I use a few anti-Catholic websites as a kind of tide marker for the intellectual (such as it is) state of anti-Catholicism. I do that because I think that it's important as a Catholic to know what sorts of arguments are out there, even bad ones, because I am liable to come across people in the process of sharing my faith who have bought into arguments that at least sound good. There are plenty of good-sounding arguments that are false, and that's just a product of truth-seeking being hard work, particularly in a fallen world. Unfortunately, few people are even willing to engage in the effort, and most people are willing to settle for what sounds reasonable without ever bothering to check whether it is real.
What seems very odd to me is that anti-Catholics appear to have more or less given up even the pretense of trying to fight Catholicism on intellectual terms. The whole response lately appears to be majoring on minors, responding to some or another nitpicky argument made by some or another apologist and acting as if the real issue is whether that particular apologist is credible, not what the truth of the matter is. Steve Ray diagnosed the problem in James White perfectly:
"He has yet to even form a coherent sentence as to why he believes in the New Testament Canon. Central tenet of his being, and he has no reason for it."
That's more or less the situation. Anti-Catholicism has all its eggs in one basket: that the authority of Scripture licenses their rejection of Catholicism. One would think that would require a compelling abductive or deductive argument for Scriptural authority, lest the appeal to Scripture be rendered viciously circular. I don't even know how there could be any other way that a belief could be rational.
I had made some remarks to that effect in an earlier post, not directed at anyone in particular, but questioning the rationality of sola scriptura on natural theological grounds. Oddly enough, Steve Hays "responded." I use the scare quotes because it doesn't seem to be a response at all. It seems to be an admission that, based on natural theology (which is simply the notion that one can have certain knowledge of God through the science of metaphysics, being as being), Protestantism has no justification. And it seems to me that if a Protestant is going to admit that, then he is implicitly admitting that he will never be able to answer Catholicism rationally.
My earlier words are in blue; Hays's comments are in red:
“It's hardly a coincidence that Mormons view Jewish anthropomorphism as philosophically normative; that appears to be what sola scriptura entails.”
i) This is a category mistake, since sola Scriptura doesn’t entail any particular interpretation of Scripture. Sola Scriptura is a rule of faith, not a hermeneutical prediction.
JP> It's not a category mistake; Hays simply hasn't responded to my argument that something can't possible serve as a formal rule unless it adjudicates exactly those sorts of hermeneutical disputes. That was the whole argument regarding formal authority.
ii) Jews themselves don’t construe “Jewish anthropomorphism” as philosophically normative in the Mormon sense of taking these anthropomorphic passages literally. Simply put, Jewish theism is a world apart from Mormon theism.
JP> I don't disagree. But Protestants following them do take literally a large number of passages about God "electing," etc., that are philosophically absurd on a literal construction. Obviously, God doesn't literally choose among people.
iii) The Bible itself, in certain programmatic statements, distinguishes between a divine and human viewpoint (e.g. Num 23:19; 1 Sam 15:29). Therefore, since Scripture itself internalizes a distinction between literal and anthropomorphic depictions of the divine, one doesn’t need to ransack natural theology to draw this distinction—for Scripture already differentiates and prioritizes those alternating perspectives.
JP> The irony here is that the two passages are both anthropomorphic, treating God as if He were literally a human agent, speaking and promising. Obviously, these are figures of the impassibility of the divine nature; it would be silly to imagine God as a being that makes choices, elects, or takes action in time and is then bound to what He did "before." That doesn't mean that the figure is unhelpful, because it is analogous in some way, but we can't take it too literally as if God were a "personal God" relating to humans like they relate to one another. There's little difference in kind between taking statements analogizing God to a human in conduct than God to a human in body, which is why I say that these sorts of mistakes seem to be inherent in taking what people said too literally in terms of intent. I have no doubt that "pre-philosophical" OT authors might have literally meant what they intended here, but natural theology demands a hermeneutical principle that takes the literal sentiment for what it analogously symbolizes.
“I can't say that I see much merit in the more general suggestion of how Catholics should argue with Protestants. The primary refutation of sola scriptura is that it is absurd as a matter of natural theology and that its conclusions deny certain conclusions of natural theology.”
i) So he doesn’t even entertain the self-witness of Scripture as a relevant consideration.
JP> From a normative perspective, that appeal would be viciously circular. Scripture might be obviously false if its self-witness were contradictory, but self-witness can't say anything positive about truth.
ii) How does he identify natural theology? Strictly speaking, there’s no such thing as natural theology. What we have, rather, is a bewildering variety of natural theologies.
JP> Strictly speaking, the claim that there is no such thing as natural theology would entail the claim that nothing at all can be known about God from existence. That's so obviously false that I'll assume that Hays isn't speaking strictly, but instead means that there is a bewildering variety of conclusions of natural theology.
I note that the number of possible conclusions hasn't stopped Hays from drawing them; he claims "In philosophy, I’m an Augustinian exemplarist. I’m a Cartesian dualist. I’m an alethic realist, but scientific antirealist. I believe in innate ideas, sense knowledge (I'm an indirect realist), and the primacy of divine revelation in Scripture." Granted, several of those conclusions are obviously wrong and even self-contradictory (e.g., innate ideas are simply nonsense, representational indirect realism using innate ideas is incompatible with the hylomorphism required to justify alethic realism, Augustinian exemplarism, and any coherent account of Cartesian dualism). But that simply goes to show that there are a lot of wrong conclusions that don't vitiate the correctness of natural theology generally. For example, idealism has been bad metaphysics for as long as there have been philosophers, but the most brilliant minds in history keep falling for it; see, e.g., Parminides, Plato, Plotinus, Kant, Berkeley. Indeed, Hays himself seems to have adopted something like a Berkeleyan psychopolis account of Heaven despite its absurdities, so why not?
Outside of Christianity, there are different versions of natural theology in Greek philosophy, Indian philosophy, Islamic philosophy, process theology, and so on.
JP> There's a nice book by Jacques Maritain called An Introduction to Philosophy that charts all of the screw-ups of every major philosophy that isn't Aristotelian, including all of the ones mentioned here. Natural theology just means that there is an answer to find, not that people wont screw up in finding it.
There are heretical forms of natural theology, like Erigena’s synthesis.
JP> Yep. People make mistakes.
Within Catholicism, there are different versions of natural theology in Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Scotus, and so on.
JP> True. And most everyone was wrong about something. The good thing about continuity is that you can actually progress and get more things right.
There are also varieties of Thomism, such as Neothomism, transcendental Thomism, existential Thomism, analytical Thomism, &c.
JP> True. Some are more right than others. See Ronald McCamy's collection of Maritain's arguments against transcendental Thomism, for example.
So, before Prejean can deploy natural theology as an interpretive grid through which to filter and validate the propositions of Scripture, he needs to isolate, identify, and defend the one true version of natural theology he is using. We look forward to his detailed argument.
JP> Spoken like a true idealist! It's all about the "interpretive grid." Reality dictating knowledge? Pshaw! That might require that even Scripture have to be consistent with external knowledge before it could be affirmed as true. But in the idealist world of divine revelation, this is entirely opposite. Scripture tells you what is real, no matter what you know, because what's real is what's in your head. If God puts something in your head, that is more "ultimate" than your experience. "Nonsense on stilts" is, I believe, the apt historical description of that.
“That is a good and sufficient reason for presuming that ANY form of divine revelation also includes the appointment of definite individuals with the power to resolve these matters.”
This is a purely a priori postulate. And one problem with this stipulation is that we find no precedent for his armchair postulate in the life of the old covenant community. God did not endow a definite set of individuals with the power to resolve doctrinal disputes. So why should we take Prejean’s dicta seriously?
JP> Indeed, I consider the old covenant community to be evidence that lack of a stable, formal authority is doomed to failure. Israel seems like an object lesson of the principle that I deductively derived (not a priori) from what struck me as reasonably descriptions of the operation of actual authorities (induced from actual knowledge). Every time that God gave them some sort of gift to help them stay on the straight and narrow, they spurned it. If that didn't show the need for the constant presence of God's authority, I don't know what would.
“My argument was essentially that, for anything to function as a binding authority, it must actually be able to bindingly resolve every dispute coming under the auspices of the formal system. That means, ultimately, that if any interpretation of any material authority can be disputed, there has to be some human authority that has the power to finally resolve it, even if that power isn't exercised. Otherwise, in the end, all you have is persuasive authority, and the hope that there is actually an answer to be had if reasonable people simply exercise their God-given reason.”
i) Once again, since no such authority existed in God’s constitution of the old covenant community, why should we intuit the necessity of such an institution in the life of the new covenant community?
JP> Because the old covenant community didn't work. It was dysfunctional, and the new covenant has been held out as something better.
ii) And it won’t do to invoke a dispensational disjunction along the lines of Isa 54:13, Jer 31:33, Ezk 36:27, for—at most—that would signal a decentralization of religious authority rather than a concentration of authority in a single individual or subset of elite individuals.
JP> Hays's magisterial pronouncement that "it won't do" could certainly benefit by an argument. As it is, he's jumped to the conclusion that the writing of the law on people's hearts has anything to do with formal authority. I certainly wouldn't be inclined to take the concept as literally. Moreover, formal authority pertains to the object of faith, so the distinction between the covenants is based on the new object, not a new disposition in the subject. The improved object of faith is the Son of God subsisting in His Body, the Church. I suppose that in that respect, I do think it involves "concentration of authority," in that it puts all faith in one person: Christ Himself, and individuals only insofar as they are His members. But I fail to see how the cited passages militate against that sort of centralization.
“The problem I see with sola scriptura in that regard is that there is no good cause for granting authority to Scripture in the first place, so there is never more than merely probable and rebuttable warrant for any particular conclusion drawn.”
Well, I suppose we should at least commend Jonathan for his candid infidelity. For him, the Word of God has no intrinsic authority. For him, the Word of God has no inherent credibility. Whatever authority we credit to Scripture is a purely secondary and derivative authority which is conferred on Scripture by some extrinsic locus of authority.
JP> Pay very close attention here, because this is a direct admission that Hays's belief is fideistic and irrational, but it's easy to miss. Hays says that my denial of the Word of God having "intrinsic authority" and "inherent credibility" is infidelity. It follows then that fidelity requires admitting these things. But "intrinsic authority" and "inherent credibility" are meaningless, nonsense in the most basic meaning of the term. So Hays is saying that faith REQUIRES you to accept something that not only has not been proved but cannot possibly be proved, because it entails something that cannot be rationally believed. That's fideism in a nutshell
How is Prejean’s view of Scripture any different than 18C Deism, a la Collins, Toland, Tindal, et al.?
JP> News flash: I'm Catholic. I believe that Christ is still around and active. They don't.
“And unlike the case of science, there's no good cause for thinking that exegesis of Scripture produces knowledge in the first place, because unlike science, its normative standards aren't justified by first principles.”
So when the OT prophets interpret the Pentateuch, this exercise doesn’t yield knowledge. And when Jesus or the Apostles interpret the OT, this exercise doesn’t yield knowledge.
JP> For THEM it did, because they have a reason to accept Scriptural authority. You have no reason, so for you, it produces nothing.
Likewise, when the church fathers or Aquinas exegete Scripture, this exercise doesn’t yield knowledge.
JP> For HIM it did, because he had a reason to accept Scriptural authority. For you, it doesn't.
“I don't see any reason to think that Scripture can function even as a persuasive authority.”
Once again, I deeply appreciate Prejean’s frank admission that Catholicism and infidelity are synonymous.
JP> Once again, I appreciate Hays's frank admission of irrational fideism.
“One can do what conservative Evangelicals do, which is a bare, unjustified assertion of properties like inerrancy, wholeness, etc., of Scripture, which is effectively to conjure a normative authority out of nowhere.”
Yes, to agree with God’s self-estimate regarding the divine authority of his word is “effectively to conjure a normative authority out of nowhere.”
JP> If by "God's self-estimate" you mean your normative interpretation of Scripture, then yes, that's exactly what I mean. Viciously circular normative arguments by definition conjure a normative authority out of nowhere.
“Every allegedly divinely revealed conclusion is only as good as its weakest normative link, and there is not even a coherent way of defining what the normative principles are. Unless God has invested some definite class of people with formal divine authority (and there might be legitimate disputes of judgment as to who those people are, but one has to at least think that there are such people), the situation for arriving at theological truth outside of natural theology is hopeless.”
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that “God has invested some definite class of people with formal divine authority,” are there no weak links in the chain of transmission? Isn’t the dissemination of Catholic dogma a trickle down process?
JP> Hays is confusing objective authority with subjective knowledge. If there's no proper object of authority (in terms of a formal system), then you don't even get to the question of whether people can find it, because there's nothing to find. Hays analogized Orthodoxy to a leaky house and says that he prefers his own. My rejoinder is that Hays doesn't even have a house, only an irrational belief that he isn't being soaked by the rain, accusing those who point out that he is wet of infidelity.
Even if the chain of transmission is hooked into the extraordinary Magisterium at one end, as soon as the chain of transmission drops below the extraordinary Magisterium, then we’re back to a series of weak links. So, by Prejean’s own yardstick, the case for Catholic dogma is hopeless.
JP> Quite the contrary, because I believe in both natural theology and the presence of Christ in the Church, I believe that there is something out there to know. If there are screw ups in transmission, then there is some real thing to which we can turn to discern whether we've screwed up. And I would mark out one key difference between my view and Hays's view: without that external grounding in reality, competition is chaos. The reason that discussion and theory can produce answers is that reality is a forcing function on the method, and in Hays's idealism, there's no necessary correlation between knowledge and reality, because the most fundamental tenet of the whole system (Scriptural authority) comes out of nowhere. Knowledge can't depend on something internal to you, like some disposition toward Scripture, some "interpretive grid," and still be knowledge about reality.
Thursday, August 30, 2007
Wednesday, August 29, 2007
More from the mailbag
Raymond Maxwell Spiotta has quite a list of intriguing filioque and Palamism questions that I will answer as best I can. Sorry it took so long, Raymond, but you ask hard questions! On the first issue:
1.) Please define "Hypostatic Procession/Origination," both in Latin & Greek terms.
JP> It's hard to delineate them in this way, because for Latin theology, it seems to me that causality is a question of what the substance is and how it got to be that way. Consequently, I think it just isn't possible to separate the origin of hypostasis and the origin of ousia in this way without rendering the concept senseless. What distinguishes the Son from the Father, for example, is not that one is the origin of hypostasis while the other is the (proximate) source of ousia. What distinguishes the two is that the Father is the source of the Holy Spirit in one way and the Son is the source of the Holy Spirit in another way. I suppose the way to look at this is that Latin theology sees multiple ways to be a source of the same thing, so that both the Father and the Son are the source of the Holy Spirit's substance (both hypostasis and ousia) but in different ways.
2.) Does the Son play a part in originating the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit, as one might think given Florence's asseveration that the Holy Spirit has "his essence and his subsistent being from the Father together with the Son"? I've seen arguments made that the Latin Filioque need only imply a flow of ousia to the Holy Spirit from the Son, and I've also seen such anti-Western polemicists as T.R. Valentine admit the possibility of such a Filioque. How would the two concepts differ, and what are my reasons for limiting the scope of Latin dogma to the latter concept?
JP> The differences are basically what I outlined above, and I don't think the Latin dogma can be made to fit the Greek separation. Historically, the Latin dogma was based on an Aristotelian concept of existence (substance), and there's no way to coherently limit the Latin belief given that understanding of causality. To put it another way, I can't think of any way to separate the two in a manner that wouldn't have made Boethius gag.
3.) I've been interacting with a Catholic apologist on the meaning of the phrase in the Florentine Defnition, "cause, according to the Greeks." He has asserted:
>>>>
"Now, ... When Florence says that the Greeks admitted that the Son is also the "cause" of the Spirit, they were NOT saying that the Greeks called the Son an "aition" of the Spirit. Indeed, they were NOT saying that the Greeks DIRECTLY STATED that the Son is a "cause" at all --that is, Florence was NOT claiming that the Greeks USED THE WORD "cause" to describe the Son in regard to the Spirit.. Rather, speaking as good Scholastics (and largely insensitive to Byzantine sensibilities), all that Florence meant was that the Greek fathers supported the Scholastic understanding that the Son, along with the Father, is the "cause" of the Spirit. The Council's statement is a totally Latin / Scholastic expression, which pays no heed to the Patristic language of Greek theology. It is speaking in the "Latin-ese" of the medieval Western Church. So, the idea of an "aition" is not even being considered in the statement. This is not what is meant by "cause.""
>>>>
Do you think there is anything going for this interpretation of the Council's words? It seems to me there isn't - that what the Fathers meant by "cause, according to the Greeks" is, pretty self-evidently, Aition - but I don't know.
JP> It seems to be a pretty good read of the Council as far as I can tell. I don't think it was remotely a comment on what the Greeks actually believed or an attempt to equate the Latin concept with what the Greeks believed, or if it was, then it was clearly mistaken. I don't think it was anything other than an attempt to point out what the Latins meant when they used the term, not what the Greeks meant by it. And what the two meant was clearly different.
On Palamism
1.) Is there any possible parallel between the Latin formulation of 'absolutedivine simplicity,' where the diversified 'attributes' of God are to beunderstood as only conceptually diversified perceptions of the unitas essentiae,and the Byzantine understanding of the Uncreated Energy as being 'indivisiblydivided?' At present I've yet to discover how the basic Augustinian idea ofGod's Essence's equivalent identification by 'Goodness,' 'Wisdom,' 'Power,' &c.can be reconciled with the Basilian account (e.g. "When all these highattributes have been enumerated, are they all names of one essence?"). Mightthe Byzantines & Latins be able simultaneously to embrace their respectivetheological conceptions with an equal degree of metaphysical rectitude, and ifso, could you do some of the grunt work for us who are new at this, and map outsomething of a basic vocabulary and chart some terminological correspondences?
JP> In my opinion, it's extremely difficult. The way that one would do it is to investigate the idea of power to see if there is common ground. In the Eastern account, powers are signs of nature, and the divine nature is characterized by the indivisibly divided power. In the Western account, power is a matter of degree of perfection, ranging from a mere vestige of the Trinitarian power to the pure act of the Trinity. What I'm having a very difficult time doing is to see how to explain that the indivisible division of Eastern divine simplicity is literally the same thing as the infinite power of Western divine simplicity.
The oneness part is easy to understand, but in the Eastern view, this is a unity of a collection of real things. When the Westerns use terms like Wisdom and Love, they are intended to connote infinite degree, not separate kinds of things (as if the Trinity were simply separate powers or energies of the divine essence). Thus, in the psychological analogy, separating the faculties is not intended to connote a number of real "things" as it would be in the East. Likewise, the relations of opposition aren't intended to convey the sort of opposition between disparate things as they would be in Eastern dialectic. In fact, it is quite the opposite; it is intended to show identity by the fact that they are poles of the same infinite degree. What shows unity in the Western account is precisely what shows improper separation in the Eastern account. But the fundamental indivisible division in the East sounds like improper division of the infinite in Western ears. Apart from each side just realizing that they are talking about entirely different metaphysical issues, I don't know how to reconcile them.
2.) If one even can, how would one express the Augustinian/Scholastic idea ofthe Beatific Vision in Palamite terms? Obviously, the distinction is stark inWestern thought between our mode of knowing God now and in the eschaton, whereasI don't see the distinction put as strongly by Byzantium. Is there any elementof Palamite thought that might approximate this distinction? Also, if God's'Essence' can be known only hereafter, and if God is esse/essential pure andsimple, how is the Westerner to circumvent the objections of the Oriental inclaiming that he can have no real knowledge of God in this life?
To be honest, I think this is just a difference between Platonic and Aristotelian intellection. The sort of identity between knower and known in Platonism is just plain opposed to the identity claimed in (Western) Aristotelianism. The Western account is of a supernatural cognitive faculty (faith) that perceives the spiritual in a certain kind of way and of a sort of intellectual vision that produces a different sort of identity in Heaven (even then, though, it is possession of the divine essence as end, a sort of sure eternal progress and an intuition of one's infinite capacity, not a comprehensive intellectual grasp of the divine essence). Again, I don't really know how one can explain that the Western claim isn't what the East thinks it is. Part of it is that they think Western Aristotelianism is identical with some Middle Platonist/Peripatetic syntheses, an assumption that I consider unrealiable.
Hope that helps, and sorry I took so long.
1.) Please define "Hypostatic Procession/Origination," both in Latin & Greek terms.
JP> It's hard to delineate them in this way, because for Latin theology, it seems to me that causality is a question of what the substance is and how it got to be that way. Consequently, I think it just isn't possible to separate the origin of hypostasis and the origin of ousia in this way without rendering the concept senseless. What distinguishes the Son from the Father, for example, is not that one is the origin of hypostasis while the other is the (proximate) source of ousia. What distinguishes the two is that the Father is the source of the Holy Spirit in one way and the Son is the source of the Holy Spirit in another way. I suppose the way to look at this is that Latin theology sees multiple ways to be a source of the same thing, so that both the Father and the Son are the source of the Holy Spirit's substance (both hypostasis and ousia) but in different ways.
2.) Does the Son play a part in originating the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit, as one might think given Florence's asseveration that the Holy Spirit has "his essence and his subsistent being from the Father together with the Son"? I've seen arguments made that the Latin Filioque need only imply a flow of ousia to the Holy Spirit from the Son, and I've also seen such anti-Western polemicists as T.R. Valentine admit the possibility of such a Filioque. How would the two concepts differ, and what are my reasons for limiting the scope of Latin dogma to the latter concept?
JP> The differences are basically what I outlined above, and I don't think the Latin dogma can be made to fit the Greek separation. Historically, the Latin dogma was based on an Aristotelian concept of existence (substance), and there's no way to coherently limit the Latin belief given that understanding of causality. To put it another way, I can't think of any way to separate the two in a manner that wouldn't have made Boethius gag.
3.) I've been interacting with a Catholic apologist on the meaning of the phrase in the Florentine Defnition, "cause, according to the Greeks." He has asserted:
>>>>
"Now, ... When Florence says that the Greeks admitted that the Son is also the "cause" of the Spirit, they were NOT saying that the Greeks called the Son an "aition" of the Spirit. Indeed, they were NOT saying that the Greeks DIRECTLY STATED that the Son is a "cause" at all --that is, Florence was NOT claiming that the Greeks USED THE WORD "cause" to describe the Son in regard to the Spirit.. Rather, speaking as good Scholastics (and largely insensitive to Byzantine sensibilities), all that Florence meant was that the Greek fathers supported the Scholastic understanding that the Son, along with the Father, is the "cause" of the Spirit. The Council's statement is a totally Latin / Scholastic expression, which pays no heed to the Patristic language of Greek theology. It is speaking in the "Latin-ese" of the medieval Western Church. So, the idea of an "aition" is not even being considered in the statement. This is not what is meant by "cause.""
>>>>
Do you think there is anything going for this interpretation of the Council's words? It seems to me there isn't - that what the Fathers meant by "cause, according to the Greeks" is, pretty self-evidently, Aition - but I don't know.
JP> It seems to be a pretty good read of the Council as far as I can tell. I don't think it was remotely a comment on what the Greeks actually believed or an attempt to equate the Latin concept with what the Greeks believed, or if it was, then it was clearly mistaken. I don't think it was anything other than an attempt to point out what the Latins meant when they used the term, not what the Greeks meant by it. And what the two meant was clearly different.
On Palamism
1.) Is there any possible parallel between the Latin formulation of 'absolutedivine simplicity,' where the diversified 'attributes' of God are to beunderstood as only conceptually diversified perceptions of the unitas essentiae,and the Byzantine understanding of the Uncreated Energy as being 'indivisiblydivided?' At present I've yet to discover how the basic Augustinian idea ofGod's Essence's equivalent identification by 'Goodness,' 'Wisdom,' 'Power,' &c.can be reconciled with the Basilian account (e.g. "When all these highattributes have been enumerated, are they all names of one essence?"). Mightthe Byzantines & Latins be able simultaneously to embrace their respectivetheological conceptions with an equal degree of metaphysical rectitude, and ifso, could you do some of the grunt work for us who are new at this, and map outsomething of a basic vocabulary and chart some terminological correspondences?
JP> In my opinion, it's extremely difficult. The way that one would do it is to investigate the idea of power to see if there is common ground. In the Eastern account, powers are signs of nature, and the divine nature is characterized by the indivisibly divided power. In the Western account, power is a matter of degree of perfection, ranging from a mere vestige of the Trinitarian power to the pure act of the Trinity. What I'm having a very difficult time doing is to see how to explain that the indivisible division of Eastern divine simplicity is literally the same thing as the infinite power of Western divine simplicity.
The oneness part is easy to understand, but in the Eastern view, this is a unity of a collection of real things. When the Westerns use terms like Wisdom and Love, they are intended to connote infinite degree, not separate kinds of things (as if the Trinity were simply separate powers or energies of the divine essence). Thus, in the psychological analogy, separating the faculties is not intended to connote a number of real "things" as it would be in the East. Likewise, the relations of opposition aren't intended to convey the sort of opposition between disparate things as they would be in Eastern dialectic. In fact, it is quite the opposite; it is intended to show identity by the fact that they are poles of the same infinite degree. What shows unity in the Western account is precisely what shows improper separation in the Eastern account. But the fundamental indivisible division in the East sounds like improper division of the infinite in Western ears. Apart from each side just realizing that they are talking about entirely different metaphysical issues, I don't know how to reconcile them.
2.) If one even can, how would one express the Augustinian/Scholastic idea ofthe Beatific Vision in Palamite terms? Obviously, the distinction is stark inWestern thought between our mode of knowing God now and in the eschaton, whereasI don't see the distinction put as strongly by Byzantium. Is there any elementof Palamite thought that might approximate this distinction? Also, if God's'Essence' can be known only hereafter, and if God is esse/essential pure andsimple, how is the Westerner to circumvent the objections of the Oriental inclaiming that he can have no real knowledge of God in this life?
To be honest, I think this is just a difference between Platonic and Aristotelian intellection. The sort of identity between knower and known in Platonism is just plain opposed to the identity claimed in (Western) Aristotelianism. The Western account is of a supernatural cognitive faculty (faith) that perceives the spiritual in a certain kind of way and of a sort of intellectual vision that produces a different sort of identity in Heaven (even then, though, it is possession of the divine essence as end, a sort of sure eternal progress and an intuition of one's infinite capacity, not a comprehensive intellectual grasp of the divine essence). Again, I don't really know how one can explain that the Western claim isn't what the East thinks it is. Part of it is that they think Western Aristotelianism is identical with some Middle Platonist/Peripatetic syntheses, an assumption that I consider unrealiable.
Hope that helps, and sorry I took so long.
Sunday, August 26, 2007
Principles of Catholic apologetics
The following reproduces a response I gave on Energetic Procession:
It seems that Sungenis noted the same monothelitism in White's position, and the creatio ex nihilo point is another one that I had in mind when I pointed out that White is granting too much to Mormonism. He's more or less a sitting duck for the arguments of Blake Ostler (note that the linked article is direct evidence of an LDS apologist making the very same argument you suggest could be made by open theists). It's hardly a coincidence that Mormons view Jewish anthropomorphism as philosophically normative; that appears to be what sola scriptura entails.
I can't say that I see much merit in the more general suggestion of how Catholics should argue with Protestants. The primary refutation of sola scriptura is that it is absurd as a matter of natural theology and that its conclusions deny certain conclusions of natural theology. The filioque is not a matter of natural theology. The arguments for the filioque merely show that it is consistent with reason, not that the filioque is true (which is why it's a misrepresentation of the Western filioque to confuse it with the dialectically based philosophical argument).
Sure, it might demonstrate inconsistency in the methodology to show that Protestants accept things that they oughtn't, but the Catholic concern is primarily the acceptance of truth, natural or revealed, so our goal is to demonstrate contradictions with what is real, not general internal critiques of someone's methodology. We care far more about people being wrong than why they are wrong. I couldn't care less what someone's "worldview" is, because reality renders one's "worldview" irrelevant for matters of metaphysics and natural theology. Reality is what it is, and everyone knows it regardless of their private conceptions.
The fact that intelligent people disagree simply demonstrates the human capacity to conceive of the unreal, which is precisely why demonstrating internal inconsistency is a wild goose chase (one that I thought Godel would have ended by demonstrating its hopelessness). The only thing that demonstrates truth or falsity is denial of actual knowledge about reality, period. Conversely, if one is willing to accept a contradiction, one can be consistent in proving all sorts of untrue things, so the problem is not inconsistency, but untruth. Since Protestants lack formed faith (hence, knowledge of most revealed truths), all I can do is show a denial of what they know or should know by natural reason or that an argument from natural reason that they make is invalid or unsound. Beyond that, I simply have to wait on the grace of God.
For that same reason, I find the reliance of historical Protestant confessions or other Christian confessions equally fruitless. Because Protestant faith is typically unformed, I have no idea whether they actually believe any of those propositions by faith, and I suspect that in most cases, they believe things inconsistent with them. So why would I make an argument based on their belief on the filioque when I honestly think that they don't believe it (or at least, don't believe it according to any coherent concept)?
I'm amenable to the suggestion that the denial of any doctrine of faith (including the Assumption) by someone who hasn't even justified his own argument for selecting doctrines of faith is absurd. But it seems a great deal more straightforward simply to point out that he started from a contradiction, such as holding Scripture as the ultimate epistemological authority.
It seems that Sungenis noted the same monothelitism in White's position, and the creatio ex nihilo point is another one that I had in mind when I pointed out that White is granting too much to Mormonism. He's more or less a sitting duck for the arguments of Blake Ostler (note that the linked article is direct evidence of an LDS apologist making the very same argument you suggest could be made by open theists). It's hardly a coincidence that Mormons view Jewish anthropomorphism as philosophically normative; that appears to be what sola scriptura entails.
I can't say that I see much merit in the more general suggestion of how Catholics should argue with Protestants. The primary refutation of sola scriptura is that it is absurd as a matter of natural theology and that its conclusions deny certain conclusions of natural theology. The filioque is not a matter of natural theology. The arguments for the filioque merely show that it is consistent with reason, not that the filioque is true (which is why it's a misrepresentation of the Western filioque to confuse it with the dialectically based philosophical argument).
Sure, it might demonstrate inconsistency in the methodology to show that Protestants accept things that they oughtn't, but the Catholic concern is primarily the acceptance of truth, natural or revealed, so our goal is to demonstrate contradictions with what is real, not general internal critiques of someone's methodology. We care far more about people being wrong than why they are wrong. I couldn't care less what someone's "worldview" is, because reality renders one's "worldview" irrelevant for matters of metaphysics and natural theology. Reality is what it is, and everyone knows it regardless of their private conceptions.
The fact that intelligent people disagree simply demonstrates the human capacity to conceive of the unreal, which is precisely why demonstrating internal inconsistency is a wild goose chase (one that I thought Godel would have ended by demonstrating its hopelessness). The only thing that demonstrates truth or falsity is denial of actual knowledge about reality, period. Conversely, if one is willing to accept a contradiction, one can be consistent in proving all sorts of untrue things, so the problem is not inconsistency, but untruth. Since Protestants lack formed faith (hence, knowledge of most revealed truths), all I can do is show a denial of what they know or should know by natural reason or that an argument from natural reason that they make is invalid or unsound. Beyond that, I simply have to wait on the grace of God.
For that same reason, I find the reliance of historical Protestant confessions or other Christian confessions equally fruitless. Because Protestant faith is typically unformed, I have no idea whether they actually believe any of those propositions by faith, and I suspect that in most cases, they believe things inconsistent with them. So why would I make an argument based on their belief on the filioque when I honestly think that they don't believe it (or at least, don't believe it according to any coherent concept)?
I'm amenable to the suggestion that the denial of any doctrine of faith (including the Assumption) by someone who hasn't even justified his own argument for selecting doctrines of faith is absurd. But it seems a great deal more straightforward simply to point out that he started from a contradiction, such as holding Scripture as the ultimate epistemological authority.
Wednesday, August 15, 2007
Just what's the problem with private judgment?
Dr. Edwin Tait, a thoughtful Protestant coming from an excellent theology school at Duke University, asks the question:
What I'm trying to drive at here is that high-church Protestants like myself see the tradition's role as being one of guidance rather than shedding additional light. Tradition steers people away from false interpretations and points the way toward true ones. It's kind of like saying "hot" and "cold" to someone playing hide-and-seek. What I'd like to see on this board--but rarely do--is a Catholic response to this understanding of tradition. Just how is it insufficient from the Catholic perspective?
I think that's a very fair question, so I set out to give a Catholic answer. I reproduce the more detailed response I gave later in the thread:
---------BEGIN QUOTED RESPONSE--------------
Quote:
I didn't say anything about dogmatic certainty. That is your addition. By "shedding light" I mean simply that Scripture teaches certain things, and these things can be ascertained by reading Scripture.
That is, in fact, all I mean by dogmatic certainty, and I gather it is also all that is meant by formal sufficiency. I mean that you are certain that some particular proposition is theological truth. My point is that you can't be certain that Scripture teaches theological truth. You would merely have some probable opinion that some particular thing that Scripture teaches is true.
Quote:
However, it is astronomically improbable that a single human being could come to all the right conclusions (I am not talking about being certain that one's conclusions are right, which I do not think is important) simply by reading Scripture.
My difficulty is that you haven't actually shown that a human being can come to ANY of the right conclusions, because you haven't shown that interpretation of Scripture gives certain theological conclusions.
Quote:
God could overrule this difficulty of interpretation by inspiring each individual believer to understand Scripture correctly--but God clearly has not chosen to do this.
We agree on that much. But for someone who makes such an admission, it is irrational for that person to think that his reading of Scripture will reveal theological truth. In other words, you've just presented a valid and sound argument for why your interpretation of Scripture can't produce certain theological truth.
JP>> You've just begged the question in terms of formal sufficiency; when you say "additional," the immediate response is "additional to what?"
Quote:
Additional to Scripture?
Scripture is a book, paper and ink, not theological truth. That might seem pedantic, but it's an important distinction, because some agent has to apply a rule to generate formal propositions from Scripture.
Quote:
Jonathan, I'm embarrassed to admit this, but I'm not completely sure what you mean by "formal content" and "proximate object."
Sorry. I've been reading too much Aristotelico-Thomist literature lately. Let's go back to the definition of faith. Faith is a supernatural cognitive faculty establishing a real relation between a person and another real entity (the proximate object; see http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/translat/aquinas5.htm and also Newman's Grammar of Assent). In that respect, it's like knowledge, which creates a real identity between the knower and the known, so I will use the term "faither" and "faithed" like "knower" and "known" to emphasize the analogy.
When you have certain knowledge of theological truth, it's because you have "faithed" the object of truth, much as when you have certain knowledge about anything it is because you have known that thing. That certain knowledge is the formal content of your knowledge or faith. Here's the problem...
Quote:
If I understand you correctly, then I would say that I get my rule from the consensus of the Church and have no problem admitting this.
That won't work, because the "consensus of the Church" is just like one's "interpretation of Scripture." It is an intentional being; it is a concept that your mind creates based on what it knows. Unless God Himself miraculously put that concept in your head, there is no way that such a thing can be the proximate object of faith, which requires a real relation between the "faither" and an external object. In Catholicism, however, the Church is a real entity; it really subsists in the Catholic Church, and it is a real object of faith. So when you say that you have faith in the Catholic Church, it's because there is a real thing "faithed" by you personally. That's the importance of apostolic succession; it creates and sustains a persistent and real object of faith. Denial of that principle is why Anglican orders are considered invalid in Catholicism.
Scripture could conceivably be a proximate object of faith, but you'd have to be arguing that God was really subsisting in every copy of Scripture, effectively substantiating the charge of Bibliolatry. As it is, the only proper proximate object of faith in Protestantism is baptism, because it is the only knowable divine act left (God's spiritual presence among two or three gathered being real but not certainly knowable). And most Protestants deny baptismal regeneration so that they don't even accept that. Orthodoxy, by contrast, has real proximate objects of faith in a significant degree. But it lacks the unity and completeness of the Catholic Church to form a true subsistence, a completely self-existing entity identified with Christ (John 17, see also http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1701108.htm), which is what allows it to serve as the true proximate object of faith. Protestantism and Orthodoxy depend on this subsistence for their reality, which is why the spiritual realities in those bodies are not self-subsistent entities but rather accidents in the metaphysical sense.
Because Protestantism has no external object of faith, Protestant faith is necessarily confused, irrational, and circular, effectively a faith in one's own mental disposition. That's the "private judgment" peril of which we Catholics so often speak; it is an attempt to judge theological truth with no real and certain basis. Basically, we believe your faith has no object, so while you actually have the faculty of faith (given in baptism), it isn't actually being directed to anything other than yourself. It's the theological equivalent to Descartes, denying the knowability of everything but himself, and it's wrong for the same reason.
----------END QUOTED RESPONSE-------------------
It occurred to me that the discussion above might also be helpful to illuminate the recent post by Fr. Patrick on Energetic Procession. I think the above quote from Tractate 108 on John also provides some insight in to St. Augustine's view of Christ and the Church. The unity of the Church, for Augustine, IS Christ Himself (cf. the Bride as wholly joined to Her spouse), and it appears to me that he has in mind derivative functions both for individuals and for local churches, in that they are identical to Christ in some respect as members, but that Christ Himself only subsists in the wholeness of the Church. That is why I theorize that he believes that Sacraments are valid even outside the confines of the Church (N.B., this metaphysical distinction between subsistence and simply existence would be difficult to grasp in Platonic/Neoplatonic terms, which is why I expect that the Eastern Fathers would be at best confused by it). If there is some definite real but not subsistent member-function, then the member does not cease to function derivatively even when it ceases to manifest its inherent unity. But only the Catholic Church is subsistent unity, because only She manifests unity in all Her functions and is a self-sustaining unity; the unity in all other churches is merely an accidental unity between particular functions received derivatively from the subsistence of the Church. This also helps to explain the gross misunderstanding that some Protestants have of the Catholic Church, betraying massive confusion on the underlying metaphysical and theological concepts.
(P.S., After re-reading that thread last linked, it might be overly charitable to say that there is simply confusion about the object of faith, because David King appears to have severe difficulties even in using the natural faculty of reason given the numerous errors in logic displayed there; see also these comments (e.g., de facto excommunication is an oxymoron, infallibility is obviously possible for created entities). On the Pseudo-Isidorean Decretals as substantially reproducing an existing belief, making them essentially a non-factor in the concept of papal authority contra the now-rebutted assertions of Dollinger et al., see Ulrich Horst. Perhaps this thread would be a better example of the inability of Protestants to comprehend the need for a proximate object of faith. Note that the questions "of the atheist" in that thread are valid and sound arguments for the irrationality of Protestant faith; pointing out that atheists also make these arguments does not actually answer them).
What I'm trying to drive at here is that high-church Protestants like myself see the tradition's role as being one of guidance rather than shedding additional light. Tradition steers people away from false interpretations and points the way toward true ones. It's kind of like saying "hot" and "cold" to someone playing hide-and-seek. What I'd like to see on this board--but rarely do--is a Catholic response to this understanding of tradition. Just how is it insufficient from the Catholic perspective?
I think that's a very fair question, so I set out to give a Catholic answer. I reproduce the more detailed response I gave later in the thread:
---------BEGIN QUOTED RESPONSE--------------
Quote:
I didn't say anything about dogmatic certainty. That is your addition. By "shedding light" I mean simply that Scripture teaches certain things, and these things can be ascertained by reading Scripture.
That is, in fact, all I mean by dogmatic certainty, and I gather it is also all that is meant by formal sufficiency. I mean that you are certain that some particular proposition is theological truth. My point is that you can't be certain that Scripture teaches theological truth. You would merely have some probable opinion that some particular thing that Scripture teaches is true.
Quote:
However, it is astronomically improbable that a single human being could come to all the right conclusions (I am not talking about being certain that one's conclusions are right, which I do not think is important) simply by reading Scripture.
My difficulty is that you haven't actually shown that a human being can come to ANY of the right conclusions, because you haven't shown that interpretation of Scripture gives certain theological conclusions.
Quote:
God could overrule this difficulty of interpretation by inspiring each individual believer to understand Scripture correctly--but God clearly has not chosen to do this.
We agree on that much. But for someone who makes such an admission, it is irrational for that person to think that his reading of Scripture will reveal theological truth. In other words, you've just presented a valid and sound argument for why your interpretation of Scripture can't produce certain theological truth.
JP>> You've just begged the question in terms of formal sufficiency; when you say "additional," the immediate response is "additional to what?"
Quote:
Additional to Scripture?
Scripture is a book, paper and ink, not theological truth. That might seem pedantic, but it's an important distinction, because some agent has to apply a rule to generate formal propositions from Scripture.
Quote:
Jonathan, I'm embarrassed to admit this, but I'm not completely sure what you mean by "formal content" and "proximate object."
Sorry. I've been reading too much Aristotelico-Thomist literature lately. Let's go back to the definition of faith. Faith is a supernatural cognitive faculty establishing a real relation between a person and another real entity (the proximate object; see http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/translat/aquinas5.htm and also Newman's Grammar of Assent). In that respect, it's like knowledge, which creates a real identity between the knower and the known, so I will use the term "faither" and "faithed" like "knower" and "known" to emphasize the analogy.
When you have certain knowledge of theological truth, it's because you have "faithed" the object of truth, much as when you have certain knowledge about anything it is because you have known that thing. That certain knowledge is the formal content of your knowledge or faith. Here's the problem...
Quote:
If I understand you correctly, then I would say that I get my rule from the consensus of the Church and have no problem admitting this.
That won't work, because the "consensus of the Church" is just like one's "interpretation of Scripture." It is an intentional being; it is a concept that your mind creates based on what it knows. Unless God Himself miraculously put that concept in your head, there is no way that such a thing can be the proximate object of faith, which requires a real relation between the "faither" and an external object. In Catholicism, however, the Church is a real entity; it really subsists in the Catholic Church, and it is a real object of faith. So when you say that you have faith in the Catholic Church, it's because there is a real thing "faithed" by you personally. That's the importance of apostolic succession; it creates and sustains a persistent and real object of faith. Denial of that principle is why Anglican orders are considered invalid in Catholicism.
Scripture could conceivably be a proximate object of faith, but you'd have to be arguing that God was really subsisting in every copy of Scripture, effectively substantiating the charge of Bibliolatry. As it is, the only proper proximate object of faith in Protestantism is baptism, because it is the only knowable divine act left (God's spiritual presence among two or three gathered being real but not certainly knowable). And most Protestants deny baptismal regeneration so that they don't even accept that. Orthodoxy, by contrast, has real proximate objects of faith in a significant degree. But it lacks the unity and completeness of the Catholic Church to form a true subsistence, a completely self-existing entity identified with Christ (John 17, see also http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1701108.htm), which is what allows it to serve as the true proximate object of faith. Protestantism and Orthodoxy depend on this subsistence for their reality, which is why the spiritual realities in those bodies are not self-subsistent entities but rather accidents in the metaphysical sense.
Because Protestantism has no external object of faith, Protestant faith is necessarily confused, irrational, and circular, effectively a faith in one's own mental disposition. That's the "private judgment" peril of which we Catholics so often speak; it is an attempt to judge theological truth with no real and certain basis. Basically, we believe your faith has no object, so while you actually have the faculty of faith (given in baptism), it isn't actually being directed to anything other than yourself. It's the theological equivalent to Descartes, denying the knowability of everything but himself, and it's wrong for the same reason.
----------END QUOTED RESPONSE-------------------
It occurred to me that the discussion above might also be helpful to illuminate the recent post by Fr. Patrick on Energetic Procession. I think the above quote from Tractate 108 on John also provides some insight in to St. Augustine's view of Christ and the Church. The unity of the Church, for Augustine, IS Christ Himself (cf. the Bride as wholly joined to Her spouse), and it appears to me that he has in mind derivative functions both for individuals and for local churches, in that they are identical to Christ in some respect as members, but that Christ Himself only subsists in the wholeness of the Church. That is why I theorize that he believes that Sacraments are valid even outside the confines of the Church (N.B., this metaphysical distinction between subsistence and simply existence would be difficult to grasp in Platonic/Neoplatonic terms, which is why I expect that the Eastern Fathers would be at best confused by it). If there is some definite real but not subsistent member-function, then the member does not cease to function derivatively even when it ceases to manifest its inherent unity. But only the Catholic Church is subsistent unity, because only She manifests unity in all Her functions and is a self-sustaining unity; the unity in all other churches is merely an accidental unity between particular functions received derivatively from the subsistence of the Church. This also helps to explain the gross misunderstanding that some Protestants have of the Catholic Church, betraying massive confusion on the underlying metaphysical and theological concepts.
(P.S., After re-reading that thread last linked, it might be overly charitable to say that there is simply confusion about the object of faith, because David King appears to have severe difficulties even in using the natural faculty of reason given the numerous errors in logic displayed there; see also these comments (e.g., de facto excommunication is an oxymoron, infallibility is obviously possible for created entities). On the Pseudo-Isidorean Decretals as substantially reproducing an existing belief, making them essentially a non-factor in the concept of papal authority contra the now-rebutted assertions of Dollinger et al., see Ulrich Horst. Perhaps this thread would be a better example of the inability of Protestants to comprehend the need for a proximate object of faith. Note that the questions "of the atheist" in that thread are valid and sound arguments for the irrationality of Protestant faith; pointing out that atheists also make these arguments does not actually answer them).
Thursday, August 09, 2007
From Jimmy Akin's combox re: James White
The post can be found here.
Mark:
You seem to have missed the point as badly as White.
Not one word about the essence of Mr Whites point, which really was a simple one.
The point seems to be proven, namely that Beckwith all those years ago, and I will assume the man was reasonably intelligent even then, was unable to grasp what is so plainly stated in Trent, that even 20 years later, the man is able to draw such sharp contrasts to his previous reading of that material.
Listen folks, maybe you all have met these so called Protestants that would not know one end of a sentence to the next, but surely Beckwith was not one of them!
Then White failed to grasp the simple point that it isn't reading Trent but grasping the underlying philosophical concepts that is the problem. Note Dr. Beckwith's explicit statement: "My reading was both prejudiced and meaningful. It was shaped by my Lutheran professors and my lack of philosophical sophistication." And there are very few Protestants who are expert in Aristotelian philosophy and practically none who are conversant in St. Thomas. Indeed, many Protestants rely on the Reformers for their interpretation of both St. Thomas and the Fathers, which modern scholarship has consistently shown to be erroneous. Given the paucity of Protestant expertise on this subject, it is unsurprising that (1) Protestants read texts all the time without understanding them and (2) Protestants who become conversant in these texts have a suspiciously high rate of conversion to Catholicism. James White is clearly not an expert on Aristotelico-Thomism; indeed, I think it is fair to say that he has practically no knowledge on the subject, despite being able to read Greek. Someone who lacks this knowledge is not even competent to exegete most Catholic theological texts, which routinely use terms like "formal sufficiency" and "efficient cause" that have narrow technical meanings.
Take, for example, Trent on justification:
Of this Justification the causes are these: the final cause indeed is the glory of God and of Jesus Christ, and life everlasting; while the efficient cause is a merciful God who washes and sanctifies gratuitously, signing, and anointing with the holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance; but the meritorious cause is His most beloved only-begotten, our Lord Jesus Christ, who, when we were enemies, for the exceeding charity wherewith he loved us, merited Justification for us by His most holy Passion on the wood of the cross, and made satisfaction for us unto God the Father; the instrumental cause is the sacrament of baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, without which (faith) no man was ever justified; lastly, the alone formal cause is the justice of God, not that whereby He Himself is just, but that whereby He maketh us just, that, to wit, with which we being endowed by Him, are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and we are not only reputed, but are truly called, and are, just, receiving justice within us, each one according to his own measure, which the Holy Ghost distributes to every one as He wills, and according to each one's proper disposition and co-operation.
Now, if you actually know what "efficient cause" means, this statement directly contradicts your statement:
"And if that is not enough, the most important issue that James was getting at, and has always been the issue with Trent, is not that Grace etc is necessary as Trent teaches, but the issue is 'sufficiency.' Is Grace alone, by faith Alone in Christ alone Sufficient for the saving of the soul and Justification?"
In fact, this was NOT the issue, and people who have studied this issue in detail know for certain that it was not the issue. For a study by an actual scholar on the subject (as contrasted with White), see Christopher Malloy's study Engrafted in Christ, for example. So what you say here is just wrong, period. There's no debate on it; "efficient cause" means the agent's power to cause the effect is sufficient, regardless of instrumentality. Nobody whom the merciful God wishes to justify and anoint with the Holy Spirit is not justified. Nor is there any difference between initial justification and recovery of justification in this regard (see Chs. XIII-XIV). You are wrong as a historical matter, and the reason that you are wrong is that you don't know what an efficient cause or a formal cause is. And given the number of Protestants who know Aristotle and St. Thomas well enough to form a scholarly opinion on the matter, it is unlikely that this error will ever be corrected.
That means that White has made the same mistake, by his own admission, for EIGHTEEN YEARS. This is practically the paragon case for Ralph Waldo Emerson's "foolish consistency" that is "the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines." Consistency in error, particularly consistency in foolish error resoluting from lack of study, is not a virtue but a vice, and that is the point of Jimmy's (2). You yourself have mindlessly followed White, who is incompetent on basic matters of Catholic theology, without checking the matter yourself, which is little better. Dr. Beckwith, a genuinely great mind, was not attached to foolish consistency when his studies revealed an error. But White, a little mind if there ever was one, prides himself on consistency with himself more than consistency with the truth. If you cannot decide which example to follow, then God help you, because reason clearly can't.
ADDENDUM--
While I'm thinking about it, I noticed once again that every time anyone converts, White seems to make much of "the best" Protestant arguments for Scriptural authority being those given by William Goode, William Whitaker, and George Salmon, asking whether the person has read any of these. I have no idea why White is impressed with any of these arguments, other than their habit of misrepresenting Catholic dogma almost as badly as White himself does. However, anybody who wants to read them can read them on the Internet Archive: Whitaker, Goode (vol. 1, vol. 2, vol. 3), and Salmon. Of the three, Whitaker is far and away the most reasonable, although prone to uncharitable misrepresentation of Bellarmine and the Jesuits. Goode and Salmon are what you expect from their age, both in terms of writing style and mindless anti-Catholic hostility. The former irritates me even when reading Newman, although many fans of 19th century English literature doubtless consider Newman's prose excellent. The latter will doubtless make it difficult reading for Catholics, but if you feel the need to slog through these works, you have been warned.
Mark:
You seem to have missed the point as badly as White.
Not one word about the essence of Mr Whites point, which really was a simple one.
The point seems to be proven, namely that Beckwith all those years ago, and I will assume the man was reasonably intelligent even then, was unable to grasp what is so plainly stated in Trent, that even 20 years later, the man is able to draw such sharp contrasts to his previous reading of that material.
Listen folks, maybe you all have met these so called Protestants that would not know one end of a sentence to the next, but surely Beckwith was not one of them!
Then White failed to grasp the simple point that it isn't reading Trent but grasping the underlying philosophical concepts that is the problem. Note Dr. Beckwith's explicit statement: "My reading was both prejudiced and meaningful. It was shaped by my Lutheran professors and my lack of philosophical sophistication." And there are very few Protestants who are expert in Aristotelian philosophy and practically none who are conversant in St. Thomas. Indeed, many Protestants rely on the Reformers for their interpretation of both St. Thomas and the Fathers, which modern scholarship has consistently shown to be erroneous. Given the paucity of Protestant expertise on this subject, it is unsurprising that (1) Protestants read texts all the time without understanding them and (2) Protestants who become conversant in these texts have a suspiciously high rate of conversion to Catholicism. James White is clearly not an expert on Aristotelico-Thomism; indeed, I think it is fair to say that he has practically no knowledge on the subject, despite being able to read Greek. Someone who lacks this knowledge is not even competent to exegete most Catholic theological texts, which routinely use terms like "formal sufficiency" and "efficient cause" that have narrow technical meanings.
Take, for example, Trent on justification:
Of this Justification the causes are these: the final cause indeed is the glory of God and of Jesus Christ, and life everlasting; while the efficient cause is a merciful God who washes and sanctifies gratuitously, signing, and anointing with the holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance; but the meritorious cause is His most beloved only-begotten, our Lord Jesus Christ, who, when we were enemies, for the exceeding charity wherewith he loved us, merited Justification for us by His most holy Passion on the wood of the cross, and made satisfaction for us unto God the Father; the instrumental cause is the sacrament of baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, without which (faith) no man was ever justified; lastly, the alone formal cause is the justice of God, not that whereby He Himself is just, but that whereby He maketh us just, that, to wit, with which we being endowed by Him, are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and we are not only reputed, but are truly called, and are, just, receiving justice within us, each one according to his own measure, which the Holy Ghost distributes to every one as He wills, and according to each one's proper disposition and co-operation.
Now, if you actually know what "efficient cause" means, this statement directly contradicts your statement:
"And if that is not enough, the most important issue that James was getting at, and has always been the issue with Trent, is not that Grace etc is necessary as Trent teaches, but the issue is 'sufficiency.' Is Grace alone, by faith Alone in Christ alone Sufficient for the saving of the soul and Justification?"
In fact, this was NOT the issue, and people who have studied this issue in detail know for certain that it was not the issue. For a study by an actual scholar on the subject (as contrasted with White), see Christopher Malloy's study Engrafted in Christ, for example. So what you say here is just wrong, period. There's no debate on it; "efficient cause" means the agent's power to cause the effect is sufficient, regardless of instrumentality. Nobody whom the merciful God wishes to justify and anoint with the Holy Spirit is not justified. Nor is there any difference between initial justification and recovery of justification in this regard (see Chs. XIII-XIV). You are wrong as a historical matter, and the reason that you are wrong is that you don't know what an efficient cause or a formal cause is. And given the number of Protestants who know Aristotle and St. Thomas well enough to form a scholarly opinion on the matter, it is unlikely that this error will ever be corrected.
That means that White has made the same mistake, by his own admission, for EIGHTEEN YEARS. This is practically the paragon case for Ralph Waldo Emerson's "foolish consistency" that is "the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines." Consistency in error, particularly consistency in foolish error resoluting from lack of study, is not a virtue but a vice, and that is the point of Jimmy's (2). You yourself have mindlessly followed White, who is incompetent on basic matters of Catholic theology, without checking the matter yourself, which is little better. Dr. Beckwith, a genuinely great mind, was not attached to foolish consistency when his studies revealed an error. But White, a little mind if there ever was one, prides himself on consistency with himself more than consistency with the truth. If you cannot decide which example to follow, then God help you, because reason clearly can't.
ADDENDUM--
While I'm thinking about it, I noticed once again that every time anyone converts, White seems to make much of "the best" Protestant arguments for Scriptural authority being those given by William Goode, William Whitaker, and George Salmon, asking whether the person has read any of these. I have no idea why White is impressed with any of these arguments, other than their habit of misrepresenting Catholic dogma almost as badly as White himself does. However, anybody who wants to read them can read them on the Internet Archive: Whitaker, Goode (vol. 1, vol. 2, vol. 3), and Salmon. Of the three, Whitaker is far and away the most reasonable, although prone to uncharitable misrepresentation of Bellarmine and the Jesuits. Goode and Salmon are what you expect from their age, both in terms of writing style and mindless anti-Catholic hostility. The former irritates me even when reading Newman, although many fans of 19th century English literature doubtless consider Newman's prose excellent. The latter will doubtless make it difficult reading for Catholics, but if you feel the need to slog through these works, you have been warned.
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