" is not to use the term <i>aitia</i> (cause or principle) or the preposition <i>ek</i> in connection with the emanation of the Spirit (procession) except in connection with the Father in order to avoid any possibility that his E-causality would be compromised.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As to the relation to St. Augustine that Fr. Crean cites, if I am correct, the reason that Augustine would have relatively little traction at the East is exactly that the East was operating primarily in the emanational model, especially after Pseudo-Dionysius, while the Western use of the relational model made Augustine a supremely magisterial figure in Latin theology. Damascene's mental model is that of emanation, so the psychological analogy to internal production would have been much riskier in that context, even though he is comfortable using elements of the analogy even in his own writing. Perhaps the best evidence that they can be reconciled is that St. Bonaventure, who was steeped in Augustine theology and the psychological model, could develop his own emanational model based directly on St. John's work. As Friedman describes, "[t]he later-medieval emanation account itself had its roots in various texts <b>by Augustine, by John Damascene (John of Damascus, d. ca. 750)</b>, by Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109), and most particularly by Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) in his word <i>De trinitate </i>[esp. Books IV-VI]." Given that Bonaventure is revered as the Seraphic Doctor of the Church, it is hard to imagine clearer evidence that Damascene's account, which focuses on E-causality and emanations, nevertheless does not conflict with the R-causal account that Augustine developed based on relations in the <i>Categories</i>.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Perhaps I may gently chide Fr. Crean for living up to his order's calling a bit too zealously. As Friedman recounts, "[i]t was only in the middle of the thirteenth century, however, that the relation account and the emanation account began to be considered mutually exclusive, so that a theologian could not be a proponent of both the one and the other. As mentioned above, Dominicans overwhelmingly held the relation account, whereas Franciscans held the emanation account. In fact, in the late thirteenth century there arose rival trinitarian traditions, a Dominican trinitarian tradition clustered around the relation account, and a Franciscan trinitarian tradition centered on the emanation account." While Friedman notes that this is "a very broad shorthand," "these groups of theologians form 'traditions' in the sense that each involved a different general approach to the Trinity that in turn led to a relatively stable complex of views; these views were handed down from scholar to scholar within the tradition and were further developed in conscious opposition of the views of the other tradition." Importantly, Friedman then says that "<b>[t]his divergence of views is already clear in Bonaventure and Aquinas</b>." But if we do not take the Angelic Doctor as excluding the Seraphic and if we see this divergence of views as a permissible diversity in concept concerning the inconceivable, then I would say that Bonaventure can teach us much about what the Cappadocians and the Damascene had in mind.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">V. Resolving historical conflicts with the E-causal and R-causal models</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">If my account is correct, then the distinction between the relational and emanational model likely dates back to different schools of Origenist though. Specifically, St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, Origen's pupil who firmly established Christianity in the Cappadocian region, and St. Didymus the Blind, who inherited Origen's Catechetical School in Alexandria and who greatly influenced St. Athanasius, developed emanational and relational theological accounts of the Trinity. Latin anti-monarchian theology was a common influence in both Rome and Alexandria, with the so-called "Rome-Alexandria axis" certainly persisting during this time period, so the common features of the relational model in Rome and Alexandria were extensive. But even in Alexandria, the acceptance of the relational mode was not monolithic, since there remained Origenist monks who adhered closely to the older theology of Origen himself. But in terms of the dominant account in Alexandria, the Alexandrian relational theology ended up developing along more or less the same lines as the Latin theology, even though the technical use of the category "relation" was a specifically Augustinian development in the West. To the extent that there was friction between the models, then, one would expect that friction to manifest itself long before the later East-West (and even later Dominican-Franciscan) conflicts.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">A. The Synod of the Oak</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I would argue that the first such conflict was between St. Theophilus of Alexandria and St. John Chrysostom at the Synod of the Oak. Theophilus was dealing with the problem of "uncorrected" Origenism, which had not been purged of the vertical causality and Middle Platonic influence, as contrasted with Athanasius's own Christianized view. This resulted in the Origenist monks known as the Tall Brothers fleeing eastward to the protection of the Emperor in Constantinople, where Chrysostom was Patriarch. St. John was steeped in the emanational model of Antiochene and Cappadocian theology, so he undoubtedly saw similarities between the Origenist theology and his own. The Emperor summoned Theophilus to answer for his condemnation of these monks, whom Chrysostom considered innocent. But through some astute maneuvering on the part of Theophilus (and notably after a failed attempt to enlist the support of St. Epiphanius of Salamis against Chrysostom), Theophilus managed to get St. John deposed as Patriarch. This was highly controversial among the people of Constantinople, who ended up recalling Chrysostom to the patriarchate, but his political enemies remained influential, and he was eventually deposed and exiled shortly before his death. Nonetheless, both St. John Chrysostom and St. Cyril of Alexandria, who supported Theophilus in having Chrysostom condemned, are revered among the greatest Doctors of the Church. This seems to be a clear example of how the difference between emanational and relational models could create division even among unquestionably orthodox Fathers.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">B. The Nestorian controversy</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The next major incident also involved Cyril. In this case, it related to the reconciliation between Cyril and John of Antioch concerning the Nestorian controversy. In this case, the conflict was triggered not by the emanational model itself but by the cruder "production" model of Theodore of Mopseustia. Mar Theodore had claimed that the Spirit "does not receive his existence" from the Son. Following this tradition, Theodoret objects to Cyril's account of the Holy Spirit in his ninth anaethema against the Nestorians as follows (quoted from Crean at p. 208):</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>We will confess that the Spirit is proper to the Son, receiving this as a religious expression, if [Cyril] means that he is of the same nature as him and proceeds from the Father. But if he means in the sense of from </i>[ek] <i>the Son, or having existence through the Son </i>[di Yiou ten hyparxis echon]<i>, we reject this as impious blasphemy.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Cyril's response (quoted from Crean at p. 209) follows exactly the R-causal account of the Spirit by the Son, using the exegesis of John 16 as per the relational model, while also taking care to deny that the Son is the E-cause of the Spirit:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">The Spirit was and is his, just as the Father's.... The Holy Spirit proceeds from God and the Father, according to the word of the Savior, but he is not foreign to the Son, for he has all things with the Father. And he himself taught this, saying about the Holy Spirit: "All that the Father has are mine. Therefore I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you."</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is, of course, how every Latin and Alexandrian theologian takes John 16. The Son is the R-cause of the Spirit, since the Spirit's existence is defined <i>relative to</i> the Son, but not the E-cause of the Spirit in the sense of <i>that for the sake of which</i> the Spirit is emanated. Thus, in response to Theodoret's production model, Cyril replies with the relational model. He later reiterated this explanation at in his explanation of the Ninth Anathema, approved by the Council of Ephesus (quoted from Crean at pp. 201-202):</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Although the only-begotten Word of God became man, yet he remained God, having all things which the Father has beside paternity; and he worked divine signs, having as his own the holy Spirit, who is from himself </i>[to ex autou]<i>, and substantially innate to him </i>[ousiodos emphekos auto].</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But much like Nestorius himself in the <i>Bazaar of Heracleides</i>, Theodoret can never quite get his head around the Alexandrian theology. Like Nestorius, Theodoret viewed Chalcedon as a repudiation of Cyril's theology at Ephesus, a complete misunderstanding resulting from the divide between the relational and emanational models (or, in Theodoret's case, the cruder version of production rather than emanation). In explaining to John of Antioch why Chalcedon supposedly repudiated the twelve anathemas, Theodoret says (at Crean p. 210) "the Holy Spirit is not of the Son nor derives existence through the Son [<i>ouk ex Yiou e di Yiou ten hyparxis echon</i>], but proceeds from the Father, and is proper to the Son as being of one substance." According to Fr. Crean, Martin Jugie believed that when this phrase had been used in Theodoret's theology, Theodoret only "wished to make a double denial that the Holy Spirit was a creature." I agree with Fr. Crean that this explanation is inadequate. For my own part, I think Theodoret's error is due to his more primitive understanding of emanation as simple production, which he inherited from Theodore of Mopsuestia. Regardless, Siecienski's assertion in <i>The Filioque</i> that Cyril somehow acceded to Theodoret's assertion that the Spirit does not derive His existence from the Son (in the sense of R-causality) is completely implausible, while the distinction between the emanational and relational models provides a ready explanation for the misunderstanding between Alexandria and Antioch.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">C. Justinian and Second Constantinople</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The post-Chalcedonian era saw unprecedented disruption in the Christian East. Dioscorus of Alexandrian broke off his miaphysite church from the rest of the East, thereby also breaking one of the only major paths of regular communication between West and East. This separation was further exacerbated by the resurgence of Homoian Arianism among the Goths, which turned the attention of the Roman Church to its own survival. In addition to the Christian world's having been split in half by these developments, the aforementioned Origenist monks, especially those in the tradition of Evagrius of Pontus, had their own resurgence, and Monophysitism outside of Alexandria had become more widely influential in the Christian East, although under heavy persecution. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This was the environment in which the Christian author who claimed the title of Dionysius the Areopagite first wrote. As Rosemary Arthur recounts in <i>Pseudo-Dionysius as Polemicist, </i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Christological disputes at the time of [Pseudo-Dionysius's] writing were the single most important cause of disunity in the Church. The Monophysite party was particularly unfortunate in this respect, divided as it was into numerous sub-groups, each accusing the other of heresy. Riven as it was by dissension and political intrigue, and distressed by persecution, the church of the early sixth century was in sore need of a theological authority to whom to appeal. The Monophysites had turned to Cyril of Alexandria for support, but even he was also claimed by the opposition in support of their views. As for the scriptures, the longstanding dispute between Antiochene and Alexandrian exegetes meant that there was no agreement here either. What was needed was an authority of the apostolic or sub-apostolic period who just happened to address the problems of the sixth century! Care needed to be taken here, because the Monophysites were already suspected of producing forgeries in defence of their arguments. The work had to be produced anonymously, since no Monophysite theologian would be accepted by the Chalcedonians or vice versa. Any overt admission of the author's Origenism would also have been a disadvantage at the time of writing, which is likely to have been between 527 and 529 AD. The accession of Justinian is of some relevance here.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Arthur believes that Sergius of Reshaina, the translator of the Dionysian corpus into Syriac, was likely the author. As Arthur relates, Sergius had the Syrian background for the Dionysian angelology, and he had been trained in Alexandrian so that he would have exposure to Neoplatonism, Judaica, and even alchemy and theurgy, all of which are demonstrated in Dionysius's writings. Arthur's summary of Sergius's unique biography is worth examining:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Sergius' ability to be on good terms with all sorts of people whose religious views were quite different from his own has led to some uncertainty about his true allegiance. If one takes a charitable view of his activities, he was sufficiently moderate and conciliatory to be entrusted by Ephraim of Antioch with a mission to Pope Agapetus in Rome in 536 AD, a time when the Monophysite bishops were being persecuted. A less charitable view would be that he knew where his best advantage lay, and was prepared to exploit it in the interest of his own personal success. When Ephrem of Antioch offered him money to betray the Monophysites by turning Agapetus against them, Sergius was only too willing to accept. This has led to an assumption that he was a Chalcedonian. He is also said to have been on good terms with the Nestorians. His close friend and pupil Theodore, to whom he dedicated several treatises, was a Nestorian priest, later bishop of Merv. Abd-Isho includes Sergius in his list of Nestorian writers. He is also described as a Nestorian priest in Georr's introduction to Sergius' translation of the </i>Categories of Aristotle<i>. Although nominally a Monophysite, Sergius' real sympathies seem to have lain with the Origenists. A physician by profession, Sergius was educated in Alexandria.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">On the Chalcedonian side, there was a similarly broad-minded figure in the form of Leontius of Byzantium, himself a former Nestorian turned Chalcedonian by the writings of Cyril of Alexandria. Johannes Zachhuber provides an in-depth analysis of Leontius in his survey of Byzantine theology titled <i>The Rise of Christian Philosophy and the End of Ancient Metaphysics</i>. Like Sergius of Reshaina, Leontius was sympathetic to the Origenists (to the point that he has been mistaken for one), while seeing the Nestorians and the Monophysites as two wrong extremes in the way that Sabellianism and Arianism were two wrong extremes about the Trinity. In particular, Zachhuber notes that Leontius "never embraces the more radically Cyrillene interpretation of the Council's creed, often dubbed neo-Chalcedonianism, that is found in John the Grammarian and, later, in Pamphilus, Theodore of Raithu, and Leontius of Jerusalem."</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Zachhuber summarizes Leontius's approach as follows:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Throughout his works, it is evident how much Leontius took the Capadocian philosophy for granted as the incontrovertible foundation for Patristic thought. Problems arising from his confrontations with opponents of Chalcedonian Christology are inevitably tackled on the basis of Cappadocian terms and concepts; it is perfectly evident that he believed these to form the conceptual basis for the solution of the Christological problem as much as, in their time, they solved the trinitarian conundrum.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Dionysius and Leontius unquestionably were the basis of the Byzantine theological synthesis that came after. And given the factions that they were attempting to reunite under the Chalcedonian banner, it is clear that the emanational model dominated the discussion. It was the one common factor of Nestorian, Cappadocian, and Origenist theology, and it had the prospect of reaching Eastern Monophysites as well, which practically rendered the older Alexandrian relational model obsolete. The prospect of reunion on the basis of a new theological synthesis was an object of obsession for the Emperor Justinian. It is at this point that the emanational and relational models will collide once again.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Justinian sought to gain support from the Miaphysites and the Origenists by condemning their old enemies, the Nestorians, in the form of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Ibas of Edessa, and Theodoret of Cyrus. He condemned the writings, which became known as the Three Chapters, and ordered his hand-picked Pope Vigilius to do the same. At this point, the Latin-speaking bishops, who knew only the relational model and often did not even know Greek well enough to meaningfully interpret the writings anyway, saw themselves as being asked to undermine Chalcedon, which taught the faith exactly as they understood it. If Chalcedon had no objection, then how could these writings be incompatible with the faith? Vigilius had this position in mind when he journeyed to Constantinople, immediately excommunicating Patriarch Mennas for signing the condemnation, which Vigilius saw as a rebuke of Chalcedon.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">At Constantinople, Vigilius was persuaded that, while the men themselves were not condemned by Chalcedon, it was still possible that their writings could be. On that basis, he reviewed certain passages from the Three Chapters and concluded that they were worthy of condemnation, issuing his <i>Iudicatum</i> against them. This triggered an explosive reaction among the Latin bishops, who knew that it was going to undermine their ability to defend the authority of Chalcedon and who knew nothing of what so-called errors may have been in the Three Chapters. In response, Vigilius rescinded the condemnation and pleaded with the Emperor not to order them condemned before holding a general council. Justinian agreed to the council, but then reissued the condemnation anyway.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The point here is not a dogmatic one. The Latins always believed Chalcedon; Vigilius repeatedly affirmed Chalcedon in his assessment of the Three Chapters. Chalcedon was their standard for orthodoxy, and nothing ever changed in that regard. What happened is that the Emperor attempted to drag the papal authority into this Eastern struggle over the orthodoxy of the emanational model, a struggle to which the West was more or less indifferent they knew essentially nothing about it. And Justinian's misunderstanding, his failure to see the difference in the emanational and relational models, only exacerbated the alienation between East and West that had already resulted from the loss of Alexandria. After this, there would be no meaningful theological interchange between East and West, so that they began to drift further and further apart.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As an example of how far Justinian's personal obsession was driving the Fifth Ecumenical Council at the expense of good will, once it became clear that the condemnation of the Nestorians was not going to obtain reunion with the Origenists, he immediately turned on them as well. This was such a late addition to the Council that it isn't even clear whether the condemnation of Origenism was actually part of the Council (the records of the acts in the West do not record it). And just as with the Latin theology, Justinian was careless with Origenist theology. His real target was (or should've been) the Evagrian Origenism that proliferated in the East, but instead, he condemned not only Evagrius and Origen himself but also other historical figures, such as Didymus the Blind and Leontius of Byzantium, who had actually been critical of Origen's teaching when they reproduced it. Ironically, if Justinian had followed the more pluralistic model of the Fathers rather than trying to force everyone into one Great Byzantine Synthesis, he might have actually succeed in bringing about greater unity.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">D. Maximus and the monothelites</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">While I may have had some disagreement with Fr. Crean, his chapter on St. Maximus the Confessor is masterful. The care he has taken in exegesis, especially in the <i>Letter to Marinus</i>, has elucidated the logic in Maximus's writing on this subject clearly and sensibly. The key observation that Fr. Crean makes is that the phrase <i>en alle lexei te kai phone</i>, which is often translated as "in their mother tongue," actually should mean "in the characteristic and accustomed" speech, meaning in their theological idiom. In other words, through his long experience in the West, Maximus has correctly perceived that there is a different theological language between East and West, but despite this difference, they can share the same dogma. Correctly understood, the remainder of the passage does not accuse the Latins of any inability, difficulty or harm in expressing themselves in Latin, as it is often interpreted, but rather points out that they will be subject to "the deceits of those who have lapsed," <i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., the Monothelites. As Fr. Crean (p. 234) puts it, "St. Maximus is thus warning that the phrase <i>procedere ex Filio</i> leaves the Latins open to the tricks or guile of those who have lapsed from the faith, meaning the monothelites."</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">What Maximus perceives here is that this language will be (deliberately, in the case of the Monothelites) misinterpreted to assert that the West is denying the sole E-causality of the Father. In other words, Maximus is the last theologian to have a deep understanding of both theological paradigms in the way that Cyril did, although others (specifically Pope Hadrian and Pope Leo III) will continue to see compatibility between the views. Maximus is unique because he was the last significant figure to be deeply engaged in both theological cultures. As a result, Maximus invokes the same from/through distinction found in the emanational model, which protects the monarchy (E-causality) of the Father while still allowing R-causality of the Son, along the same lines as Cyril. This appears to be the last such consciously "bilingual" approach. St. John Damascene, as we have seen previously, is squarely within the emanational model. While Damascene doesn't contradict the R-causal model, he does not show anything like Maximus's awareness of it.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Likewise, Siecienski shows no awareness of the two models. He discusses Maximus's view at p. 77 (my emphasis in <b>bold</b>):</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>The last point becomes important in discussing the relationship of the Son and Spirit in Maximus's thought, since the Father who spirates is always the Father of the Son (with whom he is in eternal relation). In the "trinitarian order" </i>(taxis)<i>, the Spirit, being third, proceeds from the First Cause (i.e. the Father) in such a way that he comprehends the Father's eternal relation to the only-begotten Son. Thus <b>while he does not derive hypostatic origination from the Son</b>, his procession from the Father does presuppose the Son's existence.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">...</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">In this text [exegesis of Zech. 4:2-3 on the lampstand image] one notes the centra mediatory role of the incarnate Logos, who not only illumines humanity but also pours forth the gifts of the Spirit upon the Church. In this senset it can be said that the Spirit, like a light, flows from the Father through the Son. This passage clearly echoes Gregory Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, both of whom had utilized the image of light and flame to show the flow from the unoriginate source (the Father) through another (the Son) to shine forth in another (the Spirit). <b>Yet in context all three fathers appear to be referencing the economic manifestation of the Trinity and the way Christians come to experience, in time, the gifts of the Spirit</b>.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The bolded assertions, which are essentially completely external to the writings of the authors to which he is appealing, show the influence of the emanational model. But even worse, it is not the emanational model; it is the crude "production" model of Theodore of Mopseustia and Theodoret, which corrupts Siecienski's reading of both the Alexandrian and Latin Fathers. Had he recognized that the E-causal account does not exclude the R-causal account, Maximus can be read in complete continuity with the emanational model of the Cappadocians (though not the production model of Theodoret). He affirms E-causality for the Father alone but does not contradict R-causality for both the Father and the Son, just as St. Gregory Nazianzus did and St. John Damascene will later do.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Siecienski apparently makes the same mistake with respect to the subsequent reception of Maximus's writings in the West. In discussing the use of Maximus by Anastasius the Librarian, Siencienski quotes at p. 108 the following passage:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Moreover, we have from the letter written by the same Saint Maximus to the priest Marinus concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, where he implies that the Greeks tried, in vain, to make a case against us, since we do not say that the Son is a cause or principle of the Holy Spirit, as they assert. But, not incognizant of the unity of substance between the Father and the Son, as he proceeds from the Father, we confess that he proceeds from the Son, understanding </i>processionem<i>, of course, as "mission" </i>[Sed, unitatem substantiae Patris ac Filii non nescientes, sicut procedite ex Patre, ita eum procedere fateamur ex Filio, missionem nimirum processionem intelligentes].</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Leaving aside how persuasive Anastasius is as an orthodox Latin theologian representative of the tradition (which is somewhat doubtful), Siecienski's assertion that the term "mission" here as purely economic definitely conflicts with Latin theology. Given the use of the term "mission" in both prior and subsequent Latin theology, this would be an entirely normal use of the Latin theological rules to infer the eternal causal relationship from the economy. Assuming that Anastasius is not coming out of nowhere with his views here, he would have distinguished the Father's E-causality (the sense in which He is the only cause or principle) from the Father and the Son's R-causality. That he is referring to R-causality in this context is confirmed clearly by the fact that he is speaking of the eternal unity of substance between the Father and the Son "as [the Spirit] proceeds from the Father." Anastasius attributes this to linguistic differences rather than conceptual differences, suggesting that, unlike Maximus, he does not perceive two distinct models at work here. Yet that does not prevent him from affirming the traditional position that E-causality and R-causality are not in conflict with one another.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">E. The Caroline Books and Nicaea II</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In a clear demonstration that the failure to under the other paradigm goes both ways, the Frankish theologians displayed their ignorance of the emanational paradigm in responding to Patriarch Tarasius's </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">confession that "the Holy Spirit is not from the Father and the Son according to the most true and holy rule of faith but proceeds from the Father and the Son." If Theodoret exemplifies the crude version of the emanational model, the Frankish theologians surely represent the crude version of R-causality. They see the <i>filioque</i> as excluding the unique property of the Father as <i>that for the sake of which the emanations take place </i>(i.e., the E-cause). Pope Hadrian, in response, correctly interprets the Eastern Fathers as affirming the E-causality of the Father without thereby denying the R-causality of the Father (in this case, couched in the Augustinian account of relations that were cited in the Caroline Books). While not offering a sophisticated account of how the relational and emanational models differ, Pope Hadrian does at least acknowledge that the crude Frankish understanding of the relational model will not suffice to reject the Eastern understanding. Pope Hadrian is therefore another example of how a Latin theologian affirming the relational model (R-causality) in the <i>filioque</i> need not contradict the emanational model's assertion of the Father as the sole E-cause.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The same approach was maintained by Hadrian's successor Pope Leo III. While agreeing that the doctrine of R-causality represented in the <i>filioque</i> was essential dogma and saying that "it is forbidden not to believe such a great mystery of the faith," he likewise recognized that the Nicene Creed served a valuable purpose in keeping East and West together. Pursuant to that end, he had two silver shields struck, in both Greek and Latin, omitting the <i>filioque</i>. But this was little more than a diplomatic gesture for Constantinople; the Creed was in ordinary use, and in any case, there was no doctrinal error involved in using it. And unlike Maximus, Popes Hadrian and Leo do not show understanding that there is a different model at work in the East, only that their own Latin model is compatible with what the Eastern Fathers say.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">F. The Photian Schism</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">At this point in history, we reach what appears to be the flashpoint for the conflagration that destroys what few ties remain between the East and West on this issue. The conflict between the papacy and St. Photius, the patriarch of Constantinople, ends up permanently entrenching the division between East and West to the point that they can no longer even agree on what councils are ecumenical between them.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Siencienski's description of Photius (p. 101) is apt (my emphasis in <b>bold</b>):</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Although Photius was a man of great learning, his knowledge of Latin theology appears to have been rather limited. For this reason, his attacks on the </i>filioque<i>, contained in both the </i>Encyclical to the Eastern Patriarchs <i>(Epistle 2) and the </i>Letter of the Patriarch to Aquileia<i> (Epistle 291), are attempts not to refute the Latins' patristic evidence, but rather to attack the logical consequences of a "double procession" from both Father and Son. Photius's chief arguments, <b>which became the foundation upon which the Orthodox case against the </b></i><b>filioque</b><i><b> was built</b>, can be summarized as follows:</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">1. If "the Father is one source of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the Son another source of the Holy Spirit, the monarch of the Holy Trinity is transformed into a dual divinity."</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">2. "If [the Spirit's] procession from the Father is perfect and complete -- and it is perfect, because he is perfect God from perfect God -- then why is there also procession from the Son?"</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">3. "If the Son participates in the quality or property of the Father's own person, then the Son and the Spirit lose their own personal distinctions. Here one falls into semi-Sabellianism."</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">4. "Because the Father in principle and source, not because of the nature of the divinity but because of the property of his own hypostasis ... the Son cannot be principle or source."</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">5. "By the teaching of the processions from the Son also, the Father and the Son end up being closer to each other than the Father and the Spirit, since the Son possesses not only the Father's nature but also the property of his person...."</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">6. The procession of the Spirit from the Son makes the Son a father of the Spirit's being; thus "it is impossible to see why the Holy Spirit could not be called a grandson!"</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But this is essentially an admission that the entire Orthodox case against the <i>filioque</i>, even to the present day, is based on the same failure to understand the difference in the emanational and relational models that we have seen repeated over and over in history. The anti-Islamic background of Photius's likely source Niketas Byzantinos (according to Siecienski) only makes this worse; Islamic monotheism is similar to Origenism in its subordinationism based on Neoplatonic vertical causality. It is extraordinarily likely, then, that Photius and Niketas are both reading the West in the context of the Neoplatonic Triad, even though that bears no relation to the relational model, which explicitly rejects Origenism in exactly this sense. The fatal error here is that the "quality or property" of being E-cause traditionally means that the Father is <i>that for the sake of which</i> the emanations take place; it says nothing about <i>how</i> the emanations take place, which is a theological mystery. This logical overstep in turn causes Photius and Niketas both to draw the conclusion that even <i>R-causality</i> is ruled out, a conclusion that might have been avoided if either understood what R-causality actually was and how it differed from E-causality. Siecienski is correct in this regard: the Orthodox rejection of the <i>filioque</i> is based on a logical error by Photius resulting from a failure to understand the relational model. In my opinion, this model, taken to its logical conclusion, would end up falling into the same trap that Theodoret did, but later developments would take it on a different path.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">VI. Lyons vs. Blachernae: conflict or misunderstanding?</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">From the time of Photius through the time of Lyons and Florence, this essentially remained the <i>status quo</i>. Photius's misunderstanding of the West was in the background of all of the disputes over the <i>filioque</i>, and the West had little to no understanding of the emanational model used in the East and so was unable to communicate the distinction between E-causality and R-causality. That was the situation except for one extremely rare ecumenical exchange noted by Siecienski: the dialogue between Anselm of Haverberg and Nicetas of Nicomedia in 1136. Incredibly, they seem to have worked the issue out completely. As Siencienski describes the encounter at p. 122:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Anselm agreed completely, claiming that the Latins also affirmed that the Father is "principal author and causal principle both of the generation in relation to the Son and of the procession in relation to the Holy Spirit" </i>(Est itaque Pater principalis auctor et causale principium tam generationis ad Filiuim, quam processionis ad Spiritum sanctum)<i>. The encounter ended on this note of agreement, Nicetas allowing that the Son had a role in the procession of the Spirit, Anselm affirming that the Father remained the principal source </i>(arche) <i>of the divinity. Yet despite the significance of the gathering, events conspired against future exchanges building upon the consensus reached.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">What Siecienski means is that the political squabbles between East and West over papal authority introduced entirely extraneous factors to theological discussion. What Siecienski fails to explain, and indeed fails to understand, is why this would not be a legitimate solution to the entire problem as a return to the traditional patristic understanding. In short, they realized that affirming monarchy in E-causality does not contradict <i>a true R-causal relation</i> between the Son and the Spirit, which was exactly what both Western and Eastern Fathers taught. The only thing that is needful here is to recognize that there are different uses of the term "cause" and "origin."</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In any case, whether today's historians learn anything from the encounter or not, it definitely had no impact at the time. But there was a major development: as recounted by Russell Friedman, St. Bonaventure developed the first full-blown emanational model in Latin theology based on St. John Damascene. The complication was, of course, that the emanational and relational models did not coexist peaceably in Western theology any more than they did at any other time in history. Nonetheless, this was useful in demonstrating that the E-causal account of the emanational model did not fundamentally conflict with the R-causal model of the <i>filioque</i>, for the simple reason that Bonaventure held to both simultaneously. And this is critically important, because Bonaventure was actually present at the Council of Lyons, though he unfortunately died in Lyons before its completion. (St. Thomas Aquinas had passed away <i>en route</i>.)</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">With Bonaventure's influence, we arrive at the statement of Lyons, which balances E-causality and R-causality in a highly traditional way:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">We profess faithfully and devotedly that the holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles, but as from one principle; not by two spirations, but by one single spiration. This the holy Roman church, mother and mistress of all the faithful, has till now professed, preached and taught; this she firmly holds, preaches, professes and teaches; this is the unchangeable and true belief of the orthodox fathers and doctors, Latin and Greek alike. But because some, on account of ignorance of the said indisputable truth, have fallen into various errors, we, wishing to close the way to such errors, with the approval of the sacred council, condemn and reprove all who presume to deny that the holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, or rashly to assert that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles and not as from one. </span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">R-causality requires that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as the Spirit is <i>defined relative to</i> the Father and the Son. But this does not violate E-causality, which is the reason for the affirmation <i>as from one principle</i>, affirming that the Father is <i>that for the sake of which</i> both the Son's emanation and the Spirit's procession occur. In the sense of E-cause, then, the Father would be the only cause. The Son and the Father are one principle relative to the Spirit precisely because the Father is E-cause, the reason for the Son's begetting. This affirms both a true sense that the Father and the Son are the cause of the Holy Spirit and a true sense in which the Father alone is the cause of the Spirit, which is exactly what St. Bonaventure teaches.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But then came Blachernae (1285). Blachernae was the anti-Lyons, a clash between the pro-Lyons unionist John Beccus and Gregory of Cyprus. Between Lyons and Blachernae, the pro-union Emperor had been succeeded, so there was a movement to repudiate the union with the West. The acts are reproduced from Papadakis's translation in <i>Crisis in Byzantium</i> are <a href="https://sangiulio.org/holy-canons/blachernae/" target="_blank">here</a>. Anne-Sophie Vivier-Muresan's analysis of Gregory of Cyprus and Gregory Palamas concerning the eternal manifestation of the Holy Spirit, upon which I will also rely, can be found <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344703196_The_eternal_manifestation_of_the_Spirit_through_the_Son_a_hypostatic_or_energetic_reality_Inquiry_in_the_works_of_Gregory_of_Cyprus_and_Gregory_Palamas" target="_blank">here</a>. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Vivier-Muresan quotes one of the most significant passages of Gregory's <i>Tomus</i>, which captures the relevant point:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">To the same, who affirm that the Paraclete, which is from the Father, has its existence through the Son and from the Son, and who, again, propose as proof the phrase “The Spirit exists through and from the Son”. In certain texts [of the Fathers], the phrase denotes the Spirit’s shining forth and manifestation. Indeed, the very Paraclete shines forth and is manifest eternally through the Son, in the same way that light shines forth and is manifest through the intermediary of the sun’s ray; it further denotes the bestowing, giving and sending of the Spirit to us. It does not, however, mean that it subsists through the Son and from the Son, and that it receives its being through him and from him.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Another relevant portion is the following from Papadakis's <i>Crisis in Byzantium </i>(the bracketed statements are his):</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">For there is no other hypostasis in the Trinity except the Father's, from which the existence and essence of the consubstantial [Son and Holy Spirit] is derived. According to the common mind of the Church and the aforementioned saints, the Father is the foundation and soruce of the Son and the Spirit, the only source of divinity, and the only cause. If, in fact, it is also said by some of the saints that the Spirit proceeds "through the Son," what is meant here is the eternal manifestation of the Spirit by the Son, not the purely [personal] emanation into being of the Spirit, which has its existence from the Father. Otherwise, this would deprive the Father from being the only cause and the only source of divinity, and would expose the Theologian [Gregory of Nazianzus] who says "everything the Father is said to possess, the Son, likewise, possesses except causality.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is Gregory's famous distinction between "existing through" and "subsisting through"/"having existence from," which parallels the distinction made in Thaumaturgus's creed between "having existence from" and "manifested through." But in making this distinction, Gregory Cypriot follows Photius's elision concerning E-causality: <i>that for the sake of which</i> has elided into <i>the mechanism by which</i>. That is not the traditional use of the concept; the traditional use restricted itself to the first sense and would therefore not have excluded R-causality (as indicated by the disagreement between Cyril and Theodoret on exactly this issue). So while the traditional emanational model was entirely unproblematic, since Bonaventure could reconcile John Damascene with the <i>filioque</i>, this Photian emanational model has created an entirely new difficulty that is not easily solved. Gregory is attempting to reconcile this Photian modification with the traditional patristic view; Gregory Nazianzus here means E-cause, not "cause" in the sense that Gregory Cypriot is using it, which I will refer to as "P-cause."</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In terms of how Gregory is employing the existing through/subsisting through distinction, I agree with Vivier-Muresan that this has nothing to do with an eternal energetic procession or the economic roles of the Persons. Vivier-Muresan explains her "main argument" as follows: "since Gregory knows the distinction between the Spirit’s hypostasis and energy and is not reluctant to use it in some texts, we may legitimately wonder why he does not put it at the heart of his demonstration, if that constitutes the base of his doctrine. Why does he strive instead to subtly distinguish between 'to have his existence' (ὕπαρξιν ἔχειν) (from the Father) and 'to exist' (ὑπάρχειν) (through the Son), between 'coming into being' and 'manifestation'/ 'revelation'/ 'shining forth' (φανέρωσις, ἔκφανσιϛ, ἔκλαμψις), endorsing here the argumentation of Nicephore Blemmydes, whereas he knew his work was disputed?" (N.B., it is interesting to note here that Blemmydes developed a paraconsistent logical model of the Trinity based on the ternary exclusive or (3XOR) logic that Basil Lourié has analyzed extensively in several papers, and that this model ended up being influential on Joseph Bryennios and in turn Mark of Ephesus.) In response to Vivier-Muresan's query "[c]ould we not say that the distinction between hypostasis and energy does not hold, in his theology, the key role that A. Papadakis and others give to it?," I agree with her that we certainly could say that. While Gregory does discuss economic activity and energies, he does not connect it to "manifestation" at the eternal level.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I suspect the reason that many people have been willing to follow Papadakis and others in attributing this to "eternal energetic procession" is that is is difficult to make any sense out of what Gregory is thinking otherwise. If we take this as a causal account instead, which it very much seems to be, we could then echo <a href="https://bekkos.wordpress.com/2021/10/27/john-bekkos-against-gregory-of-cypruss-view-that-manifestation-does-not-entail-existence/?fbclid=IwAR1z-wX6tUJHKfqFth7S1RrJMFA3Uz5_6uuQUItkmujFbTr3RsWWlnxi-jQ" target="_blank">John Beccus's question</a>: "<span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-size: 16px;">how does it not exceed all irrationality to confess that the Spirit exists through the Son and from the Son, even specifying these things with the term 'to exist' along with the terms 'naturally' and 'substantially,' and at the same time to deny the Spirit’s existence through the Son and from the Son?" The theology/economy distinction is relatively easy to understand; the modifications to the philosophical concept of causality in the context of the Trinity, many of which go entirely unstated, are far more complex.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit; font-size: 16px;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This leaves the East at Blachernae divided among three causal theories, which are all documented by Papadakis. There is Gregory's modified account of Photius's emanational model, what I am calling the P-causal account. There is a conservative view disclaiming any modification of the Photian model, which ends up being given its best support in the form of Gregory's own student Mark, who gave a report to Blachernae (reproduced by Papadakis) that cast considerable doubt about the <i>Tomus</i>. And there is Beccus's view, which is the traditional emanational model. The resolution of the council is essentially to say that Photius must definitely be right, but how his modification of causality can be explained in any way, much less reconciled with the patristic view, is left entirely in the air. To give an example of exactly how ridiculous the outcome was from the perspective of the three views, Beccus was condemned by the council, Gregory ends up being forced to resign after the council, and George Moschabar, Gregory's archivist who took the conservative side against Gregory for political reasons, ends up being chastised by the council for his incompetence. Yet with regard to Moschabar's rebuke, Papadakis notes the following (pp. 145-46, my emphasis in <b>bold</b>):</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>What landed [Moschabar] in even greater difficulties, however, was the reading of one of his polemical tracts to the assembled theologians. This document, for which he was immediately taken to task, brought into question not only his competence as a theologian, but his interpretation of the phrase "through the Son." His interpretation did not identify "through" with the eternal manifestation, as did Gregory's, or with "from," as did the unionists, but with the preposition </i>syn<i>, </i>meta<i> (with the genitive), or </i>ama<i>, which were translated as "with" or "together." <b>True, it was an interpretation which later Palamite theologians and Mark of Ephesus at Florence would find useful</b>. However great its subsequent popularity it could not convince Gregory or the unionists.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This admission by Papadakis illustrates the state of utter disorder in which trying to save the Photian modification to causality left Byzantine theology after Blachernae. They couldn't accept that Beccus was right about St. John Damascene, even though he almost certainly was. But their alternative explanation of John's position was so unclear that <i>an interpretation of John Damascene that Blachernae condemned as incompetent</i> ends up being normative for later anti-filioquists. This is simply indefensible, but it is the pattern that we have seen over and over and over again: when people confuse their mental models of casuality with the object itself, not accounting for the limitations they have in the Trinitarian context, this sort of conflict among orthodox Christians seems unavoidable.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit; font-size: 16px;">But perhaps this is not the end of all hope, precisely because the models may not involve the denial of any doctrine when those limitations are brought back into view. The emanational and relational models themselves were reconcilable precisely because the notion of "causality" was not univocally applicable to the divine being, so we could speak of E-cause and R-cause in a narrower and more abstract sense that did not entail any contradiction. So is there a sense in which P-causality can likewise be understood in a way that would not exclude R-cause (properly understood)? I believe there is, if we likewise view P-cause in terms of its logical content abstracted from its materialistic association.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit; font-size: 16px;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit; font-size: 16px;">I previously wrote that one analogy to Gregory's P-causal view would be the distinction between <i>originating</i> and <i>sustaining </i>cause. That is to say, what Gregory seems to have in mind with manifestation is not the Spirit's coming into existence but rather being sustained in existence by the relationship with the Father and the Son. In terms of conceptual compatibility, I note that in the quotation from <i>Parts of Animals </i>above, Aristotle actually makes an analogy between the begetting of offspring and the building of a house (which involves originating and sustaining causes) both being activities done <i>for the sake of</i> the doer, so this would not be as much of a leap as one might initially suspect. Now, if we take the eternal context here, the divine Persons are not subject to corruption and need nothing to sustain them, so we must remove the idea of change from the mental model. What this distinction would mean, then, is that there are two different <i>causal aspects</i> to the existence: an originating aspect and a sustaining aspect. But if we understand causality in its logical sense as a relationship and if we view originating causality and sustaining causality as nothing more than distinct relationships, then calling the Father the alone P-cause would not actually be excluding every sort of hypostatic causality, only originating causality. Strictly viewed in terms of a distinction between causes as subjects, this distinction between "originating" and "sustaining" would serve the same logical purpose as the distinction between "principle-not-from-principle" (E-cause) and "principle-from-principle" in the R-causal model.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit; font-size: 16px;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit; font-size: 16px;">Unlike E-causality, the distinction between originating and sustaining causes is not a distinction that makes any sense at all in the R-causal account. The R-causal account says that whatever is that <i>by which something is defined </i>is causal of that thing, and it would make no sense at all to say that the definition was originated in one way and sustained in another way. Definitions are by their nature timeless in this context. While it makes sense to say that something is the first cause or first origin in R-causality, a strict application of the distinction drawn by P-causality would be incoherent. On the other hand, if we strip the distinction between "originating" and "sustaining" to the bare idea of logical priority, then this is amenable to reconciliation with the R-causal account, in the way that the point is generator of the line and the line is the generator of the plane. Therefore, just as the traditional E-causal model can be reconciled with the R-causal model with appropriate limitations, the P-causal model can likewise be reconciled.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit; font-size: 16px;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit; font-size: 16px;">What this suggests is that, even though the task is more difficult, the models can <i>in principle</i> be asserted in a way that does not entail that one directly contradicts the other. Rather, they would intersect in an area where the exact details would be unknowable and subject to our conceptual limitations. In that case, that none of the affirmations in any of the models would require denying the applicability of any other model, as long as they are not taken too literally. If they are taken too literally, as Theodore and Theodoret did, then there could be conflict, but that would result from an error in thinking about the divine nature. But assuming that we take what I consider to be <i>reasonable limitations in causal analogies to the Trinity</i>, none of these models seem to contradict the doctrine of the Trinity. Unfortunately, as with the differences between the emanational model and the relational model, the fact that those reasonable limitations are unstated leads to unnecessary conflict.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit; font-size: 16px;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit;"><u>VII. Florence: where P-cause meets R-cause</u></span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit;"><u><br /></u></span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit;">In the intervening years between Blachernae and Florence, it is fair to say that the P-causal model was undeveloped. If anything, subsequent theologians seem to have backed off of it as much as possible, as recounted by Vivier-Muresan with respect to Gregory Palamas:</span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span><span style="background-color: white; caret-color: rgb(85, 85, 85); font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Indeed, the Byzantine author does not write that the Son eternally bestows the energy of the Spirit but rather, in a quite awkward phrase, that he has the power to do so (αὐτὸ τὸ χορηγεῖν ἔχειν ἔχει), as if he wanted to avoid formally recognizing an eternal manifestation of the Spirit through the Son. In this formula (αὐτὸ τὸ χορηγεῖν ἔχειν ἔχει), should we not rather see the image, borrowed from Gregory the Theologian, of the Son as “intendant of the Spirit”? In this case, reference is made to the eternal rest of the Spirit on the Son. In other words, the articulation between the theological level and the economic one is here designated: that is because the Spirit, in his hypostasis, rests eternally on the Son and abides in him that, in the economy, the divine energies are sent in the Spirit from the Father through the Son.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The context here is that Palamas uses manifestation language <i>only</i> for the economy. In theology, the connection between the economy and theology is that the Spirit "rests on" the Son, which is the basis of the Son's power to send in the economy. The Spirit as the anointing of the Son, the reason for His power, is what Palamas has in mind for the eternal procession of the Spirit "resting on" or "with" the Son, as indicated in Vivier-Muresan's summary (my emphasis in <b>bold</b>):</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Our first conclusions are therefore confirmed: for Palamas, the eternal procession of the Spirit “through the Son”, as it was formulated by the Fathers, concerns not the energy but his hypostasis and must be understood as the close connection between the begetting of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, indissociable from one another. This connection corresponds to the rest of the Spirit on and in the Son. Note in passing that Palamas recognizes a dynamic dimension to this rest, as a movement from the Father to the Son, as indicated by this commentary on Cyril of Alexandria:</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">"The divine Cyril also concludes in his Treasure that the Spirit physically exists in the Son from the Father and he concludes that he passes in the Son from the Father [παρὰ πατρὸϛ διήκειν ἐν υἱῷ] naturally and essentially, and that it is through him and his annointing that the Son sanctifies everything."</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Therefore, the triadology of Palamas appears to be distinct from the Cypriot’s view. More precisely, Palamas seems to step back since he assumes a position that the latter claimed to move beyond. As he refuses to take into account the literal sense of the preposition “by/through” (διά), considered as only synonymous with the prepositions σύν and μετά meaning “with”, he aligns with a theology that the patriarch explicitly rejected as being insufficiently faithful to the tradition of the Fathers. He does not evoke any eternal “manifestation” (ἔκφανσις, φανέρωσις) of the Spirit through the Son; he formally recognizes that the Son has the eternal power to bestow the Spirit (understood as uncreated energies) but does not use the term “manifestation” nor “procession” on this matter. <b>Moreover, this idea is only briefly mentioned and does not allow us to draw any parallel with the wide developments of Gregory of Cyprus on the eternal shining forth of the Spirit through the Son. On the contrary, Palamas obviously does not assume this last theme and is more generally hostile to the formulation of an eternal existence of the Spirit through the Son.</b></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Essentially, the situation has only become worse since Blachernae. Gregory Cypriot's attempts to develop the Photian position along the lines of the Cappadocians (<i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., the P-causal account that seems to have a prospect of at least possibly being reconciled with the R-causal account) have been abandoned. Palamas has essentially followed the position of Moschabar that was considered an incompetent reading of John Damascene at Blachernae. Moreover, the idea that Palamas is referring to an eternal energetic procession here is as unsustainable as it was with Gregory Cypriot. Palamas's position here cannot be reconciled with the Fathers, with Gregory Cypriot, or with Blachernae, and the description of this position as "generally hostile" to the filioquist interpretation is apt. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In this case, apart from the polemical context of the works themselves, Palamas also seems to have taken two mental images too literally: (1) cause as mechanism, following Photius's overstep and (2) anointing as a kind of literal "resting on" in the material sense. I do not see any way to save Palamas's polemical position here; in following Photius's implicit denial of the R-causal position, absent the subsequent correction made by Gregory Cypriot to save it, Palamas has fallen into the same ditch that Theodoret did. I agree with Fr. Christiaan Kappes's assessment that Palamas's use of the <i>nous-logos-eros</i> triad in the Trinity could very easily be reconciled with Bonaventure's own emanational model, which follows John Damascene. But given that Palamas follows the botched exegesis of Moschabar on the nature of procession itself, that obstacle would also need to be overcome.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">At Florence, then, it is fair to say that the difference between conceptual models in East and West, which dated all the way back to the pro-Nicene period, had never been greater. In perhaps the worst coincidence in all of the centuries of paradigm conflicts, the two leading representatives are at the extremes of their respective views: the staunch Palamite theologian Mark (Eugenicus) of Ephesus and the Dominican friar John Montenero. Respectively, they represented the uncorrected Photian position, which was likely impossible to reconcile with the West under any circumstances, and the pure R-causal model, which was the more difficult version of Latin theology to explain in Eastern terms. The only person who clearly perceived the views of both sides was the Greek theologian (and later Catholic cardinal) Bessarion, who had resolved to listen to the Fathers and who correctly discerned that they did not exclude the R-causal account of the West. But I would (objectively, I believe) attribute that to Bessarion's own brilliance as a theologian and exegete, not the eloquence of the Latin presentation, which seems to have been bungled quite badly.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">On that point, I have to register one last point of disagreement with Fr. Crean. Fr. Crean disputes Nicolas Lossky's claim that Florence was largely "a dialogue of the deaf, which had very little chance of succeeding." I agree with Fr. Crean that Lossky's position that "the theological separation of Greeks and Latins was so great that, without realizing it, they gave different meanings to the final definition of the <i>Filioque</i>" is unsustainable. Lossky's assertions that the Greeks "understood [the <i>Filioque</i>] in regard to the eternal manifestation or divine economy" based on the essence/energies distinction are implausible for the simple reason that the essence/energies distinction had nothing to do with eternal manifestation, not at Blachernae and not even in Palamite theology. Lossky is right, but for the wrong reasons; the problem is that the causal models at work are too different to enable clear communication. What seems to have happened is that the Greeks who were operating in the more traditional E-causal model, including Bessarion, were able to satisfy themselves that the Latin R-causal account was acceptable, in line with Bonaventure's theology. Those with a Palamite theology, both at Florence and within the East generally, were unsatisfied.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">What would've needed to happen in order for Florence to accomplish its aim would've been for the concerns raised by Palamite theology to have been addressed. In other words, someone would have needed to make the effort to attempt to understand Eugenicus's philosophical model with the same care that Eugenicus himself undertook to familiarize himself with Scholasticism. (Fr. Crean at p. 408 notes that, as against a claim by Vlassios Phidas, Eugenicus was both comfortable and willing to engage in Scholastic argumentation.) It is in that respect that Florence truly did end up being a "dialogue of the deaf," as outlined by Fr. Christiaan Kappes in his article "A Latin Defense of Mark of Ephesus at the Council of Ferrara-Florence," which somewhat surprisingly is not considered in Fr. Crean's book.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Importantly, Fr. Kappes points out that the Western emanational model of the Franciscans could have been a path to do so, given that Mark had studied this with his student George-Gennadius Scholarios and Emperor John VIII in preparation for Florence (my emphasis in <b>bold</b>):</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>While the imperial trio studied together, Scholarius apprised his one-time schoolmaster and the emperor about Latin sources that made the union more promising; namely, the words of the Franciscan John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308). Scholarius likely convince Mark that Palamism and Latin theology coincided via the "formal distinction" of Duns Scotus. Scholarius also informed Mark that the "Subtle Doctor" too argued <b>the Byzantine position on the </b></i><b>Filioque</b><i><b> (that is, there exists no philosophical necessity to explain the production of the Holy Spirit with reference to the Son)</b>. The imperial commission's study of Scotism uniquely explains the emperor's success in persuading Mark to refrain from directly addressing the issue of Palamism at the upcoming council. Eugenicus had already been well informed about Franciscan opposition to Thomistic theology in the 1420s under emperor Manuel II. Manuel had spoken openly of his knowledge of the irreconcilability of Franciscan and Dominican theological tenets years prior (ca. 1400). Even after Mark began his apologetic studies against Latin theology, he was nonetheless gracious to his Latin interlocutors, exemplified by aiding a future opponent, Nicholas of Cusa (d. 1464), to obtain Greek manuscripts in Constantinople.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is identically the difference between Aquinas (relational) and Bonaventure (emanational) identified by Friedman. Recall that in the emanational model, the paternity/primacy of the Father is the reason that he emanates, and the formal distinction between the modes of emanation (intellect and will) is the basis for the distinction between the Son and the Spirit with no distinction <i>between</i> the Son and Spirit being required, as there is in the relational account. In other words, this is a recognition <i>on the Eastern side</i> that harmony exists between traditional Eastern theology and the Western account. This would have been a golden opportunity for meaningful dialogue, had the Latins capitalized on it. The problem was that, because the Dominican Montenero was presenting, he gave the same answers that he would have given to his own co-religionists in the Scotist camp. Fr. Kappes cites the following example:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Amusingly, Mark's defense of the formal distinction </i>(distinctio formalis a parte rei) <i>was made before his </i>Dominican<i> interlocutors (with no noted objections from conciliar Scotists) on the subject of the divine persons at Florence. Mark appealed to Basil (nowadays, Gregory of Nyssa), assuming the equivalent of the formal distinction, or the difference between an immanent universal and its exemplifications. In fact, this is the necessitous root for Scotus's very doctrine of the Trinitarian distinctions. Montenero was a Dominican and naturally argued Aquinas's approach to the divine essence, which presumes Aristotle's simplicity criterion in its hermeneutic of St. Augustine. Both theologians' metaphysical presuppositions were diverse enough to explain Montenero's discombobulation at the Ephesine's mode of approaching talk of the divine essence. Montenero merely reflects the Thomistics rejection of formalities </i>(energeia/teleiotetes) <i>in the divine essence, implying a rejection too of univocity of the </i>concept<i> of being </i>(ens) <i>as predicated of God and creatures. Montenero defended a party line firmly established against Scotism via the Dominican, John Capreolus (ca. 1380-1444). It is beyond the scope of the present inquiry to decide between the Thomistic camp and that of the Byzantines. I only wish to draw the reader's attention to the fact that Mark's metaphysical approach was not "puerile"; rather, it was concentric with the formidable </i>via Scoti<i>.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This tendency by Montenero to priortize winning the argument over obtaining understanding eventually proved to be fatal to the prospect of meaningful dialogue. Fr. Kappes describes an incident involving comparative exegesis of Basil's <i>Ad Eunomium</i> in which Montenero was so determined to contradict everything that Eugenicus said that he "read Basil to claim that there is a proper difference in the 'dignity (<i>dignitas/axioma</i>)' of persons reflected in the order of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." Eugenicus, expecting Montenero to recent once it was pointed out that this would entail subordinationism, was shocked to see Montenero try to defend this position. One might say that this was one isolated incident, but it destroyed (probably rightly) Mark's belief that the presentations were about anything other than "Latin <i>philoneikia</i> (love of debate)." After having been subject to indignity after indignity (which Fr. Kappes documents in detail), this absurdity was the last straw. Thus ended the hope of any true reconciliation between the Palamite view represented by Mark and the West, and so went the prospects of Eastern and Western reunion as a whole.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">VIII. Conclusion: how can we proceed?</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">If I am correct, then the distinction between relational and emanational models identified by Friedman among the Scholastics replicates a division between Origenist inheritances through Didymus the Blind (Alexandria) and Gregory the Wonderworker (Cappadocia). These models are in turn built on differing analogies of causality in the Trinity, and as these models became more and more disconnected, the theology of the East and West drifted further and further apart. The most problematic development is this regard was when Photius and Niketas Byzantinos made a slight but critical change in the understanding of causality in their anti-Western polemics. This took the East off of what up until then had been a parallel path, and the division has been increasing more or less steadily since then.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">If I am correct, then there are a number of historical mistakes that have contributed to misunderstandings on this point:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The debate over the <i>filioque</i> has nothing to do with Latin theology being essentialist and Cappadocian theology being personalist, <i>contra</i> de Regnon's error.</span></li><li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The Latin view has nothing to do with the Neoplatonic Intelligible Triad or vertical causality generally, <i>contra </i>du Roy's error.</span></li><li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The debate over the <i>filioque</i> has nothing to do with the essence/energies distinction, <i>contra</i> Lossky and essentially every other Neo-Palamite theologian who has followed him.</span></li><li><span style="font-family: inherit;">In every significant difference between Alexandrian and Antiochene theology, including exegesis (of John 16 particularly), Christology (logos-<i>sarx</i> vs. logos-<i>anthropos</i>), and deification ("Alexandrian Tradition II" vs. Cappadocian, as per Norman Russell), Alexandria aligns with Rome and the relational model, which rebuts the idea of a monolithic Cappadocian theology in the patristic era.</span></li></ul><span style="font-family: inherit;">That would mean that the 1995 Clarification ends up being more or less useless for exactly the same reason that Met. John Zizioulas thought it was promising. Zizioulas asks:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Does the expression "principaliter" necessarily preclude making the Son a kind of secondary cause in the ontological emergence of the Spirit? The Filioque seems to suggest two sources of the Spirit's personal existence, one of which (the Father) may be called the first and original cause (principaliter), while the other one (the Son) may be regarded as a secondary (not principaliter) cause, but still a "cause" albeit not "principaliter".</span></i></div></i><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><i><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>The discussions both at the time of St. Photius and at Lyons and Florence-Ferrara seem to have paid special attention to this delicate point. </i><b>It is not accidental that the Greek theologians ever since the time of Photius insisted on the expression: μόνος αίτιος ο Πατήρ i.e. the Father is the sole cause of the Son as well as of the Spirit. This concern does not seem to be fully covered by the Augustinian expression principaliter. </b><i>The second Council of Lyons is unclear on this matter when it says that the Father as Father of His Son is "together with Him the single principle from which the Spirit proceeds".</i></span></div></i><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The reason that Greek theologians have said this "since the time of Photius" is that it had no basis in the patristic testimony, nor was this idea of "secondary cause" (in the sense of R-cause) ever viewed as problematic until Photius spontaneously decided it was. There was so little warrant for this change that Gregory Cypriot subsequently had to invent his own distinction between "existing from" and "subsisting from" in order to try to reconstruct Photius's theology, a distinction which no one had ever heard before according to both Beccus and Gregory's own student Mark. And in the subsequent centuries both Gregory Palamas and Mark of Ephesus will not even try to defend that distinction, instead arguing that John Damascene taught what Photius did, a reading that Gregory Cypriot and Blachernae as a whole considered entirely implausible. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">It is not for the West to explain how Photius was somehow right about the Latin Fathers when he was wrong and, based on his reading of Augustine, probably even knew he was wrong. It will not do to cite the essence/energies distinction, essentialist theology, Neoplatonism, the theology/economy separation, "temporal procession," "eternal energetic procession," or any of the manifold excuses that seem to crop up every time this is discussed. Photius misjudged the Latin tradition; there is simply no way to avoid it. And eisegesis of the Latin Fathers based on the temporal/eternal procession distinction in a way that contradicts the traditional understanding of John 16 will fare no better. We know this is implausible.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Correcting this error requires only consistency. Do not be more Orthodox than the Fathers, who clearly saw this sort of pluralism as possible while remaining faithful to the doctrine. Do not be more Photian that Photius, who reunited with Rome despite knowing that Rome retained the <i>filioque</i> as doctrine. Do not be more Palamite that Palamas, who saw something he could accept in Augustine's psychological analogy. Do not be more Eugenican than Eugenicus, who showed every sign of being willing to reconcile his own doctrine with the Franciscan model if given a full and fair opportunity to do so.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">There are plenty of issues remaining over which the East and the West can fight with the papacy as the most glaring example. But we can at least reconcile on this one, if we are only willing to reason together.</span></div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-36433364610115261912023-06-23T15:30:00.012-04:002023-07-04T10:58:07.551-04:00When polemics become pointless<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>John 5:19-21 and 30 So Jesus said to them, "Truly, truly, I say to you, the Son can do nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing. For whatever the Father does, that the Son does likewise. For the Father loves the Son and shows him all that he himself is doing. And greater works than these will he show him, so that you may marvel. For as the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whom he will. ... </i><i>I can do nothing on my own. As I hear, I judge, and my judgment is just, because I seek not my own will but the will of him who sent me."</i></span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">John 10:30 I and the Father are one.</span></i></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">John 14:9-17 Jesus said to him, "Have I been with you so long, and you still do not know me, Philip? Whoever has seen me has seen the Father. How can you say, ‘Show us the Father’? Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own authority, but the Father who dwells in me does his works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father is in me, or else believe on account of the works themselves. </span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>"Truly, truly, I say to you, whoever believes in me will also do the works that I do; and greater works than these will he do, because I am going to the Father. Whatever you ask in my name, this I will do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. If you ask me anything in my name, I will do it. </i><i>If you love me, you will keep my commandments. And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Helper, to be with you forever, even the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him. You know him, for he dwells with you and will be in you."</i></span></div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">John 16:12-15 I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth, for he will not speak on his own authority, but whatever he hears he will speak, and he will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, for he will take what is mine and declare it to you. All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">I. Latin theology: inferring eternal causal relations from the economy</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The Johannine passages above form the bedrock of Latin Trinitarian theology from its very beginnings all the way through Scholasticism and even today. As Michel René Barnes describes in his magisterial survey, <i>Augustine and Nicene Theology</i>, "the originating logic of Latin Trinitarian theology is anti-monarchian (i.e., anti-modalist), and in that logic the grounds for real distinctions in the Trinity is provided by causal relations and eternal irreducibility, not, as modern readers expect, by a logic built on the ontological difference between 'person' and 'essence' (or 'nature'). Moderns expect Trinitarian theology to develop through a polar logic of 'person' and 'essence,' but Latin Trinitarian theology develops instead through the logic of eternal causal relations and irreducibility." Barnes notes that even the concept of "person" used in Latin theology is "not psychological, but ontological," which Tertullian describes as "a substance [i.e. existence] which is himself" that is "something like Aristotle's first substance."</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Barnes goes on to explain how Latin theologians use the visible activities of the Son in the economy to establish these logical principles:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>This understanding is based upon the visual or theophanic statements in John 5:17-19 and 14:9-17. The way in which the Son reveals the Father is the very same way in which the Son reveals his own divinity -- by his works </i>(opera)<i>. This last sense will prove to be the most important in Latin patristic Trinitarian theology, for a distinctive feature of that theology is the early, and thereafter consistent, articulation of a doctrine of same power (and thus same substance) between the Son and the Father. The argument takes this form: the works that Christ does are evidence of the kind of power that causes them; the works are the products of operations that are uniquely associated with a divine power. Power is </i>substance as cause<i>, and the distinctive causality of a specific substance is contained in (or exists as) its power, for all works arise out of a power and indicate, by their acts, the identity of that power. This account expresses in a technical way the almost common-sense judgment that actions are the manifestations and results of what a thing is: "Fire burns, wind blows," etc.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Barnes notes that this understanding of power is "not quite that of inseparable operations," which will ultimately require further thought on the Holy Spirit as a divine actor, but it is certainly compatible with the idea. Likewise, it does not deal with substance in the sense of <i>ousia</i> so as to show that the Father and the Son are <i>homoouision</i>, although this explanation is perfectly compatible with that concept. Barnes's <i>The Power of God</i> explains how the technical philosophical sense of "power" is used by Gregory of Nyssa to rebut the Eunomian inferences about divine nature, but Latin theology did not require going beyond the "almost common-sense" level in its own analysis of power. That is because Latin theology deals with the <i>activity of concrete subjects</i> (individuals, first substances) along with <i>the cause of their common power</i>, which does not require delving into exactly how this power is derived from nature. This is in turn how Latin theology understands that works (<i>opera</i>) show the relations ("in" or "one") between distinct subjects. In other words, Latin theology is a set of theological rules for reasoning from the economic activity of the Trinity to the (causal relations of) the immanent Trinity.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The polemical context in which these theological rules are deployed is also highly relevant, in particular because the connection between economy and theology considered here is almost completely disconnected from the one that arises in connection with Eunomius. With respect to the differences between the Western Homoian Arians and the Eastern Eunomian Arians, Barnes remarks as follows:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>In the East the anti-Nicene consensus on this language [similarity of essence] broke at a Synod in Antioch in 361, with the emergence of a theology that insisted on the doctrinal priority of the difference between the essences or natures of the Father and the Son: thus was born anomian theology, known more popularly as "Eunomian" theology, after its most visible and prolific proponent, Eunomius of Cyzicus. However, "Latin Homoians managed to contain some of the distinctions that resulted in distinct groupings </i>[N.B., <i>homoian, homoiousian, anomian</i>] <i>in the east"*</i><i>; in particular, Eunomian theology has no play in the West.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>* Quote from Lewis Ayres, </i>Nicaea and Its Legacy</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This context is critically important, because Eunomian theology explicitly concerned what could be known about <i>nature</i> from the economy. The Latin inference concerning the economy is not based the nature of divine power or on consubstantiality <i>per se</i> but rather on the causal relationship that results in the individual substance's possession of the power. The reason that the works of the Son show that Christ "is in the Father and the Father in [Christ]" is that they show the divine origin of His power in the Father; He does what He sees the Father doing. Likewise, the Holy Spirit speaks on Jesus's behalf, "not ... on His own authority, but whatever He hears, He will speak," showing that the Spirit derives His divine power from the Son who likewise derives His divine power from the Father. St. Augustine goes so far as to say that the Power that goes out from the Son in Lukan passages is the Holy Spirit, using it to show the eternal causal relation between the two. The Latin theological rules for drawing inferences then do not involve reasoning about the <i>nature</i> of the divine power but only on the personal possession of the power from another in the case of the Son and the Spirit. In Latin theology, "power from" equals "substance originates from."</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">By contrast, Eunomius made claims about the ability to know natures from (economic) activities. This is what the Cappadocians were concerned to refute in their responses to the Eunomian claims. Notably, the Cappadocians pointed out that even the natures of simple things, such as corn, would not be fully comprehended by <i>epinoia</i> (knowledge from activities), much less the incomprehensible divine nature. But such <i>epinoia</i> were nonetheless true signs <i>that</i> the nature was possessed, so that it was valid to reason from power (in the technical philosophical sense) to the possession of nature but not to a comprehensive description. Latin theology did not need to take that next step, because comprehensive knowledge of the divine nature was never asserted in Eunomian fashion in the West. But there was nothing in the Latin theological rules that would have prevented Latin theologians from making the same assertion that the Cappadocians did. In fact, Augustine's explanation of natural signs, as developed further in Scholasticism and contemporary semiotics, essentially results in the same conclusion concerning knowledge about nature.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The reason the distinction here is significant is that the distinction between economy and theology offered by the Cappadocians needs to be understood <i>in the context of knowledge about natures</i> rather than in the context of knowledge about immanent relations generally. In an oft-cited statement from the Fifth Theological Oration, St. Gregory Nazianzus says the following: "What then is Procession? Do you tell me what is the Unbegottenness of the Father, and I will explain to you the physiology of the Generation of the Son and the Procession of the Spirit, and we shall both of us be frenzy-stricken for prying into the mystery of God." This is exactly to answer the Eunomian curiosity into the <i>nature</i> of begetting and proceeding. But as to the <i>relational structure</i>, the Theologian has no such qualms, saying "For, tell me, what position will you assign to that which Proceeds, which has started up between the two terms of your division, and is introduced by a better Theologian than you, our Saviour Himself? Or perhaps you have taken that word out of your Gospels for the sake of your Third Testament, The Holy Ghost, which proceeds from the Father; Who, inasmuch as He proceeds from That Source, is no Creature; and inasmuch as He is not Begotten is no Son; and inasmuch as He is between the Unbegotten and the Begotten is God." On the contrary, Gregory says that "we do not admit your first division, which declares that there is no mean between Begotten and Unbegotten." As the mean (<i>meson</i>) between Begotten and Unbegotten, the Spirit relates back to both, which is exactly what the Latin argument for relations from the economy maintains.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Unfortunately, up until Barnes and Ayres, about a century and a half of historical study in this area has dedicated itself to getting this issue wrong, most especially with respect to Augustine. On the Western side, this has primarily been due to anachronistically reading St. Thomas Aquinas as the interpreter <i>par excellence</i> of Western theology. On the Eastern side, it primarily relates to reading St. Photios the Great as the authoritative voice for the Fathers on Trinitarian doctrine. Both men were excellent historians of their respective traditions; neither was perfect in that regard, and both were highly suspect in their interpretation of the Fathers on the other side of the East-West divide. But the hagiographic perception of these figures has been entirely out of perspective with their historical acumen, and people like Barnes, those who are content to do sound historical work without mounting the soapbox for one or another theological position, are rare.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">At any rate, among those Thomist hagiographers are two incredibly influential historians: Olivier du Roy and Théodore de Regnon. The former has situated St. Augustine within a Neoplatonist tradition that was (in du Roy's view) perfected into a philosophical synthesis by St. Thomas. The latter attributes to the patristic era some relatively primitive theological beliefs that were (again, naturally) perfected by Scholasticism, which was in turn taken out of context to say that the Latin theology begins with the essence while the Greek theology begins with the Persons. This has had the unfortunate effect of completely misrepresenting both the historical context in which Latin theology developed and what the Latin Fathers actually believed about it.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">If we instead refer back to the anti-Homoian, pro-Nicene context of these writings, they exemplify neither an effort to synthesize the <i>philosophia perennis</i> (<i>contra</i> du Roy and other Neo-Thomists) nor an attempt to ground the doctrine of the Trinity in metaphysical concepts (contra de Regnon). They were instead a modest set of theological rules for interpreting Scriptural statements about God. Trying to situate Latin (or for that matter, Cappadocian) teaching in these grand narratives about the role of philosophy in Christianity generally fundamentally misunderstands what they are trying to do, and it has been the Achilles heel of Christian history throughout the modern era.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The only cure is to return to sound historical methodology, and here Barnes provides an excellent guide:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>There are, I propose, seven different criteria by which one judges a historical reading (or interpretation) of a text. A given reading is more credible as a work of scholarship in direct proportion to its degree of success in fulfilling these criteria. First, the reading must locate the text (or topic) in its contemporary context, and use that context to unpack the meaning or sense in the text. Second, the reading must identify the presence (or effect) of tradition in the text (or topic) and use that presence to identify the meaning or sense in the text. Third, the reading must identify and place the content of the text in a larger external narrative which supports the reading(s) derived from the previous steps by making such a content possible (or even, happy day, <b>likely</b>). Fourth, the reading must utilize a knowledge of scholarship on the author, text, and topic; the broader and more detailed the engagement with scholarship, the more sophisticated the reading. Fifth, there must be a close reading or exegesis of the text which uncovers the key steps in the author's logic or expression. Sixth, the reading must identify, and show a fluency with, those conceptual idioms that are the key building blocks of the author's logic or expression. Seventh and finally, judgments on the sense of any part (a sentence, a phrase) of the text must relate that sense against the text as a whole (and test out that proposed out against the whole text). Such a relating of the part to the whole is necessary to avoid the danger of a "historical fundamentalism" (akin to "biblical fundamentalism") in which sentences or phrases are interpreted apart from the text within which the words stand. Steps such as these (and there is nothing definitive about this list or the order) are, I would argue, necessary for a credible reading of <b>any</b> theological (or philosophical) text, but it is enough for now to identify with such criteria the credibility of a reading of a text which falls under the rubric of historical theology</i>.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">II. Pointless polemics: Craig Trugia's response to Brian Duong on the <i>filioque</i></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The impetus for writing this post is that the vast majority of polemics in the East-West <i>filioque </i>debate are motivated by bad history based on unreliable methodologies that should simply be corrected. And there is an unfortunate recent example of such an unreliable methodology in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRIbb5YMG98" target="_blank">Craig Truglia's response</a> to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6CcNU3YcX0&t=3608s" target="_blank">Brian ("dwong") Duong's survey of <i>filioque</i> prooftexts</a>. Obviously, no chain of prooftexts is going to be able to engage in a full-blown analysis at the level Barnes outlines, but dwong does an admirable job of quickly covering the fifth and sixth steps of uncovering the key steps in the author's logic and understanding the conceptual idioms used in the authors in question. But Truglia falsely accuses dwong of failing on the first, second, third, and seventh steps in terms of situating the passages in context. (The fourth point is necessarily omitted for the simple reason that Truglia himself apparently has little to no familiarity with significant secondary scholarship on Augustine and the other Latin Fathers.) Yet in point of fact, dwong has situated the arguments perfectly within the anti-Homoian Latin theological context that Barnes identifies: that the economic relations demonstrate the immanent relations.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Historically, Truglia's go-to move is to read the epistemic economy/theology distinction from the Eunomian controversy into the Latin West, where it clearly doesn't belong. When Truglia mentions the "temporal procession," which might variously be referred to as the "eternal temporal procession" or "eternal energetic procession" (as per Papadakis), the assumption here is that <i>eternal causal relations between the persons</i> cannot be inferred or known from the <i>temporal relations of the economy</i>. But Latin theology is built on the principles of irreducibility and eternal causal relations based on power, and that would be sheerly incoherent if the economy/theology distinction were used in the context of eternal causal relations.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This isn't to say that Latin theologians did not recognize the economy/theology distinction; it is clearly contemplated in the <i>ad intra </i>(immanent) and <i>ad extra</i> (economic) distinction. Rather it is to say that the idea that one could not infer anything about the causal Trinitarian relations from Scriptural passages on the economy would have been unthinkable to Latin theologians. The reason for this confusion is that the Cappadocians' battle with Eunomius took place primarily in the <i>milieu</i> of Neoplatonic philosophy, and du Roy's unfortunately influential error about Latin theology was to wrongly read the Neoplatonic context into Augustine's writings. Thus, Augustine's argument have been seen as anti-Eunomian rather than anti-Homoian, even though Augustine's own writings distinguish Arius himself from Homoian Arians and from Eunomius (a conclusion also documented by Barnes). In some ways, then, Truglia's mistake is understandable; he is simply repeating a historical error that has been replicated among both Western and Eastern scholars, having been only relatively recently debunked by the "new canon" Augustinian scholarship of Barnes and Ayres. But while Barnes and Ayres have only published book-length works relatively recently, their work in this area dates back to the Neo-Palamite renaissance in the nineties, so this is not scholarship of which anyone seriously engaging with Western theology should be unaware. Nor are the works of Fr. Giulio Maspero or Fr. Khaled Anatolios, which reach very similar conclusions, obscure in this area.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Regardless, Truglia erroneously reads the epistemic (anti-Eunomian) economy/theology distinction into the Latin Fathers. From the historical perspective, it is a disastrous mistake. Admittedly, it is a mistake with a very long pedigree in the East, but as I mentioned before, Saints are certainly not infallible historians. This basic misunderstanding of the history, not a legitimate conflict between the sides, is at the heart of the Schism. When I say that East-West polemics are pointless, this is exactly what I mean. Given the now-corrected understanding of Latin theology, what we should be doing is to understand how Florence and Blachernae are based on a misunderstanding, as our respective patriarchs have exhorted us to do. A meaningful response to dwong would be to explain how Blachernae does not contradict the Western patristic theology that dwong has <i>correctly</i> identified. But Truglia instead goes the opposite direction: mischaracterizing Latin theology by falsely contextualizing it with the economy/theology distinction. Let us call this assertion that one <i>cannot </i>infer eternal relations of origin from the economy the "False Rule," as contrasted with the theological rules of inference that Barnes identifies above.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">III.Truglia's False Rule in Augustine</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As an example of the False Rule, we can consider Truglia's article "<a href="https://orthodoxchristiantheology.com/2019/12/07/the-council-of-florence-and-a-heretical-filioque/" target="_blank">The Council of Florence and a Heretical <i>Filioque</i></a>" from December 2019. In characterizing Pope Adrian I's defense of Patriarch Tarasius as against the Franks, Truglia asserts that "Pope Adrian I, in keeping with the preceding orthodox explanations of the Filioque, responded defending the temporal, as opposed to eternal, procession of the Spirit from the Son and the consubstantiality of the Spirit as evidenced by such a procession." The problem for Truglia is that Latin theology never made such a distinction; indeed, if that distinction had been made, it would have rendered all of the Latin arguments completely useless as anti-Homoian apologetics in their original context. The following is his citation from Mendham's work on the Seventh Ecumenical Council, where he describes the response to the accusation that Patriarch Tarasius was heretically denying the <i>filioque</i> as follows:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Adrian introduces his learned array as follows: "Tarasius did not of himself invent this dogma, but made his confession as being taught by the doctrine of the holy Fathers, passages of which from our great affection to your most exalted royal dignity we will now lay before you, with all brevity." After which follow his quotations. Passing by those which are irrelevant, those which bear on the subject shall be brought forward; and, first, those passages which verbally make agains the Pope and Tarasius, and for Charlemagne: -- (1). From Augustin (lib. iv. c. 20, de Trinitate</i><i>) "Nor can we say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son also; for I do not see what else was intended when, breathing on them, he said -- 'Receive ye the Holy Ghost:' not that the corporeal blast proceeding from a body with powers of touch corporally, was the substance of the Holy Spirit: but a demonstration by a fitting signification that the Son did not proceed from the Father only but from the Son also, Who is there so insane as to say that the Spirit which He gave by breathing upon them was different from that Spirit which He sent forth after His ascension? (2). From Saint Augustine (lib. xv. 26, de Trinitate). And that He proceeds from both may be thus proved: -- The Son Himself saith, 'He proceedeth from the Father;' and, after He had risen again and appeared to His disciples, 'He breathed on them and said, Receive ye the Holy Ghost' that He might show that He proceeded from Him also. (3). From Saint Gregory, the Pope, in his twenty-sixth homily on the holy Gospel: -- Among other things, He says, 'When the Comforter shall come whom I will send unto you.' If 'to be sent' signifies only 'to become incarnate,' then the Holy Spirit could in no sense be said to be sent since He certainly was not incarnate: but His mission is the same with His procession, by which He proceeds from the Father and the Son." The author of the "Caroline Books" could not have found anywhere three quotations better suited to his purpose than these, which Adrian brings forward for his confutation. Infallibility seemed at a low ebb when the Pope wrote this letter. In the quotations which follow, there is an apparent agreement with Tarasius and the Pope against the "Caroline Books." (1). From Saint Athanasius, on Virginity: -- "And in the Holy Spirit, which, existing in the Father and the Son, is sent forth by the Father, is given by the Son." (2). From [Saint] Hilary (liv. vii. de Fide):--"The Spirit of Truth proceeds from the Father, and is sent by the Son, and receives from the Son." (3). From Saint Cyril, on the worship of the Spirit: -- "As He is of God, and essentially at the same time of the Father and of the Son, He is of both -- that is, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father by the Son." (4). Gregory, in his Missal, teaches us to ask that the Spirit may be poured into us, and manifested, and be conformed by his Son Jesus Christ. The support which these passages give is doubtful: none of them deny the procession from the Son, and seem to see little more than is allowed in the chapter from the "Caroline Books," quoted above -- "By the Son, the Spirit appeared in fire upon the Apostles; by the Son is He given to man, &c." -- Adrian's Answer to Charlemagne, page 109, 110.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But this dispute has nothing to do with the distinction between theology and economy, nor does anything in the historical context suggest that it does. Truglia has read the False Rule retroactively into the Latin and Alexandrian Fathers, even though they did not use it that way. What actually happened was that the Carolingians took the mirror image of the Photian approach: anything that did not strictly <i>verbally</i> agree with their formula was viewed as heterodox. This was a misreading of the Eastern tradition in the same way that Photius misread the West, reading a verbal difference as indicating a direct theological conflict. Correcting this misreading, not the assertion of a "temporal, as opposed to eternal, procession" is what Pope Adrian was trying to accomplish. In other words, he was trying to explain why Tarasius did not intended to deny the dogmatic truth of the <i>filioque</i> even though he used different words.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is clear because the entire Latin tradition for centuries had always viewed causality of power in the economy as indicating causality of origin in eternity. Perhaps the best indication is the citation from Augustine. Barnes, whose recent work includes the essay "Augustine's Last Pneumatology" covering Augustine's very latest work on the Holy Spirit, notes that "Augustine reads virtually all statements about the relations of the Son and Spirit as also signifying their eternal relationship." The Scriptural quotations above are typical; Barnes identifies the same arguments concerning insufflation in <i>de Trinitate</i> in a polemical text specifically on the Holy Spirit: the <i>Ninety-Ninth Tractate on John</i>, which is an extended exegesis of John 16:13. (Interestingly, Augustine also offers his own pneumatological interpretation of the Power going forth from Jesus in Luke 8:46, Luke 24:49, Acts 1:8, and Luke 6:19, all of which are clearly in the economy.) In Augustine's very latest pneumatological work, a treatise against Maximinus, he appeals also to the work of the Spirit in creation, which would be completely ineffective as an anti-Homoian argument if it did not serve to situate the Spirit in the Trinitarian order with the Son. Thus, the idea that Adrian was arguing that the quoted passages above were "temporal, as opposed to eternal" is entirely implausible, and to then say that such a thing is what Augustine himself taught goes beyond implausibility to fantasy. Even Photios himself recognized that it was not possible to give these passages from Augustine an economic interpretation, and Gregory Palamas does not even attempt to do so, instead offering a different eternal interpretation.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But again, historical implausibility, even to the level of fantasy, does not deter Truglia's polemical drive. In his response to dwong, Truglia repeatedly appealed to the False Rule in in a way that is implausible for Latin theology. He starts with Augustine around 2:00, and claims that "when juxtaposed with [dwong's] private interpretation, it teaches the <i>filioque</i>." Truglia also claims that dwong "juxtaposes his own logic onto the text instead of that of the author in the same work" accusing him of making "this interpretive error" repeatedly so as to engage in "partisan <i>eisegesis</i>." This, Truglia contrasts with his own method (a viciously ironic contrast, as it will turn out, as he is trying to exegete via the False Rule a work that Barnes also interpreted in completely opposite fashion).</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Truglia then surveys Augustine's teaching on divine simplicity, which points out that "the Son is born of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father; but the Father is neither born of, nor proceeds from, another." Incredibly, Truglia has completely lost the <i>Scriptural context of the interpretation</i>. John 16:13 is an explanation for how <i>the Son</i> has more to tell the disciples, which He will tell them <i>by means of sending the Spirit</i>. If Truglia's explanation of causality from the Father were to exclude the Spirit's essence coming also from the Son, then Augustine's exegesis of the passage would be senseless, which is an interpretive mistake that Barnes certainly does not make. On the contrary, based on Augustine's argument from divine simplicity, what the Son communicates to the Spirit could be nothing else than the identical essence that the Father communicates to the Spirit, which is the doctrine of the <i>filioque</i>. The fact that Truglia has essentially bulldozed over the key theological point Augustine is making can hardly be called sound historical method. On the contrary, he has proved that dwong (and Barnes, of course) are reading the passage correctly, while nonetheless falsely accusing dwong of quote-mining and <i>eisegesis</i>.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Truglia moves on to <i>de Trin</i>. V and does no better. He invokes the False Rule to claim that Augustine is talking about "the temporal procession to man," which is, again, completely alien to Augustine's thought. It is directly contradictory to Barnes's conclusion based on a comprehensive survey of all of Augustine's works and years of expertise in this specific author -- Augustine makes no such distinction (nor do any Latin pro-Nicene theologians). Truglia, having already admitted that this "sounds like Florence" (which probably should have caused Truglia to rethink his life choices concerning being an apologist), lands what he apparently considers to be the <i>coup de grace</i> in his observation that Augustine analogizes the Trinity as a principle to creation to the Father and the Son as one principle of the Spirit. Truglia is so convinced by the brilliance of this observation that he even makes a cute party girl meme followed by the assertion that anyone who has read the paragraph would conclude that "eternal origins are not even remotely the topic of discussion," again based on his oblivious reliance on the False Rule. Incredibly, Truglia doesn't even quit there, but then turns to <i>de Trin.</i> IV, which points out that the Father is the <i>principium</i> of the deity. He shows all signs of being completely oblivious to the fact that Augustine also clearly distinguishes in the context of eternal origin between being <i>principium</i> <i>principaliter,</i> as the Father is, and <i>communiter,</i> as the Son is so as to be one <i>principium</i> with the Father. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Finally, in response to the same passages against Maximinus and <i>de Trin.</i> XV that Barnes cites, Truglia claims that, despite their explicit causal language, Augustine does not actually mean what Florence says. In other words, despite the fact that Augustine says "the Father begot a Son and, by begetting Him, gave it to Him that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him as well," he cannot possibly mean this. He speciously cites the use of <i>auctor</i> as an instance of the False Rule, which is (again) wrong, but also claims there is another rationale. In addressing that rationale, Truglia thinks there is an even better passage in <i>de Trin.</i> XV.47: "[the] procession from both, without any changeableness of nature, gives to the Holy Spirit essence without beginning of time." (Granted, apart from Truglia's specious use of the False Rule, this passage really isn't any stronger than any of the others, but let's leave that aside: Truglia at least recognizes that this is an eternal relationship.)</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">So how can this be without proving the "Florentine [<i>sic</i>] <i>filioque,</i>" asks Truglia? At this point, Truglia asserts, based on Augustine's statements that the Father is <i>principium</i> and <i>auctor</i>, that Augustine's claim are <i>real</i> but not <i>causal</i>. Again, this reading is completely at odds with Barnes's capacious grasp of the subject matter; Barnes even comments in passing at one point that "the advantage of Augustine's <i>filioque</i> theology was, historically, that it was the stronger description of the Spirit's causal origin than alternative accounts." The real tragedy of Truglia's commitment to polemics at this point is that, if he actually paused even a moment to consider that the East and West might be labeling the same logical relations using different terms, this could actually be a moment of ecumenical breakthrough. But it is not to be.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As I reminder, I previously followed the account of Thomas Ryba in illustrating the reflexive logical relations that Augustine described in <i>de Trinitate</i>. That diagram looked like this:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" data-original-height="834" data-original-width="1636" height="285" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZSsaq1d1DrzhUVuDZaqDdG7qMJc8bxl3dUqtFdl_JkC7cE9iwgMHxf_e36SsSn8kbmnddd-R7rr5JYwaMR3bDdUaByp53CN1g-PGE5LoQV0duh8P4mxQBInlT_xsrMWW_H5EtNg/w559-h285/Screen+Shot+2021-10-09+at+4.43.47+PM.png" style="text-align: start;" width="559" /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The point of the psychological analogy here is internal production, <i>i</i>.<i>e</i>., that what is produced by the mind remains within the mind. The psychological model is therefore modeled on the <i>ad intra</i>/<i>ad extra</i> distinction; psychological productions are within the mind and therefore cannot be subject to the economy/theology distinction or Truglia's False Rule. At least as Augustine used the analogy, it wasn't intended to map faculties onto the different Persons, although St. Bonaventure will later utilize a stronger version of the psychological analogy that makes a more direct connection to the mental powers. But the point of reflexivity is that the processions both go out of and rest in or on the Persons. That the psychological analogy was intended to show that activities can all be internal activities of the same mind (which is really an illustration of how the Trinity operates inseparably) is documented in Lewis Ayres, <i>Augustine and the Trinity</i>. But Truglia completely loses the thread in his own diagram.</span></div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgmw4Ny_xlEE0WzYtv8KROcC9sNj-eVvSdNonEG6xkvalZ6ufrR4_1tF1ru9cnYEHIOXkrFdJ-W6Z83D_bGMpwCw_4Y8uATmGYSaad6YIJn32LriD8U93NjKG5MfOw3hOgO7ou5DSwTs6HD6DJuaYHHHwGzsDp_bF3O7ECDTZoJmJSWtwMqhuDusg/s1270/Screen%20Shot%202023-06-19%20at%209.14.21%20PM.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" data-original-height="744" data-original-width="1270" height="234" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgmw4Ny_xlEE0WzYtv8KROcC9sNj-eVvSdNonEG6xkvalZ6ufrR4_1tF1ru9cnYEHIOXkrFdJ-W6Z83D_bGMpwCw_4Y8uATmGYSaad6YIJn32LriD8U93NjKG5MfOw3hOgO7ou5DSwTs6HD6DJuaYHHHwGzsDp_bF3O7ECDTZoJmJSWtwMqhuDusg/w400-h234/Screen%20Shot%202023-06-19%20at%209.14.21%20PM.png" width="400" /></span></a></div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Truglia notes that Vision is "the end and rest of the Will," alleging that this means that the Spirit is proceeding to the Son but not from the Son. In particular, Truglia cites <i>de Trin</i>. XV "the Will proceeds from the human Mind first, in order that that may be sought which, when found, may be called offspring; which offspring being already brought forth or born, that Will is made perfect, resting in this end." Note that in the first place Augustine explicitly <i>disclaims</i> the idea that the existence of the faculties themselves can show relations of origin here; Truglia himself cites the relevant passages: "we can neither call the Will the quasi-offspring of Vision, since it existed before Vision; nor the quasi-parent, since that Vision was not formed and expressed from the Will." The point is that the analogy doesn't hold except with respect to the respective activities, a theme that Augustine constantly repeats in his "analogies" for the Trinity (which Ayres notes he refuses to even call "analogies"). So, as we always should with these psychological analogies, we need to focus on the sequence between the operations to show the eternal causal relations.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">If we actually followed Augustine's logic here, then, the vision would be <i>within the mind</i>. And in terms of <i>operation</i>, Vision itself (impressing the mental image of the object) is prior, and the Will proceeds from the Mind (which has the Vision within it) <i>back to itself </i>in turning its attention to the Vision. If Vision were correctly drawn within the Mind, so that the Will directing its attention to the Vision is the Mind directing its Will to itself, we would have the <i>filioque</i>. This is why Barnes and Ayres (and essentially everyone not named Craig Truglia) realize that this <i>real</i> but not <i>causal</i> interpretation of statement in <i>de Trin</i>. and the treatise against Maximinus is unsustainable. The operation producing the Spirit (in an internal psychological sense) presupposes the existence of the Son, and by the causal rule of operations, that means the Son must perform the same operation without personally originating it. This is exactly the causal relationship maintained in Latin theology, since the Son does whatever He sees the Father doing. There is an excellent argument that Latin theology and Eastern theology mean something different by "cause" in this context, but to say that the relation is non-causal in Augustine (or any other Latin theologian) in the <i>conceptual</i> way that it is being used here (<i>principium</i>) is nonsense.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">IV. Truglia's False Rule in other Fathers</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As I pointed out, Truglia's diagram above is the closest Truglia comes to at least potentially seeing this issue. Perhaps if he had considered that "causality" appears to mean something different in the eternal context to East and West, as opposed to simply relying blindly on the temporal procession/eternal origination distinction, that would have been a productive exercise. But Truglia misses the opportunity; after that, he never comes close. He continues to invoke the False Rules to argue that anti-Homoian Latin sources are talking about the "temporal procession," even though that distinction would be completely senseless as an anti-Homoian argument and completely alien to the logic of Latin theology outlined by Barnes. For someone who makes accusations of eisegesis repeatedly, one would think that the introduction of an entirely alien premise from an entirely different philosophical context might raise at least a yellow flag. With respect to St. Hilary of Poitiers, Truglia at least admits the plausibility of the (correct Florentine) interpretation, while failing to realize the implausibility of his own use of the False Rule.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Truglia's analysis of St. Athanasius does no better. As I've pointed out, the description of the Spirit as "image of the Son" in <i>Ad Serapion </i>is damning for the anti-filioquist position, because even St. Thomas Aquinas affirms that this is the same as Augustine's doctrine of the <i>filioque</i>. But yet again, Truglia assumes that the False Rule, a principle that can't be found anywhere in Athanasius, precludes any inferences about eternal hypostatic causality based on the economy. Athanasius's anti-Arian arguments in particular are not in an anti-Eunomian context, so the application of the False Rule fails just as badly here. Even David Bradshaw in <i>Aristotle East and West</i> recognizes that Athanasius's use of the term "energies," for example, is not the later concept that would be developed by the Cappadocians vis-a-vis the Eunomians, although he unfortunately fails to acknowledge the parallel metaphysical tradition that Athanasius represents. As I have <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/the-filioque-impasse-resolved.html" target="_blank">pointed out previously</a>, the metaphysics that Athanasius deploys is essentially identical to the relational metaphysics that Augustine developed. A comparison between Khaled Anatolios's <i>Athanasius</i> and David Meconi's <i>The One Christ</i> is particularly instructive here.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In terms of the specific points of contact, for example, the fact that Athanasius asserts knowledge comes from the Spirit through the Son and is received from the Son is unquestionably an assertion of eternal origin. This is an example of power-based causality that would be comfortable to any Latin theologian, even the pre-Nicene anti-monarchian theology. But in Truglia's mind, the straightforward anti-Arian application is allegedly defeated by the application of the False Rule. Part of the problem is that, with respect to Athanasius's writings, Blachernae similarly retcons "exists through the Son and from the Son" into its own interpretation of manifestation. But as with all of the Roman and Alexandrian Fathers, the concept is not actually in any of them. Truglia, in typical eisegetical fashion following Blachernae, reads this alien distinction of the False Rule into Athanasius. If there is no inference to theology from the economy in this context, Athanasius's anti-Arian argument would be useless; Truglia's "speculative" argument concerning knowledge is completely at odds with the pro-Nicene arguments that Athanasius and Augustine both make. Again, we have to distinguish the polemical purposes of Blachernae from sound historical methodology. Blachernae has clearly gone completely over the top in its historical claims. But that should actually be comforting for people of an irenic bent, because it suggests that there was a misunderstanding of the Latin view that might be reconcilable, as opposed to a direct conflict between the pro-Nicene Latin theology and the doctrine of Blachernae.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Moving on, St. Cyril of Alexandria likewise follows St. Athanasius, including in the use of "image of the Son" language. I concur with Truglia that the passage dwong cited describes a single procession from the Father but that "[the Spirit] is not alien to the Son in terms of his essence." But, after all, the <i>filioque </i>doesn't say anything different from this; that is exactly what the distinction between <i>principaliter</i> and <i>communiter</i> means. Truglia cites Theodoret's accusation as context: "the Holy Spirit is not of the Son, nor derives existence from the Son, but proceeds from the Father, and is properly stated to be of the Son, as being of one substance." Cyril then responds "for [the Spirit] is consubstantial with Them and He is poured forth, that is, He proceeds as from the fountain of God the Father and He is bestowed on creation through the Son." Cyril later says "the Spirit emerges from the substance of God the Fatehr and is poured out on those worthy to receive him through the Word ... since the Father's Spirit is also revealed as the Spirit of the Son, with the Father sending Him or commissioning the Son to bestow Him on the saints, the Son in turn gives Him as His own, because of the identity of substance which binds Him to the Father." </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But Truglia uses the False Rule to say that the epistemic economy/theology distinction is in play here, and this isn't what was at issue. Theodoret maintains that any <i>verbal</i> assertion of derived existence must necessarily be opposed to the monarchy of the Father, similar to Photios's assertions in the <i>Mystagogy</i> and the Carolingian counter-assertions against Tarasius. This is likely because Theodoret's own metaphysical concept of <i>qnoma</i> (expressed nature) doesn't recognize natures as distinct abstracts from the concrete expression, similar to the reasons that he has trouble generally understanding the Cyrillian Christology. (<i>N</i>.<i>B</i>., Paul B. Clayton's <i>The Christology of Theodoret of Cyrus</i> is essential reading on this point.) So Truglia sees Cyril as denying an eternal causal relation, while Cyril himself seems to be appealing to exactly the same <i>principaliter</i>/<i>communiter</i> distinction of eternal origin that Augustine does. It's not a question of Theodoret knowing Greek or not; Cyril's response is showing that double procession (literally "from both" in the language of both Cyril and Leo) is not intended to violate the monarchy of the Father, which is associated with "cause" <i>as that term is used in the East</i>. That's not because double procession is economic or energetic, but rather because the basis of the relation is the Son's reception of the essence from the Father, not the Son's possession of the essence of Himself. The idea that Cyril's response to Theodoret is a <i>denial</i> of <i>ab utroque</i> procession, an idea popularized most notably by Edward Siecienski, is an unwarranted inference based on the False Rule. And while I agree with Mikonja Knežević's analysis of Palamas's exegeis of Cyril on this point, it is just as obvious to me that Palamas is flat wrong as a historical matter. It is more likely that Cyril is drawing a distinction to avoid the criticism, not denying the double procession entirely, and the Antiochene theologians seem to have been satisfied with the explanation. In any case, we cannot go back in time to rewrite the texts of authors like Cyril in their original context simply because later historians who are revered as saints interpreted the text wrongly.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This brings me back to a point I raised earlier. Saints on both sides of the schism got not only the other side's Fathers but also their own Fathers wrong as a historical matter. St. Thomas got St. John Damascene and Pseudo-Dionysius wrong. St. Bonaventure got St. John Damascene more or less right, but probably got St. Augustine wrong on the psychological analogy. St. Photios got the entire concept of the <i>filioque</i> in St. Augustine, St. Leo the Great, and St. Gregory the Great wrong. St. Gregory Palamas almost certainly got St. Cyril wrong. St. Mark of Ephesus didn't understand the patristic background of Latin theology. (This is not, however, to say that Eugenikos was completely ignorant of Latin theology either; Fr. Christiaan Kappes has documented his familiarity with Thomas and Scotus.) That brings us to St. Maximus the Confessor, who was probably the last major figure to truly understand the reconcilability of the Eastern and Western views and who was also badly misread by both sides at Florence.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">V. The irenic view of St. Maximus</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">With the discussion of St. Maximus the Confessor, we really come to the question of Florence itself and whether we are going to choose to be polemical or irenic in our interpretation. This is because Pseudo-Dionysius represents an absolute break from the older (and broader) metaphysical tradition outside of the anti-Eunomian Neoplatonic context. After Pseudo-Dionysius, everything was retroactively read in the East in terms of Neoplatonism, which naturally replaced the broader anti-Arian tradition with the more-or-less anti-Eunomian theology of the Cappadocians. As part of this redefinition of the Apostolic tradition, the epistemic economy/theology distinction, Truglia's False Rule, was then read retroactively into the Fathers in a way that erased not only the Latin patristic theology but also the Alexandrian theology of Athanasius and Cyril, the latter of whom was comfortable using theological concepts to navigate the metaphysical differences between the two traditions. At the same time, the West, which was essentially oblivious to both Pseudo-Dionysius and the theological chaos in which his works were written (documented well by Rosemary Arthur in <i>Pseudo-Dionysius as Polemicist</i>), had completely lost touch with the theological background that led to the Fifth and Sixth Ecumenical Councils. There is situated Maximus -- a man steeped in this new Pseudo-Dionysian theology in a truly profound way but likewise intimately familiar with the Augustinian tradition.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Maximus's famous <i>Letter to Marinus</i> was probably the greatest flashpoint in the Florentine battle between East and West. But it shows the beginning of the pointlessly polemical movement in the East resulting from the Pseudo-Dionysian retcon of patristic theology, a tradition that would later be carried on by Photios, by Gregory of Cyprus, and, ultimately, by modern polemicists like Truglia and Siecienski, who end up reading Latin and Alexandria theology according to the False Rule. What is particularly exasperating about these sorts of polemics is that the authors are aware of the original anti-Eunomian context of the economy/theology distinction, but then inexplicably refuse to acknowledge the decontextualization of the rule when it is being used to reinterpret broader anti-Arian writings. This results in imputing interpretations into the earlier patristic writers that simply aren't there.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">For example, Siecienski essentially takes the identical line using the False Rule that Truglia does. After noting that Maximus does strongly affirm the link between theology and economy in the Incarnation (unquestionably a key feature of his Pseudo-Dionysian synthesis), Siencienski then attempts to situate Maximus's own writings on the <i>filioque</i> in the anti-Eunomian context of the Cappadocians. He says:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>This thinking was certainly not new to Maximus, and it clearly manifests his reliance on the Cappadocian tradition, despite Gregory of Nazianzus's hesitations about blurring the lines between economy </i>(oikonomia) <i>and theology </i>(theologia) <i>because of the heresy of Eunomius. Maximus, writing long after Gregory's Eunomian opponents had been quieted, adopts and adapts his position so that [as Maximian scholar Lars Thunberg says] "this distinction between theology and economy is strictly upheld ... but at the same time he relates them intimately so that a correspondence is established." While, like Gregory, Maximus was hesitant to develop what later generations would call "natural theology," he allowed the eyes of faith to discern certain "adumbrations" of the Trinity within the natural order. As he wrote in </i>[QT 13]<i>, "from beings we believe in God who is, that he exists ... from the wise contemplation of creation receiving the idea of the Holy Trinity of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit."</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Rather than applying the False Rule here, Siecienski could have just taken the Latin theological approach that inference of causal eternal relations is one of the "adumbrations" that might be discerned from the economy and that is does not blur into Eunomian speculation about the nature. Granted, this is "causality" in the Latin sense, <i>principium</i>, not "causality" in the sense that the East uses the term. But Barnes's conclusions necessitate that is truly <i>causal of the hypostasis</i> in this broader sense, in that the Father and the Son are collectively the reason that the Spirit possesses the power of God, just not in the sense of causality that the East customarily uses the term.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But the irenic path is not the one Siecienski takes. He continues (my emphasis in <b>bold</b>):</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>[I]n speaking about "the Holy Spirit ... belong[ing] to the nature of the Son according to his essence, since he proceeds inexpressibly from the Father through his begotten Son," scholars have long wondered (and often debated) whether Maximus is describing not merely the temporal manifestation of the Spirit, but also his eternal relationship to the Son. This concept brings us back to the idea of "trinitarian order" </i>(taxis) <i>and the recognition found in Maximus and the Eastern fathers that although "originated from the Father, the Spirit comprehends, in his relation to the Father, the relationship between the Father and the Son" [quoting Pierre Piret]. Thus while the Father remains unoriginate cause of the Spirit, he is always Father of the Son, and thus the Spirit comes forth from him in such a way that this eternal relationship to the Son is not excluded. How is this eternal relationship between Spirit and Son then expressed? For Maximus, as it was for many of the Greek Fathers, it is in speaking of the Spirit's procession/progression "through the Son" </i>(dia tou yiou). <i>This can be seen only only in Maximus's </i>Queastiones ad Thalassium <i>63, but in </i>Quaestiones et dubia<i> 34, where he wrote: "Just as the mind [i.e., the Father] is cause of the Word, so is he also [cause] of the Spirit through the Word. And, just as one cannot say that the Word is of the voice, so too one cannot say that the Son is of the Spirit."</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Thus while the Father remained the sole cause of the Spirit's hypostasis (as the one who spirates him), the Spirit, intimately aware of the Father's begetting of the Son, comes forth from the begetter through the begotten as the Spirit eternally manifesting their common nature. This was the important theological truth that both Cyril and Gregory of Nyssa had both hinted at in their writings, and this was the concept that Maximus's </i>Letter to Marinus<i> tried to express with even greater clarity.</i></span></b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Suffice it to say that there is a far more parsimonious interpretation: that Maximus was not trying to full express some hidden theological concept of Cyril and Gregory of Nyssa (which is frankly so well-hidden that it likely doesn't exist) but rather that he was simply aware that there were multiple ways to express the same truth. In other words, Maximus could very easily have given both "a wholehearted endorsement of 'filioquism'" <i>and</i> the "'non-negotiables' for orthodox theology" by the simple expedient of saying that not every <i>causal relationship</i> must be a <i>cause in the Eastern sense</i>.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">So what do I mean by "cause in the Eastern sense?" What the Eastern Fathers means by cause is what Latins mean by the combination of the verb "spirate" with the adverb "principaliter." What the Latin Fathers mean by "cause" is the verb "spirate" irrespective of the adverb. If Maximus thought that one had to deny causality of the Son <i>to the point of denying causality in this Latin sense</i>, then it would be an out-and-out denial of Latin theology as Barnes outlines it. Siecienski says that this merely "challenges" the West. That is nonsense. Either it <i>outright denies</i> the West, in which case Maximus was not a competent witness to Latin theology anyway, or Maximus has a far more versatile grasp of how to understand Latin theology than contemporary Orthodox polemicists do.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I will take the latter view, which is the irenic view. Maximus knew full well that the Latins understood causality of the hypostasis of the Spirit <i>from</i> the Father <i>and from</i> the Son and that it meant the same thing that the East meant by <i>from </i>the Father <i>through</i> the Son. Both sides had the same <i>broad</i> understanding of causal relationships, which was never intended to exclude co-causality of the Son in the hypostasis of the Spirit. It simply means that the Son as co-cause was Himself caused to be. In other words, "eternal manifestation" is causality, only a different causal relationship than the Spirit has to the Father. In other words, <i>the Western claim of co-causality does not contradict the Eastern claim of exclusive causality, if "causality" is not read equivocally</i>. The assertion that <i>ekporeusthai</i> is hypostatically causal while <i>proienai</i> is not causal even in the Latin sense, however, remains implausible.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I will provide a lengthier explanation of how I believe that the distinct accounts of causality can be reconciled. But for now, what we need to understand is that the polemical invocation of the False Rule against the West would only serve to render all of Latin theology, as Barnes outlines it, incoherent. If this were what Maximus intended to do (the polemical interpretation), then it would only prove that Maximus was himself not as familiar with Western theology as people think. But my irenic interpretation is that Maximus was sensitive to the fact that the terms "cause" were being used differently and that the Latin use of <i>principium </i>did not deny the monarchy of the Father. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div> </div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-51229195788856096972023-06-02T18:37:00.006-04:002023-07-04T10:58:24.204-04:00Why the hypostasis/hyparxis distinction doesn't work<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">It is a somewhat regrettable tendency of some Eastern Catholics to believe that Latin dogmatic theology is in need of correction by Eastern theology. That is not to say that in seeing how they are the same, one cannot learn a great deal, so the goal should be exactly that: affirming that the Western and Eastern theologies do not disagree or contradict one another. Eastern Catholic spirituality can also (in my view, at least) greatly mitigate Western tendencies to prudential error, such as matters relating to the exercise of the papacy. But the dogma itself was revealed by the Apostles, and while it might develop, what is dogmatic is simply true. I've written extensively about how I understand dogma as <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/divine-revelation-as-normative-authority.html" target="_blank">lawful divine commands</a>, and God simply cannot err in what He commands us to believe.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The <i>filioque </i>is unquestionably Catholic dogma, and it was explicitly dogmatized in the <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/divine-revelation-as-normative-authority.html" target="_blank">Fourth Lateran Council (1215)</a> as follows:</span></p><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">We firmly believe and simply confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immeasurable, almighty, unchangeable, incomprehensible and ineffable, Father, Son and holy Spirit, three persons but one absolutely simple essence, substance or nature. <b>The Father is from none, the Son from the Father alone, and the holy Spirit from both equally, eternally without beginning or end</b>; the Father generating, the Son being born, and the holy Spirit proceeding; consubstantial and coequal, co-omnipotent and coeternal; <b>one principle of all things</b>, creator of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal</span></i><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">This was the context of the subsequent dogmatic statement of <a href="https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum14.htm" target="_blank">Lyons (1274)</a>, not even sixty years later:</span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">We profess faithfully and devotedly that <b>the holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles, but as from one principle; not by two spirations, but by one single spiration</b>. This the holy Roman church, mother and mistress of all the faithful, has till now professed, preached and taught; this she firmly holds, preaches, professes and teaches; this is the unchangeable and true belief of the orthodox fathers and doctors, Latin and Greek alike. But because some, on account of ignorance of the said indisputable truth, have fallen into various errors, we, wishing to close the way to such errors, with the approval of the sacred council, condemn and reprove <b>all who presume to deny that the holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, or rashly to assert that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles and not as from on</b>e.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">And likewise, <a href="https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/ecumenical-council-of-florence-1438-1445-1461" target="_blank">in Florence</a>, nearly two centuries later:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>For when Latins and Greeks came together in this holy synod, they all strove that, among other things, the article about the procession of the holy Spirit should be discussed with the utmost care and assiduous investigation. Texts were produced from divine scriptures and many authorities of eastern and western holy doctors, some saying the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, others saying the procession is from the Father through the Son. All were aiming at the same meaning in different words. The Greeks asserted that when they claim that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, they do not intend to exclude the Son; but because it seemed to them that the Latins assert that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles and two spirations, they refrained from saying that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. The Latins asserted that they say the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son not with the intention of excluding the Father from being the source and principle of all deity, that is of the Son and of the holy Spirit, nor to imply that the Son does not receive from the Father, because the holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, nor that they posit two principles or two spirations; but they assert that there is only one principle and a single spiration of the holy Spirit, as they have asserted hitherto. Since, then, one and the same meaning resulted from all this, they unanimously agreed and consented to the following holy and God-pleasing union, in the same sense and with one mind.<br /><br />In the name of the holy Trinity, Father, Son and holy Spirit, we define, with the approval of this holy universal council of Florence, that the following truth of faith shall be believed and accepted by all Christians and thus shall all profess it: <b>that the holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son, and has his essence and his subsistent being from the Father together with the Son, and proceeds from both eternally as from one principle and a single spiration</b>. We declare that when holy doctors and fathers say that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, this bears the sense that thereby also the Son should be signified, according to the Greeks indeed as cause, and according to the Latins as principle of the subsistence of the holy Spirit, just like the Father.</i><br /><br /><i>And since the Father gave to his only-begotten Son in begetting him everything the Father has, except to be the Father, so the Son has eternally from the Father, by whom he was eternally begotten, this also, namely that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.</i></span><div><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">The defining characteristic of all of these statements is that there can be <i>no distinction whatsoever in the act of spirating</i> but only in <i>who is spirating</i>. Note that this maps onto the doctrine of inseparable operations, which the Fourth Lateran invokes when it notes that God is "one principle of all things, creator of all things invisible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal." Just as there can be no distinction in what is done (creating) but only who is creating (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), so can there be no distinction in what is "done" (spirating) but only who "does" it (Father and Son). I have used the scare quotes around "do" because the eternal immanent acts are "acts" only notionally given that God's mode of existence is fundamentally incomprehensible to created intellect, being completely shrouded in mystery. The real underlying metaphysical property distinguishing the Persons would be a <i>relation</i> or <i>relative property</i>, and we do not know the nature of it. This is why we can say that we do not understand the nature of begetting and proceeding, but we are nevertheless capable of affirming the existence of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">To put it another way, Latin theology requires that <i>in relation to the Holy Spirit, the Father and the Son are completely identical apart from that one is Father and one is Son</i>. That is why I think the focus of the ecumenical dialogue on the two terms <i>ekporeusthai </i>and <i>proienai</i> for the procession of the Holy Spirit has been largely unhelpful. It gives the impression that there are two <i>kinds</i> of processions, and there just aren't. Latin theology requires unity of procession and principle, and that can only be maintained the Father and the Son are "doing" the same "act." There cannot be two acts: one of spiration for purposes of <i>ekporeusthai</i> and one of spiration for purposes of <i>proienai</i>, which would directly contradict the fundamental Latin dogmatic principle. In other words, <i>ekporeusthai</i> is used to say "the act of spiration peformed by the Father," and <i>proienai</i> is used to say "the act of spiration performed by the Father and the Son," but "the act of spiration" is identical in both terms. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">Out of a misguided ecumenical impulse, though, some people have taken the Clarification as suggesting that there are somehow two distinct acts involved: spiration of the hypostasis and spiration of the existence (essence). The ostensible reason for this separation is that Florence's statement translated as "subsistent being" was rendered as <i>hyparxis</i> (existence). Based on this, it is alleged that Florence has somehow endorsed the distinction between <i>ekporeusthia</i> ("having existence from," which pertains to hypostasis) and manifestation ("existing through," <i>hyparxis</i>). This misguided attempt at ecumenism fails to appreciate either.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The Eastern Orthodox position of Blachernae is that the Son does not originate either the <i>hypostasis</i> or the <i>hyparxis</i> of the Spirit. What Blachernae means by manifestation is what is recited in the Longer Creed of Gregory Thaumaturgus as follows: "And there is One Holy Spirit, having His subsistence from God, and being made manifest by the Son, [to wit to men]: Image of the Son, Perfect Image of the Perfect; Life, the Cause of the living; Holy Fount; Sanctity, the Supplier, or Leader, of Sanctification; in whom is manifested God the Father, who is above all and in all, and God the Son, who is through all." As I've said before, manifestation in Blachernae does not refer to origin, even in the eternal sense, so what the Son is doing at best can only refer to as <i>sustaining</i> the existence or operation of the Spirit. We might think of this as the Father's origination of the Holy Spirit's hypostasis and possession of the essence and the Son as the conduit for the continuous flow of essence from the Father. Whether that flow of essence can be identified with the divine energies or not is a question still under scholarly investigation, but it clearly is not a suggestion that the Spirit has His hypostasis from the Father and His essence from the Father and the Son. That approach would fall squarely within Photios's criticism in the <i>Mystagogy </i>that the procession of the hypostasis from the Father would be incomplete, so it can hardly be the Orthodox view.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">It obviously isn't the Latin view either. The unity of spiration does not allow distinctions between what the Father is giving in the act and what the Son is giving in the act, which would make the spiration composite. Unless Florence was simply being incoherent (not to mention directly contradicting Lateran IV and Lyons), there is no way that Florence could be assertion that origination of hypostasis and origination of existence are different things. All that Florence means by <i>hyparxis</i> is the existence of the hypostasis, which is nothing other than to say that the hypostasis is originated by the Father and the Son. This is also consistent with the Eastern use of the term <i>tropos hyparxeos</i> (mode of existence) as a synonym for hypostasis. To say that a hypostasis was originated without its existence would therefore be a contradiction in terms, because hypostasis is a mode of existence.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But what of the assertion, one with which the Latin theologians agree, that the Father is the sole <i>arche</i> or <i>pege</i> (source) of the Trinity? This likewise must be interpreted not as if the Father is doing anything different with respect to the Spirit but only to refer to His personal role that distinguishes Him from the Son. In other words, the Father is the personal source of the Spirit as source of the Son (<i>pege</i>), which distinguishes Him from the Son, who is the personal source of the Spirit as not-the-<i>pege</i>. The Father does not cease to be the <i>pege</i> in spirating the Spirit, nor does the Son become the <i>pege</i> in spirating the Spirit, so that the <i>who</i> is still two but the <i>what</i> is one.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The Orthodox polemical position will say that it is <i>originating persons at all</i> rather than the personal role taken in originating persons that is the personal property defining the Father. This is, in Latin theology, called <i>innascibility</i>. Whether this logically excludes the Son from originating the Spirit as subject is essentially the debate; I have yet to hear a convincing argument that it does, so it seems to me that the distinction between "having existence from" and "existing through" introduced by Blachernae is simply idle. That is to say, the distinction does not logically serve any purpose other than the distinction between <i>ekporeusis </i>and <i>proiesis</i>, which is to say that is specifies that there are two distinct subjects of the action but does not introduce any distinction in the act that the subjects are performing. If that is true, then even accepting the logically prior existence of the Son, such as when the Spirit is spoken of as Image of the Son, is enough to show that the East has never excluded the <i>filioque</i> from orthodoxy but only a caricature of the <i>filioque</i> drawn by Photios. And since the misunderstanding has been largely accepted as such at this point, it suffices to say that the <i>hypostasis</i>/<i>hyparxis</i> distinction that neither side accepts is a foolish diversion.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">[UPDATE -- One of the misguided "ecumenists" has articulated his position in greater detail, and I find it useful to point out exactly the knots into which one must tie the theology in order to hold this position. Here is his attempt to sustain the irrational distinction between origination of hypostasis (OOH) and communication of essence (COE).]</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">The dogma of Florence on Filioque is the locus of the debate about Filioque. Disagreement exists because it is claimed that when Florence asserts, "We declare that when holy doctors and fathers say that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, this bears the sense that thereby also the Son should be signified, according to the Greeks indeed as cause, and according to the Latins as principle of the subsistence of the holy Spirit, just like the Father," it is an explicit dogma on the origination of Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Pope St. JP2's Official Clarification explained that the dogma of Florence is about the communication of the Holy Spirit's Essence, not the origination of Holy Spirit's hypostasis; in effect, that the Latin Tradition views Procession as communication of Essence (COE) rather than origination of Hypostasis (OOH). There are both many Latin Catholics and many EO who oppose the Official Clarification. </span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP>Actually, the only complaint I have about the Clarification is that people will misunderstand it in exactly this way. This is an example of what the Clarification actually says:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">In the seventh century, the Byzantines were shocked by a confession of faith made by the Pope and including the Filioque with reference to the procession of the Holy Spirit; they translated the procession inaccurately by ekporeusiV. St Maximus the Confessor then wrote a letter from Rome linking together the two approaches — Cappadocian and Latin-Alexandrian — to the eternal origin of the Spirit: the Father is the sole principle without principle (in Greek aitia) of the Son and of the Spirit; the Father and the Son are consubstantial source of the procession (to proienai) of this same Spirit. "For the procession they [the Romans] brought the witness of the Latin Fathers, as well, of course, as that of St Cyril of Alexandria in his sacred study on the Gospel of St John. On this basis they showed that they themselves do not make the Son Cause (Aitia) of the Spirit. They know, indeed, that the Father is the sole Cause of the Son and of the Spirit, of one by generation and of the other by ekporeusiV — but they explained that the latter comes (proienai) through the Son, and they showed in this way the unity and the immutability of the essence" (Letter to Marinus of Cyprus, PG 91, 136 A-B). According to St Maximus, echoing Rome, the Filioque does not concern the ekporeusiV of the Spirit issued from the Father as source of the Trinity, but manifests his proienai (processio) in the consubstantial communion of the Father and the Son, while excluding any possible subordinationist interpretation of the Father's monarchy.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">The fact that in Latin and Alexandrian theology the Holy Spirit, proceeds (proeisi) from the Father and the Son in their consubstantial communion does not mean that it is the divine essence or substance that proceed in him, but that it is communicated from the Father and the Son who have it in common.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP>The problem with the COE interpretation is that "in their consubstantial communion" does not refer to <i>what</i> is being communicated but <i>how</i> they are acting. When referring to actions in consubstantial communion, such as the act of creation by the Trinity, it means that the Persons in question <i>act as one</i> with respect to that activity on account of the unity of their essence. Just as the Father remains the monarch of the Trinity even in creation, so the Father remains the monarch of the Trinity even when both the Father and the Son are spirating the Spirit. By contrast, the <i>incorrect</i> reading of "in their consubstantial communion" is that this language refers to the essence rather than to the activity of the Persons, which is exactly the mistake that has been made here. And unlike the difference between <i>hyparxis</i> and <i>hypostasis</i>, the difference between "in their consubstantial communion" and "from the essence" is not just a conceptual one; the former refers to Personal relations, and the latter to essence (nature). I wrote <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/12/consubstantiality-as-relative-property.html" target="_blank">a previous article</a> about why this language should have been explained, rather than merely asserted, in the clarification.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">The Catholics (which in this OP will be referred to as diarchists for their insistence that S is source of Essence and Hypostasis of HS just as F is source of Essence and Hypostasis) argue the Official Clarification contradicts the Latin Tradition on Filioque that they claim views Procession as OOH. Certain EO also insist the dogma of Florence is about OOH since that is their own legitimate Tradition on what Procession means.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP>Given that the entire point of "in their consubstantial communion" is that the Father and the Son would act as one principle by virtue of their common essence, calling this position "diarchic" is senseless. And pointing this out is not opposing the Clarification so much as pointing out that "in their consubstantial communion" is being badly misinterpreted in a way that would contradict the original Florentine texts, which very clearly endorsed OOH (just as Lateran IV and Lyons did). Moreover, this idea of unified operations is one of the core tenets of anti-Arian Latin theology back to its very earliest days.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">There are four basic issues raised by those who reject the Official Clarification, whether Latin Catholic or EO:</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(1) What are the reasons for claiming the dogma of Florence is about communication of Essence rather than origination of Hypostasis? The issue here is the internal evidence from the Florentine text.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(2) What are the grounds for distinguishing COE from OOH? Don't they refer to PRECISELY THE SAME divine act?</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(3) Even if the dogma of Florence is about COE, it is still diarchist since it claims the Son is source of Essence and Hypostasis just as the Father is source of Essence and Hypostasis.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(4) Even if the dogma of Florence is about COE, the Greek fathers historically reject COE by the Son to the Holy Spirit.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">I will offer a response to the four issues in the following weeks. For now, I will be focusing on issue #2.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP>From my perspective, issue #2 is the only issue, because if there's no distinction between COE and OOH, then there can't possibly be good reasons for #1, meaning that the hypothetical conditions in #3 and #4 also fail. So logically, if there are no grounds for distinguishing COE and OOH, then we're done.<br /><br /><i>The dogma of COE (F communicates His Essence/Substance to S and HS) is distinguished from the dogma of OOH (F originates [is source of Hypostases for] S and HS), but opponents, doubters, and inquirers wonder how it is that COE and OOH can be distinguished. The more polemical argue it is an artificial distinction to justify the notion that the Son is not involved in OOH. Are they not ontologically precisely the same act? The answer is NO.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">As it is good rhetoric not merely to defend one's position, but also to refute the opposition, this OP will treat of topics under two general headings: [A] reasons for the distinction, and [B] reasons why OOH is at the very least incompatible, and at worst heretical, with Filioque.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">[A] Reasons for the distinction:</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>It is mete to first elaborate on how/why the distinction could have come about. At Nicea I, attended by fathers East and West, it was determined that an assertion of OOH was insufficient to combat Arianism. In fact, Arians used the very fact of OOH to conclude that S is subordinate to F. An assertion on the unity of Essence HAD to be ADDITIONALLY dogmatized to fully address the Arian heresy. Everyone was thus aware that the dogma of unity of Essence, not the dogma of OOH per se, was the effective means of opposing Arianism.</i><br /><br />JP> This is an excellent argument for why OOH should not (and cannot) be viewed separately from COE without opening doctrine up to the Arian heresy. OOH minus COE is not an adequate defense against Arianism.<br /><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Within several decades after Nicea I, by the end of the 4th century, Arianism was practically wiped out in the East with the aid of the imperial power. Consequently and understandably, the concepts of OOH and COE came to be easily and absolutely equated in the Eastern mind. The situation was very different in the West. In the same time period, the Goths, who adhered to Arianism, became the ascendant secular power in the West by the end of the 4th century. In fact, Arianism lasted in the West until the 7th century. That's a HUGE time difference. By a practical necessity, the solution of Nicea against Arianism - the assertion of unity of Essence - became the focus of Western Christendom against the persistent Arianism in the West. Rhetoric had to be developed to strengthen the dogma of unity of Essence - and this is the context in which Filioque came into use.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> This essentially writes out of history the entire neo-Nicene/pro-Nicene theology developed after Nicaea that culminated in First Constantinople, including any recognition of the various neo-Arian movements (Homoian, Homoiousian, and Eunomian) to which they were responding. Completely omitted from this is the anti-Homoian response in the West by Marius Victorinus, Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine, and others. That is summarized incomparably by Michel Rene Barnes in <i>Augustine and Nicene Theology</i>. The subsequent response to Gothic (Homoian) Arianism was essentially initiated by St. Leo the Great in Spain, following exactly the same lines as the pro-Nicene Latin response. The fact that Arianism <i>lasted</i> longer, due to Arian emperors in the West and later to Gothic secular power, was not the source of any new theology. St. Leo, who was certainly familiar with the later Christological debates, would hardly have been oblivious to the connection between OOH and COE. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">An additional, crucial factor is the fact that the phrase "proceeds from the Father" was not in the original Creed of Nicea. The expression was formally added by 381 Constantinople. However, there is no evidence that the West had adopted the Constantinopolitan Creed with its additions until the the period of the Cncl. of Chalcedon. At the time of Chalcedon, Arianism was very much still active in the West - in other words, the theological paradigm focusing on the dogma of unity of Essence was very much in effect, if not at its height in theological development. In fact, the first recorded use of filioque in the West occurred in 447, just a few before the Cncl. of Chalcedon (in a letter of Pope St. Leo, and in a Cncl. of Toledo). In effect, by the time the Constantinopolitan Creed (with its ADDITIONAL statement "proceeds from the Father") came to be recognized and used in the West, the focus on the unity of Essence was already the theological paradigm of the West. Comprehending "proceeds from the Father" as communication of Essence was very natural, and adding "filioque" to that statement was both natural and orthodox to the Latin fathers who did so. A not insignificant consideration is that the Latin "procedit" very easily accomodated the focus on communication of Essence.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> This is completely ahistorical. "Proceeds from the Father" is Biblical language, and Augustine and Hilary both wrote extensively on the Trinity in well-known works before Constantinople. On the purported reading of history, every Western author, including St. Leo the Great, somehow forgot everything they knew about OOH and COE, including all of the Western pro-Nicene, anti-Homoian apologetics that dominated theological discussion for years, between Constantinople (381) and AD 447. And as for it being the first use of the term, St. Leo clearly took it directly from Augustine, and the ideal that <i>communiter</i> as used by St. Augustine referred to COE rather than OOH is completely unsupportable. So the assertion here would be that St. Leo took a radical departure from Augustine in inventing a completely new distinction that had no background in Latin theology, which is completely implausible. Or we could simply accept that the OOH/COE distinction is specious, and none of these absurd historical consequences arise.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Next, a primer on Latin terminology on distinctions applied to theology is necessary. There are 3 types of distinctions (some sources offer more categories, but these 3 are the most general and the most relevant for the present discussion): real, formal, and virtual.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Two things REALLY distinct exist independent of each other, and the distinction is thus objective. E.g.: a tree and a rock.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Two things FORMALLY distinct DO NOT exist independent of each other, but the distinction is nevertheless objective. E.g.: numbers (i.e., the concept of 1 does not exist without the concept of 2, but they are objectively distinct - 1 is not 2, and 2 is not 1).</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Two things VIRTUALLY distinct DO NOT exist independent of each other because they are actually the same thing. The distinction is only subjective (conceptual). E.g.: take a hollow, semi-spherical object whose rim is attached to a wall. X approaches the object from one side of the wall and says "this is a convex thing." Y approaches the object from the other side of the wall and says, "this is a concave thing." However, the two things are actually the same object.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> What is presented here is not a primer on Latin theology; it is a primer on the idiosyncratic use of those terms in this theory.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Real distinctions obtain in extramental reality. The quintessential example is any separate existence in reality; that is definitely a real distinction. For example, since only the Son assumed human nature, only the Son acts as a human being, and only the Son suffers and dies on the Cross, there must necessarily be a real distinction between the Trinitarian Persons. To deny that would entail the heresy of Patripassianism.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">There is dispute among the Schoolmen as to what to call distinctions with some foundation in the reality of the thing that does not amount to separate existence. Scotists famously assert a formal distinction, in analogy to how a mind has intellect and will but that there cannot be an intellect or will without a mind, so that the operations differ in formality without being another thing. Later Thomists will call this a major virtual distinction, which has some basis in the reality of the thing, but is not itself a distinction in the reality of the thing. In both cases, the quintessential example is the divine attributes: we can perceive a distinction between God's justice, mercy, knowledge, omnipotence, etc., but God in Himself is simple.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Lastly, there is a conceptual, notional, or minor virtual distinction, which is a purely mental distinction between things that necessarily imply one another. The example of the definition of convexity and concavity works; likewise, 2+2 and 4 are only conceptually different. Since quantity is abstracted from separate existence, I would say that the unit (1) is a real distinction, but mathematics performed with quantities then results in conceptual distinctions. The distinction between <i>hyparxis</i> and <i>hypostasis</i>, between the fact of existence and the mode of existence, falls into this category as well.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">In the Latin Tradition, it was deemed necessary to make these distinctions; failure to acknowledge these distinctions could lead to heresy. </span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> I agree with this. For example, if one thinks there are not real distinctions between the Persons, one will fall into Patripassianism.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">E.g., F, S and HS are FORMALLY distinct. To say they are REALLY distinct is the heresy of polytheism; to say they are VIRTUALLY distinct is the heresy of modalism.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> This is complete nonsense. The reason that the real distinction between Persons does not entail polytheism is that the Persons are identical with the essence. Denial of the real distinction between the Persons is heresy, because it would mean that the Son could not separately assume human nature apart from the other Persons. The nature of the distinction between the Persons and the essence is mysterious, to be sure, but what maintains the unity of God is the distinction between the Persons and the essence, not the distinction among the Persons, which is definitely real.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">COE and OOH are formally distinct divine acts. This means these acts do not exist (or occur) apart from the other in the immanent, eternal reality of the Godhead. However, the distinction between them is objective. </span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> "Objective" in this context means "in reference to extramental reality." I have pointed out that <i>hyparxis</i> and <i>hypostasis</i> (<i>tropos hyparxeos</i>) are merely conceptually different. Thus, COE and OOH are merely conceptually different. Trying to ground distinctions in reality in a conceptual distinction cannot succeed.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">The following are the reasons why the distinction is true and valid:</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(A1) Essence is unoriginate; Hypostasis is originated. Hypostasis is not communicated, only originated, and Essence cannot be originated, only communicated. Note crucially that the distinction is not between Essence per se and Hypostasis per se (since these are only virtually distinct in each Person), but between the divine acts (hence, the argument of opponents of COE that COE dichotomizes Essence from Hypostasis is really a red herring fallacy). True enough that according to the dogma of divine simplicity (at least according to the Latin Tradition), there is only virtual distinction between divine act and divine existence, but this will be proven to be opposed to the position of COE opponents further below.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> Bizarrely enough, this almost gets the entire issue right and then completely misses the point. The act "communicating the essence" and "originating the hypostasis" is identical, because hypostasis just is possession of the essence. It's the idea that those two acts are distinct that makes no sense.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(A2) COE redounds to the dogma of unity of Essence/the equality of the Persons. OOH redounds, quite differently, to the dogma of the distinction of Persons (since the Persons are only distinguished by their relations).</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> That is generally the case with purely conceptual distinctions. You think about different things with different words. In the case of these identical actions, you can focus more on the fact that spiration produces existence or that it involves communication of essence, but it in no way means that OOH and COE are really distinct.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(A3) A final reason COE and OOH cannot simply be equated is that HS actually also communicates Essence, though He does it to creatures. If the two were simply equivalent, creatures would logically and naturally be divine beings, which is theologically incoherent (certainly erroneous, perhaps heretical). Thus, the diarchist position is inconsistent with the Latin Tradition. There is a crucial caveat to (A3), however. This final reason might only be valid within the Latin Tradition (practically sufficient to refute the diarchists), but might present a difficulty in the context of the Greek Tradition. This is because of the Essence/Energy distinction. The Greek Tradition would not say that Essence is communicated to creatures; it is only Energy that is communicated to creatures. Thus the incoherence of equating COE and OOH as diarchists do might not be as apparent from an Eastern perspective. I theorize a way to overcome the dilemma is to appeal to the fact that per the Greek doctrine, Energy is never dichotomized from Essence - where Essence is present, there is Energy and vice-versa. One can say that when Energy is communicated to creatures, Essence is also transmitted, though the creature does not experience the Essence. I wonder if (and hope) the foregoing theory is acceptable to Eastern Catholics and EO who are willing to consider the orthodoxy of the Filioque doctrine.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> It would be hard to find a more blatant example of going completely off the rails in the interest of ecumenism. If COE were correct <i>and also</i> if the Holy Spirit communicated essence to creatures in the same sense, then that would either make the Holy Spirit into an energy (a divine creation) or make human beings into divine beings, which are both absurd. Indeed, the absurdity of this position probably should have been the clue that the COE/OOH distinction was not correct. From a Latin theological prespective, this notion of communication of essence collapsed the <i>ad intra</i> immanent acts with the <i>ad extra </i>missions. The Holy Spirit (and that only in inseparable operation with the divine Trinity) communicates the divine essence analogically by making participation in the divine life available. But that is participation in divine activity, not origination of divine beings.<br /><br /><i>[B] Reasons why OOH is at the very least incompatible, and at worst heretical, with Filioque:</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(B1) Contradicts the dogma of divine simplicity. Divine simplicity (at least in the Latin Tradition) means there is only virtual distinction between divine act and divine existence, whether that divine existence be hypostasis or hyparxis. In other words, the divine act is definitional of the divine existence. If a divine act is done by virtue of hypostasis, then ONLY ONE PERSON can do it; if a divine act is done by virtue of hyparxis, then ALL PERSONS can do it. Those are the only two patristic and orthodox theological options, the only two types of actions vis-a-vis divine existence that is recognized by the Church universal. Diarchists introduce a novelty, contradict this dogma, by positing a THIRD level of existence consisting only of two Persons, F and S, excluding HS. This is necessarily the case since diarchists claim the Third Person cannot do something that F and S can do BY VIRTUE OF COMMON ESSENCE - viz., originating divine Hypostasis.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> First, the idea of levels of existence itself violates divine simplicity. The Persons are identical to the divine essence on pain of polytheism. Second, hyparxis and hypostasis are only conceptually distinct, so if something is really done by virtue of hyparxis, then it is really done by virtue of hypostasis. Third, "in their consubstantial communion" in the Clarification already says, explicitly, that the Father and the Son can undertake actions separately as consubstantial without violating divine simplicity, so this is actually accusing the Clarification of heresy. Fourth, it's completely misrepresenting what the claim of "in their consubstantial communion" means, because it means that they act by virtue of the Father's personal initiation of the act (the Father's possession of the essence), with the Son participating only be virtue of the common essence He has received from the Father. So this "reason" B1 is completely incoherent.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(B2) Contradicts dogma of unity of Essence/equality of Persons since F and S can do something by virtue of common essence that HS can't - i.e., originate divine Hypostasis. COE is immune to this objection because HS, as explained above, indeed also communicates Essence, though to creatures. (Notably, certain EO polemicists argue that even if COE is the dogma of Florence, COE to creatures is insufficient, claiming that HS must be communicating Essence to another divine Person for equality to be established - i.e., such EO are claiming that HS communicating divinity to creatures is insufficient to establish His divinity. This argument is heretical, contradicting the unanimous teaching of the fathers East and West that the fact HS communicates divinity to creatures PROVES that HS is God, because only divine Being can communicate divinity.)</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> Since the action is not done "by virtue of common essence" but rather by virtue of the Father's possession of the essence, this objection is specious. Likewise, no Father has ever said that the Holy Spirit communicates the divine essence in the <i>ad extra</i> sense in the same way that essence is communicated in the <i>ad intra</i> sense, which would be absurd.<br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(B3) Contradicts dogma of the monarchy of the Father. This seems pretty evident, but diarchists claim their position does not contradict this dogma because the Father is admitted to be "First Cause," while the Son is only a secondary cause, so to speak. Howevermuch that "logic" seems cogent to a diarchist, it actually contradicts the dogma of Florence, because the Florentine dogma asserts that S is cause in THE SAME WAY that F is cause. Thus, either S is First Cause or Source just like F (which is heresy since S is made to share F's hypostatic property), or S must be cause just like F in a DIFFERENT way - i.e., Son is NOT source. The dogma of COE asserts that S is cause in communicating Essence to HS just like F communicates Essence to HS. Concisely, F is BOTH source and communicator of Essence, but S is only communicator of Essence, NOT its source. The dogma of COE does not dichotomize source of Essence from source of Hypostasis, because Source of Essence and Hypostasis in the dogma of COE is F ALONE.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> This is confusing hypostatic properties with actions, and this is exactly why I said that the problem could've been caught all the way back at (A1). Certainly, only F is source of essence, and S is only communicator of essence. But since COE and OOH are identical, what this says is that F and S are both OOH and COE without F being S, which is exactly what Florence says. What is heretical (and nonsensical) is to say that S participated in COE but not OOH.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Two further elaborations are necessary, enumerated as (C1) and (C2).</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(C1) Opponents of COE ask: "How can Hypostasis exist at any time without Essence?" The response is: "How can one impose the notion of time on the immanent, eternal reality of the Godhead?" The truth is COE adherents do not conceive of COE as occurring subsequent to OOH, but rather that COE and OOH occur AT ONCE in the moment of Eternity. I would ask why such a notion - of intruding temporal considerations into the immanent reality - would even cross the minds of COE opponents, as this was the very mindset that led to the invention of the Arian and modalist heresies.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> Since this is not a question I've ever asked or ever would ask, it's not relevant. The assertion is that hypostasis and hyparxis are logically equivalent and only conceptually distinct. Time has nothing to do with it.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(C2) The second elaboration is a note of caution. I have encountered the argument that COE adherents claim COE EXCLUDES OOH. This is merely a polemical caricature proferred by its opponents. As this OP clarifies, the COE position only affirms a formal distinction from OOH. There is indeed an exclusion inherent in the dogma of COE, but it is not OOH per se; the exclusion applies to the notion that F gives to S His (F's) hypostatic property of being source of Essence and hypostasis. It is evident why diarchists would view the foregoing as a claim that OOH is excluded by COE - i.e., that S is source of Essence and Hypostasis with F is the defining characteristic of the diarchist doctrine on OOH, and to exclude that notion is equivalent in their view to excluding OOH altogether. Certain (not all) EO, on the other hand, proffer the same accusation based on the modern notion that the Greek expression dia tou Uios refers ONLY to a temporal manifestation, and is not relevant for the immanent reality of God in Eternity (though the Eastern medieval sources actually refer to the manifestation as eternal [hence occurring in the immanent reality], not temporal [not MERELY economic]).</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">JP> This misunderstands the objection. The point is that conceiving COE without OOH is logically incoherent, since the acts are logically equivalent. In other words, asserting a formal distinction between COE and OOH is nonsensical. </span></div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-43078306935871361492023-05-27T12:36:00.001-04:002023-07-04T10:58:55.799-04:00Prospective mitigation: the Trojan horse in Catholic moral theology<p style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Jesus stood up and said to her, “Woman, where are they? Has no one condemned you?” 11 She said, “No one, Lord.” And Jesus said, “Neither do I condemn you; go, and from now on sin no more.” (John 8:10-11)</span></i></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">And why not do evil that good may come?—as some people slanderously charge us with saying. Their condemnation is just. (Rom. 3:8)</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Anyone who does not love does not know God, because God is love. (1 John 4:9)</span></i></div><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The central message of the Christian faith is <i>metanoia</i>, turning toward God (<i>conversio</i>) and away from sin. This is not simply a revealed truth but a metaphysical truth. God called all things from non-being out of love for the purpose of love, which is why Christians affirm that "God is love." This is the entire purpose of our existence, and this is why the supernatural virtues of <i>faith</i>, <i>hope</i>, and <i>love</i> are essential to fulfilling this purpose in our lives. In <i>faith</i>, we recognize the invisible God in His relationship to us and respond accordingly. In <i>hope</i>, we firmly believe that we <i>can</i> achieve this <i>metanoia</i> that will enable us to live this relationship with him. In <i>love</i>, we realize this relationship in our lives.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But progressive moral theology, in its attempt to falsely display a sense of mercy for human weakness, actually erodes and even destroys the theological virtue of hope and its integration with the other virtues by standing in the way of <i>metanoia</i>. Historically, the virtue of hope is exemplified in the requirement of <i>firm purpose of amendment</i> in contrition. This is the resolute will not to sin again in the future, and it arises from the belief that God's grace can always suffice to "lead us not into temptation" under any circumstances. This is not to say, of course, that it is in any sense God's fault if we fall; the grace we had was sufficient, and we ourselves had the fault for refusing God's aid, knowing in faith that He was with us. But the hope that we will not sin in the future and the resolution to try, even knowing that we might fail, is essential to the ability to live the Christian life. And the exercise of Christian love, worrying about others rather than oneself, takes the focus off of one's own conduct, which fortifies hope. This is why the theological virtues tend to be lost in the opposite order; love first fails, which then weakens hope as the person becomes more self-centered, ultimately leading to the denial of the living relationship that faith acknowledges.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As I mentioned, the theological virtue of hope is strongly connected in <i>metanoia</i> to the firm purpose of amendment, and the Catechism reflects this in its teaching on sins against hope:</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><b><span style="font-family: inherit;">Hope</span></b></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">2090 When God reveals Himself and calls him, man cannot fully respond to the divine love by his own powers. He must hope that God will give him the capacity to love Him in return and to act in conformity with the commandments of charity. Hope is the confident expectation of divine blessing and the beatific vision of God; it is also the fear of offending God's love and of incurring punishment. </span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">2091 The first commandment is also concerned with sins against hope, namely, despair and presumption: </span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">By despair, man ceases to hope for his personal salvation from God, for help in attaining it or for the forgiveness of his sins. Despair is contrary to God's goodness, to his justice - for the Lord is faithful to his promises - and to his mercy. </span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">2092 There are two kinds of presumption. Either man presumes upon his own capacities, (hoping to be able to save himself without help from on high), or he presumes upon God's almighty power or his mercy (hoping to obtain his forgiveness without conversion and glory without merit).</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">It is that phrase "hoping to obtain his forgiveness without conversion" that is corrosive of the theological virtue of hope. Since hope pertains to future conduct, this refers to the false hope that we will be forgiven <i>despite</i> lacking the resolute will not to sin. We can be assured that God has given us sufficient grace that, if we are rightly disposed to receive it, we will not fall into sin. We <i>cannot</i> be assured that God will overcome our resistance to that grace if we ourselves have not turned toward Him and away from sin. To <i>expect</i> that God will do so is the false hope of presumption.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is not to say that one cannot be ignorant of the wrongness of one's conduct. It is entirely possible that one will not know that one's conduct involves grave matter. Although there is innate awareness of the natural law implicit in the proper function of reason, the fallen world has darkened the intellect through ignorance and deception, so that error or ignorance remains possible. This can even happen with respect to issues of life itself, as the "culture of death" pervades modern society:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">How did such a situation come about? Many different factors have to be taken into account. In the background there is the profound crisis of culture, which generates scepticism in relation to the very foundations of knowledge and ethics, and which makes it increasingly difficult to grasp clearly the meaning of what man is, the meaning of his rights and his duties. Then there are all kinds of existential and interpersonal difficulties, made worse by the complexity of a society in which individuals, couples and families are often left alone with their problems. There are situations of acute poverty, anxiety or frustration in which the struggle to make ends meet, the presence of unbearable pain, or instances of violence, especially against women, make the choice to defend and promote life so demanding as sometimes to reach the point of heroism.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><p><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">All this explains, at least in part, how the value of life can today undergo a kind of "eclipse", even though conscience does not cease to point to it as a sacred and inviolable value, as is evident in the tendency to disguise certain crimes against life in its early or final stages by using innocuous medical terms which distract attention from the fact that what is involved is the right to life of an actual human person. <br /></span></i></p></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">In fact, while the climate of widespread moral uncertainty can in some way be explained by the multiplicity and gravity of today's social problems, and these can sometimes mitigate the subjective responsibility of individuals, it is no less true that we are confronted by an even larger reality, which can be described as a veritable structure of sin. This reality is characterized by the emergence of a culture which denies solidarity and in many cases takes the form of a veritable "culture of death". This culture is actively fostered by powerful cultural, economic and political currents which encourage an idea of society excessively concerned with efficiency. Looking at the situation from this point of view, it is possible to speak in a certain sense of a war of the powerful against the weak: a life which would require greater acceptance, love and care is considered useless, or held to be an intolerable burden, and is therefore rejected in one way or another. A person who, because of illness, handicap or, more simply, just by existing, compromises the well-being or life-style of those who are more favoured tends to be looked upon as an enemy to be resisted or eliminated. In this way a kind of "conspiracy against life" is unleashed. This conspiracy involves not only individuals in their personal, family or group relationships, but goes far beyond, to the point of damaging and distorting, at the international level, relations between peoples and States. [Evangelium Vitae 11-12]</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">...</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Decisions that go against life sometimes arise from difficult or even tragic situations of profound suffering, loneliness, a total lack of economic prospects, depression and anxiety about the future. Such circumstances can mitigate even to a notable degree subjective responsibility and the consequent culpability of those who make these choices which in themselves are evil. But today the problem goes far beyond the necessary recognition of these personal situations. It is a problem which exists at the cultural, social and political level, where it reveals its more sinister and disturbing aspect in the tendency, ever more widely shared, to interpret the above crimes against life as legitimate expressions of individual freedom, to be acknowledged and protected as actual rights. [Evangelium Vitae 18]</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">...</span></i></div><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">But today, in many people's consciences, the perception of its gravity has become progressively obscured. The acceptance of abortion in the popular mind, in behaviour and even in law itself, is a telling sign of an extremely dangerous crisis of the moral sense, which is becoming more and more incapable of distinguishing between good and evil, even when the fundamental right to life is at stake. [Evangelium Vitae 58]</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Although, as Pope St. John Paul II says here, "conscience does not cease to point to [life] as a sacred and inviolable value," what we see in the culture of death is an intersection of pervasive ignorance and enormous social pressure, neither of which alone would be exculpatory but which in combination may be. When one does not perceive the gravity of what one is doing, in large part because the humanity of the fetus is obscured by trusted experts, then one's moral agency may be overwhelmed by pressures that would not in the least be exculpatory for a well-formed conscience. Thus, this social disinformation campaign creates a social structure of sin in which deceived members of society, disproportionately the weak, are unable to exercise their moral judgment correctly.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">We should not judge such victims of the social structures of sin too harshly, as <i>EV</i> teaches concerning the "necessary recognition of these personal situations." But we would do a grave injustice to these people if we were to deprive them of hope that they can turn from sin and live. And this is exactly what we would do if we allowed "subjective responsibility and the consequent culpability" to prospectively excuse grave sin of which they have become conscious. Giving this license to sin would effectively deprive the person of hope, instead substituting the false hope of presumption for the Gospel. It would make the culture of death not something to be overcome but instead an irresistible inevitability that grace can never penetrate. It would make true contrition, true <i>metanoia</i>, an impossibility.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Yet this false hope is exactly what progressive dissenters have been selling since <i>Humanae Vitae</i> was first published, and far too few Catholics have been engaged in stopping them. And since <i>Amoris Laetitia</i>, these dissenters have only become more emboldened. In this article, I explain why the dissenters were able to exploit weaknesses in <i>Amoris Laetitia </i>to do so and how it has led two prominent defenders of Pope Francis, Pedro Gabriel and Stephen Walford, into progressive dissent.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">I. <i>Metanoia</i> and the Sacraments</span></u></div><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As ministers of the Sacraments, priests have a unique and essential role in calling people to <i>metanoia</i>. Authority figures who are charged with responsibility over others have a different set of responsibility owing to their positive obligation to protect those who may not be capable of protecting themselves. For that reason Scripture says "Not many of you should become teachers, my brothers, for you know that we who teach will be judged with greater strictness" (James 3:1). To compare this to a mundane situation, there are laws that require people to be assessed for adequate skill before being allowed the privilege of driving. Subjectively, people may consider themselves capable of driving safely, but the privilege is nonetheless regulated as a matter of public safety. So there is both the moral duty not to drive in a way that will harm others and the greater duty of the authority figures to regulate driving, regardless of whether anyone is actually harmed by lax regulation.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">We can turn to a couple of similar examples. A bodyguard has a duty of care over the person he is protecting. If a bodyguard fails to exercise this care in a way to prevent harm to his charge or worse conspires with an assailant, then he has broken his duty in a way that makes him responsible for it. With respect to laws against abortion or euthanasia, for example, the government has a positive duty not to grant a license to do these things, just as it has a positive duty not to grant a license to assassination, duels, or "honor killing." This moral duty as protector and moral tutor is distinct from the government's actual ability to prevent the evil; it is a much graver assault to the common good to positively license murder with government authority, even if that regulation were actually to result in less murder, than to be negligent, because the formal complicity with the wrong is absent in the latter case. (This distinction and its gravity is, however, frequently lost on voters who might tend to consider <i>licensing the murder of millions of unborn children</i> to somehow be proportionate to <i>mildly disagreeing with me on exactly how trillions of dollars of taxing and spending will be allocated</i>. But that is a separate discussion; for now, we will only consider it as an example of this duty to protect.)</span></p><p></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Priests likewise have a <i>duty to protect</i> the Eucharist from abuse and sacrilege, one example of which is reflected in canon 915: "Those who have been excommunicated or interdicted after the imposition or declaration of the penalty and others obstinately persevering in manifest grave sin are not to be admitted to holy communion." While the canon is an explicit obligation, the underlying duty is a moral one that cannot be dispensed; the priest is obliged to prevent people who have publicly broken from the Church from partaking of the Eucharist in an abusive way. This is why "manifest grave sin" is not the same thing as "a mortal (grave) sin committed in public," when we might have no idea about whether the person has met the conditions of full knowledge and consent. Rather, "manifest grave sin" is a public act that objectively declares opposition to the Church's moral teaching, regardless of whether or not one is personally guilty of sin in doing so. Likewise is the case for Protestants who have a manifestly different sacramental teaching, who may then receive the Eucharist only in grave circumstances and when "the person [is] unable to have recourse for the sacrament desired to a minister of his or her own Church or ecclesial Community, ask[s] for the sacrament of his or her own initiative, [and] manifest[s] Catholic faith in this sacrament and [is] properly disposed."</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">When the priest fails to exercise this duty to protect the Eucharist, this is a <i>scandal</i> to the faithful. Note that the scandal is not that someone might have taken sacrilegious Communion, although that is certainly to be avoided, but that the priest has scandalously failed in his duty to act as guardian. This is analogous, albeit applicable to an entirely different genus of sin, to the scandal one feels at a government that gives license to murderers. For that reason, when there has been a public break from the Church, there may need to be some form of public reconciliation, although there might be objective reasons for not requiring this. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In addition, when there has been a public break from the faith, the priest also has a responsibility to assess that the person has <i>objectively</i> reconciled himself to the faith, which will generally require confession of the manifest grave sin, including firm purpose of amendment to avoid that sin in the future. The priest has a grave duty not to give absolution and to bind the person not to participate in the Eucharist if there is at least reasonable doubt whether the person has a firm purpose of amendment for grave sins brought forward in Confession. If the priest fails to do so, then he might give the penitent a <i>false sense of security</i>. This pertains directly to the dogma of the matter of Confession, since true contrition (including the resolution not to sin again) is a requirement of matter for the sins to be confessed.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">With respect to firm purpose of amendment, priests do not judge (or at least are not supposed to judge) subjective guilt in the confessional; it is not their role to judge guilt. Instead, what they judge objectively is firm purpose of amendment -- that the penitent has made a sincere resolution not to commit the sin again, <i>even if the person may fail in the attempt</i>. This is an essential element of the matter of Penance; it cannot be omitted or changed any more than the bread or wine can be omitted or replaced the Eucharist. What the priest judges then is the <i>objective evidence</i> of the firm purpose of amendment, not the person's <i>subjective guilt</i> for the sins being confessed, which no man can judge. And with respect to manifest grave sin, public acts that show an objective contradiction to the faith, that objective evidence requires accounting for what is publicly known.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">One of the heresies of Protestantism was exactly that objective contrition and Penance was not required for access to the Eucharist. Hence, the Council of Trent replied as follows:</span></div><i style="text-align: start;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br />Now, ecclesiastical usage declares that such an examination is necessary in order that no one conscious to himself of mortal sin, <b>however contrite he may feel</b>, ought to receive the Sacred Eucharist without previous sacramental confession.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is reflected in canon 916: "A person who is conscious of grave sin is not to celebrate Mass or receive the body of the Lord without previous sacramental confession unless there is a grave reason and there is no opportunity to confess; in this case the person is to remember the obligation to make an act of perfect contrition which includes the resolution of confessing as soon as possible." In Confession, the priest plays a role with respect to this canon in the internal forum; he provides an objective assessment of whether the requirement of objective contrition has been met. There is still a requirement that the person be "conscious to himself of mortal sin," which includes any situation of grave matter of which he might be responsible. If there is any reasonable doubt in that matter, the requirement "however contrite he may feel" implies that the person short of moral certainty should instead confess this sin and submit it to the objective judgment of the Church. The question required for this examination under canon 916 is not "am I guilty of mortal sin?," which may be difficult or impossible to judge based on one's own feelings, but "have I adequately repented for what I am conscious of having done, even if I am not sure I am guilty?" This is why the canon uses the term "grave sin," referring to awareness of objectively grave conduct, as opposed to "mortal sin," which is a question of guilt. In the absence of having done so, there is no adequate basis for moral security, and consequently, no adequate examination of conscience before the Eucharist.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In short, in situations when someone has through public action (including manifest grave sin) put himself in <i>irregular relationship with the Church</i>, the person must therefore take steps with a priest to <i>regularize his relationship with the Church</i>. That irregular relationship must be sufficiently regularized for the priest to determine that the person has turned from the previous public action with firm purpose of amendment. With regard to scandal, the person may also need to take some public action as well. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is confirmed by the Pontifical Council on Legislative Texts. On June 24, 2000 Declaration in response to the question: “Should a priest deny Communion to a Catholic who is an obstinate public sinner?,” the reason for the affirmative answer was as follows (emphasis added): “In effect, the reception of the body of Christ when one is publicly unworthy constitutes an objective harm to the ecclesial communion: <b>it is a behavior that affects the rights of the Church and of all the faithful to live in accord with the exigencies of that communion</b>." In other words, the priest's duty to guard the Eucharist in public is not just a matter of the pastoral relationship with the penitent; it pertains directly to the priest's public role as a minister of the Church.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">With the issue properly framed in terms of both the priest's <i>public duty to guard the Eucharist </i>and <i>private duty to require firm purpose of amendment</i>, we can now turn to the moral specification of adultery.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">I. Adultery as a species of sin</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The <i>Catechism of the Catholic Church</i> in Part 3, Section 2, groups sexual sins generally as violations of the Sixth Commandment "You shall not commit adultery" based on our Lord's explanation in Matthew 5:27-28 "You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall not commit adultery.’ But I say to you that everyone who looks at a woman with lustful intent has already committed adultery with her in his heart." From this, we conclude that the commandment prohibits violations of <i>the state of chastity required before marriage</i>, <i>the failure to enter into the state of marriage when one is treating another person as a spouse</i>, and <i>the violation of marital vows in the state of marriage</i>. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Thus, "adultery" can be understood in two senses. One is the sense that Jesus means: a violation of the commandment against adultery, which can include sins of lust generally. This is the sense in which even hatred of one's brother is a violation of the commandment against murder; it shares the same root disposition against which the commandment is written. But if we restrict ourselves to the narrower sense, "adultery" is a sin against marriage, which is the consecration of the sexual faculty to another person in indissoluble union. In this sense, adultery refers to sins against that consecrated union, going beyond mere violations of chastity or other impurity. For this reason, the Catechism groups this section into <i>sins against chastity</i>, which are possible for the unmarried (lust, fornication, masturbation, pornography, prostitution, and rape), and <i>sins against marriage</i>, which are possible only for the married or for those living in a state that is only appropriate for the married (adultery, divorce, polygamy, incest, free union/trial marriage). "Fornication" refers exclusively to sexual activity with another person <i>before</i> the sexual faculty has been consecrated to union; afterward, it is <i>adultery</i>, which I will specifically refer to as "adulterous sex."</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">What the Catechism teaches is that within the category of "adultery" in the sense of sins against marriage, there are two species of sins: breach of the sexual consecration (adulterous sex) and attacks on the union as such. The latter is why (civil) divorce may be a sin even if the person does not remarry; it is publicly inconsistent with that person's profession of entering into an indissoluble union. But the Church recognizes that there may be objective justifications for doing so, so the Magisterium has clarified that this is not in itself "manifest grave sin" if the public civil act indicates that such an objective justification was present (<i>e</i>.<i>g</i>., the innocent spouse was abandoned, abused, or betrayed; the other spouse is entirely unwilling to reconcile and may have remarried). This clarification was primarily due to the fact that civil divorce as a stand-alone institution independent of the religious authority was a relatively recent development, and the modern system of "no-fault" divorce was even more recent than that, making the situations much rarer and more reasonably subject to case-by-case administration. So this public declaration by the Magisterium that not all civil divorce is sinful allows the priest to fulfill his duty without scandal to the faithful or to his own conscience.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Divorce <i>and remarriage</i> (meaning civil remarriage) falls into this class of sins against the union itself, not in the same subspecies of sin adulterous sex. Adulterous sex itself may take place, or it may not, but whether it does or not, it would be a separate subspecies of sin. As our Lord says, "Everyone who divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery, and he who marries a woman divorced from her husband commits adultery" (Luke 16:18). Unlike divorce, this has traditionally been considered "manifest grave sin," which the Catechism calls "a situation of public and permanent adultery," as contrasted with adulterous sex, which is "occult" in the sense of moral theology (there is no way to tell whether it is happening unless the remarried couple separates). There might be good reasons to divorce, but there are no such objective reasons to remarry, which is simply a sin against the indissoluble union that one had already formed. This lends itself to a very simple rule: anyone who is remarried is barred from the public celebration of the Eucharist.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But here we reach an extraordinarily difficult problem: <i>what if someone innocently divorced and/or remarried due to inculpable ignorance, or what if someone who sinfully divorced and/or remarried now repents</i>? Given that it is a public break from the faith of the Church, the priest has both a public and private responsibility: to guard the Eucharist in public and to assure objective repentance (firm purpose of amendment) in private before (1) giving absolution for the public break and (2) providing spiritual direction to the penitent either to return to the Eucharist or to continue to refrain from it until the proper disposition with respect to the prior (objective) sin is achieved. Certainly with respect to the public break, there might be massive practical obstacles to regularizing the situation (the most common being inability to obtain an annulment even if one might be morally certain that the prior marriage was invalid). And with respect to the private situation, the fact that one half of the couple may have sincerely repented does not mean that the other one will, especially in a mixed marriage. It is this complex situation that set the context for <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> and <i>Amoris Laetitia</i>.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">II. The solution of <i>Familiaris Consortio</i></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Familiaris Consortio </i>84 completely separates the public and private aspects of the issue. Essentially, it requires the priest to treat the divorce-and-remarriage as a manifest grave sin in public while handling it in terms of firm purpose of amendment in private. With respect to the priest's public role, <i>FC</i> 84 says the following:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">However, the Church reaffirms her practice, which is based upon Sacred Scripture, of not admitting to Eucharistic Communion divorced persons who have remarried. They are unable to be admitted thereto from the fact that their state and condition of life objectively contradict that union of love between Christ and the Church which is signified and effected by the Eucharist. Besides this, there is another special pastoral reason: if these people were admitted to the Eucharist, the faithful would be led into error and confusion regarding the Church's teaching about the indissolubility of marriage.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In private, however, the following applies:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Reconciliation in the sacrament of Penance which would open the way to the Eucharist, can only be granted to those who, repenting of having broken the sign of the Covenant and of fidelity to Christ, are sincerely ready to undertake a way of life that is no longer in contradiction to the indissolubility of marriage. This means, in practice, that when, for serious reasons, such as for example the children's upbringing, a man and a woman cannot satisfy the obligation to separate, they "take on themselves the duty to live in complete continence, that is, by abstinence from the acts proper to married couples."</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Some people (mistakenly) took this as intending that such people could return to the Eucharist <i>in public</i>. That would be inconsistent with Pope St. John Paul II's homily that was cited in <i>FC 84</i>. In that homily, he said:</span></div><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br />Although it should not be denied that these people can receive, if necessary, the sacrament of penance and then Eucharistic communion, when with a sincere heart they embrace a way of life that is not in contradiction with the indissolubility of marriage, that is , when the man and the woman, who cannot comply with the obligation to separate, agree to live in total continence, that is, abstaining from the acts proper only to the spouses and <b>at the same time there is no scandal</b>; however, <b>the deprivation of sacramental reconciliation with God</b> should not distance them in the slightest from perseverance in prayer, penance and the exercise of charity, so that they can finally achieve the grace of conversion and salvation.</span></i><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">"The deprivation of sacramental reconciliation with God" here refers to those people who <i>cannot</i> meet the conditions, who should nevertheless pray for the conversion of heart that will enable them to pursue continence as they are morally obliged to do. But even those who do must still avoid the scandal of public Communion. The Pontifical Council on Legislative Texts on June 24, 2000 <a href="https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/intrptxt/documents/rc_pc_intrptxt_doc_20000706_declaration_en.html" target="_blank">reiterated that this is the case</a>. First, the Council noted that the public responsibility of the priest to guard the Eucharist is objective, and it does not depend on the subjective culpability of the people in question:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>The prohibition found in the cited canon [915], by its nature, is derived from divine law and transcends the domain of positive ecclesiastical laws: the latter cannot introduce legislative changes which would oppose the doctrine of the Church. The scriptural text on which the ecclesial tradition has always relied is that of St. Paul: "This means that whoever eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord unworthily sins against the body and blood of the Lord. A man should examine himself first only then should he eat of the bread and drink of the cup. He who eats and drinks without recognizing the body eats and drinks a judgment on himself."</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><p align="left"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>This text concerns in the first place the individual faithful and their moral conscience, a reality that is expressed as well by the Code in can. 916. But the unworthiness that comes from being in a state of sin also poses a serious juridical problem in the Church: indeed the canon of the </i>Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches<i> that is parallel to can. 915 CIC of the Latin Church makes reference to the term "unworthy": "Those who are publicly unworthy are forbidden from receiving the Divine Eucharist" (can. 712). In effect, the reception of the Body of Christ when one is publicly unworthy constitutes an objective harm to the ecclesial communion: it is a behavior that affects the rights of the Church and of all the faithful to live in accord with the exigencies of that communion. In the concrete case of the admission to Holy Communion of faithful who are divorced and remarried, the scandal, understood as an action that prompts others towards wrongdoing, affects at the same time both the sacrament of the Eucharist and the indissolubility of marriage. That scandal exists even if such behavior, unfortunately, no longer arouses surprise: in fact it is precisely with respect to the deformation of the conscience that it becomes more necessary for Pastors to act, with as much patience as firmness, as a protection to the sanctity of the Sacraments and a defense of Christian morality, and for the correct formation of the faithful.</i></span></p></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">So with respect to access to the Eucharist, the person must be both privately worthy under canon 916 AND publicly worthy under canon 915. With respect to divorce itself, as mentioned previously, there can be public information that provides a justification for the divorce. Otherwise, manifest grave sin is "a serious juridical problem" that prevents the minister of the Sacrament from publicly granting access to the Eucharist, <i>even if the person is rightly disposed in private</i>. The Council therefore concludes:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">Those faithful who are divorced and remarried would not be considered to be within the situation of serious habitual sin who would not be able, for serious motives - such as, for example, the upbringing of the children - "to satisfy the obligation of separation, assuming the task of living in full continence, that is, abstaining from the acts proper to spouses" (</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">Familiaris consortio</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">, n. 84), and who on the basis of that intention have received the sacrament of Penance. Given that the fact that these faithful are not living</span><span style="text-align: -webkit-left;"><i> </i>more uxorio</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;"> is </span><span style="text-align: -webkit-left;">per se</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;"> occult, while their condition as persons who are divorced and remarried is per se manifest, they will be able to receive Eucharistic Communion only </span><span style="text-align: -webkit-left;">remoto scandalo</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: -webkit-left;">.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Thus, <i>Familaris Consortio</i> holds that the declared intent to live as brother and sister suffices to show <i>firm purpose of amendment</i> from the sin of remarriage, meaning that the priest can grant absolution and even the Eucharist in private (or the penitent may go elsewhere that the person is unknown). But unless there is some public sign of that intent, it does not remove the manifest grave sin, meaning the priest must still refuse Communion in public.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">II. The new teaching of <i>Amoris Laetitia</i></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The context of <i>AL</i> Chapter 8 was this situation after <i>FC</i>, in which the remarried and even some divorced Catholic who were not remarried were barred from receiving the Eucharist in public. Unfortunately, <i>AL</i> not only failed to provide any useful guidance for the objective at all but also blurred the critical public-private distinction (by not even mentioning it at all), thereby opening the door for proportionalists to foment dissension against the infallible teaching of <i>Veritatis Splendor</i>. Technically, what <i>AL</i> says is correct and does not contradict the infallible teaching of <i>VS</i>. But, as I will outline, it is so blindingly obvious that that the progressive dissenters can exploit the resulting ambiguity (which they have actually done without a word of criticism from the Pope) that the document itself was at best grossly imprudent.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">What <i>AL</i> seems to have been <i>intended</i> to do is to say that <i>remaining</i> in civil remarriage is not necessarily a manifest grave sin, in the same way that civil divorce is not necessarily a manifest grave sin. Just as we have clarified the teaching to say that not every civil divorce would keep one from participating in the Eucharist, perhaps the same can be said of remarriage. Perhaps the most obvious example would be a convert from another faith who might have been remarried but who cannot reasonably depart from commitments to support the new family. As with the case of divorce, there may be objective evidence of these sorts of commitments, or they may be less apparent but still reasonably inferred. But in any case, we can recognize that there may be such reasonably apparent and just causes for remaining remarried, so that despite failing at the objective ideal, the failure might not amount to "manifest grave sin." Therefore, it is not reasonable to exclude such people from public celebration of the Eucharist any more than it would be to exclude divorcees as a general practice. It is not "manifest" that the objective irregularity entails "grave sin," since there might be good reasons for remaining in the union.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">And that is, in fact, what I believe the new Magisterial teaching of <i>AL </i>to be. It is a matter of sacramental discipline concerning the priest's obligation to withhold the Eucharist on the basis of manifest grave sin, and it is providing Magisterial guidance to the effect that being or remaining in a remarried state in the current societal conditions might no longer necessarily be viewed as "manifest grave sin," given that there is reasonable public notice that there might be sufficient justification for remaining in such a union, especially when children are involved. This judgment is, however, left to the judgment of the bishops in various countries as to how well this is understood; some may maintain the current discipline, and others may vary it. This amounts to a revision to the Catechism's statement that remarriage is "a situation of public and permanent adultery," which is similar to the previous Magisterial revision to say that the state of being divorced would not, in and of itself, be considered manifest grave sin as an ongoing opposition to Church teaching. Effectively, it provides an objective basis for reasonably shifting this issue from the public forum to the private forum based on the judgment of the episcopal conference. That is a reasonable and merciful accommodation for people who would otherwise need to take the Eucharist in secret or in a remote parish, being careful to avoid any priest or person who might be acquainted with the situation.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Contrary to Pedro Gabriel's assertion that opponents of his view of <i>AL</i> are simply refusing to accept new teaching, I <i>eagerly accept</i> this new Magisterial teaching. As a general rule, if we can charitably assume that people are being continent in any kind of irregular union, be it remarriage, cohabitation, or even same-sex unions, it is better that we all be allowed to do so when it is clear that the Church does not bless or condone them. Remaining in a union is not the same as entering that union in the first place, the latter being an act the person may now even regret having done. I do not think separating people from the parish who are not openly declaring their opposition to the faith helps either the parish or those trying to walk in faith. </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I believe this is exactly what Pope Francis meant when he said in <i>AL</i> 297: "No one can be condemned for ever, because that is not the logic of the Gospel!" (We can easily dispense with the interpretation that this is a denial of the doctrine of Hell; Pope Francis manifestly accepts that doctrine.) Rather, if someone who has done an objectively wrong thing in the past has repented of it, it makes no sense that such a person would continued to be viewed as one in "manifest grave sin" thereafter even if that person has actually repented of the sin and shows no ongoing opposition, yet he nonetheless retains real obligations as a consequence of the prior actions. This interpretation is consistent with what Pope Francis presents as a contrasting case that would forbid access to the Eucharist, although not necessarily as a complete bar to parish life: "Naturally, if someone flaunts an objective sin as if it were part of the Christian ideal, or wants to impose something other than what the Church teaches, he or she can in no way presume to teach or preach to others; this is a case of something which separates from the community (cf. Mt 18:17)."</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But the problem is that <i>the reasoning offered in support of this conclusion is non-existent</i>. The standard for whether something is "manifest grave sin" under canon 915, which is not even mentioned at all, is <i>objective</i> not <i>subjective</i>. The Pope's reasoning, such as it is, for not keeping the remarried from the public celebration of the Eucharist seems entirely reasonable in <i>AL </i>296-300. The Pope seems to be thinking of canon 915 when <i>AL</i> mentions "a new set of general rules, canonical in nature and applicable to all cases" while being conscious of the need to avoid the risk that the accommodation will "lead people to think that the Church maintains a double standard." Likewise, when saying that "[i]t must remain clear that this is not the ideal which the Gospel proposes for marriage and the family," the Pope definitely has in mind "the ideal" that the couple regularizes their status, either by separation or annulment of the prior union. But because the Pope never once speaks on the objective requirements of manifest grave sin (external forum) or firm purpose of amendment (internal forum), this statements are highly vulnerable to being twisted in a radically subjectivist way. Even worse, there is the one footnote 329 that augurs poorly; it is a sign of worse things to come in AL 301-303. Specifically, this represents an intrusion of a completely irrelevant consideration: mitigating factors.<br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">III. "Mitigating factors" (which have nothing to do with anything)</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Thus far, in context, all of the discussion about "irregular unions," specifically, divorced Catholics and remarried Catholics has been consistent with previous developments. Namely, the objective ideal for such Catholics is to regularize their living arrangements either by (1) reuniting with the original spouse, (2) declaring the original marriage null, or (3) undertaking a public act of separation. That is the only way to rectify the objective public situation, so that the union can become regular. When <i>AL</i> uses the term "ideal" or "objective ideal," it is clearly referring to this regularized relationship by its repeated and manifest use of the term, as for example:</span></div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /><i>The ideal of marriage, marked by a commitment to exclusivity and stability, is swept aside whenever it proves inconvenient or tiresome. [AL 34]</i></span><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">The Christian ideal, especially in families, is a love that never gives up. I am sometimes amazed to see men or women who have had to separate from their spouse for their own protection, yet, because of their enduring conjugal love, still try to help them, even by enlisting others, in their moments of illness, suffering or trial. Here too we see a love that never gives up. [AL 119]</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">The ideal of marriage cannot be seen purely as generous donation and self-sacrifice, where each spouse renounces all personal needs and seeks only the other’s good without concern for personal satisfaction. [AL 157]</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Married couples are grateful that their pastors uphold the high ideal of a love that is strong, solid, enduring and capable of sustaining them through whatever trials they may have to face. [AL 200]</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Often, however, we ourselves do not take advantage of those occasions when they do return, to remind them of the beautiful ideal of Christian marriage and the support that our parishes can offer them. [AL 230]</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 13pt; text-align: start;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Some forms of union radically contradict this ideal, while others realize it in at least a partial and analogous way. The Synod Fathers stated that the Church does not disregard the constructive elements in those situations which do not yet or no longer correspond to her teaching on marriage. [AL 292]</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 13pt; text-align: start;"><br /></span></div><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Naturally, if someone flaunts an objective sin as if it were part of the Christian ideal, or wants to impose something other than what the Church teaches, he or she can in no way presume to teach or preach to others; this is a case of something which separates from the community (cf. Mt 18:17). [AL 297]<br /><br />There are also the cases of those who made every effort to save their first marriage and were unjustly abandoned, or of “those who have entered into a second union for the sake of the children’s upbringing, and are sometimes subjectively certain in conscience that their previous and irreparably broken marriage had never been valid”. Another thing is a new union arising from a recent divorce, with all the suffering and confusion which this entails for children and entire families, or the case of someone who has consistently failed in his obligations to the family. It must remain clear that this is not the ideal which the Gospel proposes for marriage and the family. [AL 298]</span></i></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is absolutely clear; the objective ideal is Christian marriage, and any state that deviates from that ideal, necessarily including remarriage, is "objective sin" (which, as with divorce, might not be "manifest grave sin"), and this situation is "not the ideal which the Gospel proposes for marriage and the family." <i style="text-align: justify;">FC</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> recognized that remarried Catholics might not be </span><i style="text-align: justify;">privately</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> sinful and might repent, but because of the conflict with the objective ideal in remarriage, public participation in the Eucharist could not be allowed. </span><i style="text-align: justify;">AL</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> then extended the teaching concerning public divorce to say that remarried Catholics might also not be in a situation of </span><i style="text-align: justify;">manifest grave sin,</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> given information known to the public concerning civil divorces and lack of sinful intent in entering such unions. The point is that </span><i style="text-align: justify;">none of this teaching in AL 296-300 relates to subjective culpability</i><span style="text-align: justify;">. It is solely related to the </span><i style="text-align: justify;">public inclusion</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> of remarried Catholics in the life of the Church, a new teaching which was, in my opinion, sorely overdue.</span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: justify;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: justify;">Frankly, if we are reading <i>AL</i> honestly, the Pope's intent to address this issue of public participation is <i>manifestly clear</i>. The goal, the objective ideal, is a regularized state of marital life. The Holy Father, in line with his predecessor Pope St. John Paul II recognizes that returning to this state may be difficult or impossible based on past choices and that the duty to remain continent in such circumstances is quite difficult, especially without the help of the Sacraments. When Pope Francis speaks of "mitigating circumstances," he does <i>not</i> mean mitigation of the duty to remain continent. Not one word in <i>Amoris Laetitia</i> says otherwise, and this would be a complete contradiction of his own predecessor and the age-old moral teaching of the Catholic Church. He manifestly means mitigation of <i>the moral duty to regularize one's objective situation to the Christian ideal</i>, not the <i>moral duty to remain continent</i>. Only the former could even possibly be the subject of public scandal barring access to public participation in the Eucharist. The problem is that unlike St. John Paul II, <i>Pope Francis never mentions the duty to remain continent!</i> So while we know that the objective ideal he has in mind is a regularized state of life, from both the fair reading of his words and from a basic hermeneutic of continuity, dissenters from the moral teaching of Pope St. John Paul II have exploited Pope Francis's silence on the obligation to remain continent to further their dissent. (I note that traditionalist dissenters have likewise used the opportunity to interpret the Pope's words contrary to his expressed intent.)</span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit; text-align: justify;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="text-align: justify;">But in terms of giving ammunition to dissenters, the Pope has only himself to blame, because in what appears to be an attempt to express <i>sympathy</i> for sinners, he sounds like he is giving <i>license</i> to sinners. First, </span><span style="text-align: justify;">there is this curious footnote, apparently a note in passing that says concerning people who remain in remarried union, which says "In such situations [</span><i style="text-align: justify;">viz</i><span style="text-align: justify;">. remarried unions], many people, knowing and accepting the possibility of living 'as brothers and sisters' which the Church offers them, </span><b style="text-align: justify;">point out that if certain expressions of intimacy are lacking</b><span style="text-align: justify;">, 'it often happens that faithfulness is endangered and the good of the children suffers.'" By using the language "many people .... point out," this cannot be </span><span style="text-align: justify;">more than a sympathetic observation, which is actually quite common when moral teaching is perceived to be difficult. For example, <i>FC</i> points out the difficulties of complying with the teaching on contraception, but it clearly does not suggest that the teaching on contraception is optional. The problem is that it quotes language from the Second Vatican Council completely out of context in doing so, which can imply that there is something dogmatic here, even though a careful reading of the statement in context rules it out</span><span style="text-align: justify;">.</span></span></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">A footnote is one thing; three entire sections in <i>AL</i> (301-303) is much worse. In discussing mitigating circumstances, Pope Francis clearly has in mind people who are being excessively judgmental, which is a frequent concern of his. This is why he makes the otherwise inexplicable statement that it "can no longer simply be said that all those in any 'irregular' situation are living in a state of mortal sin and are deprived of sanctifying grace." Of course, that's been obviously true since <i>Familiaris Consortio</i>, which gave access to the Sacrament of Penance to the divorced and remarried, so this is actually just a reiteration of the teaching along with an instruction not to judge others in violation of this standard. But it has never been the case that anyone, even priests in the confessional, are supposed to <i>judge</i> whether someone is in mortal sin. The Holy Father has thus raised this <i>legitimate</i> concern (that no one, not even priests should be judging the state of someone's soul) in a way that, by his own silence, fails to clearly rule out heresy in moral theology.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Here we must turn back to the priest's role in Confession, which is not to judge people's hearts. What the priest judges then is the <i>objective evidence</i> of the firm purpose of amendment, not the person's <i>subjective guilt</i> for the sins being confessed, which no man can judge. And with respect to manifest grave sin, public acts that show an objective contradiction to the faith, that objective evidence requires accounting for what is publicly known. If the priest determines that the penitent lacks firm purpose of amendment with respect to <i>either</i> (1) the sin of remarriage, which is public or (2) the sin of adulterous sex, which is entirely private, he should advise that person not to partake of the Eucharist based on the objective evidence of lack of firm purpose of amendment, even if that person <i>might</i> be subjectively inculpable. This is because priests are not in the heart-judging business; they are ministers of the Sacraments, and they must administer them objectively.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">To put it another way, mitigating circumstances are <i>retrospective</i> and <i>subjective</i>; contrition is <i>prospective</i> and <i>objective</i>. Moral security is provided by the <i>objective</i> and not the <i>subjective</i>. In the case of (past) remarriage and failing to rectify the situation, it is possible to have such moral security, since there may in fact be objective reasons why one might remain in a union while truly repenting of ever intentionally having done so. That is, it is possible to show <i>objective contrition</i> even while remaining remarried based on objective reasons, such as children of the later marriage or similar responsibilities, which indicate that the person has indeed repented of any sinful intention with respect to the previous fall but is unable to rectify the objective situation without further sin. This is why remarriage in itself, like divorce, might not be considered a manifest grave sin requiring exclusion from the Eucharist: such objective evidence of plausible reasons for the person being unable to rectify the situation may be available. With respect to adulterous sex, on the other hand, firm purpose of amendment requires intent to live as brother and sister unless one has a morally secure basis for considered one's previous marriage null; there simply is no other objective basis for moral security otherwise. That has nothing to do with mitigating circumstances at all, because the relevant consideration for readmission to the Eucharist is objective contrition, not subjective guilt.</span></div></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="text-align: left;">Given, then, that the only relevance of Pope Francis's observation of mitigating circumstances as against people (including priests and bystanders at Mass) </span><i style="text-align: left;">wrongly</i><span style="text-align: left;"> attempting to judge people's hearts, Pope Francis's failure to draw these distinctions between the sin of remarriage and the sin of adulterous sex and between objective contrition and subjective guilt is extraordinarily dangerous. It is so dangerous in fact that it has </span><i style="text-align: left;">actually led</i><span style="text-align: left;"> people like Stephen Walford and Pedro Gabriel into material heresy, and if they weren't simply oblivious to these distinctions (primarily due to Pope Francis's failure to even mention them), it would be formal heresy. Pope Francis's desire to chastise people for judging others, which is not wrong in itself, nonetheless has abandoned the sheepfold to predacious wolves in sheep's clothing. He appears to be more concerned with correcting people who are too judgmental in his view than providing guidance to those who are in desperate need of what Pope St. John Paul II refers to as "the grace of conversion and salvation."</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">IV. <i>AL</i> on firm purpose of amendment</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This confusion is enabling dissenters to attempt to use the teaching of <i>AL</i> to make the internal forum purely subjective, a push that has been on since <i>Humanae Vitae</i>. But while the internal forum is definitely not external, in that it is not public, but it is also not purely subjective. It is a dialogue between the subjective, the penitent, and the objective, the priest who requires objective contrition in the form of the firm purpose of amendment. The confessional is where the penitent is <i>made accountable to the objective</i>, even if one's subjective guilt might not have been fully imputable. Even if one had not turned fully to sin, by God's providence, one must still decisively turn away from it in order to be rightly disposed for the Eucharist. This is the <i>metanoia</i> about which Pedro Gabriel writes extensively, but that <i>metanoia</i> is not rationalizing oneself into material heresy based on a misguided loyalty, but instead the requirement we all have to turn from our sin and live.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Pope Francis himself affirms the need for objective amendment in <i>AL</i> 311 fn. 364, when he says "Perhaps out of a certain scrupulosity, concealed beneath a zeal for fidelity to the truth, some priests demand of penitents a purpose of amendment so lacking in nuance that it causes mercy to be obscured by the pursuit of a supposedly pure justice. For this reason, it is helpful to recall the teaching of Saint John Paul II, who stated that the possibility of a new fall 'should not prejudice the authenticity of the resolution.'" Pope Francis does not deny the requirement of firm purpose of amendment, nor does he modify that teaching one iota. Again, what Pope Francis has presented is simply a reiteration of the teaching of <i>Familiaris Consortio</i><i>. </i>Especially given the quotation of Pope St. John Paul II, the point here must be that failure to remain continent, even if foreseeable, does not exclude the possibility of firm purpose of amendment for the penitent. But this does not say that someone <i>who does not even intend to remain continent</i> has shown contrition and therefore met the objective requirement of firm purpose of amendment. To say that someone who does not even intend to remain continent, even if lacking full culpability for that sin, is nonetheless rightly disposed for the Eucharist is heresy.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is stated well by the theologian Josef Seifert in his essay <i><a href="https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=11720" target="_blank">Does Pure Logic Threaten to Destroy the Entire Moral Theology of the Catholic Church?</a></i> In that essay, Seifert puts the point aptly:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>The assertion of AL I wish to investigate here, however, does not invoke subjective conscience at all, but claims a totally objective divine will for us to commit, in certain situations, acts that are intrinsically wrong, and have always been considered such by the Church. Since God can certainly not have a lack of ethical knowledge, an “erring conscience,” or a weakness of free will, this text does not “defend the rights of human subjectivity,” as Buttiglione claims, but appears to affirm clearly that these intrinsically disordered and objectively gravely sinful acts, as Buttiglione admits, can be permitted, or can even objectively be commanded, by God. If this is truly what AL affirms, all alarm over AL’s direct affirmations, regarding matters of changes of sacramental discipline (<b>admitting, after due discernment, adulterers, active homosexuals, and other couples in similar situations to the sacraments of confession and eucharist</b>, and, logically, also of baptism, confirmation, and matrimony, <b>without their willingness to change their lives and to live in total sexual abstinence</b>, which Pope John Paul II demanded in Familiaris Consortio from couples in such “irregular situations”), refer only to the peak of an iceberg, to the weak beginning of an avalanche, or to the first few buildings destroyed by a moral theological atomic bomb that threatens to tear down the whole moral edifice of the 10 commandments and of Catholic Moral Teaching.</i><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">...</span></i></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Must then not from pure logic euthanasia, suicide, or assistance to it, lies, thefts, perjuries, negations or betrayals of Christ, like that of St. Peter, or murder, under some circumstances and after proper “discernment,” be good and praiseworthy because of the complexity of a concrete situation (or because of a lack of ethical knowledge or strength of will)? Can then not God also demand that a Sicilian, who feels obligated to extinguish the innocent family members of a family, whose head has murdered a member of his own family and whose brother would murder four families if he does not kill one, go ahead with his murder, because his act is, under his conditions “what God himself is asking amid the concrete complexity of one’s limits, while yet not fully the objective ideal”? Does not pure logic demand that we draw this consequence from this proposition of Pope Francis?</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">However, if the title question of this paper must be answered in the affirmative, as I personally believe to be the case, the purely logical consequence of that one assertion of Amoris Laetitia seems to destroy the entire moral teaching of the Church. Should it not, therefore, be withdrawn and condemned <b>by Pope Francis himself, who no doubt abhors such a consequence</b>, which, if the title question needs to be answered affirmatively, iron and cool logic cannot fail to draw from the cited assertion of Pope Francis?</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Quite right, and this is precisely the point. Contrition is conversion, and lack of objective willingness to convert from grave sin, completely and without excuse, does not meet the requirement. That is simply the purpose of amendment required to receive absolution and to rightly dispose oneself for the Eucharist when conscious of grave sin, even if one may not be fully responsible for it. Fortunately, as <a href="https://www.ncregister.com/blog/professor-josef-seifert-shares-his-views-on-gaudete-et-exsultate" target="_blank">Seifert himself confirmed</a> with respect to with respect to the later document <i>Gaudate et Exsultate</i>, the Pope did in fact confirm that <i>AL</i> did not change the teaching of Pope St. John Paul II with respect to intrinsically evil acts and the requirement of firm purpose of amendment not to commit them. While I agree with Seifert's concerns outlined above, I also believe that this section of <i>AL</i>, when correctly read, is directed at the harsh judgment of those who <i>despite</i> the teaching of <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> were still denying the Sacraments on the grounds that the couple might fail to remain continent. That is what the footnote concerning purpose of amendment seems to be addressing, not that a priest can ever license access to the Eucharist without firm purpose of amendment from adulterous sex, but that a priest can and should give the benefit of the doubt that those who fail to remain continent do not necessarily lack the will to try. But Seifert is right to say that it is an absurdly risky decision to leave people to the pitfalls of trying to connect these dots when Pope Francis could simply say this outright.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Nor does <a href="https://cvcomment.org/2016/09/18/buenos-aires-bishops-guidelines-on-amoris-laetitia-full-text/" target="_blank">the Buenos Aires interpretation</a> of <i>AL</i>, which the Pope authoritatively indicated was correct, make the matter any clearer. On this point, the guidelines read as follows:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>5) Whenever feasible, and depending on the specific circumstances of a couple, and especially when both partners are Christians walking together on the path of faith, the priest may suggest a decision to live in continence. </i>Amoris Laetitia<i> does not ignore the difficulties arising from this option (cf. footnote 329) and offers the possibility of having access to the Sacrament of Reconciliation if the partners fail in this purpose (cf. footnote 364, recalling the teaching that Saint John Paul II sent to Cardinal W. Baum, dated 22 March, 1996).</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>6) In other, more complex cases, and when a declaration of nullity has not been obtained, the above mentioned option may not, in fact, be feasible. Nonetheless, a path of discernment is still possible. If it comes to be recognized that, in a specific case, there are limitations that mitigate responsibility and culpability (cf. 301-302), especially when a person believes they would incur a subsequent wrong by harming the children of the new union, </i>Amoris Laetitia<i> offers the possibility of access to the sacraments of Reconciliation and Eucharist (cf. footnotes 336 and 351). These sacraments, in turn, dispose the person to continue maturing and growing with the power of grace.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">We have already covered that the Pope has <i>not</i> in <i>AL</i> granted anyone a prospective license to sin, so that firm purpose of amendment is not required. On the contrary, he reiterates that "purpose of amendment" is necessary. So understanding this as a license to unrepentant adulterous sex cannot be what is intended. Apart from being blatantly heretical, it contradicts what the Pope has affirmed, and while Pope Francis is not always the most careful theologian, one must presume that he is not so confused that he would assert that black is white.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Correctly understood, then, the interpretive task here is not so difficult. In #5, the "decision" is a decision <i>as a couple</i>, which is apparent from the immediate context. In other words, the priest should suggest that the couple <i>together agree</i> to remain continent. If that process of <i>mutual decision</i> is not feasible (#6) but there are nonetheless mitigating circumstances for the person to remain in the remarried union (the objectively sinful state) despite the foreseeable risks that one's partner may not agree to remain continent despite one's own sincere intent to do so and that one might not be able to maintain one's own resolve, such a person is not thereby excluded automatically excluded from the Sacraments. But they would absolutely be excluded if the person in question <i>had no intent to remain continent</i>. If that were the case, then there would be no firm purpose of amendment, and the confessor should instead bind that person not to partake of the Eucharist until such purpose of amendment is achieved.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">V. Progressive wolves and vulnerable laymen</span></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I have pointed out that the progressive wolves in the Church have been attempting to remove the objective requirement of firm purpose of amendment and to make the internal forum purely subjective for years. There is now a class of supporters of Pope St. John Paul II, including most prominently Rocco Buttiglione, who have been duped into believing that the sainted Pope's teaching on mitigating circumstances has somehow rendered the internal forum <i>purely </i>subjective. In this respect, I believe that his sincere compassion for remarried Catholics has caused him to disregard the maxim "do not become so soft-hearted that you become soft-headed," but this mistake has caused him to overlook the massive danger that Seifert points out. People need to be called to repentance and hope in God's grace! Walford and Gabriel have both fallen into the same trap. In that respect, these people are serving as what under Communism were called "useful idiots," well-meaning people who have nonetheless been duped into serving the purposes of manipulative progressives.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Based on what I have outlined before, there are two heretical subjectivist propositions that have crept into otherwise-conservative theology:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">1. One can have moral security in one's lack of culpability in objectively doubtful circumstances apart from Confession.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">2. Mitigating circumstances can <i>prospectively</i> modify the requirement of firm purpose of amendment.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Nowhere does <i>AL</i> teach either of these propositions, but Walford and Gabriel (and Buttiglione) make them central axioms of their (materially) heretical moral theology. And, as expected, the doctrine of mitigating circumstances, which is only relevant to the extent that observers are <i>wrongly judging others</i>, has somehow been transformed into a key principle of Sacramental theology. Thus, both Walford and Gabriel go "all in" on the license-to-sin interpretation of <i>AL</i> that Seifert warned against.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This mistake is prominent in Gabriel's work <i>The Orthodoxy of Amoris Laetitia</i>:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Only mortal sin precluded the sinner from the Eucharist, and not every sexual sin fitted the requirements for a mortal sin: subjective culpability had to be ascertained. Pope Francis just extended this logic one step further, to people to whom this process was barred before: the divorced and remarried. </i>Amoris Laetitia <i>was orthodox after all!</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Likewise in Walford's <i>Pope Francis, The Family, and Divorce</i>:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Regardless of personal opinions or understandings, we must ask ourselves: if these souls are not in a state of mortal sin and possibly not even bearing much guilt -- as authentic moral theology attests -- what right do I have to demand that their own personal meeting with the Lord does not happen?</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Assuming that one has not entirely capitulated to progressivism in moral theology, then a priest-confessor has the same right that has always been defended and enshrined in canons 915 and 916: to require a penitent to display objective contrition before approaching the Eucharist. One's state of grace, one's subjective culpability, is in the end known only to God. In general, the only way to be morally certain that one is not guilty of <i>grave sin</i> (the term used in canon 916) is to receive absolution in Confession, which requires firm purpose of amendment. The teaching on mitigating circumstances is certainly <i>not</i> intended to introduce a purely subjective "am I in mortal sin?" test that removes the objectivity of contrition.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">It is because of their complete disregard for the requirement of objective contrition that both Gabriel and Walford take the pastoral "good faith" exception <i>for ignorance</i> entirely out of context. The "good faith" exception is directed to sins that are <i>not</i> confessed that the priest-confessor would need to elicit from the penitent and directs the priest's <i>inquiry</i> into such matters. I have reproduced relevant sections from the <i>Vadamecum for Confessors Concerning Some Aspects of the Morality of Conjugal Life</i>, which is mistakenly cited in support of Gabriel's and Walford's views, in their entirety (my emphasis in <b>bold</b>) so that the distinction can be seen:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>2. The minister of Reconciliation should always keep in mind that the sacrament has been instituted for men and women who are sinners. Therefore, barring manifest proof to the contrary, he will receive the penitents who approach the confessional <b>taking for granted their good will to be reconciled with the merciful God, a good will that is born, although in different degrees, of a contrite and humbled heart</b> (Psalm 50:19).</i><br /><br /><i>3. When occasional penitents approach the sacrament, those who have not confessed for a long time and manifest a grave general situation, it is necessary, before asking direct and concrete questions with regard to responsible procreation and chastity in general, to enlighten them so that they can understand these duties in a vision of faith. Thus it will be necessary, if the accusation of sins has been too succinct or mechanical, to help the penitents to place their life before God, and, with general questions on various virtues and/or obligations in accordance with their personal conditions, remind them in a positive way of the invitation to the sanctity of love, and of the importance of their duties in the area of procreation and the education of children.</i><br /><br /><i>4. When it is the penitent who asks questions or seeks clarification on specific points, even if only implicitly, the confessor will have to respond adequately, but always with prudence and discretion, without approving erroneous opinions.</i><br /><br /><i>5. </i><b style="font-style: italic;">The confessor is bound to admonish penitents regarding objectively grave transgressions of God's law and to ensure that they truly desire absolution and God's pardon with the resolution to re-examine and correct their behaviour</b><i>. Frequent relapse into sins of contraception does not in itself constitute a motive for denying absolution; </i><b style="font-style: italic;">absolution cannot be imparted, however, in the absence of sufficient repentance or of the resolution not to fall again into sin</b><i>.</i><br /><br /><i>6. The penitent who regularly confesses with the same priest frequently seeks something besides absolution alone. The confessor needs to know how to provide guidance to help him or her to improve in all Christian virtues, and, in consequence, in the sanctification of marital life. This certainly will be easier where a relationship of actual spiritual direction exists, even if this name is not used.</i><br /><br /><i>7. </i><b style="font-style: italic;">On the part of the penitent, the sacrament of Reconciliation requires sincere sorrow, a formally complete accusation of mortal sins, and the resolution, with the help of God, not to fall into sin again</b><i>. In general, it is not necessary for the confessor </i><b style="font-style: italic;">to investigate concerning sins committed in invincible ignorance of their evil, or due to an inculpable error of judgment</b><i>. Although these sins are not imputable, they do not cease, however, to be an evil and a disorder. This also holds for the objective evil of contraception, which introduces a pernicious habit into the conjugal life of the couple. It is therefore necessary to strive in the most suitable way to free the moral conscience from those errors which contradict the nature of conjugal life as a total gift.</i><br /><br /><i>Though one must keep in mind that the formation of consciences is to be accomplished above all in catechesis for married couples, both general or specific, it is always necessary to assist the spouses, also in the moment of the sacrament of Reconciliation, to examine themselves on the specific duties of conjugal life. Whenever the confessor considers it necessary to question the penitent, he should do so with discretion and respect.</i><br /><br /><i>8. The principle according to which </i><b style="font-style: italic;">it is preferable to let penitents remain in good faith in cases of error due to subjectively invincible ignorance</b><i>, is certainly to be considered always valid, even in matters of conjugal chastity. And this applies whenever it is foreseen that the penitent, </i><b style="font-style: italic;">although oriented towards living within the bounds of a life of faith</b><i>, would not be prepared to change his own conduct, but rather would begin formally to sin. Nonetheless, in these cases, the confessor must try to bring such penitents ever closer to accepting God's plan in their own lives, even in these demands, by means of prayer, admonition and exhorting them to form their consciences, and by the teaching of the Church.</i><br /><br /><i>9. </i><b style="font-style: italic;">The pastoral "law of gradualness"</b><i>, not to be confused with the "gradualness of the law" which would tend to diminish the demands it places on us, consists of </i><b style="font-style: italic;">requiring a decisive break with sin together with a progressive path towards total union with the will of God and with his loving demands</b><i>.</i><br /><br /><i>10. On the other hand, </i><b style="font-style: italic;">to presume to make one's own weakness the criterion of moral truth is unacceptable</b><i>. From the very first proclamation of the word of Jesus, Christians realize that there is a "disproportion" between the moral law, natural and evangelical, and the human capacity. They equally understand that the recognition of their own weakness is the necessary and secure road by which the doors to God's mercy will be opened.</i><br /><br /><i>11. </i><b style="font-style: italic;">Sacramental absolution is not to be denied to those who, repentant after having gravely sinned against conjugal chastity, demonstrate the desire to strive to abstain from sinning again, notwithstanding relapses</b><i>. In accordance with the approved doctrine and practice followed by the holy Doctors and confessors with regard to habitual penitents, the confessor is to avoid demonstrating lack of trust either in the grace of God or in the dispositions of the penitent, by exacting humanly impossible absolute guarantees of an irreproachable future conduct.</i><br /><br />The use of the terms "inquire" and "investigate" in this context is unambiguous: it refers to the inquiry into sins that have not been confessed. With respect to those sins that have been confessed or other "objectively grave transgressions" raised in the accusation of sins (even if the penitent denies full responsibility), these are matters that cannot be ignored or placed under the "good faith" umbrella. The priest-confessor may not be required to elicit that recognition from the penitent, as is the case when the penitent is objectively ignorant that the conduct is even a sin, but it would be dereliction of his duty to fail to require objective contrition once the penitent knows that the conduct is sinful, even if he does not think he is fully culpable. And the very fact that the penitent is pursuing a path of discernment concerning objective sin necessarily places this matter in the consciousness of both the priest-confessor and the penitent. In that regard, with respect to <i>the moral duty to regularize the union</i>, it is possible that one shows objective contrition if one sincerely has looked for opportunities to rectify the past mistake and continues to do so. But with respect to <i>the moral duty not to have adulterous sex</i>, one must at the very least intend not to do so in the future in order to make a "decisive break with sin." Mercy recognizes that those who try may fail and may need to return to God's mercy again and again, but the difference between <i>those who resolve to sin no more, while falling short</i> and <i>those who make no such resolution</i> is as wide as the gap between Heaven and Hell.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="text-align: justify;">Again, to reiterate the constant moral teaching of the Church, </span><i style="text-align: justify;">mitigation</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> is </span><i style="text-align: justify;">retrospective </i><span style="text-align: justify;">and </span><i style="text-align: justify;">subjective</i><span style="text-align: justify;">, and </span><i style="text-align: justify;">contrition</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> is </span><i style="text-align: justify;">prospective</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> and </span><i style="text-align: justify;">objective</i><span style="text-align: justify;">. This is not to say that the two things are entirely unrelated, and that is why mitigating circumstances are a legitimate factor in discernment, not to give a license for future conduct but to understand why a person might fail despite good intentions. If a person repeatedly came to Confession without such explanations, then the priest might reasonably question whether the person was truly committed not to commit the sin in the future. But if the failure was likely less culpable or not culpable, then this is evidence that the person is sincerely trying but failing due to weakness or ignorance as opposed to malevolence. This has nothing to do with <i>inquiring</i> into unconfessed sins, which the "good faith" practice addresses, but rather with <i>too harshly judging</i> what those sins the penitent knows and has brought forward, including the failure to regularize one's marital situation. </span><i style="text-align: justify;">Amoris Laetitia</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> is then not about giving anyone a license to sin but rather recognizing that there can be people who are sincerely trying not to sin who are nonetheless (1) in situations where it might be difficult to avoid doing so, perhaps not even as a result of their own fault and (2) inculpably remaining in such situations that are difficult or impossible to exit. Some might even be in a situation where they have objective reasons for believing that they were not previously married but cannot practically verify them in any external way, such as by a tribunal, in which case one might have objective reasons to believe that one's current union is not adulterous. But in all cases, the prospective action of the penitent in these matters of discernment is evaluated </span><i style="text-align: justify;">objectively</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> and not </span><i style="text-align: justify;">subjectively</i><span style="text-align: justify;">. </span></span></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But Pope Francis should know the teaching of objective contrition has been under assault for decades. The progressive "am I in mortal sin?" standard for absolution rather than the "have I engaged in objectively sinful conduct from which I must repent?" standard has blurred the objective "grave sin" standard used, <i>inter alia</i>, in canon 916 and the <i>Vadamecum</i>. In speaking about "mortal sin," Pope Francis should know as a shepherd that the wolves are about to pounce. But as with <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2022/09/why-amoris-laetitia-is-back-in-news.html" target="_blank">Fr. Julio Martinez and Fr. Miguel Yañez</a> or his own preface to Walford's book, he not only fails to warn against the wolves but also gives them a podium in the middle of the flock. I am obliged as a Catholic to give religious submission of the intellect and will to <i>Amoris Laetitia</i>, and I will absolutely defend that Pope Francis has affirmed the constant teaching of the Church that objective contrition, including intent to remain continent, is required for absolution and access to the Eucharist. But he has done nothing to forestall the progressive "license to sin" interpretation, as evidenced by the fact that even his defenders have been duped into believing it.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Indeed, Gabriel's "am I in mortal sin?" interpretation of access to the Eucharist, bereft of the requirement of objective contrition, is so corrupted that he fails to interpret not only <i>Amoris Laetitia</i> but <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> wrongly. For example, Gabriel asserts of <i>Familiaris Consortio</i> that "no civilly remarried person can receive the Eucharist unless he or she abides by total continence." That is nothing other than the dogmatic teaching of objective contrition: no person is rightly disposed for the Eucharist unless he has turned from all grave sins of which he is conscious with firm purpose of amendment. It is not <i>FC</i> alone that teaches this, but the unwavering dogma of the Catholic Church. What <i>Amoris Laetitia</i> changed was whether such people could receive the Eucharist <i>in public</i> as opposed to <i>remoto scandolo</i>, and this is reasonably a disciplinary question concerning the judgment of whether being remarried constitutes a state of "public and permanent adultery" so as to constitute "manifest grave sin." In that regard, Pope Francis has essentially extended the previous teaching concerning divorce (that is, that there may be publicly accessible reasons demonstrating either lack of sinful intent or inability to rectify the consequences of past actions) to apply to remarriage.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">What Gabriel misses is that <i>public</i> celebration of the Eucharist is a matter of the <i>external forum</i> that is reasonably subject to sacramental discipline, albeit only in a matter consistent with the underlying doctrine on faith and morals. In his reasoning, though, he has confused the objective requirements of the external forum with the <i>objective requirements of the internal forum</i>, instead concluding that the internal forum is purely a matter of subjective culpability ("am I in mortal sin?"). He explicitly cites Rocco Buttiglione (convincingly rebutted by Seifert on the subject of objective contrition) and Fr. Paul Keller, who has constructed an example of the "correct" (read: progressive) application of <i>Amoris Laetitia</i> as a license to sin so absurd that it <a href="https://www.catholicworldreport.com/2017/01/07/is-fr-paul-kellers-essay-really-the-way-amoris-laetitia-should-be-read/">amounts to a canonical crime</a>. Walford's own example of a remarried couple (emphasis in <b>bold</b>) is as ridiculous as Fr. Keller's:</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">In this new union they have tried to live hard as brother and sister, but their attempts have caused great tension and constant arguments. The husband is now fighting temptations against impurity of various kinds. The peace of the home is fragmenting and the children are being affected. No longer are the arguments kept behind closed doors, but abuse is being hurled across the room while the children play. There is a real danger of the home becoming a quasi-war zone, and possibly a family break-up is imminent. Not only have the children had to experience this, but they have also not experienced for a considerable time any affection between their parents; on the contrary, coldness has been apparent even in the "good" times. They are confused; what they hear preached at Church is not replicated at home. The older ones are asking questions why mom and dad no longer love each other, and there is the distinct possibility they begin to see nothing beneficial in Catholicism based on their experience at home; in fact, there is the danger of blame being attributed to the faith.</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i><b>At this point, the parents make the decision that living celibate lives is unworkable</b>. They say to God: "We cannot continue like this, we don't have the strength even though we have tried. For our children, we are now witnesses for the devil more than you. We are spreading poison and it is ruining them. If we continue this, we are causing greater evil, and we feel we may turn the children away from the faith. Our conscience tells us we risk breaking the fifth commandment and in a real sense, destroying their emotional and spiritual lives. It is our honest intention to flee from all these evils including the sexual relationship, and we long to live lives of purity. We ask your constant forgiveness even though our weakness means we cannot fulfill what you desire from us. <b>We shall strive in whatever way we can to respond to your grace knowing that your love and mercy will lead us to salvation</b>. As proof of our good intention, what we lack now, we will make up for in other areas; in almsgiving and fasting</i>.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">It is difficult to imagine a clearer repudiation of the theological virtue of hope than the statement that turning away from sin "is unworkable." Far from "knowing that your love and mercy will lead us to salvation," the couple has positively denied any such belief. They do not believe God's grace is coming, to the point that they have decided to give up entirely. They have decided, contrary to Paul's warning to "do evil so that good may come of it," to break the sixth commandment in order to (ostensibly) avoid breaking the fifth. That is not a good intention in any sense; their efforts to "make up" for it are attempts to somehow pay God off with good works to excuse an evil intention, but they show no proof of a good one. In short, this is a couple who has given up hope, as evidenced by the lack of firm purpose of amendment. They are not even trying anymore.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Gabriel is equally ridiculous in his attempts to justify the "license to sin" interpretation of <i>Amoris Laetitia</i>. (Note that I have omitted what I consider an extraordinarily offensive analogy involving rape that Gabriel used to justify his position, which I have become convinced was simply due to an error in judgment but which is nonetheless quite shocking.)</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Some critics, who actually understand the doctrinal core of </i>Amoris Laetitia<i>, will claim that the teaching on mitigating circumstances is being misapplied here [in prospective mitigation]. As I said before in chapter 4, the "while not yet fully the objective ideal" wording implies that the sinful behavior might persist for some time, while the pastor tries to bring the sinner back into full communion with the church. According to these critics, this is wrong because mitigating circumstances only apply retroactively.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>In other words, "mitigating circumstances" are useful guides for a sinner to perform a conscience exam </i>after<i> the sin has been committed. If, after this conscience exam, the sinner determines he had no full consent while performing the sin, he is not in mortal sin and can receive communion. This is very different -- so it is argued -- from someone saying "I have mitigating circumstances, so I have permission to sin in the future." This would open the Eucharist to impenitent sinners, who have no firm resolution not to sin again.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>I believe this is a warped version of what Pope Francis intends to implement. As I explained in chapter 6, it is a misinterpretation to claim that communion should be given to impenitent sinners. Francis is quite clear that this process of pastoral discernment is open only to people with "humility, discretion, and love for the Church and her teaching, in a sincere search for God's will and a desire to make a more perfect response to it." This is </i>not<i> a description of an impenitent sinner. Nor can we say this person has no firm resolution not to sin again, because <b>mitigating circumstances are encumbering such resolution</b>: "the possibility of a new fall should not prejudice the authenticity of the resolution."</i></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>In light of this, we should stop thinking about sinners who self-justify themselves as "I have mitigating circumstances, so I have permission to sin in the future," since those are excluded from the discernment process as laid out by #300. On the contrary, we should start thinking instead about sinners who worry, "I have mitigating circumstances that will not disappear in the foreseeable future. I do not want to sin, but need grace to help me with this situation; the sacraments would help."</i> </span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In the first place, Gabriel had previously contradicted <i>Amoris Laetitia</i> at one point when he said that "[i]n certain situations where the new union cannot be legitimately regularized, this 'objective ideal' would be living and brother and sister." The Holy Father has been absolutely clear that the "objective ideal" is <i>objectively living the Church's marital teaching</i>, so Gabriel has already misinterpreted <i>AL</i> to think that it waives the requirement of martial continence, which is what he mistakenly thinks "Pope Francis intends to implement." (As I have pointed out, he clearly does not, but Gabriel has been duped by Rocco Buttiglione into thinking that he does.) But even apart from that, as the bolded text shows <i>he believes that mitigating circumstances can apply to the resolution not to sin</i>! This is, of course, a blatant denial of the objective requirement of firm purpose of amendment and the theological virtue of hope. The fact that there is a possibility of a new fall does not negate the possibility of a firm purpose of amendment, but it certainly does not excuse the requirement of making such a resolution <i>right now</i>. So once again, we have seen the false hope of mitigation offered in place of true hope in God.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Someone who believe in true Christian <i>metanoia</i> would never say "I <i>have</i> mitigating circumstances." They could only ever say "I <i>had</i> mitigating circumstances in my old life of sin, but by God's grace, I have turned away from my old life of sin, and I hope in God's grace to keep me from sin hereafter." To rely on mitigating circumstances from one's past mistakes is to deny hope; there is no third option. So contrary to Gabriel's assertion, if "mitigating circumstances are encumbering" the resolution not to sin again, that person is most certainly impenitent. Contrition is a requirement for one to be penitent, and firm purpose of amendment is required for contrition. Gabriel's assertion here is a direct denial of the moral teaching of the Catholic Church.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">And this is what Gabriel misses: the "small step" that Pope Francis describes in <i>Amoris Laetitia</i> is exactly this resolution to be continent, the same one described in <i>Familiaris Consortio</i>. It is Gabriel's mistake to think that Pope Francis has changed the teaching in the <i>internal forum</i> at all. But Pope Francis means this tiny resolution to do better is "a small step, in the midst of great human limitations, can be more pleasing to God than a life which appears outwardly in order, but moves through the day without confronting great difficulties" (<i>AL</i> 305). This is <i>metanoia</i> when the circumstances seem impossible, but where the Christian does not give up hope. To take that hope away from them, as Buttiglione, Keller, Gabriel, and Walford would do, and to say that these "mitigating circumstances" are simply too much for God has nothing to do with mercy.</span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Gabriel notes in his response that progressives "think [Pope Francis] is a kind of Trojan horse that will be used to change the church into the form they want." I agree with Gabriel that Pope Francis is not; <i>AL</i> addressed the public participation of the remarried in the Eucharist without ever once modifying the requirements of continence and firm purpose of amendment in the internal forum. In other words, Pope Francis never taught the heretical progressive moral theology. The real Trojan horse is Gabriel himself, along with those like him who ostensibly support the moral teaching of Pope St. John Paul II while being duped into serving progressive ends. My hope is that they will realize that they are being exploited to peddle the "license to sin" interpretation.</span></div><p></p></div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-35402741276614912982023-05-03T07:46:00.002-04:002023-05-03T07:46:38.866-04:00The essence/energies impasse resolved?<p>I pointed out in a previous post how I would assess <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/05/my-theory-on-blachernae.html" target="_blank">the difference between East and West on Blachernae</a> based on my view that <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/the-filioque-impasse-resolved.html" target="_blank">the <i>filioque</i> impasse can be resolved</a>. Naturally, that led to a question about the essence-energies distinction, and here are my thoughts on that:</p><p><i>I cover that preliminarily in the article on the resolution of the </i>filioque<i>, but it's basically a question of the differences between what I call the relational model and what I call the Cappadocian Neoplatonic model on participation. The views actually agree on what deification is: grace to participate in the Trinitarian life. And they also agree that the Trinitarian life is the internal activity of the essence among the Persons, which is the power by which God creates. So it's just a question of what account is given of that act of participation.</i></p><p><i>In the Neoplatonic model, participation is when something takes on the attributes of a higher being by participation in the natural energeia of that higher being. Energeia are thought of as a kind of entity or expression of the entity in a participable manner as part of the overall hierarchy of being, which are connected to logoi (principles) or proodoi (processions) in an ordered way from higher to lower. But unlike Plotinus's version, the Cappadocian Neoplatonic model (especially as developed by Maximus) does not ground these emanations in the vertical causality from One to Nous to Intellect but rather in the good will of the entire Trinity. These expressions in being (energeia) tell us something about the nature (ousia) and the personal distinction, but the existence of the essence itself is beyond being, completely incomprehensible by any finite form as the Good is above understanding in terms of being.<br /><br />In the relational model, participation is not understood in terms of specific attributes but rather the infinite act of God's self-existence. God is incomprehensible by analogy to the way that one can understand the concept of infinity without ever even being able to possibly count through it, then taken to the existential level. I used the gravitational model to illustrate this; finite essences like rocks and trees are essentially at fixed distances from God, like a stable orbit, so they participate in the gravitational relationship but in a limited and stable way. Rational beings, such as men and angels, are suited to move toward or away from God by free will, which makes their souls capable of interacting with God by grace, which is basically that gravitational relationship with God drawing the man or angel in toward God (or, with the resistance of sin, drifting out of orbit into space/non-being). So this account of participation is more like intensity relative to God's own infinite intensity, rather than different modes of sharing in divine attributes based on the different energeia.<br /><br />The real difference is in how the *body* participates in the activity of God by grace. If participation is about modes, then there's no reason in principle that a certain activity by grace would not involve the entire person, body and soul. This is essentially the account of participation in the divine energeia offered by St. Gregory Palamas. If instead the means of participation are imagining the infinite act of existence, then participation is basically a hierarchy in which our rational part, our soul, becomes more and more an image of God, and the body, which is already ordered to the soul, will ultimately be brought to another level when it can even more be ordered to that rational activity without ceasing to be the material body that it is. This is why we can go to Heaven as disembodied souls even now, before the bodily resurrection. <br /><br />In short, the difference is whether there is a foretaste now of the *bodily* aspects of glorification. The West believes that we only see the bodily aspects of glorification through better use of the currently unglorified body, including healing of its natural capacities through the Sacraments, in service of charity, which gives us a view of that future but still veiled. When we see the miraculous material effects of the divine power, this is a sign of that divine activity in which we participate through the soul and which we will enjoy bodily after the Last Judgment, but it is not itself a bodily participation (seeing with bodily eyes) in that activity. The Cappadocian Neoplatonic model holds that bodily glorification is simply a mode of participation, so that there is no reason why there would not be a foretaste of total personal glorification, even bodily, now, so that we could see the divine glory with bodily eyes.<br /><br />Now I think it would be nigh-impossible to say that those are the same: either bodily eyes see the divine glory now, or they do not. But both sides agree that these sorts of mystical experiences are fundamentally mysterious, that they are solely products of divine grace and not human effort, and that asceticism (denial of the body) makes one better disposed to receive them if they are granted. So I do not think that disagreement is in itself any more fundamental than the metaphysical disagreement on participation that I outlined above.</i></p>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-34212342296413294722023-05-02T08:21:00.003-04:002023-05-02T08:21:34.298-04:00My theory on Blachernae<p style="text-align: justify;">It occurred to me in a recent dialogue that I had not put my theory on how the Council of Blachernae fits into my theory that the East and the West actually agree on the <i>filioque</i> on paper anywhere. Obviously, that seems to be a pretty clear case of dogmatic conflict, but even so, I am not so sure. Here were my thoughts on how I would fit Blachernae into the discussion:</p><i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Blachernae is the hard part, and this is (weirdly) the time at which the East might have gotten closer to the West, but the polemical context against Florence obscured the fact.</i></div></i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>I think there is a merely verbal distinction about the same conceptual understanding. That conceptual understanding is that the begetting of the Son is logically prior to the procession of the Spirit. But there was a period in Palamas where he went really far to the other side in trying to answer the Latin use of Cyril; this is documented by Mikonja Knežević. During that time, Palamas argued that the priority between the Son and the Spirit was *merely* verbal; that is, he argued that it was literally because the word “Father” caused us to immediately think of “Son” first that there was any order among the Trinitarian persons. But I think even he realized later that this position was too extreme, because Gregory of Cyprus doesn’t seem to take that position by Blachernae, and Palamas wasn’t objecting to that. So I think that we’ve at least agreed that the procession of the Spirit logically presumes the existence of the Son. The question then really becomes how that logical priority is articulated; the assumption on the Eastern side is that the West must be saying that the logical priority of the Son to the Spirit is the *same as* the logical priority of the Father’s priority to the Son. That is where I think the mistake was made. The West had made that distinction all the way back to Augustine in his notion of principium, and it was essentially just followed for centuries. I believe that Cyril makes the same conceptual distinction in different words when he says that the Spirit proceeds from the Son according to essence.</i></div></i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>If we accept that there is a common conceptual distinction here, then we can look at how it is articulated differently in Latin and Greek, how we say the same thing in different words. So let’s talk about what the West means by the “single spiration” “as from one principle.”</i></div></i><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>The fact that this is from Augustine (and Leo the Great) and not Aquinas is demonstrated by the fact that it was stated in the <a href="https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum12-2.htm" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Fourth Lateran Council</a> when it condemned the doctrine of Joachim of Fiore and said the true doctrine was found in Peter Lombard’s Sentences. In recounting the confession of faith, the council fathers repeat a very old formula in Latin theology: “The Father is from none, the Son from the Father alone, and the holy Spirit from both equally, eternally without beginning or end; the Father generating, the Son being born, and the holy Spirit proceeding; consubstantial and coequal, co-omnipotent and coeternal; one principle of all things, creator of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal.” </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">That relation to the Trinity as the principle of creation is important, because it connects being “principle” to inseparable operations. If the Father and the Son are both principle of the Spirit (as per Augustine, the Father being principle-without-principle and the Son being principle-from-principle), then just as the Trinity is one principle to creation, so the Father and the Son must be one principle to the Spirit. There could no more be multiple spirations than there could be multiple acts of creation. </div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">So nothing in Lyons or Florence was new. The actual difference between Latin and Greek is not this; the difference is that the Latins *explicitly* appeal to the prior existence of the Son, while the Greeks only *implicitly* affirm the prior existence of the Son. From my perspective, this is primarily out of two concerns: (1) because a lot of heresy came out of Neoplatonism, they do not want to say anything that even *sounds* like the Intelligible Triad, and (2) there is no *explicit* statement that the Spirit proceeds from the Son (although Irenaeus interpreted Rev. 22:1 that way, so there was precedent). For that reason, theologians like Theodoret maintained that we couldn’t affirm it, even if it should have been implicit in a way that Irenaeus, Athanasius, and Cyril had no problem affirming. </div></span><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><span style="font-style: italic;"><div style="text-align: justify;">Blachernae is, it seems to me, an attempt to have it both ways: to affirm some kind of logical relationship presuming the Son’s existence without actually making any positive affirmation that the Spirit proceeds from the Son. I am persuaded by <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344703196_The_eternal_manifestation_of_the_Spirit_through_the_Son_a_hypostatic_or_energetic_reality_Inquiry_in_the_works_of_Gregory_of_Cyprus_and_Gregory_Palamas" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Anne-Sophie Vivier-Muresan</a> that what Palamas and Gregory of Cyprus had in mind was NOT eternal energetic procession and so was NOT linking the essence-energies distinction to the inner life of the Trinity. What I think that they were trying to do was to affirm a logical relationship that would not require them to affirm the filioque, and what I think they had in mind was something like the difference between an originating cause and a sustaining cause. </div></span><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/11/eternal-manifestation-as-efficient.html">https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/11/eternal-manifestation-as-efficient.html</a> </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic; text-align: justify;"><i>Note that this does NOT work from the Western perspective. It would break the causality into two principles, and there is no way for the Father to be the sole principle as originator but one principle with the Son as sustainer. So I’m not saying that we can just adopt one explanation and say that we’re done. What I am saying is that we can at least bracket the question of metaphysical explanation and say that what both sides are trying to explain is the same thing: a conceptual framework that explains the logical existence of the Son in the procession of the Spirit. Being a less-than-perfect philosopher is not an impediment to holiness; St. Basil implicitly denied inseparable operations when he thought that the Holy Spirit could only act spiritually and not materially, but he is nonetheless revered as the Doctor of the Holy Spirit for the dogma that he affirmed. In my opinion, Blachernae was not successful as a metaphysical explanation, but I can see what they were trying to affirm with the explanation, and what they were trying to affirm seems to be the very same thing that is affirmed in Latin theology.</i></div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-11999983022685963472023-04-29T16:14:00.000-04:002023-04-29T16:14:11.906-04:00The filioque impasse resolved<p>When I originally wrote my series on reflexive relations and especially the <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/09/historical-use-of-reflexive-relations.html" target="_blank">historical use of that concept</a>, I pointed out that the use of the phrase "image of the Son" was logically identical to what the West meant by "and from the Son," as confirmed by St. Thomas Aquinas himself. I was at the time familiar with St. John Damascene's use of the phrase and the conceptual antecedents, but not the express use of "image of the Son." Thanks to the help of Father-Deacon Anton Usher, an Eastern Catholic, I learned that this expression was used in the same way in St. Athanasius's <i>Ad Serapion</i> (and followed explicitly by St. Cyril) and also in St. Gregory Thaumaturgus's shorter creed, thus dating the usage to the earliest days of the Nicene faith.</p><p>The longer version of the creed reads as follows:</p><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>There is one God, the Father of the living Word, who is His subsistent Wisdom and Power and Eternal Image: perfect Begetter of the perfect Begotten, Father of the only-begotten Son. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>There is one Lord, Only of the Only, God of God, Image and Likeness of Deity, Efficient Word, Wisdom comprehensive of the constitution of all things, and Power formative of the whole creation, true Son of true Father, Invisible of Invisible, and Incorruptible of Incorruptible, and Immortal of Immortal and Eternal of Eternal. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>And there is One Holy Spirit, having His subsistence from God, and being made manifest by the Son, [to wit to men]: Image of the Son, Perfect Image of the Perfect; Life, the Cause of the living; Holy Fount; Sanctity, the Supplier, or Leader, of Sanctification; in whom is manifested God the Father, who is above all and in all, and God the Son, who is through all. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>There is a perfect Trinity, in glory and eternity and sovereignty, neither divided nor estranged. Wherefore there is nothing either created or in servitude in the Trinity; nor anything superinduced, as if at some former period it was non-existent, and at some later period it was introduced. And thus neither was the Son ever wanting to the Father, nor the Spirit to the Son; but without variation and without change, the same Trinity abides ever.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This description of the Spirit as "Image of the Son, Perfect Image of the Perfect" or its shorter equivalent quoted by St. Gregory of Nyssa, "Perfect Image of the Perfect Son," could be substituted in place of the <i>filioque</i> formulation "and from the Son" with absolutely no change in meaning. That is, if the Creed recited "I believe in the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father, Perfect Image of the Perfect Son," the West would be affirming nothing different from what we affirm today, only using much older creedal language. The impasse is resolved; the <i>filioque</i> divide has been relegated to semantics, as the great Orthodox bishop Kallistos Ware said it had been.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">So why do we continue a fight that has no reason in principle? It is purely an accident of history at this point, and to be completely blunt about it, both sides have bungled this historical study <i>even of their own respective traditions</i>. In an effort to recruit various historical figures as generals in a war for their respective philosophical-theological methods, they badly misread them, perhaps most notably St. Augustine, St. Photius (who in his turn misread Augustine), and St. Thomas Aquinas (who was somewhat more faithful to Augustine but at the cost of misreading St. Dionysius). And the error committed here is the quintessentially modern error, the Enlightenment distilled to perfection -- it is the confusion of the philosophical-theological <i>account</i> of Christian life with the life itself.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">One example is the later interpolation "made manifest, <i>to wit to men,</i>" which is an interesting addition (it is not found in Nyssen's version or earlier versions of the creed). This was probably inserted into the original creed by later monopatrists, perhaps following Theodoret of Cyrus or perhaps an earlier tradition influencing him, because it clearly puts the procession of the Spirit only in the economy. But whether deliberately inserted to make this point or included for a completely different purpose, such as the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as a Person being somewhat underdeveloped at the time, there is certainly very little evidence that this consideration was widespread or revelant to the Wonderworker himself. But when viewed through a philosophical-theological lens, this becomes retroactive evidence that "image of the Son" must mean something other than the <i>filioque</i>, even if that says more about the interpreter than what is being interpreted.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The result is that the historical voice itself is suppressed. Something that would've helped to show a common concept is effectively written out of history. Photius, having been inculcated in a monopatrist tradition, cannot see that St. Athanasius and St. Cyril may have been using "image of the Son" in a way that is consonant with the Western concept, even though they never used the words. Then the interaction between Theodoret and St. Cyril is likewise interpreted in a monopatrist way (Siecienski's reading in his book on the <i>filioque</i> being but one modern example). In yet another historical example, the language "having His subsistence from God, and being made manifest by the Son" is later seen by the Council of Blachernae as a distinction between "having existence from and existing through," with "perfect image of the perfect Son" being relegated to only the manifestation. Blachernae in turn is then reinterpreted through the Neo-Palamite lens by Papadakis as teaching an "eternal energetic manifestation" connected to the essence/energies distinction, which Anne-Sophie Vivier-Muresan has pointed out might not have been intended even by Gregory of Cyprus or even Gregory Palamas himself. The voice of St. John Damascene, who recognizes both the "image of the Son" and the monopatrist threads in the tradition, and sees the two as reconcilable, is silenced and replaced by an imaginary advocate for one or another philosophical-theological position. (St. Thomas is at least honest about this; he says that John's monopatrism is a mistake that he must have learned from Nestorians, but that is only evidence that he has taken St. John out of historical context.)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The West has not done any better. Following what was effectively a modern rediscovery of Neoplatonism, there was a fervent effort by Neo-Thomists to reclaim the narrative that St. Thomas had effectively synthesized all of the <i>philosophia perennis</i> into Aristotelico-Thomism, which was absolutely critical for the Neo-Thomist claims of metaphysical certainty that they were attempting to assert against modernism. As this happened during what has been called "the Neo-Thomist captivity of the Church," in which the antimodernist assertion of Thomism as the antidote to modernism was in full force, historical accident once again caused history to be bulldozed by a philosophical-theological paradigm. In this case, the baptism of Neoplatonism via Augustine became an absolutely critical historical element, whether it was Augustine himself who purified the pagans or Aquinas who finally broke the chains that tied Augustine to paganism. The inconvenient voices within the tradition, such as St. Bonaventure, who certainly had a much better grasp of the Neoplatonic tradition in the East than Aquinas did (and likely better than Augustine as well), were not heard. And given the Eastern concern about "Hellenism" that already contributed to misinterpretations of Augustine's thought, it is essentially a perfect storm in terms of the devastating impact on historicity.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">At least with respect to Augustine, though, retrieving a genuine historical understanding is as easy as ABC, in this case referring to (Lewis) Ayres, (Michel René) Barnes, and (Richard) Cross. In that regard, this retrieval of what Augustine actually meant in historical context is well-summarized in <i>Augustine and the Trinity</i> by Ayres, <i>Augustine and Nicene Theology</i> by Barnes, and a pair of articles by Cross ("<i>Quid Tres? </i>On What Precisely Augustine Professes Not to Understand in <i>De Trinitate</i> 5 and 7" in <i>The Harvard Theological Review</i> and "Divine Simplicity and the Doctrine of the Trinity: Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine" in David Bradshaw, ed., <i>Philosophical Theology and the Christian Tradition: Russian and Western Perspectives</i>). Ayres's and Barnes's "new canon scholarship" concerning Augustine, which has been available for decades before the recent books that summarize it, is difficult to deny. Even its opponents are frequently forced to admit that their criticism of Théodore de Regnon (who first offered the "Greek starts with the person, and Latin starts with the essence" explanation rooted in Neoplatonism) and Olivier du Roy (who asserted Neoplatonic origins of Augustine's theology) is well-founded. But this has unfortunately not resulted in more people questioning whether opposition to the <i>filioque</i> might itself need rethinking.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">That is essentially the line I would maintain, summarized in two points: (1) what Augustine actually thought is compatible with the Eastern "Image of the Son" formulation and (2) contemporary Orthodox criticism of the <i>filioque</i> based on Augustine's supposed Hellenization have been debunked. Augustine's formulation of the <i>filioque</i> would not have differed at all from St. Cyril of Alexandria's formulation that the Spirit proceeds from the essence of the Son, which was in turn consistent with Cyril's description of the Spirit as the Image of the Son. In responding to the Orthodox polemics against that proposition, I have titled the post "The <i>filioque</i> impasse resolved" in response to Michelle Coetzee's <i>The Filioque Impasse</i>. I have chosen Coetzee as an implicit foil not because she has introduced a particularly novel viewpoint; on the contrary, she has summarized the polemical Orthodox view on the <i>filioque-</i>as-Hellenization in its major aspects both accurately and conveniently without introducing new theories. Her view of Augustine as a Neoplatonist, for example, is taken more or less in its entirety from <i>Orthodox Readings of Augustine</i>, primarily from Bradshaw's reading, and her engagement with the scholarship of Ayres and Barnes is passing at best, making her work the perfect example of the dehistoricizing view I have pointed out. Let's begin with the false history of Western Neoplatonism.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>I. Plotinus's program in the East vs. where the West begins</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The first unquestionably expert philosopher in Neoplatonism in Western Chrisitanity was Marius Victorinus, who appears to have been an influence on both Augustine and Boethius. Victorinus is the <i>bête noire</i> in every Orthodox theory of Neoplatonism in the West, since Augustine appears to have read his work. So in demonstrating why the Orthodox polemic is at odds with the historical record, we will start here.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Barnes explains why Victorinus's Trinitarian work cannot be taken in the Neoplatonic sense imputed to him: Victorinus is unconcerned with so-called "vertical causality," the explanation for how things are brought into existence. Barnes's explanation in <i>Augustine and Nicene Theology</i> cannot be improved, so I will simply reproduce it (<b>bold</b> is my emphasis):</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>I will attempt to sum up the key presupposition(s) which distinguishes Victorinus' Neoplatonism. It is a common-place to think of Being as unmoving or motionless because it "goes" nowhere, nor changes for it has no parts. For Neoplatonists, Being brings being(s) into existence. For the interested but not specialist reader, what must be kept in mind is that the goal or logic of Neoplatonism is, for our purposes here, to explain the origin(s) and kind(s) of being. Plotinus has the famous "dual-motions" of higher being </i>[exitus-reditus]<i>: the inward motion which results in identity, the outward motion which results in (a) new being. Each level of "generation and return" produces a new being (</i>hypostasis<i>?) whose being-ness is derived and less than the level of origin. Hence the famous hierarchy of being which is known as a "vertical causality." I have characterized this dual-motion as "Stoic </i>tonos<i> stripped of it </i>[sic]<i> materiality," and I have made no claims to originality by this linking of Neoplatonic hierarchy of being to the Stoic notion of the inward and outward motion (</i>tonos<i>) of the </i>pneuma<i>. If the conceptual origins of Neoplatonic aetiology may be found in Stoic origins, then to that philosophy we add Aristotelian concepts of potentiality and actuality to being, but understanding "potentiality and actuality" not in a strict Aristotelian sense, in which actuality brings into being what was there potentially, but as power and act. "Power" is not an uncompleted act; it is that which makes an act possible, and which determines what that act "will be." The existence of the act does not diminish it; indeed, what a thing is -- its </i>ousia<i> -- may be its power(s) existing in the unity of whatever the "it is." Or as Plato so succinctly put it: "I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing other than power."</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Given that Neoplatonism is a philosophy which seeks to provide the explanation of the origin and kinds of beings (as I said above), here I provide the reader with a provision definition of Being which should be kept in mind, as word-for-word as possible, for understanding any characteristic Victorinus attributes to Being. Thus:</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><b>Being (in the sense of "God is Being, from whom all creation takes its being") is an auto-kenetic crystalline active power unfolding within itself unceasingly. The key concept is that of intrinsic cyclic motion, power to act. Existence is a verb, an action, a doing. "Action springs forth" (from "to be") as the "Word leapt."</b>[Barnes explains in a footnote that "crystalline" refers to the triadic relational structure of the activity.]</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Victorinus is not dealing with the static Neoplatonic hierarchy of being at all; he is referring to the soul's <i>activity</i> in the form of a <i>triadic power</i>. Created effects, most notably the human soul with its activities of being, living, and thinking, are related to this power as <i>images</i>, so that every created thing is a finite image of the triadic act of being in the Trinity. Just as there is not a vertical hierarchy of powers in the soul but rather a horizontal relation among them, so the triadic image in Victorinus does not follow Plotinus's project of establishing a hierarchy of being but instead establishes an account of existence based on power-activity. Barnes explains further:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The fundamental principle of existence, from which comes being, etc., is this </i>tonos<i>. The essence of the soul moves in three fundamental or self-constituting (auto-genesis) ways or </i>tonoi<i> or frequencies -- however we take the analogy to be best conceived: the motion of being, the motion of life, the motion of intellection. This motion is often called "horizonal" </i>[sic] <i>to distinguish it from the "descending" notion of being "spilling over" or flowing down. In vertical causation, the previous source is prior (at least notionally) and superior to its product: the cause must always be prior to its effect, greater than its effect, and contain that effect.... Most scholars place Plotinus' aetiology within this genera of causalities (vertical causation, source greater than its effects, etc). <b>The key to understanding Victorinus' Trinitarian theology is to understand that his aetiology does not wholly (or principally) owe to this Plotinian genera of noetic triad, but to the genera of another "Neoplatonism," one often attributed to Porphyry, or at least called after him</b></i><b>.</b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Victorinus has not taken Plotinus's One-<i>Nous</i>-Soul triad; he has instead borrowed Plotinus's account of the <i>human soul</i>: "What then are the constitutents seen in soul and how many are there? Since we find in soul <i>ousia</i> and <i>life</i> together and <i>ousia</i> is common to all soul, and <i>life</i> also common, and <i>life</i> is also <i>Intellect</i>" (<i>Ennead</i> VI.2.7). Unlike One-<i>Nous</i>-Soul, this Being-Life-Intellect triad is rarely used, and it falls into a more general class of philosophical descriptions of the soul rather than a particularly Neoplatonic account of being. So if the distinctive feature of Neoplatonism is <i>emanation</i>, we may say, following Russell Friedman's distinction of Trinitarian accounts, that Victorinus's model is <i>relational</i> rather than <i>emanational </i>(I will have more to say on this later). In any case, in this specific application, Victorinus appears to be completely original to his theology; he has connected the <i>ousia</i> of the soul to the Nicene <i>homoousion</i> in a way that no one before, and perhaps not even anyone since, did. That "perhaps" brings us to the reception in the West, but before that move, I want to directly address how Barnes's work answers the more polemical Orthodox interpretation offered especially by David Bradshaw.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Bradshaw interacts with Marius Victorinus especially at pp. 108-14 in <i>Aristotle East and West</i>, but based on Victorinus's general familiarity with Neoplatonism, he interprets what Victorinus says in terms of "vertical causality." As Barnes pointed out, this is a mistaken reading of Victorinus. Based on this mistaken reading, Bradshaw understands Victorinus's distinction between <i>esse</i>, "existence which is unqualified and in that sense 'infinite'" (Greek <i>to einai</i>), and finite being (Greek <i>to on</i>), the circumscribed, intelligible existence of substance(s), which corresponds to activity in creation (<i>agere</i>, <i>operari</i>) . But this actually relates to how the Son is uniquely presented in the economy as an object of vision, a uniquely Latin concern with respect to Homoian Arians that Barnes situates in context throughout the book, which is why Victorinus distinguishes between the hidden Father and the manifest Son. This is clear in Victorinus's use of the concept in a polemical response to the use of John 14:28, a common text cited by Homoians. As Bradshaw puts it:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Attempting to explain the statement of Christ that "the Father is greater than I" (John 14:28) -- always a difficult text for the orthodox -- Victorinus writes:</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Father is greater [than the Son] because He gave all to the Son and is the cause of the Son's being and mode of being. But He is also greater because he is inactive action (</i>actio inactuosa<i>). Such act is more blessed because it is without effort and unchanging, the source of all things that are, dwelling in respose, perfect in itself and needing nothing. The Son, however, received being, and proceeding from action to act (</i>in quod est agere ab actione procedens<i>) comes into perfection. He is realized as a plentiude by motion, having made all things that are. (Adv. Arium 1.13.9-16)</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Potency, which preexists all things, is both a "preprinciple" and exists prior to the truly </i>on<i> ... Scripture and common knowledge affirm that this [preprinciple] is God and </i>esse<i> and that there is nothing before Him (</i>ante ipsum nihil esse<i>), He who is at once </i>esse<i> and </i>operari<i>. We confess and adore this God as the principle of all that is, for by act (</i>actione<i>) are those things which are; for before action they do not yet exist. For we believe in a God who acts, as for example, "In the beginning God made heaven and earth" ... Therefore He is the true God and the only God, because He is God in both power and activity (</i>potentia et actione<i>), but internal (</i>interna<i>), whereas Christ is both power and in activity (</i>potentia et actione<i>), but now external and manifest (</i>foris et aperta<i>). God the Father is therefore first act and first existence and first substance, the original </i>to on<i>, who by His own action begets Himself. (Adv. Arium 1.33.8-25).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Interpreted in the context of the Homoian argument concerning the manifestation of different Persons in the economy showing a kind of subdivinity, Victorinus's answer must surely refer to the expression of the Word in creation, not some inherent distinction of divine power between the Father and the Son. The certain clue here is the "common power, common works" assertion based on John 14:9-10, the predecessor of the later doctrine of inseparable operations and a core principle of the anti-monarchian Latin theology identified by Barnes. In the later Christian philosophy, this would be called a <i>divine mission</i>, an extension of the inner-Trinitarian relations with a created term: the inner Word becomes an outer Word. The inner-Trinitarian "manifestation of the hidden" becomes the <i>ad extra</i> divine mission of the Son in revelation. Bradshaw's reading misses the Christian context of Victorinus in his conclusion, instead assuming he is giving an account of vertical causality. This is is why he asserts that "[m]uch like Plotinus, Victorinus insists that what is present in the effect must be present implicitly or in a hidden manner in the cause," a conclusion that clearly runs afoul of the explanation that Barnes has laid out.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">What is particular fascinating is that if Bradshaw had made the connection to Victorinus's actual purpose, he might realize that the distinction Victorinus is drawing between <i>to einai</i> and <i>to on</i> in the context of the economy serves exactly the same explanatory purpose as the essence/energies distinction. This is, of course, why Victorinus notes that <i>even the Father</i> is "the original <i>to on</i>," so as not to suggest, by being <i>to on</i>, in this sense the Son has a different nature or power from the Father. Rather, the Son is "external and manifest" in the economy while the Father remains "hidden." So the <i>to on</i>, the power of (finite) being that is expressed in creation and in the economy, is the same in the "first act and first existence and first substance," the Father, as the Son. It is why Victorinus says in another passage quoted by Bradshaw that "[i]nsofar as [the Logos] defines and encloses, providing form to each, it is the <i>on</i>, the already existing, since [thanks to it] there has come to be a particular form of <i>esse </i>(<i>Adv. Arium </i>IV.19.26-37)." This is not an account of the Logos's begetting from the Son or a confusion of the Son's existence (<i>esse</i>) with finite being (<i>to on</i>); rather, it is an explanation of how the <i>ad extra</i> acts of the Trinity reveal the existence of the Persons without thereby diminishing the Son's divinity.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">And although everything in Victorinus looks like a nail under Bradshaw's Neoplatonic hammer, it seems that Bradshaw himself has some unconscious awareness that his tool is unsuited to the task. Such anomalies include contrasts with true Neoplatonists ("It is interesting that he denies there to be any participation of <i>on</i> in <i>esse</i>; this is directly contrary to the view expressed in the Commentary [on <i>Parmenides</i>]. He also gives no indication that <i>esse</i> and <i>to on</i> are somehow the same reality viewed under the light of different aspects, like the One and One-Being of the Commentary."). Although Bradshaw asserts that Victorinus's distinction between "the Father as internal activity and the Son as external activity" is his "adaptation of the two acts of Plotinus [concerning vertical causality]," he notes that "Victorinus does not present the distinction as universally applicable, for he does not discuss activity or generation in the sensible realm, and even within the Godhead he does not use it in discussing the procession of the Holy Spirit.... He also downplays the notion that the external act is inferior in reality to the internal act, for although he does acknowledge a certain inferiority of the Son to the Father he places much greater stress on their consubstantiality." Viewed from the perspective of Latin anti-Homoian theology as outlined by Barnes, it would be apparent that the economic visibility of the Son and the consubstantiality of the Trinity are two distinct lines of argument, which is why Victorinus does not conflate his economic explanation with his inner-Trinitarian explanation. Despite these clues, Bradshaw continues to try to pound Victorinus's use of the soul triad (being-life-intellect) into the shape of Plotinus's Intelligible Triad of One-<i>Nous</i>-Soul, although at least conceding that this "more considered view" is significantly different. But Barnes's account of the origin of the soul triad in Victorinus shows that such efforts are futile.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I do not say any of this to denigrate Bradshaw, his work in <i>Aristotle East and West</i> is both impressive and, for the Eastern part especially, generally persuasive. But only one of him and Barnes can be right about what Victorinus had in mind, and it pretty clearly isn't Bradshaw. The problem is that the connection through Plotinus's Intelligible Triad is the only way that Bradshaw can equate Victorinus's view of activity of the soul to Aristotle's Prime Mover and his "unqualified being" to the Form of the Good (the One), which is infinite in the sense of formlessness and unknowability. But if what Victorinus has in mind is not Neoplatonism's vertical causality at all but instead "an auto-kenetic crystalline active power unfolding within itself unceasingly," one that is infinite not in the sense of formlessness but infinite power, omnipotence itself, then Bradshaw has landed on the wrong sense of potency. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Instead of Bradshaw's view, Barnes has the right of it when he says "'Power' is not an uncompleted act; it is that which makes an act possible, and which determines what that act 'will be.' The existence of the act does not diminish it; indeed, what a thing is -- its <i>ousia</i> -- may be its power(s) existing in the unity of whatever the 'it is.'" As Barnes points out, Plato was actually the first person to point out that every being is an expression of a power, and this concept, not the vertical causality of Plotinus, seems to have been far more important for Latin theology, at least implicitly. Such a power as Victorinus describes would be exactly the kind that St. Augustine has in mind when he says "God alone acts (<i>poiei</i>) and is not himself actualized or affected," a position which is quoted by St. Gregory Palamas in support of the same position (<i>Capita</i> 133.3-6, as quoted by Tikhon Pino in <i>Essence and Energies</i>). This would be pure active potency, not a passive potency actualized by moving to act or even an infinite cyclical act in the fashion of the Prime Mover. It would be the <i>dunamis </i>to the <i>energeia</i> of creation and grace. And that is a good place to move on to the Bishop of Hippo.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>II. Augustine as Latin theologian</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The title "Augustine as Latin theologian" is a response to Bradshaw's "Augustine the Metaphysician" in <i>Orthodox Readings of Augustine</i>, which largely follows what he says about Augustine in <i>Aristotle East and West</i> and "Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers." Coetzee, in particular, repeatedly and favorably cites this work, along with Zizoulas, <i>Being and Communion</i>, and Hireotheos (Vlachos), <i>The Person in the Orthodox Tradition</i>. Those works are the principle basis for Coetzee's audacious claim "I have demonstrated that the fundamental point of departure between the Eastern and Western traditions is [1] different understandings of the word 'person' in relation to the Divine Persons and [2] parallel divergent notions of divine unity." The main thrust of Coetzee's argument is that the Cappadocians had a robust metaphysicial notion of <i>person</i>, which Coetzee follows Hierotheos in calling "person-<i>hypostasis.</i>" Coetzee likewise follows Zizoulas in saying that the unity of the Trinity is constituted by the mutual love of the Persons, and in this sense, "God is love," as contrasted with the Western view in which the persons are allegedly demoted to "mere relations" and the unity of the Persons is constituted only as the divine simplicity of Plotinus's One. I will address the second assertion first.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">With respect to the Platonic notion of unity, the problem is that if Ayres, Barnes, and Cross are right about the history, then none of these claims can be true. I showed this with Victorinus not because he is a critical source for Western theology or even Augustine in particular, although Augustine and Boethius both probably read him. If Victorinus, who is clearly immersed in Neoplatonic philosophy to a degree far greater than many of his Western Christian contemporaries, does not even follow Plotinus in this regard, how much less likely is it that others were adopting the Intelligible Triad, vertical causality, and its implicit use of Aristotle's Prime Mover? It is not, and there is essentially no evidence that this was the case. So what is the explanation for how we arrived at this point, when the West is charged with a "Hellenism" that there is no historical reason to believe existed?</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Once again, historical accident prevailed over the overarching narrative. The Cappadocian context was, in large part, a struggle against Greek Neoplatonism and especially the application of vertical causality to the Trinity, which is the "Hellenism" that they decry. But the real problem in that regard is that Origen, who had enormous influence in the East and some in the West, had adopted this very approach, so that a large part of the Cappadocian project was rehabilitating the Christian use of <i>hypostasis</i> from this Origenist influence. That difference over the philosophical authority of Origen seems to have been the dividing line particularly between the Cappadocians in the East and the Rome-Alexandria axis in the West. In both Rome and even Origen's own city of Alexandria, the reception of Origen's Platonist speculation tended to be qualified in a careful way. Notably, as per Khaled Anatolios's <i>Athanasius</i>, "Athanasius respectfully corrected his illustrious predecessor [Origen] on such issues as the conception of a graded hierarchy within the Trinity and the notion that the world is an eternally necessary correlative to God's almightiness," what we might call Origen without Originenism. By contrast, one might fairly say that Eunomian theology was nothing other than an enthusiastic embrace of Origenism. Even moderate neo-Arians (the <i>homoiousian</i> party) saw the danger posed by such extreme views.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In terms of the reception of Origen in the West, only St. Jerome was intimately familiar with Origen's work, and he was ferociously defensive against the charge by his former friend Tyrannus Rufinus that he ever adopted the Origenist philosophy. This is indicative of a stance very similar to that of St. Athanasius: Origen was a respected theologian and exegete, but there was no general endorsement of his philosophy. As for the philosophical influence of Origen among other Westerners, Elizabeth Clark's standard work <i>The Origenist Controversy</i> summarizes it well:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>[T]he person who came to epitomize "Western" theology was Augustine, whose mind was barely touched by the Origenist dispute at the time it erupted. In later theology, Augustine drew the line against Origenist speculation: the body belonged to the first creation (sexual intercourse would not have been part of Paradise had sin not intervened) and would continue in some form in the afterlife; the affirmation of an </i>apokatastasis<i> was roundly denounced; and hierarchy of status was championed both here and in the hereafter. Banished was Origen's vision of the original and final unity of all rational creation. Through both his theological brilliance and his ecclesiological politics, Augustine forged for the West a theology that, however broad in its </i>social<i> and </i>historical<i> vision of the unity of humankind in sin, forfeited Origen's larger cosmological concerns. By refusing to answer the Origenist question of the soul's origin, Augustine in effect bypassed most of the Origenist (and anti-Origenist) discussion that occupied other Western theologians during his formative and mature years.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This is not to say that either Augustine or his predecessors in the West were unfamiliar with Origen. György Heidl tracks such influences in <i>Origen's Influence on the Young Augustine</i> and concludes that the <i>libri pleni</i> that Augustine describes in <i>Contra Academicos</i> as a "few drops of most pleasant unguent," which lit an "incredible conflagration" in which Augustine realized that Christian philosophy had the capacity to explain the object of the philosophers' speculation. Heidl is, I think rightly, skeptical of the conclusion that these <i>libri pleni</i> were the "few books" of Plotinus that Augustine describes in <i>De beata vita</i> with a much milder reaction. Rather, Heidl believes that what triggered the "conflagration" in this case were likely books on Christian philosophy encountered in Milan with Sts. Simplicianus and Ambrose, including the <i>Homily on the Song of Songs</i> by Origen. With regard to the background of this development, Heidl cites an instructive narrative from Augustine's <i>Confessions</i>:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Augustine visited the experienced and philosophically well-educated Simplicianus immediately after the reading of the </i>libri platonicorum <i>and Scripture. The old master was "glad" that Augustine "had not fallen in with the writings of other philosophers which had been full of frauds and deceits according to the elements of this world" (cf. Col. 2:8). He then told Augustine the story of Marius Victorinus' conversion "in order to exhort me," Augustine says, "to Christ's humility which is hidden from the wise and revealed to the little ones." This remark thus reveals that Simplicianus taught Augustine to evaluate Platonism or Neoplatonism properly and to recognize its subordinate place to Christianity.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In addition to reinforcing the fact that the reception of Platonism by Christian philosophers such as Victorinus was critical, as Barnes amply demonstrates, this also provides another example of "Origen without Origenism" similar to Athanasius's position. As another example, the exegetical works from Origen were well-known and influential in the West, but when describing St. Ambrose's reception of Plotinian doctrines, Heidl is clearly negative: "[D]espite the undeniable influence of a number of Plotinian <i>Enneads</i> on Ambrose's works, the presence of 'Plotinian doctrines' in these homilies is highly questionable. In fact, Ambrose's ideas substantially differ from Plotinus' metaphysics." In a footnote, Heidl adds "It is an open question whether Ambrose used Plotinus' treatises directly, or whether he simply copied a Greek model (perhaps a writing of a Cappadocian father), as he often did, which already contained the passages of <i>Enneads</i> 1.6; 1.7; 1.8; 3.5 in a 'Christianized' form. If this was the case, Ambrose probably was not conscious of using Plotinus' texts."</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">We have arrived at a rather remarkable juncture. It has practically become a commonplace that Augustine's model of the Trinity was based on Plotinus's Intelligible Triad (whether or not "baptized" by him), which was the basis for de Régnon's theory that Latin theology "begins with the essence." There is more than a hundred years of scholarship in both East and West to this effect; indeed, Barnes notes "that Régnon's constellation of themes remains recognizable in recent Augustinian scholarship, such as Edmund Hill's introduction to his translation of <i>De Trinitate</i>. Hill's emphasis on Augustine's interpretation of the Old Testament theophanies, his comparison of Gregory Nazianzen's relational theology with Augustine's, and his insistence on the theological continuity between early Greek and Latin theologies (cast in opposition to a hard-line division of these two traditions ironically attributed to Prestige), all these features reveal to the reader a scholarly world still circumscribed by Régnon's insights a hundred years later." <i><b>Yet there is no plausible account of Augustine's reception of the Intelligible Triad, either from Plotinus or mediated through Origen!</b> </i>There is not even reasonable evidence of <i>any pro-Nicene Latin theologian</i> having applied the Intelligible Triad (or, even implicitly, Aristotle's Prime Mover) in the Christian context.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The assertion that Augustine has somehow collapsed the essence of God into the expression of God's will in creation immediately falls with the Neoplatonic assertion. It is based entirely on the notion that Augustine is collapsing the (Neoplatonic) simplicity of the One with the intelligible being of the Intellect. But like Victorinus, Augustine is instead distinguishing the infinite internal existence of God from its expression in the economy. Instead of saying that God is beyond being in His essence (like the Neoplatonic One) but accessible in His <i>energeia</i>, Augustine instead is drawing the distinction between the infinity of God, which transcends even the infinity of numbers (see Adam Drozdek's "Beyond Infinity: Augustine and Cantor") and which acts without converting potency to act, and created things that can only have a finite (though potentially infinite in a certain respect) relation to God. And this is a fatal flaw in Bradshaw's argument based on Augustine's belief that God is intelligible.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The reason that we can understand that God's infinity-above-infinity is in Augustine's mind is the very analogy that Bradshaw admits: the eye can only see one side of a body at a time. Bradshaw points out that Augustine cannot possibly mean this analogy literally, since a body could be comprehended by the simple expedient of walking around to take multiple views, but does not seem to understand why he says this. But based on the distinction of Augustine's infinity-beyond-infinity and Plotinus's essence beyond being, it becomes clear what Augustine has in mind. What Augustine means is exactly what Aristotle means in saying that the intellect can <i>potentially</i> be infinite, in that it can in principle become any form. But it can never actually comprehend every form in the manner that God Himself does, so when presented with a truly infinite, an infinite-beyond-infinite that includes every possible form, then even if such a form serves as the object of the intellect, it would only be an object that could be taken in by infinitely many views. The intellect would take on ever-greater understanding without ever comprehending the object, which is why Augustine says that the divine essence is knowable but not comprehensible.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Bradshaw has Augustine seeing Aristotle's Prime Mover, which has infinity in terms of an infinite cyclical motion of thought, a mental perpetual motion machine. This is because he sees Plotinus's Intellect in Augustine. But Augustine does not have Aristotle's Prime Mover or Plotinus's Intellect in mind. He has the divine <i>Logos</i>, the Word of God through Whom all things are created in His <i>image</i>. And the reason why I have called Victorinus's account "relational" is the same reason that I would call Augustine's account "relational" -- because "image of" is a relation (and "perfect image" would be identity of power and substance). The finite things that are called from non-being by God are not emanated from God but instead are made to exist by imitation of God's own infinite act of existence. They might move toward God's own internal motion, but they cannot become God's internal motion and thus be absorbed into it. The beatific vision, in Augustine's mind, does not imply that we see God's essence in the mode of Plotinian (or Origenist) identity and collapse back into it. On the contrary, we continue moving eternally toward a comprehension that we can never achieve, a situation that is nonetheless satisfying from the perspective of desire because we know for certain that there is always more to know. The difference between this view and the Intelligible Triad in this regard turns on a difference between two fundamental paradigms in Christian philosophy: relational and emanational.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>III. The relational model and Western triadology</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The distinction between "relational" models and "emanational" models of the Trinity was identified in the context of medieval Scholasticism in Russell Friedman's <i>Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham</i>, but traces it all the way back to the fourth century. Friedman summarizes the distinction between the models as follows (<b>bold</b> emphasis is mine):</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, then, there were rival ways of looking at the Trinity, one way that appealed to relations, the other to emanations. Before I specify how these two ways differ, I would like to point out what they have in common. What these two explanatory approaches to trinitarian identity and distinction agreed upon was that each divine person was </i>constituted<i>; that is to say, each person took on his own distinct personal being, on account of a single characteristic that is unique to that one person and distinguishes that person from the other two persons. This single characteristic was called a "personal property" (</i>proprietas personalis<i>), and according to both the relation and the emanation account the personal properties bring about some type of real distinction between the persons. The three divine persons, then, according to both the relation and the emanation account, are essentially identical (i.e., they share completely the same divine essence), apart from one difference, which is the unique personal property that makes each of the persons distinct from the other two persons. The personal properties thus bring about "merely" personal distinctions, that is, a </i>real<i> but not an </i>essential<i> distinction.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">...</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The disagreement, then, between the relation and the emanation account was over the nature of these personal properties: are they relational in nature or are they emanational in nature[?] Interestingly, these two ways of explaining trinitarian identity and distinction <b>have their remote origins in the thought of the pagan philosopher Aristotle, since they are based on the categories of relation, on the one hand, and of action and passion, on the other.</b> The relation account itself descends ultimately from Augustine of Hippo (d. 430) and Ancius Manlius Severinus Boethius (d. ca. 525), who in their respective works </i>De trinitate<i> examined which of the ten Aristotelian categories can be applied to God or said about God and which cannot. To make a longer story short, Augustine and Boethius claimed that only two categories can be said about God: substance and relation. Substance is the category that describes things that have an independent existence of their own, like individual members of a natural kind, e.g., John the human being, Fido the dog, Lucy the cow. God clearly has independent existence, and so for Augustine and Boethius God is substance to the highest degree. What about relation? This is more complicated, but the problem with predicating any accident -- and relation is an accident -- of God is that Aristotelian accidents inhere in their subject, they exist in it, and they are different from their subject, since accidents can come and go while the subject remains.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>As Boethius says, it is the circumstances of the thing that the category of relation points to, not the thing itself. Aristotle actually noted this characteristic of relation when he named the category: the particular characteristic of relation, what sets it apart from the other categories, is that it is </i>toward something<i> (Latin: </i>ad aliquid<i>, Greek: </i>pros ti<i>), and hence relation indicates nothing about its subject or foundation besides the extrinsic circumstances in which that subject or foundation finds itself. For Augustine and Boethius, then special </i><b>divine relations</b><i>, possessed of no accidentality and inherence, and therefore implying no composition, are compatible with God's simplicity; in fact, these relations explain how the Father and the Son (and, by extension, the Holy Spirit) are distinct personally but identical essentially. How do the divine relations do this? Augustine and Boethius capitalized on the fact that 'father' and 'son' are relative terms.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Friedman's extended treatment of this subject thoroughly accounts for the philosophical background and medieval use of relations in Aquinas and Bonaventure, and that account essentially contradicts Bradshaw's assessment of the aetiology of Boethius's ideas in <i>Aristotle East and West</i> (which was already based on an incorrect assessment of Victorinus). Paul Thom independently comes to the same conclusions as Friedman about Aristotle, Boethius, Aquinas, and Bonaventure in his philosophical treatment <i>The Logic of the Trinity</i>. The history of Western triadology is essentially one of explaining the peculiar metaphysical qualities of these divine relations: how they can be a relative mode of being without being something besides the essence. For an early example, Richard Cross notes in his article "Quid Tres?" that Augustine wrangles with the issue of how the term "person," which refers to a genus of (rational) beings can be properly used as a term for individuals in God with no corresponding species, like "man" or "angel." Note that although Victorinus himself is not operating in this modified Aristotelian framework for inner-Trinitarian relations, instead replying on the philosophical account of the soul, Barnes nonetheless finds that his account is relational (with Barnes using the term "crystalline" to refer to its triadic relational nature). What these scholars all demonstrate is that, when one is not looking for the Intelligible Triad in the Christian philosophy in the West, one instead finds the relational model. To put it another way, if one does not make the mistake of thinking that Victorinus and Augustine derive their theologies from the Intelligible Triad but instead puts their polemical texts within their historical context, the parallels to Neoplatonic metaphysics completely evaporate.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">One can think of the relational model arising from reflections on categorical being as such, essentially all of creation, and how those categories must be modified when dealing with the being of God, Who is both infinite and utterly simple. This creates an unbridgeable gap between categorical being and God's own being, and we would not know anything about God's inner life or relations but for God's act of revealing it to us. Hence, the relational account says that we know that internal relations are rationally possible, but it only serves as a defense that they are rational, not a proof that they exist, which would have to come from revelation. The relations are then grounded in the relational property of existing in relation-to, the relational opposition (which is, again, not what is meant by that term in Neoplatonic metaphysics). That philosophical development is consistent with the facts that (1) Latin theology was primarily a polemic against Homoian and monarchian accounts of the Trinity and (2) the issue of vertical causality in Plotinus and Origen was historically not even on the radar of Latin theology.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But in the West, the reception of the works of Dionysius along with Aristotelian philosophy in particular drove much greater interest in the Neoplatonic model of emanations, and this motivated inquiry into what caused the relations. Friedman explains the alternative emanational account as follows:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The resources to develop a rival to the relation account are already to be found in Aristotle's description of the category of relation. In his philosophical dictionary in Book V of the </i>Metaphysics<i>, Aristotle presents an account of three different types of relation. [From FN 8, there are relations founded in number and unity, causal relations of a producer to what is produced, and psychological relations, such as a measure to what is measured.] Here, only the second type is relevant: the causal relation of producer to product. The paradigmatic example that Aristotle offers of this is the relation of father to son.... Thus, the second Aristotelian type of relation, the relation of producer to product, is founded on action and passion, on acting and being acted upon, and in particular the relation of a father to a son is founded on the father's originating the son, on his having contributed to giving the son existence.... This is the intuition that later-medieval proponents of the emanation account of personal distinction were to capitalize on: production is the reason for there being a relation in the first place, and hence in some logical, non-temporal sense, the origination of the production of the Son from the Father must be "prior" to the relations between them. That is to say, some later-medieval theologians reasoned that, just as all categorial relations of the second kind are posterior to (and dependent upon) the corresponding productions, so the divine relations are logically posterior to (and dependent upon) the divine productions.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Thus, on the emanation account, the Father is the divine essence in a fundamentally different way than the Son is, and the Holy Spirit is the very same divine essence in a third totally different way, these three different ways being how each one originates or has being. Specifically, the Father has the divine essence from no other because the Father is unemanated -- this is a property unique to the Father that gets its own name: it is the Father's "innascibility" (</i>innascibilitas<i>). The Son, on the other hand, is born (</i>natus est<i>), and hence he has the divine essence naturally by the emanation "generation" (</i>generatio<i>), and medieval theologians will also often say that the Son is emanated by way of nature (</i>per modum naturae<i>). Finally, the Holy Spirit, who is a gift willingly given by the Father and the Son, has the divine essence voluntarily by the emanation "spiration" (</i>spiratio<i>), and the medievals will also say that the Holy Spirit is emanated by way of will (</i>per modum voluntatis<i>). </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The later-medieval emanation account itself had its roots in various texts by Augustine, by John Damascene (John of Damascus, d. ca. 750), by Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1170), and most particularly by Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) in his work </i>De trinitate<i>. It was only in the middle of the thirteenth century, however, that the relation account and the emanation account began to be considered mutually exclusive, so that a theologian could not be a proponent of both the one and the other. As mentioned above, Dominicans overwhelmingly held the relation account, whereas Franciscans held the emanation account. </i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>This divergence of views is already clear in Bonaventure and Aquinas.... [T]here is a systematic disagreement between the two theologians regarding the way in which we conceive the Trinity, and at issue here is whether the personal properties that bring about the distinction between the persons are best thought of as relations or as emanations. I want to stress, however, that, as I read it, the dispute between Bonaventure and Aquinas is about the way we </i>conceive<i> of the personal properties (as emanations or as relations), not about what the properties in actuality are (relations).</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This passage highlights a number of important considerations: (1) the difference between the models is not in terms of what is explained (on which they agree) but how it is explained, (2) it was only after extensive consideration that one could draw the conclusion that they were two different models, (3) both models accepted the <i>filioque</i>, and (4) there was, in this case, a direct influence from the Christianized Neoplatonism in the East from St. John Damascene. But there is still essentially none of the "vertical causality" that drove Plotinus's Intelligible Triad and the resulting hierarchy of being. So even though the Franciscan view made a new use of Augustine's psychological model in what Friedman calls the "strong way," there is no sign that this is a late intrusion of Neoplatonism into a Latin theology that previously excluded it. But the emanational model does introduce a new concept from Aristotle, the concept of the relations as <i>causal productions</i> (from the <i>Metaphysics</i>) as opposed to <i>mode of existence</i> (from the <i>Categories</i>). </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that the fact that the Holy Spirit is <i>emanated by way of will</i> does not mean that the Holy Spirit is <i>caused by an act of will</i>, which would be Arianism, or that the Son is the material principle from which the Holy Spirit proceeds. Rather, it means that the Holy Spirit proceeds by virtue of the Father's possession of the faculty of will with His own divine essence (also possessed by the Son) as object, which is what is meant by the titles of <i>Love</i> and <i>Gift</i> in the emanational model. Early emanational accounts, such as the one offered by Richard of St. Victor, do not always make these distinctions clearly, which contributed to confusion when they were presented to the East. (Confusion on this point, as well as confusion of the emanational and relational models generally, has greatly impaired East-West dialogue; this is discussed in greater detail in <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2021/12/the-son-as-source-of-spirit-quod.html" target="_blank">my dialogue with Fr. Christiaan Kappes</a>.)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">So at this point, not only is there a clear difference between the Western philosophical exposition of the Trinity and the Intelligible Triad, <i>there are not one but two such explanations, each having no dependence on Neoplatonic vertical causality</i>. From the historical perspective, if Friedman, Thom, and Barnes are correct, then Bradshaw simply cannot be right about Victorinus, Augustine, and Boethius having derived anything from Plotinus's Intelligible Triad. The last recourse for Bradshaw, then, is that the West has not followed Plotinus but has nonetheless fallen into the same philosophical trap that Plotinus did. Thus, even if they did not learn it from Plotinus, perhaps the relational model nonetheless has the same defective concept of "unity" (divine simplicity) or a deficient concept of "person," as per Coetzee's twofold accusation. Yet it turns out that this charge fares no better than the historical case.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>IV. Philosophical implications of the relational model</u> </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Focusing now on the relational model, which was developed much earlier, we can consider whether there is any difference between the Cappadocian account and the relational model on the subjects of unity and person. It may be helpful here to situate the relational model within its theological context. Barnes in <i>Augustine and Nicene Theology</i> cites a threefold logical structure for every Latin theologian from Tertullian on: (1) the Three are understood to be one by unity of works and power, (2) the Three are distinct from one another by causal relations between one another, and (3) the Three are each always themselves and not another. The word for what is Three is <i>persona</i>, which is not a psychological term in this context but an ontological subject of action, akin to Aristotle's first substance. The reason that this model is rightly called "relational" is that "[i]n Latin Trinitarian theology, the idea 'person' does not provide the conceptual grounding for 'real distinctions' in the Godhead: that grounding is provided by the second and third items in the 'logic' listed just above." "Relation" is the category that provides the basis for distinction, and there is no underlying philosophical assertion that grounds the relations. Barnes notes that "[m]oderns expect Trinitarian theology to develop through a polar logic of 'person' and 'essence,' but Latin Trinitarian theology develops instead through the logic of eternal causal relations and irreducibility."</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Given that a central concern was the Homoian argument that the visibility of the Son in revelation proved that He was of a different essence, the argument for unity of nature from unity of power was a critical element of Latin theology. As Barnes explains "[p]ower is <i>substance as cause</i>, and the distinctive causality of a specific substance is contained in (or exists as) its power, for all works arise out of a power and indicate, by their acts, the identity of that power." The central Scriptural passage for establishing this case is John 14:9-11 [ESV] <i>Jesus said to him, "Have I been with you so long, and you still do not know me, Philip? Whoever has seen me has seen the Father. How can you say, 'Show us the Father'? Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own authority, but the Father who dwells in me does his works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father is in me, or else believe on account of the works themselves."</i> It is that concluding point -- that working divine things shows that the Son is divine, that He is "in" (united with) the Father -- that establishes the core point of Latin theology. This is not yet the doctrine of inseparable operations, but it is entirely consistent with that doctrine.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This emphasis on the role of the works of the Son making the Father visible creates a strong emphasis on visual language in such passages as Phil. 2:5-7, Col. 1:15, Hebr. 1:3, and John 1:14 and 5:17-19. But the need to establish the common nature prevents the visibility of the Son from being a <i>personal </i> property of the Son, so these passages are interpreted in terms of how the Son acts in displaying the power of God relative to creation. The connection to visibility was also used in the context of <i>image</i> in terms of the Son perfectly imitating what the Father does. Barnes points out that "[t]he doctrine that the Son's unity with the Father is demonstrated in the fact that he 'images' the Father can also support a 'Nicene' Trinitarian theology whose logic is neither power-based nor substance-based, but <i>iconic</i>," citing Faustinus of Rome as an example. Given another interpretation by Augustine that the power that goes forth from Jesus in Luke 8:46 is the Holy Spirit, which Barnes points out in his chapter on Augustine's pneumatology, the identical argument could be made for the Holy Spirit as the Image of the Son. This is a common element with St. Athanasius, as recounted by Fr. Khaled Anatolios in <i>Retrieving Nicaea</i>:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>One way of retrieving Athanasius's conception of the trinitarian structuring of divine immediacy in humanity's sharing in divine life is to follow his usage of the language of "image," which we haev already encountered as central to the conceptual structure of </i>On the Incarnation<i>. Much insight into the Alexandrian's theological vision can be gleaned by noting how the language of "image" is used to draw a series of immediate links between God and humanity. Humanity is made according to God's image, and its entrance into and perserverance in being is constituted through its participation in the divine Image, who is Word, Wisdom, and Son of the Father. The Son, in turn, is the true and perfect Image of the Father, who fully shares the being of the Father in himself and is only thus capable of sharing this being-with-the-Father with creation. The Spirit also is the Image of the Son, sharing the life of the Son to be shared by creation. Throughout this usage, "image" does not so much denote visibility or objective reproduction of a prototype. In the case of humanity, however, the being-according-to-the-image is not simply coincident with the entirety of its being, inasmuch as this being is also simultaneously being-from-nothing. That is why the human being is not simply "image" of God, but "according to the Image." Human being is thus a movement from nothing into God. When this movement became radically disrupted by sin, the divine Image, whose being is coincident with his sharing of the life of the Father, repaired human image through his own incarnate humanity. He did this by transferring humanity's movement-from-nothing into himself, such that we now have a new "point of origin" in Christ. The human bein's movement from nothing into God is now accomplished within Christ, who integrates this movement into his own imaging of the Father and the Spirit's imaging of himself. The salvific effect of the incarnation is precisely to transfer the potential obstruction of the starting point of nothingness, actualized and intensified by sin, into the free and unobstructed movement of Father, Son, and Spirit, through the new creatureliness of the incarnate Word.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">We have seen previously that Athanasius was an example, as in the West, of a Christian theologian who received Origen without his Neoplatonic metaphysical baggage, but here we also see an excellent example of how "image" is used in the same relational way that the West uses it. Athanasius was certainly known in the West by St. Hilary of Poitiers and by Western Christians through his <i>Life of Anthony</i>, as recounted in Augustine's <i>Confessions</i> 8.6-8. But even if Athanasius's overall approach here was not a direct influence, the use of the "image" concept here is parallel to Victorinus's description of the soul's activity as the image of the inner-Trinitarian activity, and it is identical to the "iconic" theology that Barnes describes in Faustinus. Just as the Son and the Spirit image the divine power perfectly and are thereby one God, man, and most especially man's soul, images the divine power <i>as the effect of a cause</i>. This intimate connection of "image" to <i>working </i>(<i>opera</i>) as opposed to static imitation, a critical feature of Latin theology, also appears here in Athanasius. Again, Bradshaw in <i>Aristotle East and West</i> (pp. 154-56) seems to see this but to underestimate the significance when he says "Athenagoras, Clement, and Athanasius refer to the son as the <i>energeia</i> of the Father, and Athanasius refers to the Holy Spirit as the <i>energeia</i> of the Son" but says "[n]one of these writers attaches particular significance to the term." On the contrary, Athanasius is using <i>energeia</i> to show that the activity of the Son is the way the Son images the Father, and the activity of the Spirit is the way the Spirit images the Son. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This dual use of "image" as applied to God (perfect image, identity) and man (according to the image, acting in a God-like way) connects the Trinitarian relations to an account of creation and deification, what I will call the <i>anti-Plotinian account</i>. Recall that the central concern of Plotinus is vertical causality, which is why he posits the Intelligible Triad and the hierarchy of being. The relational account, which is focused on how the activity of the Son images the activity of the Father, naturally lends itself to explaining how humanity is created according to the image of God. In the Trinity, the exercise of divine power shows that the Persons have the same nature; in created being, as <i>effects</i> of the divine power, they show the <i>power that caused them, </i>the same Trinitarian power exercised by the Persons of the Trinity. This clearly distinguishes the uncreated (divine, possessors of the power, united by nature) from the uncreated (finite, effects of the power, acts of will). The concern is not at all to explain how creation has emanated from God (or the One in Plotinus's case) but rather to show that creation is a <i>caused effect of divine power possessed by the Trinity</i>. The hierarchy of being is not based on the <i>exitus-reditus</i> model in which successive forms are more and more remote from the unity of the One; rather, the hierarchy goes <i>up</i> as the creatures are more and more God-like in their characteristic activity.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Perhaps the easiest way to see what I mean by the anti-Plotinian account is to think of God's power as a kind of gravitational pull that draws things from non-being (formlessness, chaos, or nonexistence) into the act of existence. As things better and better imitate the divine activity, they are drawn closer and closer into the divine life. The lesser created beings are limited in their ability to approach, resting into stable orbits around God in their respective activity, not static but not progressing beyond their limits. But man, made according to the Image of God, is unique in that he has infinite potential to approach God and, conversely, the voluntary capacity to turn away from God toward non-being, though the latter is not infinite. This gravitational-type metaphor is seen in passages such as Romans 4:17 ("God ... who calls into existence the things that do not exist"), John 6:44 ("No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. And I will raise him up on the last day") and John 12:32 ("And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all people to myself"). But what must be emphasized is that this is not at all the static hierarchy of being and participation in terms of intelligibility that Plotinus has in mind. I use the gravitational metaphor to illustrate that the entire account is inseparable from the concept of activity, but Augustine also uses this language of "weight" explicitly in the same sense in <i>Confessions</i> 13.9.10: "The body by its own weight gravitates toward its own place.... Out of order, they are restless; restored to order, they are at rest. My weight is my love; by it am I borne wherever I am borne." (One may note the similarity to God's Sabbath rest here; it is not a cessation from activity, which the static Plotinian account would require, but a resting within an order of activity.)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Overall, Augustine's account of creation and deification falls squarely into this anti-Plotinian account from the relational model; this is documented so thoroughly in Fr. David Meconi's <i>The One Christ: St. Augustine's Theology of Deification</i> that no other reference is required. I cite the following excerpt discussing Augustine's use of "image" for the purpose of comparison to the beliefs of Athanasius mentioned above:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Augustine's understanding of </i>imago<i> parallels his doctrine of creation, because each plays a paradoxical role of simultaneously distinguishing and uniting. A created image is the reproduction of a temporally antecedent archetype: because it is an "image," it is always like and patterned upon this archetype, but because it is "derived," a created image is always incommensurate with and inferior to its original non-pareil. Something images another only if it is not that other; something can reflect another only if the two are related yet separate. Created </i>ad imaginem Dei<i>, human persons are simultaneously God's receptive icons as well as God's distinct others. As such, Augustine argues that an image possesses a true natural propensity to become its truest self through union with its paradigmatic exemplar. The human person therefore becomes most real by becoming most fully God's. In this way we come to understand, first, how only the Son can be said to be the perfect image of God and, second, how the human person can never find any "rest" or lasting satisfaction in the creatures surrounding him but only in communion with God. This again is the paradox of the </i>imago Dei<i>. It simultaneously makes the ontological otherness between eternal and created persons while also highlighting the relationship between them.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Interestingly, Meconi has also (albeit inadvertently) identified one of the misinterpretations of Augustine by du Roy at p. 55. Du Roy correctly identifies that Augustine uses the fact that man is made "to" (<i>ad</i>) the image to make a distinction between the perfect Image (the Son) and the created image (man); this is the same way that Athanasius uses "according to." But du Roy's Platonizing reading of Augustine leads him to see a tension that isn't there: "du Roy argues that this understanding of <i>ad</i> allowed Augustine to hold two truths simultaneously: the human soul is both an image (however imperfect) of the divine and is at the same time naturally desirous of becoming <i>more</i> like God." Du Roy's insertion of Plotinus into the anti-Plotinian account causes him to miss entirely the fact that the <i>activity</i> of the soul is what is in the image of God, not a static exemplar. This is why, while the ascent in both Augustine and Athanasius is <i>Platonic</i> in the sense of engaging what is most God-like in man (the activity of the soul), but not in terms of ontological (entitative) likeness. It is not a return along the Neoplatonic chain of being but an ascent toward God.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">When these Doctors of the Church are read correctly, the Rome-Alexandria axis holds firm; Athanasius and Augustine stand shoulder-to-shoulder in their account of the Trinity, creation, and deification. Both appeal to activity (<i>energeia</i>) in their account of "image" and deification. Both have a dynamic concept of imitation. In fact, both originate in an "Origen without Origenism" approach to Scripture. Norman Russell credits Origen with the first understanding of participation as a dynamic engagement with divine activity. In <i>The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition</i>, Russell describes Origen's doctrine as follows:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Deification in Origen's writings means the participation of rational creatures through the operation of the Son and the Holy Spirit in the divinity that derives ultimately from the Father. </div><div style="text-align: justify;">...</div><div style="text-align: justify;">Although Origen adopts Clement's vocabulary, his more ontological and dynamic participation through the Logos in God's very life is new. Clement's use of 'participation' is close to that of Plato and Philo.... It expresses the way in which creatures come to possess attributes which belong properly to a higher level of being. Participation in the attributes of God is the means by which likeness to God is brought about. Origen uses participation in more dynamic way to signify 'living with the life of God.' God reaches out actively to human beings whose response, through participation in the life of the Trinity, makes them spirits, christs, and gods. Indeed Origen's doctrine may be said to be the re-expression in metaphysical terms of the Pauline metaphors of participatory union with Christ.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This leads from what Russell calls the "Alexandrian Tradition I" to the "Alexandrian Tradition II" in Athanasius and Cyril, which emphasizes the ecclesial and sacramental role in deification:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>[In Alexandrian Tradition II], there is a fundamental reliance on the theme of participation, which offers a way of understanding on the ontological level how Becoming can share in Being, or the created in the uncreated, without abandoning its contingent status, and on the dynamic level how the created and contingent can partake increasingly of the divine nature through the operation of the Holy Spirit, which enables it to attain eventually to the image and likeness of God. This develops an Origenian them.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>[Also,] there is a firm rejection of any approach to bridging the gulf between created and uncreated by positing an inferior level of deity which can function as a mediator. Mediation is accomplished through the exaltation of Christ's humanity</i>. [Cf. Augustine's assertion that there is "no other mediating nature" between God and humanity on p. 59 of <i>The One Christ</i>, for which this tradition seems a more likely source than Plotinus.]</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">When the relational model is thus situated in its full philosophical and theological context, including the use of image in creation and deification, its difference from the vertical causality of Plotinus becomes even more apparent, as do the similarities between Athanasius and Augustine in its application. And this, more than anything, seems to be the problem with Bradshaw's understanding of Latin theology. It is not only that Bradshaw has not correctly understood its historical background, although he has been misled by the Platonizing reading of Victorinus and Augustine. It is more than he does not seem to understand the <i>Christian philosophical context</i> of what Augustine is writing. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">For example, Bradshaw says in <i>Aristotle East and West</i> (p. 224) that "[t]he most striking feature of Augustine's conception of being, from our standpoint, is its static character. For Augustine <i>esse</i> is not an act, but a condition -- that of full and unqualified wholeness." He makes a similar assertion about Boethius, reading him according to the vertical causality of Neoplatonism: "Since Boethius offers no account of the procession of <i>id quod est</i> from <i>esse</i>, it is not surprising that he would conceive their relationship on the static model of participation rather than the more dynamic model of a potentiality coming to act." Bradshaw believes, apparently, that because this is credited to the Platonists, Augustine is somehow endorsing identically what the Platonists believed about these things, even though such a static concept of being and procession would be absolutely senseless in the context of Latin power theology. So he interprets Augustine as a Platonist rather than a Christian philosopher informed by Platonism. If he did the same with Athanasius, he could just as well charge Athanasius with the same inconsistency, apparently apart from the fact that Athanasius uses the Greek word <i>energeia</i> and Augustine does not. It could not be more obvious for Augustine that God is active in a sense that far transcends any created thing; his entire theology of deification is built on it. In fact, the term <i>maiestas</i>, which is often used to translate <i>energeia,</i> is a commonplace in Latin theology according to Barnes. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The real problem for Bradshaw seems to be that he does not understand <i>how exactly</i> a God who is pure act in the Aristotelian sense of act and potency can actually do anything. This is a modern philosophical problem concerning divine simplicity and modal polytheism, exemplified by Christopher Hughes's <i>On a Complex Theory of a Simple God </i>and discussed in Eleonore Stump's and Norman Kretzmann's work on Aquinas, which work Bradshaw discusses at some length in <i>Aristotle East and West</i>. Bradshaw seems to think that he can dodge the criticism with a weaker account of divine simplicity based on the essence-energies distinction, and he points out that Stump and Kretzmann essentially do the same but with no real justification in Aquinas. But the entire criticism of modal polytheism, and even the Stump-Kretzmann reading of divine simplicity, is already based on violating the distinction between created and uncreated being in the relational model. Acting through conversion of act to potency is what is explicitly <i>denied</i> in the relational account by placing God outside of categorical being. Augustine himself says that the unique quality of divine being is that it doesn't act by conversion of act to potency, so interpreting <i>actus purus</i> as essentially an exhaustion of all potency makes no sense. The concept of divine infinity as developed specifically by Aquinas (who follows Richard Fishacre) defines divine infinity as being beyond the constraints of act and potency. It may be a great mystery as to <i>how</i> God creates or acts in creation, just as it is a mystery <i>how</i> God is timeless or <i>how </i>the Trinity is both necessary and unknowable or <i>how</i> God is unaffected in Himself by interaction with creation. That is hardly an excuse to attribute an allegedly necessary consequence to the Western position that it has both expressly denied and has <i>reasonably</i> attributed to the mysterious difference between divine and created being.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">To put it another way, if the relational account concerning the divine act of existence and the created act of existence is correct, then we would expect the question of how finite acts of existence are created to be futile. This is because it would be asking a question about the divine being that we definitely cannot understand, and the only reason that the Western model might be interpreted to say something about that issue is due to a misinterpretation of what it is saying. In the Neoplatonic model of vertical causality, there must be a participable <i>thing</i> in order for something to take on a higher activity, so we would have no way to relate to God without "things around God." But on the relational model of God as infinite activity and creatures as finite activity, no such "thing" would be required; created things would simply be actualized by God relative to non-being (we don't and can't know how), while God Himself is fully actualized. Rather than banishing Rome and Alexandria to neo-Paganism and Origenism for using the relational model, perhaps it would be better to understand why the Cappadocians had a completely different theological project.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><u>V. The Cappadocian Neoplatonic model</u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In sharp contrast with Rome and Alexandria, the Cappadocian fathers were faced with a Neoplatonic onslaught in Antioch and Constantinople, having to deal with both <i>homoiousians</i> who were actively trying to philosophically rebut the Nicene <i>homoousios </i>doctrine <u>and</u> the heresiarch Eunomius, who used Neoplatonic philosophy to attack the divinity of the Son and the Spirit. While never fully adopting Neoplatonic metaphysics and certainly never accepting the Intelligible Triad as a model for Trinitarian processions, the Cappadocians nonetheless operated <i>within</i> that philosophical framework. Hence, their development of <i>energeia</i> and participation were much more similar to how those terms were used in Neoplatonism and much different from how they were used in Rome and Alexandria.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Norman Russell, in distinguishing the doctrines of deification between Alexandria and Cappadocia, summarizes the Cappadocian view as follows:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Cappadocians take the doctrine of deficiation from the Alexandrians and adapt it to a Platonizing understanding of Christianity as the attainment of likeness to God as far as is possible for human nature. They do not make much use of the terminology of the Alexandrians: </i>theopoien<i> is used only twice by Basic, once by Gregory of Nazianzus, and twice by Gregory of Nyssa -- Gregory of Nazianzus, the only Cappadocian to speak at all frequently of deification, much preferring to use </i>theoo<i> and his own coinage, </i>theosis<i>. Nor do they base themselves on the realistic approach to deification. Only the body of Christ, the ensouled flesh which the Logos assumed, is deified in any literal sense, and even that becomes problematical in the struggle with Apollinarianism. Human beings are deified in a merely ethical or metaphorical sense, the emphasis being as much on the ascent of the soul to God as on the transformation of the believer through baptism.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The Cappadocian concept of deification is conditioned by their Platonism and their apophatic approach to the Godhead. They took for granted that the attainment of likeness to God was the </i>telos<i> of human life. But God remains in his essence utterly beyond human grasp. The deification of the Christian is subordinated to this by being kept to the ethical and analogous levels. For Basil, </i>theos<i> is simply a title which God bestows on the worthy. It expressed man's eschatological fulfilment when the whole man, body and soul, will be spiritualized and rendered incorrupt so that it may enjoy the vision of God. For Gregory of Nazianzus theosis is man's </i>telos<i> brought about on the one hand by the deifying power of the Holy Spirit in baptism, and on the other by the moral struggle in the ascetic life. But we can never become 'gods' in the proper sense, that is to say, we can never bridge the gap between the created and uncreated orders of reality. For Gregory of Nyssa a man becomes a god by imitating the characteristics of the divine nature, by participating in the divine attributes, by modelling himself on the properties of the Godhead. Ultimately he transcends his own nature and becomes immune from corruption and mortality, but Gregory of Nyssa is unwilling to call this 'deification.' Deification for him is fundamentally a christological concept, which by extension may also be applied to the eucharist</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">There are certainly differences between the Cappadocian Neoplatonic model and the relational model, differences that became exponentially more pronounced when the Neoplatonist who called himself Dionysius the Areopagite became the basis for philosophical synthesis in the East. St. Maximus the Confessor was even more pronouncedly Neoplatonic, although he seemed to accept the Alexandrian origins of the Western view when he said the following in his letter to Marinus:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><i>With regard to the first matter, they (the Romans) have produced the unanimous documentary evidence of the Latin fathers, and also of Cyril of Alexandria, from the sacred commentary he composed on the gospel of St. John. On the basis of these texts, they have shown that they have not made the Son the cause of the Spirit — they know in fact that the Father is the only cause of the Son and the Spirit, the one by begetting and the other by procession; but [they use this expression] in order to manifest the Spirit’s coming-forth (</i>proienai<i>) through him and, in this way, to make clear the unity and identity of the essence.</i><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Read in the context of the relational model and the Spirit as the Image/<i>energeia</i> of the Son, this makes perfect sense. But by the time of Florence, the ability to have such discussions reasonably seemed to have long passed. Unfortunately, polemical motivations have tended to make history into a battlefied in a way that has exacerbated the problem. One must continue to hope that the scholarship to correct these misunderstandings will have some effect, but it is a slow process. One highly encouraging work along these lines is Johannes Zachhuber's <i>The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics</i>, a broad survey of the use of philosophical concepts through the development of Christian dogma in the East. Of particular relevance is his description of St. Cyril of Alexandria:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Cyril clearly did not have the philosophical disposition of Origen or Gregory of Nyssa. He also, evidently, followed in his trinitarian theology a trajectory going back to Athanasius' anti-Arian argument. He could certainly not be called a follower of the Cappadocian tradition except perhaps for a largely unexplored link connecting him with Gregory of Nazianzus. Yet his relative independence of the Cappadocian tradition makes him all the more interesting for the purpose of the present section whose task it is to show the emergence of Cappadocian philosophy as a classical theory and thus as the language and conceptuality that became increasingly universally shared by authors across the Christian East.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Zachhuber's conclusion is only corroborated by Russell, Bradshaw, and many others. This is, it seems to me, the beginning of the Cappacodian Neoplatonic model and the relational model coming to be seen as incompatible in the way that the relational model and the emanational model would come to be seen as incompatible in the High Middle Ages. And most of the Orthodox polemics that Coetzee raises result from that firm conviction that the Cappadocian Neoplatonic model was not only the exclusive model for Christian theology but also the only model not tainted with Hellenization. For all practical purposes, the relational model has been lost to history.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But even accepting that there may be two models that are incommensurable in the final analysis (despite being simultaneously acceptable from a dogmatic perspective), one could ask whether there is some inherent defect or failure in the relational model that caused it to be supplanted. Is there really a fundamental problem solved by the Cappadocian Neoplatonic model in either unity or person that cannot be solved any other way without falling into Hellenism?</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Zachhuber's answer is negative on both counts:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>As far as the classical theory of Cappadocian philosophy is concerned, it will appear that the advocates of broad philosophical continuity between Hellenistic and Christian philosoph are essentially right. Claims to the contrary have mostly been based on the notion that the Cappadocians initiated a philosophical turn to the individual or even to the personal. Yet this interpretation is unsustainable. On the contrary, it will appear from my subsequent analysis that at heart, the Cappadocians developed an ontology of being as one; thus far, they did not diverge from the long-standing emphasis on ontological unity in Greek philosophical thought. They did not replace this principle of a single first principle or </i>arche<i> with an unbridled affirmation of a plurality of persons whose unity merely consists in their mutual communion, even though they affirmed that the single </i>ousia<i> necessarily subsists in a plurality of individual hypostases.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Paying attention to the latter [concrete] dimension of Cappadocian philosophy makes it immediately clear how much it is geared toward the unity or oneness of being. While </i>ousia<i>, or being, only an exclusively exists in individual instantiations, the role of these instantiations is little more than to provide concrete realizations for the universal. They are, we might say, </i>only<i> hypostases of the single </i>ousia<i> or nature. In particular, their individuality is in no way important for this theory.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>This should not come as a surprise: after all, the doctrinal paradigm on which the Cappadocian philosophy was built was based [in] the Trinity whose</i> ousia<i> is absolutely simple, although it only subsists in three hypostases. Yet, as the Eastern Fathers are at pains to emphasize, the affirmation of three hypostases does not impinge on the tenets of monotheism as the distinction between the three can be reduced to the fact that their mode of subsistence is different. In other words, their difference is ultimately reduced to the factuality of their separate subsistence or existence.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>...</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>The creation of the world by God always created the conceptual difficulty of how the oneness and simplicity of God could be reconciled with the plurality and diversity of created reality. Yet there could be no doubt which of these two poles predominates. While the Christian thinker could not advocate a monism in which the evolution of plurality form the single source of all being was only a semblance or an unfortunate accident, the origin and goal of all movement was and remained the unity and simplicity of the divine.</i></div><div><div><br /></div><div>Richard Cross in his chapter "Divine Simplicity and the Doctrine of the Trinity" says the same in response to Andrew Radde-Gallwitz (and implicitly de Régnon):</div><div><br /></div><div><i>But my main point is that the account of divine simplicity found in the two traditions, represented by Gregory (in Contra Eunomium 2) and Augustine, is equally strong. And this, I argue, provides further evidence that the old Western analysis of the history of the doctrine is profoundly mistaken, and that the time for serious consideration of some kind of rapprochement is overdue on both sides of the Ecumenical divide.</i></div><div><br /></div><div>And perhaps the best historical example was the Council of Constantinople itself, in which Pope St. Damasus insisted that expressing the individuality by the term <i>hypostasis</i> was neither necessary nor helpful in the Latin view. As Barnes relates:</div><div><br /></div><div><i>It is said that the letter from the Council in Constantinope in 382 written to Damasus and Western bishops was "intended to be compatible with Western statements." The doctrinal summary begins with "according to .... [our] faith there is one Godhead </i>[theotes]<i>, Power </i>[dunamis]<i>, and essence </i>[ousia]<i> of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, the dignity being equal, and the majesty being equal in three perfect </i>hypostases<i>, i.e., three perfect </i>prosopa<i>." Notice that power is mentioned before essence. All Western Nicenes used a Latin word similar in meaning to </i>theotes<i> to speak about the unity of the Trinity (e.g., </i>deitas<i>, </i>divinitas<i>), but there is little that they could argue from it. Most Western Nicenes used the Latin equivalents of </i>dunamis<i> to speak about the unity of the Trinity and to argue for it. Many Western Nicenes used </i>substantia<i> to speak about divine unity, and some used it to argue for the unity of the Trinity. The letter equates </i>hypostases<i> with </i>prosopa<i>, implicitly allowing that either could be used. If the letters of Damaus to Basil and the Eastern bishops are accurate, then that Greek party's refusal to allow any word but </i>hypostasis <i>for the formula "three what?" ended with either Basil's death or the council in 381. Damasus and Latin theologies of "one power, three persons" won.</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;">Would that we could similarly end futile quarrels today. We could start by admitting that "Image of the Son" means the same thing as "from the Father and the Son."</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i><br /></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"> </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"> </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div></div></div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-84130170393540787352023-04-20T09:15:00.002-04:002023-04-20T10:06:39.826-04:00Scripture dysphoria<p style="text-align: justify;">Casey Chalk's recent publication of <a href="https://stpaulcenter.com/product/the-obscurity-in-scripture-disputing-sola-scriptura-and-the-protestant-notion-of-biblical-perspicuity/" rel="nofollow" style="font-style: italic;" target="_blank">The Obscurity of Scripture</a>, a heartfelt account of wrestling with the doctrine of <i>sola Scriptura</i> before a reluctant admission that it made no sense, has triggered a wildly disproportionate reaction among Protestant apologists. The underlying philosophical explanation has been previously published for years at the <i>Called to Communion</i> website, but it produced nothing like the angry backlash that Chalk's latest work has, including such slanders as "doesn't he think texts have meaning?," "I guess Roman Catholics are postmodernists now," and "I can't understand what Chalk is saying because I don't have an infallible interpreter."</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Then I realized that I'd seen a similar level of discontent and anger before in response to philosophical arguments concerning biological sex, a fact of which I was reminded by <a href="https://quillette.com/2023/04/17/philosophys-no-go-zone/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">this article</a>. The response to Chalk seems to stem from the same sort of existential dread that drives the response to otherwise-innocuous inquiries into the philosophical basis of biological sex. In the context of the transgender debate, the underlying psychological condition is known as <i>gender dysphoria</i>, referring to a profound and existential sense that one does not belong in the biological sex of one's birth. Transgender allies see this condition reflecting the individual's "truth," and thus view attempts to give an account of gender rooted in biological sex as attacks, while those providing a philosophical account of biological sex are generally motivated by a desire to know the truth of things in the same way that they would know any other truth.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">By analogy, I would call <i>Scripture dysphoria</i> an existential discontent with the essential elements of what is necessary for Scripture to count as divine revelation, that is, to affirm that it is <i>inspired</i> and has <i>divine normative authority</i>. These are requirements for God to have spoken clearly to us; Chalk explicitly ties the "obscurity" he means to the inherent obscurity of the divine nature, a fact that appears to have been largely overlooked. The work at <i>Called to Communion </i>and my own <a href="https://crimsoncatholic.blogspot.com/2023/04/divine-revelation-as-normative-authority.html" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">previous article on normative authority</a> are both directed to this issue of the philosophy of divine revelation, and this is essentially what Chalk's book addresses head-on. There have been other works that have addressed the fundamental issue of Scriptural authority more delicately, such as Matthew Levering's <i><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Was-Reformation-Mistake-Catholic-Unbiblical/dp/0310530717" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Was the Reformation a Mistake?</a></i>, but the inquiry is the same. There are real philosophical requirements for Scripture to count as divine revelation, just as there are real biological parameters for one to count as a member of a biological sex.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Note that this has absolutely nothing to do with the the ability to interpret texts reliably, only with the specifically unique properties that qualify Scripture as divine revelation, especially the existence of a divinely authorized Magisterium ratifying Scripture's authority. In that respect, the response "you're challenging the authority of Scripture" is in the same class as "you're challenging my gender." It is not engaging at all with the philosophical claim that there are requirements for a text to count as divine revelation. Perspicuity of Scripture is similar in that regard to gender as personal expression; the denial is equated with an attack on the person's identity, not merely an ordinary philosophical discussion.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">When dealing with these sorts of intensely personal beliefs, it is difficult to have a reasonable discussion, and it requires great empathy. (Levering is a model of that sort of charitable interaction.) Rather than engaging with these sorts of emotional responses as arguments, we probably need to recognize that the person making such arguments is dealing with issues that can trigger an existential crisis and that this might not be the right time to push the issue. That being said, as with the transgender debate, one may still need to be firm about maintaining the truth and not to capitulate to intimidation. In that respect, I do think that this discussion needs to be had that what Protestants mean by "authority," much like what transgender allies mean by "gender," is simply not the same concept Christianity has historically held. </p>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-59403122691631612562023-04-11T18:29:00.003-04:002023-09-22T09:59:42.765-04:00The right way to recognize and resist<p style="text-align: justify;"><i>Newsies</i> is an American musical that gives a dramatized account of the newsboy strike of 1899. In the musical, Joseph Pulitzer, the publisher of the <i>New York World</i>, hikes the prices at which the newsies have to purchase the papers they sell, a move matched by his competitors. This leaves the newsboys, children often forced by circumstance to work the streets to survive, in an even worse circumstance. They have nowhere else to go and no alternative, so they decide to draw the line and to go on strike.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">They do not dispute Pulitzer's ownership of the paper. They do not say that he has deprived himself of office by his unjust act. They do not advance some ridiculous claim that they are entitled to exercise control over the printing presses or to set the prices themselves. They do not issue a fraternal correction to Joe. What they do is to make their position on injustice clear and to choose not to do what they are entitled not to do. (Let the reader understand!) Likewise, they do not turn on the scabbers who come to take their place; they persuade them through the justice of their position that all of the newsies are in this together.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I cannot help think that if certain groups within the Church would behave with the good sense that these children exercised, to rally others to the justice of their position by solidarity rather than attempting to usurp authority, they would have a great deal more support. On the justice of that position, though, I can't say it any better than <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQAgRVkI3hI" target="_blank">the newsies did</a>.</p><i>Pulitzer may own the world, but he don't own us<br />Pulitzer may own the world, but he don't own us!<br />Pulitizer may crack the whip, but he won't whip us<br />Pulitizer may crack the whip, but he won't whip us!<br /><br /></i><div><i>And the world will know<br />We been keepin' score<br />Either they gives us our rights or we gives them a war<br />We've been down too long<br />And we paid our dues<br />And the things we do today will be tomorrow's news<br />And the die is cast<br />And the torch is passed<br />And the roar will rise<br />From the streets below<br />And our ranks will grow and grow and grow and so<br />The world will feel the fire and finally know!<br /><br /></i></div><div><i>Pulitzer may own the world, but he don't own us!<br />Pulitzer may own the world, but he don't own us!<br />Pulitzer may crack the whip, but he won't whip us!<br />Pulitzer may crack the whip, but he won't whip us!<br /><br /></i></div><div><i>So the world says no?<br />Well the kids do too<br />Try to walk all over us, we'll stomp all over you<br />Can they kick us out?<br />Take away our vote?<br />Will we let them stuff this crock o' garbage down our throat? No!<br />Everyday we wait<br />Is a day we lose<br />And this ain't for fun<br />And it ain't for show<br />And we'll fight 'em toe to toe to toe and so<br />Your world will feel the fire and finally, finally know!</i></div>CrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.com