It is a somewhat regrettable tendency of some Eastern Catholics to believe that Latin dogmatic theology is in need of correction by Eastern theology. That is not to say that in seeing how they are the same, one cannot learn a great deal, so the goal should be exactly that: affirming that the Western and Eastern theologies do not disagree or contradict one another. Eastern Catholic spirituality can also (in my view, at least) greatly mitigate Western tendencies to prudential error, such as matters relating to the exercise of the papacy. But the dogma itself was revealed by the Apostles, and while it might develop, what is dogmatic is simply true. I've written extensively about how I understand dogma as lawful divine commands, and God simply cannot err in what He commands us to believe.
The filioque is unquestionably Catholic dogma, and it was explicitly dogmatized in the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) as follows:
We firmly believe and simply confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immeasurable, almighty, unchangeable, incomprehensible and ineffable, Father, Son and holy Spirit, three persons but one absolutely simple essence, substance or nature. The Father is from none, the Son from the Father alone, and the holy Spirit from both equally, eternally without beginning or end; the Father generating, the Son being born, and the holy Spirit proceeding; consubstantial and coequal, co-omnipotent and coeternal; one principle of all things, creator of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporealThis was the context of the subsequent dogmatic statement of Lyons (1274), not even sixty years later:
We profess faithfully and devotedly that the holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles, but as from one principle; not by two spirations, but by one single spiration. This the holy Roman church, mother and mistress of all the faithful, has till now professed, preached and taught; this she firmly holds, preaches, professes and teaches; this is the unchangeable and true belief of the orthodox fathers and doctors, Latin and Greek alike. But because some, on account of ignorance of the said indisputable truth, have fallen into various errors, we, wishing to close the way to such errors, with the approval of the sacred council, condemn and reprove all who presume to deny that the holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, or rashly to assert that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles and not as from one.
And likewise, in Florence, nearly two centuries later:
In the name of the holy Trinity, Father, Son and holy Spirit, we define, with the approval of this holy universal council of Florence, that the following truth of faith shall be believed and accepted by all Christians and thus shall all profess it: that the holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son, and has his essence and his subsistent being from the Father together with the Son, and proceeds from both eternally as from one principle and a single spiration. We declare that when holy doctors and fathers say that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, this bears the sense that thereby also the Son should be signified, according to the Greeks indeed as cause, and according to the Latins as principle of the subsistence of the holy Spirit, just like the Father.
And since the Father gave to his only-begotten Son in begetting him everything the Father has, except to be the Father, so the Son has eternally from the Father, by whom he was eternally begotten, this also, namely that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.
The defining characteristic of all of these statements is that there can be no distinction whatsoever in the act of spirating but only in who is spirating. Note that this maps onto the doctrine of inseparable operations, which the Fourth Lateran invokes when it notes that God is "one principle of all things, creator of all things invisible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal." Just as there can be no distinction in what is done (creating) but only who is creating (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), so can there be no distinction in what is "done" (spirating) but only who "does" it (Father and Son). I have used the scare quotes around "do" because the eternal immanent acts are "acts" only notionally given that God's mode of existence is fundamentally incomprehensible to created intellect, being completely shrouded in mystery. The real underlying metaphysical property distinguishing the Persons would be a relation or relative property, and we do not know the nature of it. This is why we can say that we do not understand the nature of begetting and proceeding, but we are nevertheless capable of affirming the existence of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
To put it another way, Latin theology requires that in relation to the Holy Spirit, the Father and the Son are completely identical apart from that one is Father and one is Son. That is why I think the focus of the ecumenical dialogue on the two terms ekporeusthai and proienai for the procession of the Holy Spirit has been largely unhelpful. It gives the impression that there are two kinds of processions, and there just aren't. Latin theology requires unity of procession and principle, and that can only be maintained the Father and the Son are "doing" the same "act." There cannot be two acts: one of spiration for purposes of ekporeusthai and one of spiration for purposes of proienai, which would directly contradict the fundamental Latin dogmatic principle. In other words, ekporeusthai is used to say "the act of spiration peformed by the Father," and proienai is used to say "the act of spiration performed by the Father and the Son," but "the act of spiration" is identical in both terms.
Out of a misguided ecumenical impulse, though, some people have taken the Clarification as suggesting that there are somehow two distinct acts involved: spiration of the hypostasis and spiration of the existence (essence). The ostensible reason for this separation is that Florence's statement translated as "subsistent being" was rendered as hyparxis (existence). Based on this, it is alleged that Florence has somehow endorsed the distinction between ekporeusthia ("having existence from," which pertains to hypostasis) and manifestation ("existing through," hyparxis). This misguided attempt at ecumenism fails to appreciate either.
The Eastern Orthodox position of Blachernae is that the Son does not originate either the hypostasis or the hyparxis of the Spirit. What Blachernae means by manifestation is what is recited in the Longer Creed of Gregory Thaumaturgus as follows: "And there is One Holy Spirit, having His subsistence from God, and being made manifest by the Son, [to wit to men]: Image of the Son, Perfect Image of the Perfect; Life, the Cause of the living; Holy Fount; Sanctity, the Supplier, or Leader, of Sanctification; in whom is manifested God the Father, who is above all and in all, and God the Son, who is through all." As I've said before, manifestation in Blachernae does not refer to origin, even in the eternal sense, so what the Son is doing at best can only refer to as sustaining the existence or operation of the Spirit. We might think of this as the Father's origination of the Holy Spirit's hypostasis and possession of the essence and the Son as the conduit for the continuous flow of essence from the Father. Whether that flow of essence can be identified with the divine energies or not is a question still under scholarly investigation, but it clearly is not a suggestion that the Spirit has His hypostasis from the Father and His essence from the Father and the Son. That approach would fall squarely within Photios's criticism in the Mystagogy that the procession of the hypostasis from the Father would be incomplete, so it can hardly be the Orthodox view.
It obviously isn't the Latin view either. The unity of spiration does not allow distinctions between what the Father is giving in the act and what the Son is giving in the act, which would make the spiration composite. Unless Florence was simply being incoherent (not to mention directly contradicting Lateran IV and Lyons), there is no way that Florence could be assertion that origination of hypostasis and origination of existence are different things. All that Florence means by hyparxis is the existence of the hypostasis, which is nothing other than to say that the hypostasis is originated by the Father and the Son. This is also consistent with the Eastern use of the term tropos hyparxeos (mode of existence) as a synonym for hypostasis. To say that a hypostasis was originated without its existence would therefore be a contradiction in terms, because hypostasis is a mode of existence.
But what of the assertion, one with which the Latin theologians agree, that the Father is the sole arche or pege (source) of the Trinity? This likewise must be interpreted not as if the Father is doing anything different with respect to the Spirit but only to refer to His personal role that distinguishes Him from the Son. In other words, the Father is the personal source of the Spirit as source of the Son (pege), which distinguishes Him from the Son, who is the personal source of the Spirit as not-the-pege. The Father does not cease to be the pege in spirating the Spirit, nor does the Son become the pege in spirating the Spirit, so that the who is still two but the what is one.
The Orthodox polemical position will say that it is originating persons at all rather than the personal role taken in originating persons that is the personal property defining the Father. This is, in Latin theology, called innascibility. Whether this logically excludes the Son from originating the Spirit as subject is essentially the debate; I have yet to hear a convincing argument that it does, so it seems to me that the distinction between "having existence from" and "existing through" introduced by Blachernae is simply idle. That is to say, the distinction does not logically serve any purpose other than the distinction between ekporeusis and proiesis, which is to say that is specifies that there are two distinct subjects of the action but does not introduce any distinction in the act that the subjects are performing. If that is true, then even accepting the logically prior existence of the Son, such as when the Spirit is spoken of as Image of the Son, is enough to show that the East has never excluded the filioque from orthodoxy but only a caricature of the filioque drawn by Photios. And since the misunderstanding has been largely accepted as such at this point, it suffices to say that the hypostasis/hyparxis distinction that neither side accepts is a foolish diversion.
[UPDATE -- One of the misguided "ecumenists" has articulated his position in greater detail, and I find it useful to point out exactly the knots into which one must tie the theology in order to hold this position. Here is his attempt to sustain the irrational distinction between origination of hypostasis (OOH) and communication of essence (COE).]
The dogma of Florence on Filioque is the locus of the debate about Filioque. Disagreement exists because it is claimed that when Florence asserts, "We declare that when holy doctors and fathers say that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, this bears the sense that thereby also the Son should be signified, according to the Greeks indeed as cause, and according to the Latins as principle of the subsistence of the holy Spirit, just like the Father," it is an explicit dogma on the origination of Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit.
Pope St. JP2's Official Clarification explained that the dogma of Florence is about the communication of the Holy Spirit's Essence, not the origination of Holy Spirit's hypostasis; in effect, that the Latin Tradition views Procession as communication of Essence (COE) rather than origination of Hypostasis (OOH). There are both many Latin Catholics and many EO who oppose the Official Clarification.
JP>Actually, the only complaint I have about the Clarification is that people will misunderstand it in exactly this way. This is an example of what the Clarification actually says:
In the seventh century, the Byzantines were shocked by a confession of faith made by the Pope and including the Filioque with reference to the procession of the Holy Spirit; they translated the procession inaccurately by ekporeusiV. St Maximus the Confessor then wrote a letter from Rome linking together the two approaches — Cappadocian and Latin-Alexandrian — to the eternal origin of the Spirit: the Father is the sole principle without principle (in Greek aitia) of the Son and of the Spirit; the Father and the Son are consubstantial source of the procession (to proienai) of this same Spirit. "For the procession they [the Romans] brought the witness of the Latin Fathers, as well, of course, as that of St Cyril of Alexandria in his sacred study on the Gospel of St John. On this basis they showed that they themselves do not make the Son Cause (Aitia) of the Spirit. They know, indeed, that the Father is the sole Cause of the Son and of the Spirit, of one by generation and of the other by ekporeusiV — but they explained that the latter comes (proienai) through the Son, and they showed in this way the unity and the immutability of the essence" (Letter to Marinus of Cyprus, PG 91, 136 A-B). According to St Maximus, echoing Rome, the Filioque does not concern the ekporeusiV of the Spirit issued from the Father as source of the Trinity, but manifests his proienai (processio) in the consubstantial communion of the Father and the Son, while excluding any possible subordinationist interpretation of the Father's monarchy.
The fact that in Latin and Alexandrian theology the Holy Spirit, proceeds (proeisi) from the Father and the Son in their consubstantial communion does not mean that it is the divine essence or substance that proceed in him, but that it is communicated from the Father and the Son who have it in common.
JP>The problem with the COE interpretation is that "in their consubstantial communion" does not refer to what is being communicated but how they are acting. When referring to actions in consubstantial communion, such as the act of creation by the Trinity, it means that the Persons in question act as one with respect to that activity on account of the unity of their essence. Just as the Father remains the monarch of the Trinity even in creation, so the Father remains the monarch of the Trinity even when both the Father and the Son are spirating the Spirit. By contrast, the incorrect reading of "in their consubstantial communion" is that this language refers to the essence rather than to the activity of the Persons, which is exactly the mistake that has been made here. And unlike the difference between hyparxis and hypostasis, the difference between "in their consubstantial communion" and "from the essence" is not just a conceptual one; the former refers to Personal relations, and the latter to essence (nature). I wrote a previous article about why this language should have been explained, rather than merely asserted, in the clarification.
The Catholics (which in this OP will be referred to as diarchists for their insistence that S is source of Essence and Hypostasis of HS just as F is source of Essence and Hypostasis) argue the Official Clarification contradicts the Latin Tradition on Filioque that they claim views Procession as OOH. Certain EO also insist the dogma of Florence is about OOH since that is their own legitimate Tradition on what Procession means.
JP>Given that the entire point of "in their consubstantial communion" is that the Father and the Son would act as one principle by virtue of their common essence, calling this position "diarchic" is senseless. And pointing this out is not opposing the Clarification so much as pointing out that "in their consubstantial communion" is being badly misinterpreted in a way that would contradict the original Florentine texts, which very clearly endorsed OOH (just as Lateran IV and Lyons did). Moreover, this idea of unified operations is one of the core tenets of anti-Arian Latin theology back to its very earliest days.
There are four basic issues raised by those who reject the Official Clarification, whether Latin Catholic or EO:
(1) What are the reasons for claiming the dogma of Florence is about communication of Essence rather than origination of Hypostasis? The issue here is the internal evidence from the Florentine text.
(2) What are the grounds for distinguishing COE from OOH? Don't they refer to PRECISELY THE SAME divine act?
(3) Even if the dogma of Florence is about COE, it is still diarchist since it claims the Son is source of Essence and Hypostasis just as the Father is source of Essence and Hypostasis.
(4) Even if the dogma of Florence is about COE, the Greek fathers historically reject COE by the Son to the Holy Spirit.
I will offer a response to the four issues in the following weeks. For now, I will be focusing on issue #2.
JP>From my perspective, issue #2 is the only issue, because if there's no distinction between COE and OOH, then there can't possibly be good reasons for #1, meaning that the hypothetical conditions in #3 and #4 also fail. So logically, if there are no grounds for distinguishing COE and OOH, then we're done.
The dogma of COE (F communicates His Essence/Substance to S and HS) is distinguished from the dogma of OOH (F originates [is source of Hypostases for] S and HS), but opponents, doubters, and inquirers wonder how it is that COE and OOH can be distinguished. The more polemical argue it is an artificial distinction to justify the notion that the Son is not involved in OOH. Are they not ontologically precisely the same act? The answer is NO.
The dogma of COE (F communicates His Essence/Substance to S and HS) is distinguished from the dogma of OOH (F originates [is source of Hypostases for] S and HS), but opponents, doubters, and inquirers wonder how it is that COE and OOH can be distinguished. The more polemical argue it is an artificial distinction to justify the notion that the Son is not involved in OOH. Are they not ontologically precisely the same act? The answer is NO.
As it is good rhetoric not merely to defend one's position, but also to refute the opposition, this OP will treat of topics under two general headings: [A] reasons for the distinction, and [B] reasons why OOH is at the very least incompatible, and at worst heretical, with Filioque.
[A] Reasons for the distinction:
It is mete to first elaborate on how/why the distinction could have come about. At Nicea I, attended by fathers East and West, it was determined that an assertion of OOH was insufficient to combat Arianism. In fact, Arians used the very fact of OOH to conclude that S is subordinate to F. An assertion on the unity of Essence HAD to be ADDITIONALLY dogmatized to fully address the Arian heresy. Everyone was thus aware that the dogma of unity of Essence, not the dogma of OOH per se, was the effective means of opposing Arianism.
JP> This is an excellent argument for why OOH should not (and cannot) be viewed separately from COE without opening doctrine up to the Arian heresy. OOH minus COE is not an adequate defense against Arianism.
JP> This is an excellent argument for why OOH should not (and cannot) be viewed separately from COE without opening doctrine up to the Arian heresy. OOH minus COE is not an adequate defense against Arianism.
Within several decades after Nicea I, by the end of the 4th century, Arianism was practically wiped out in the East with the aid of the imperial power. Consequently and understandably, the concepts of OOH and COE came to be easily and absolutely equated in the Eastern mind. The situation was very different in the West. In the same time period, the Goths, who adhered to Arianism, became the ascendant secular power in the West by the end of the 4th century. In fact, Arianism lasted in the West until the 7th century. That's a HUGE time difference. By a practical necessity, the solution of Nicea against Arianism - the assertion of unity of Essence - became the focus of Western Christendom against the persistent Arianism in the West. Rhetoric had to be developed to strengthen the dogma of unity of Essence - and this is the context in which Filioque came into use.
JP> This essentially writes out of history the entire neo-Nicene/pro-Nicene theology developed after Nicaea that culminated in First Constantinople, including any recognition of the various neo-Arian movements (Homoian, Homoiousian, and Eunomian) to which they were responding. Completely omitted from this is the anti-Homoian response in the West by Marius Victorinus, Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine, and others. That is summarized incomparably by Michel Rene Barnes in Augustine and Nicene Theology. The subsequent response to Gothic (Homoian) Arianism was essentially initiated by St. Leo the Great in Spain, following exactly the same lines as the pro-Nicene Latin response. The fact that Arianism lasted longer, due to Arian emperors in the West and later to Gothic secular power, was not the source of any new theology. St. Leo, who was certainly familiar with the later Christological debates, would hardly have been oblivious to the connection between OOH and COE.
An additional, crucial factor is the fact that the phrase "proceeds from the Father" was not in the original Creed of Nicea. The expression was formally added by 381 Constantinople. However, there is no evidence that the West had adopted the Constantinopolitan Creed with its additions until the the period of the Cncl. of Chalcedon. At the time of Chalcedon, Arianism was very much still active in the West - in other words, the theological paradigm focusing on the dogma of unity of Essence was very much in effect, if not at its height in theological development. In fact, the first recorded use of filioque in the West occurred in 447, just a few before the Cncl. of Chalcedon (in a letter of Pope St. Leo, and in a Cncl. of Toledo). In effect, by the time the Constantinopolitan Creed (with its ADDITIONAL statement "proceeds from the Father") came to be recognized and used in the West, the focus on the unity of Essence was already the theological paradigm of the West. Comprehending "proceeds from the Father" as communication of Essence was very natural, and adding "filioque" to that statement was both natural and orthodox to the Latin fathers who did so. A not insignificant consideration is that the Latin "procedit" very easily accomodated the focus on communication of Essence.
JP> This is completely ahistorical. "Proceeds from the Father" is Biblical language, and Augustine and Hilary both wrote extensively on the Trinity in well-known works before Constantinople. On the purported reading of history, every Western author, including St. Leo the Great, somehow forgot everything they knew about OOH and COE, including all of the Western pro-Nicene, anti-Homoian apologetics that dominated theological discussion for years, between Constantinople (381) and AD 447. And as for it being the first use of the term, St. Leo clearly took it directly from Augustine, and the ideal that communiter as used by St. Augustine referred to COE rather than OOH is completely unsupportable. So the assertion here would be that St. Leo took a radical departure from Augustine in inventing a completely new distinction that had no background in Latin theology, which is completely implausible. Or we could simply accept that the OOH/COE distinction is specious, and none of these absurd historical consequences arise.
Next, a primer on Latin terminology on distinctions applied to theology is necessary. There are 3 types of distinctions (some sources offer more categories, but these 3 are the most general and the most relevant for the present discussion): real, formal, and virtual.
Two things REALLY distinct exist independent of each other, and the distinction is thus objective. E.g.: a tree and a rock.
Two things FORMALLY distinct DO NOT exist independent of each other, but the distinction is nevertheless objective. E.g.: numbers (i.e., the concept of 1 does not exist without the concept of 2, but they are objectively distinct - 1 is not 2, and 2 is not 1).
Two things VIRTUALLY distinct DO NOT exist independent of each other because they are actually the same thing. The distinction is only subjective (conceptual). E.g.: take a hollow, semi-spherical object whose rim is attached to a wall. X approaches the object from one side of the wall and says "this is a convex thing." Y approaches the object from the other side of the wall and says, "this is a concave thing." However, the two things are actually the same object.
JP> What is presented here is not a primer on Latin theology; it is a primer on the idiosyncratic use of those terms in this theory.
Real distinctions obtain in extramental reality. The quintessential example is any separate existence in reality; that is definitely a real distinction. For example, since only the Son assumed human nature, only the Son acts as a human being, and only the Son suffers and dies on the Cross, there must necessarily be a real distinction between the Trinitarian Persons. To deny that would entail the heresy of Patripassianism.
There is dispute among the Schoolmen as to what to call distinctions with some foundation in the reality of the thing that does not amount to separate existence. Scotists famously assert a formal distinction, in analogy to how a mind has intellect and will but that there cannot be an intellect or will without a mind, so that the operations differ in formality without being another thing. Later Thomists will call this a major virtual distinction, which has some basis in the reality of the thing, but is not itself a distinction in the reality of the thing. In both cases, the quintessential example is the divine attributes: we can perceive a distinction between God's justice, mercy, knowledge, omnipotence, etc., but God in Himself is simple.
Lastly, there is a conceptual, notional, or minor virtual distinction, which is a purely mental distinction between things that necessarily imply one another. The example of the definition of convexity and concavity works; likewise, 2+2 and 4 are only conceptually different. Since quantity is abstracted from separate existence, I would say that the unit (1) is a real distinction, but mathematics performed with quantities then results in conceptual distinctions. The distinction between hyparxis and hypostasis, between the fact of existence and the mode of existence, falls into this category as well.
In the Latin Tradition, it was deemed necessary to make these distinctions; failure to acknowledge these distinctions could lead to heresy.
JP> I agree with this. For example, if one thinks there are not real distinctions between the Persons, one will fall into Patripassianism.
E.g., F, S and HS are FORMALLY distinct. To say they are REALLY distinct is the heresy of polytheism; to say they are VIRTUALLY distinct is the heresy of modalism.
JP> This is complete nonsense. The reason that the real distinction between Persons does not entail polytheism is that the Persons are identical with the essence. Denial of the real distinction between the Persons is heresy, because it would mean that the Son could not separately assume human nature apart from the other Persons. The nature of the distinction between the Persons and the essence is mysterious, to be sure, but what maintains the unity of God is the distinction between the Persons and the essence, not the distinction among the Persons, which is definitely real.
COE and OOH are formally distinct divine acts. This means these acts do not exist (or occur) apart from the other in the immanent, eternal reality of the Godhead. However, the distinction between them is objective.
JP> "Objective" in this context means "in reference to extramental reality." I have pointed out that hyparxis and hypostasis (tropos hyparxeos) are merely conceptually different. Thus, COE and OOH are merely conceptually different. Trying to ground distinctions in reality in a conceptual distinction cannot succeed.
The following are the reasons why the distinction is true and valid:
(A1) Essence is unoriginate; Hypostasis is originated. Hypostasis is not communicated, only originated, and Essence cannot be originated, only communicated. Note crucially that the distinction is not between Essence per se and Hypostasis per se (since these are only virtually distinct in each Person), but between the divine acts (hence, the argument of opponents of COE that COE dichotomizes Essence from Hypostasis is really a red herring fallacy). True enough that according to the dogma of divine simplicity (at least according to the Latin Tradition), there is only virtual distinction between divine act and divine existence, but this will be proven to be opposed to the position of COE opponents further below.
JP> Bizarrely enough, this almost gets the entire issue right and then completely misses the point. The act "communicating the essence" and "originating the hypostasis" is identical, because hypostasis just is possession of the essence. It's the idea that those two acts are distinct that makes no sense.
(A2) COE redounds to the dogma of unity of Essence/the equality of the Persons. OOH redounds, quite differently, to the dogma of the distinction of Persons (since the Persons are only distinguished by their relations).
JP> That is generally the case with purely conceptual distinctions. You think about different things with different words. In the case of these identical actions, you can focus more on the fact that spiration produces existence or that it involves communication of essence, but it in no way means that OOH and COE are really distinct.
(A3) A final reason COE and OOH cannot simply be equated is that HS actually also communicates Essence, though He does it to creatures. If the two were simply equivalent, creatures would logically and naturally be divine beings, which is theologically incoherent (certainly erroneous, perhaps heretical). Thus, the diarchist position is inconsistent with the Latin Tradition. There is a crucial caveat to (A3), however. This final reason might only be valid within the Latin Tradition (practically sufficient to refute the diarchists), but might present a difficulty in the context of the Greek Tradition. This is because of the Essence/Energy distinction. The Greek Tradition would not say that Essence is communicated to creatures; it is only Energy that is communicated to creatures. Thus the incoherence of equating COE and OOH as diarchists do might not be as apparent from an Eastern perspective. I theorize a way to overcome the dilemma is to appeal to the fact that per the Greek doctrine, Energy is never dichotomized from Essence - where Essence is present, there is Energy and vice-versa. One can say that when Energy is communicated to creatures, Essence is also transmitted, though the creature does not experience the Essence. I wonder if (and hope) the foregoing theory is acceptable to Eastern Catholics and EO who are willing to consider the orthodoxy of the Filioque doctrine.
JP> It would be hard to find a more blatant example of going completely off the rails in the interest of ecumenism. If COE were correct and also if the Holy Spirit communicated essence to creatures in the same sense, then that would either make the Holy Spirit into an energy (a divine creation) or make human beings into divine beings, which are both absurd. Indeed, the absurdity of this position probably should have been the clue that the COE/OOH distinction was not correct. From a Latin theological prespective, this notion of communication of essence collapsed the ad intra immanent acts with the ad extra missions. The Holy Spirit (and that only in inseparable operation with the divine Trinity) communicates the divine essence analogically by making participation in the divine life available. But that is participation in divine activity, not origination of divine beings.
[B] Reasons why OOH is at the very least incompatible, and at worst heretical, with Filioque:
[B] Reasons why OOH is at the very least incompatible, and at worst heretical, with Filioque:
(B1) Contradicts the dogma of divine simplicity. Divine simplicity (at least in the Latin Tradition) means there is only virtual distinction between divine act and divine existence, whether that divine existence be hypostasis or hyparxis. In other words, the divine act is definitional of the divine existence. If a divine act is done by virtue of hypostasis, then ONLY ONE PERSON can do it; if a divine act is done by virtue of hyparxis, then ALL PERSONS can do it. Those are the only two patristic and orthodox theological options, the only two types of actions vis-a-vis divine existence that is recognized by the Church universal. Diarchists introduce a novelty, contradict this dogma, by positing a THIRD level of existence consisting only of two Persons, F and S, excluding HS. This is necessarily the case since diarchists claim the Third Person cannot do something that F and S can do BY VIRTUE OF COMMON ESSENCE - viz., originating divine Hypostasis.
JP> First, the idea of levels of existence itself violates divine simplicity. The Persons are identical to the divine essence on pain of polytheism. Second, hyparxis and hypostasis are only conceptually distinct, so if something is really done by virtue of hyparxis, then it is really done by virtue of hypostasis. Third, "in their consubstantial communion" in the Clarification already says, explicitly, that the Father and the Son can undertake actions separately as consubstantial without violating divine simplicity, so this is actually accusing the Clarification of heresy. Fourth, it's completely misrepresenting what the claim of "in their consubstantial communion" means, because it means that they act by virtue of the Father's personal initiation of the act (the Father's possession of the essence), with the Son participating only be virtue of the common essence He has received from the Father. So this "reason" B1 is completely incoherent.
(B2) Contradicts dogma of unity of Essence/equality of Persons since F and S can do something by virtue of common essence that HS can't - i.e., originate divine Hypostasis. COE is immune to this objection because HS, as explained above, indeed also communicates Essence, though to creatures. (Notably, certain EO polemicists argue that even if COE is the dogma of Florence, COE to creatures is insufficient, claiming that HS must be communicating Essence to another divine Person for equality to be established - i.e., such EO are claiming that HS communicating divinity to creatures is insufficient to establish His divinity. This argument is heretical, contradicting the unanimous teaching of the fathers East and West that the fact HS communicates divinity to creatures PROVES that HS is God, because only divine Being can communicate divinity.)
JP> Since the action is not done "by virtue of common essence" but rather by virtue of the Father's possession of the essence, this objection is specious. Likewise, no Father has ever said that the Holy Spirit communicates the divine essence in the ad extra sense in the same way that essence is communicated in the ad intra sense, which would be absurd.
(B3) Contradicts dogma of the monarchy of the Father. This seems pretty evident, but diarchists claim their position does not contradict this dogma because the Father is admitted to be "First Cause," while the Son is only a secondary cause, so to speak. Howevermuch that "logic" seems cogent to a diarchist, it actually contradicts the dogma of Florence, because the Florentine dogma asserts that S is cause in THE SAME WAY that F is cause. Thus, either S is First Cause or Source just like F (which is heresy since S is made to share F's hypostatic property), or S must be cause just like F in a DIFFERENT way - i.e., Son is NOT source. The dogma of COE asserts that S is cause in communicating Essence to HS just like F communicates Essence to HS. Concisely, F is BOTH source and communicator of Essence, but S is only communicator of Essence, NOT its source. The dogma of COE does not dichotomize source of Essence from source of Hypostasis, because Source of Essence and Hypostasis in the dogma of COE is F ALONE.
JP> This is confusing hypostatic properties with actions, and this is exactly why I said that the problem could've been caught all the way back at (A1). Certainly, only F is source of essence, and S is only communicator of essence. But since COE and OOH are identical, what this says is that F and S are both OOH and COE without F being S, which is exactly what Florence says. What is heretical (and nonsensical) is to say that S participated in COE but not OOH.
Two further elaborations are necessary, enumerated as (C1) and (C2).
(C1) Opponents of COE ask: "How can Hypostasis exist at any time without Essence?" The response is: "How can one impose the notion of time on the immanent, eternal reality of the Godhead?" The truth is COE adherents do not conceive of COE as occurring subsequent to OOH, but rather that COE and OOH occur AT ONCE in the moment of Eternity. I would ask why such a notion - of intruding temporal considerations into the immanent reality - would even cross the minds of COE opponents, as this was the very mindset that led to the invention of the Arian and modalist heresies.
JP> Since this is not a question I've ever asked or ever would ask, it's not relevant. The assertion is that hypostasis and hyparxis are logically equivalent and only conceptually distinct. Time has nothing to do with it.
(C2) The second elaboration is a note of caution. I have encountered the argument that COE adherents claim COE EXCLUDES OOH. This is merely a polemical caricature proferred by its opponents. As this OP clarifies, the COE position only affirms a formal distinction from OOH. There is indeed an exclusion inherent in the dogma of COE, but it is not OOH per se; the exclusion applies to the notion that F gives to S His (F's) hypostatic property of being source of Essence and hypostasis. It is evident why diarchists would view the foregoing as a claim that OOH is excluded by COE - i.e., that S is source of Essence and Hypostasis with F is the defining characteristic of the diarchist doctrine on OOH, and to exclude that notion is equivalent in their view to excluding OOH altogether. Certain (not all) EO, on the other hand, proffer the same accusation based on the modern notion that the Greek expression dia tou Uios refers ONLY to a temporal manifestation, and is not relevant for the immanent reality of God in Eternity (though the Eastern medieval sources actually refer to the manifestation as eternal [hence occurring in the immanent reality], not temporal [not MERELY economic]).
JP> This misunderstands the objection. The point is that conceiving COE without OOH is logically incoherent, since the acts are logically equivalent. In other words, asserting a formal distinction between COE and OOH is nonsensical.
