tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post1232520685222509664..comments2023-06-19T11:08:54.896-04:00Comments on Crimson Catholic: Open letter to Mike LiccioneCrimsonCatholichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-5860210747456753132007-07-14T01:35:00.000-04:002007-07-14T01:35:00.000-04:00Well, I'm not always great at articulating myself ...Well, I'm not always great at articulating myself (see the attempted discussion with Mark Thomas Lickona for an example), but I do try, so thanks!CrimsonCatholichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-4579130852526700232007-07-13T19:59:00.000-04:002007-07-13T19:59:00.000-04:00Thanks so much for taking the time with me, Jonath...Thanks so much for taking the time with me, Jonathan. Your responses are always so on target & articulate.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-57881880483258767042007-07-13T16:13:00.000-04:002007-07-13T16:13:00.000-04:00Ad the first:But I fail to see how these assertion...<I>Ad</I> the first:<BR/><I>But I fail to see how these assertions lock in with the Florentine definition, i.e. "we declare that what Holy Doctors and Fathers say, namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, tends to this meaning, that by this it is signified that *the Son also is the cause,* according to the Greeks, and according to the Latins, the principle of the subsistence of the Holy Spirit, as is the Father also."<BR/><BR/>Shed some light on this, please.</I><BR/><BR/>It seems that this must certainly be wrong if taken literally, as what the Greeks meant by <I>aitia</I> clearly does not mapt onto what the Latins meant by principle, and it never did as far as I can tell. What this really means is to convey that how Rome has consistently interpreted what the Greeks have said is the same as what the Latins have said. Now the East could (and did) protest that this is not what they actually meant as a historical matter, but my rejoinder would be that those differences are dogmatically immaterial, because neither the Latin nor the Greek view endorses anything contrary to any dogma. So even if it is factually not correct that the Greeks meant the same thing, it does indicate concurrence on what the dogma is intended to prevent (Arianism, Eunomianism, etc.). <BR/><BR/>That might be even more confusing, but dogmas are not infallible in matters of historical scholarship and the like, and indeed, they should rarely be understood as assertions of historical fact. I would say the same thing about the dogmatic statements on papal infallibility, the Assumption, and the Immaculate Conception. If you regard statements about doctrines "always being taught" as historical fact, then it seems obvious that they are inaccurate, but it seems equally obvious that they are not intended as statements of historical fact. What matters is that whatever dogmatic truth being asserted as part of the body of revelation serves a dogmatic function logically connected to whatever else has been revealed. IOW, saying that this doctrine has been "taught" in the Church is not meant to imply that it has been thought out in all its implications.<BR/><BR/><I>Ad</I> the second:<BR/><I>Not being very familiar at all with Latin Triadological literature, I can only ask you to elaborate on what you mean by 'manifestation' as opposed to other aspects one might easily confuse the Latins of addressing, to pinpoint where you see this expressed (esp. in the De Trinitates of Ss. Augustine and Hilary), and possibly to forestall any preenvisioned objections to your characterization of the Latin non-interaction with the question of the Father as arche.</I><BR/><BR/>"Manifestation" might even be misleading, because it could have other connotations. "Revealed as existing" might be more to the point. In other words, it is a bare affirmation of the existence of the persons and their distinction, stripped of all other causal connotations, which is what I mean when I say that it does not deal with what the Greeks have in mind by <I>arche</I>/<I>pege</I>/etc. <BR/><BR/>In the Neoplatonist regime, the term is not entirely removed of its causal connotations. I've written some about why I think there is a difference, in that the Stoic background of Latin theology appears to have had a different concept of knowledge and knowability, which was amenable to being reconciled with the Aristotelian concept of knowledge as real union with the other <I>as other</I>. The metaphysical background was simply different, and the differences were somewhat poorly understood.<BR/><BR/><I>To make sure, are you saying that St. Augustine's predication of the Father as 'principaliter' is not equivalent to the Cappodocian's predication of Him as arche/aitia?</I><BR/><BR/>Yes, that's what I am saying. Augustine was not the Platonist that the Cappadocians were by a long shot. In fact, I think that there have been some major errors regarding Augustine's philosophy and its evolution (including by historians of the caliber of Peter Brown and Etienne Gilson) that remain uncorrected even now. The Western "Platonism" was a complicated synthesis that seems to have significantly reinterpreted even those few Platonic sources that were known to it, and some of the major sources and their influences on subsequent writers (particularly Marius Victorinus and Boethius) are barely even understood. To try to map Ambrose, Simplicianus, Augustine, Jerome, or Anselm onto the Eastern landscape is a daunting task, fraught with the possibility of error.<BR/><BR/><I>Thirdly, the RC with whom I interacted objected to your claim that 'procedere' "lies exactly between [ekporeusis & proienai]," claiming in his turn that procedere is a word that simply encompasses the two, not occupying any medial position between the two, as you seem to suggest.</I><BR/><BR/>What I really mean by "lies exactly between" in this context is that its meaning not only encompasses both but that it is at a higher level of abstraction conveying MORE than either of these terms do. In other words, it conveys not only the meaning of both words but also the abstract concept that unites the two. It is a higher meaning that bridges both, rather than simply being the sum of both or some <I>tertium quid</I> between the two. Thus, <I>ekporeusis</I> is <I>procedere</I> applied in the sense of being drawn into existence from something and <I>proneia</I> conveys the sense of something like being emitted from an existing thing, but <I>procedere</I> really extends to any sort of "from" relation <I>at all</I>, of which the other two terms are merely special cases.<BR/><BR/><I>If you have time, I would also be interested in seeing where you derive your approximate equivalence of 'substance/essense' in the Latin view with 'immanent energies' & the 'uncreated Glory'.</I><BR/><BR/>It would probably be clearer to say that there is no difference between participation in the uncreated glory and vision of the divine essence (or mystical experience) in the Latin view. The difference is in what is meant by an "intellectual vision" in the West and participation in the East. In the West, distinct degrees of intellectual vision do not require any real distinction in the object (and likewise, distinct finite objects of the divine will do not require real distinctions in God either). In the East, there has to be a real distinction, because Platonic metaphysics take a much more literal view of the identity of knower and known (you either know it, or you don't, and in the case of the divine essence, to know it is to be it). I don't think there is any great dogmatic importance in that difference, but it is a difference.CrimsonCatholichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08623996344637714843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8971239.post-25953021541547792182007-07-09T23:07:00.000-04:002007-07-09T23:07:00.000-04:00Wow. I shall require time in digesting this whole...Wow. I shall require time in digesting this whole <I>spirituque</I> thing. <BR/><BR/>For now, let me pose a few basic questions about the filioque, and about some of things you wrote in your post "Spirit as Divine Substance."<BR/><BR/><B>First</B>, I've seen it claimed by an RC apologist that "the Roman position has never changed. The Father is the sole Cause (Aition / Principium) of the Holy Spirit." The Vatican Clarification of the Filioque states: "The doctrine of the Filioque must be understood and presented by the Catholic Church in such a way that it cannot appear to contradict the Monarchy of the Father nor the fact that he is the sole origin (ἀρχὴ, αἰτία) of the ἐκπόρευσις of the Spirit."<BR/><BR/>But I fail to see how these assertions lock in with the Florentine definition, i.e. "we declare that what Holy Doctors and Fathers say, namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, tends to this meaning, that by this it is signified that *the Son also is the cause,* according to the Greeks, and according to the Latins, the principle of the subsistence of the Holy Spirit, as is the Father also."<BR/><BR/>Shed some light on this, please.<BR/><BR/><B>Secondly</B>, you wrote, "To be strictly correct, the Latin view says nothing about the soure of existence of the Persons qua Persons; it doesn't address the question of aitia or arche at all because it only deals with the Persons as manifested."<BR/><BR/>Do you think this assertion controversial? Not being very familiar at all with Latin Triadological literature, I can only ask you to elaborate on what you mean by 'manifestation' as opposed to other aspects one might easily confuse the Latins of addressing, to pinpoint where you see this expressed (esp. in the <I>De Trinitate</I>s of Ss. Augustine and Hilary), and possibly to forestall any preenvisioned objections to your characterization of the Latin non-interaction with the question of the Father as arche. To make sure, are you saying that St. Augustine's predication of the Father as 'principaliter' is not equivalent to the Cappodocian's predication of Him as arche/aitia?<BR/><BR/><B>Thirdly</B>, the RC with whom I interacted objected to your claim that 'procedere' "lies exactly between [ekporeusis & proienai]," claiming in his turn that procedere is a word that simply encompasses the two, not occupying any medial position between the two, as you seem to suggest. <BR/><BR/>If you have time, I would also be interested in seeing where you derive your approximate equivalence of 'substance/essense' in the Latin view with 'immanent energies' & the 'uncreated Glory'. <BR/><BR/>Sorry for the unfocused nature of these questions. I do not have the foundation I would like from which to frame them, but this itch for translingual metaphysical correpsondence needs to be scratched, and I think you're the one fit for the task.<BR/><BR/>God blessAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com